[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




         REAUTHORIZING THE U.S. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                                 OF THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AAFAIRS
                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________


                             March 11, 2025

                               __________


                            Serial No. 119-4

                               __________


        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs







                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
               
               





Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

60-302 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2025









                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman

MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, 
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
JOE WILSON, South Carolina           BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
    American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JIM R. BAIRD, Indiana                SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
KEITH SELF, Texas                    PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               GEORGE LATIMER, New York
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

              James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                 Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director

                                 ------                                

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                   YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman

MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             AMI BERA, California, Ranking 
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                      Member
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       BRAD SHERMAN, California
    American Samoa                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam                   GABE AMO, Rhode Island
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                 Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director








                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                            REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                   Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairwoman Young Kim...........     1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Ami Bera........     2

                               WITNESSES

Statement of Hon. Ted Yoho, D.V.M., Former U.S. Representative, 
  Florida's 3rd Congressional District...........................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
Statement of Rob Mosbacher, Former Ceo, Overseas Private 
  Investment Corporation.........................................     9
  Prepared Statement.............................................    11
Statement of Erin Collinson, Director of Policy Outreach, Center 
  For Global Development.........................................    16
  Prepared Statement.............................................    18

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    44
Hearing Minutes..................................................    45
Hearing Attendance...............................................    46

                        Material for the Record

NENSC, Submitted by Chairwoman Young Kim.........................    47








 
         REAUTHORIZING THE U.S. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, March 11, 2025

                  House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,
                              Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mrs. Kim. The Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific 
will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the needed 
reforms of the DFC to be considered for the reauthorization. I 
now recognize myself for an opening statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRWOMAN YOUNG KIM

    Again, welcome to the East Asia and the Pacific 
Subcommittee hearing on reauthorizing the U.S. Development 
Finance Corporation. I want to welcome and thank our witnesses 
for joining us today as we discuss the future of the U.S. 
International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, which is 
a vital tool of American economic and foreign policy.
    Thanks to your valuable input, the DFC was created through 
the 2018 BUILD Act and it built upon its predecessor, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or OPIC, by 
integrating other development finance tools to better mobilize 
private capital. Despite being a younger agency, DFC has 
demonstrated a significant step forward in enhancing our 
Nation's ability to promote private sector led development in 
emerging markets, advancing the U.S. national security interest 
and status on the global stage, and strengthening communities 
and livelihoods around the world.
    When U.S. foreign assistance is used efficiently, it can 
have a great impact in advancing the U.S. national security and 
economic interests. In fact, it can even make a profit for U.S. 
taxpayers. For instance, in fiscal year 2023, the DFC's revenue 
exceeded costs by 341 million dollars.
    The DFC is approaching the end of its 7-year authorization 
in October of this year. While DFC's current lending cap stands 
at 60 billion, double that of OPIC, it has already lent more 
than 49 billion dollars. If the current deal in the pipeline 
continues at this rate, the DFC will reach its lending cap 
before October, making this reauthorization process more 
urgent.
    Our subcommittee has the unique opportunity to shape and 
reauthorize the DFC with much needed reforms to ensure that it 
remains agile, effective, and aligned with America's national 
security priorities. The Biden administration had an ambiguous 
definition of national security and thus pushed through 
projects that advanced the administration's diversity and green 
agenda. Furthermore, we know that the DFC was unable to fully 
utilize its equity investment tool and was prohibited from 
operating in countries that would be particularly useful for 
advancing U.S. national security. These are just some of the 
evident issues that must be addressed in the reauthorization 
this year.
    Today's hearing will therefore explore several important 
questions. One, how can the DFC better address emerging threats 
and opportunities such as energy security and supply chain 
resilience? Two, what reforms or additional authorities are 
needed to enhance the DFC's ability to compete with the Chinese 
Communist Party's Belt and Road Initiative? And third, how can 
we ensure that the DFC's operations remain transparent, 
accountable, and targeted to deliver measurable outcomes for 
our partners abroad and American taxpayers?
    We must ensure that the DFC is equipped to face the 21st 
century challenges with cutting edge approaches. The 
modernization and reauthorization process offers an opportune 
moment to amend the DFC's mandate to expand its flexibility and 
financial toolkit.
    With that, we have a distinguished panel of witnesses 
before us today whose insights will inform the reauthorization 
process. Their testimony will help us assess DFC's progress, 
identify gaps and areas for improvement, and chart a path 
forward to ensure this institution remains a cornerstone of 
U.S. global leadership.
    The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman 
from California, Mr. Bera, for any statements that you may 
have.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA

    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for hosting today's 
important hearing. I also want to thank the witnesses for 
bringing their expertise before the subcommittee today.
    As the chairwoman mentioned, it's been less than 7 years 
since Congress passed and President Trump signed into law the 
BUILD Act, establishing the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation, or DFC. The DFC was created to modernize 
how the United States approaches development and better allows 
to compete with our strategic competitors. The DFC was built to 
catalyze our Nation's strength, namely our strong, vibrant 
private sector which is the envy of the world.
    I'll also note since our former colleague and my good 
friend Ted Yoho is here, he was instrumental in putting that 
bipartisan piece of legislation together that passed with a big 
vote. And again, I think President Trump should be proud of his 
legacy in helping create the Development Finance Corporation.
    When the BUILD Act passed, a mentor to both of us, HFAC 
Chairman Ed Royce noted that one of his goals was to creating 
lasting institutional linkages with other development agencies. 
Today, one of those development agencies that DFC works closely 
with, USAID has effectively been dismantled through the illegal 
cancellation of programs. And that really does damage U.S. 
security.
    USAID played an outsized role in helping DFC generate 
projects through their field staff station that U.S. missions 
throughout the world. In addition, the foreign assistance 
freeze has also prevented the DFC from the timely delivery of 
payments, damaging the U.S. credibility as it seeks to provide 
an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative that 
reflects our values and strengths.
    I appreciate the efforts to make sure taxpayer dollars are 
being used responsibility and in the most efficient and 
effective way. But it's critical that we allow these flows to 
start again and that we avoid unfortunate errors that present a 
gift to our strategic rivals.
    In a bipartisan way, last year under Chairman McCaul and 
Ranking Member Meeks, the bipartisan DFC Modernization and 
Reauthorization Act passed out of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. The bill contained several critical DFC reforms, 
including modifying equity scoring to be calculated on a net 
present basis, allowing the DFC to support high-income 
countries under certain conditions, allowing the DFC to pay a 
percentage of its employees outside of the GS scale to attract 
highly qualified talent from the private sector, and increasing 
the maximum contingent liability, MCL cap, from 60 billion to 
120 billion so the DFC can take on new projects.
    It's my belief as we go into the reauthorization that the 
DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act would serve as an 
excellent foundation and for the work as we look at 
reauthorization this year.
    With that, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, 
look forward to getting their perspective and their expertise. 
And I'll yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. The chair now recognizes the--oh, we 
did that. Other members of the committee are reminded that 
opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are 
pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us 
today on this very important topic: Hon. Ted Yoho, former U.S. 
Representative of Florida representing 3d District, and Mr. Rob 
Mosbacher, former CEO of the DFC's predecessor agency of OPIC; 
and Ms. Erin Collinson, Director of Policy Outreach at the 
Center for Global Development.
    The committee recognizes the importance of the issues 
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us 
today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, 
and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 
minutes in order to allow our members to ask questions.
    I now first recognize Dr. Yoho for your opening statement.

                     STATEMENT OF TED YOHO

    Dr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. It's my honor to address 
this committee on the importance of the first 7-year 
reauthorization of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation. 
It's imperative that the DFC has a strong bipartisan prompt 
reauthorization for this important development tool so that it 
can fulfill the Administration's goal of making America safer, 
stronger, and more prosperous. Excuse me.
    The DFC has the ability to develop the basic infrastructure 
projects needed in developing countries to increase the 
recipient country's economic situation by creating jobs, thus 
helping countries transition from aid to trade. This benefits 
the U.S. and its taxpayers by providing needed resources like 
critical minerals and opens up new markets for U.S. exports to 
recipient nations.
    The DFC is also the preeminent development tool to counter 
the Chinese influence in the developing world via the Belt Road 
Initiative. To date, China invested an estimated one trillion 
dollars in 147 countries since 2013 compared to the U.S.' 76 
billion dollars in 114 countries since 2019. The Chinese 
influence is gaining in countries around the world while the 
U.S., ours is waning. China strategically invests in ports, 
mines, rails, roads, bridges, energy, telecommunications, and 
the procurement of all the minerals from rare earths used in 
our military jets to everything electronic along with copper, 
gold, aluminum, and steel.
    These investments serve to grow China's economy by opening 
up new trading markets, strengthen military from the increased 
revenues, corner the commodities on the world market, and they 
set the price. They leverage their influence against other 
countries to pressure them to their demands, including the U.S. 
This allows China to expand their communist ideologies and 
influences in the developing world.
    To date, the DFC has had some notable project success but 
pales in comparison to the strategic investments the CCP has 
done. The Chinese require recipient countries to use Chinese 
State sponsored businesses, workers, and engineers. They build 
Chinese hotels, restaurants, and they have very little impact 
on the local labor market.
    To be more competitive in a divided world based on 
ideologies, the U.S. should focus on developing infrastructure 
projects in strategic regions of the world to build economies 
and jobs while increasing trade and increasing strong 
alliances. I recommend some topics to be considered in the DFC 
reauthorization to make it stronger.
    First, I'd give the DFC more flexibility by raising a 
country of eligibility from low-middle-income to middle-upper-
income levels. This gives the DFC the option to do more 
projects strategically in regions that will strengthen our 
national security and increase trade. And illustration is the 
country of Panama where the DFC can't operate due to these 
restrictions yet China is heavily invested on both sides of the 
Panama Canal.
    Second, the maximum contingent liability, MCL, should be 
raised from 60 to 150 billion dollars--some are recommending up 
to 250 billion dollars, that's going to be up to you guys--to 
enable the DFC to take on larger, more impactful projects. By 
the end of 2024, the DFC has lent out over 90 percent of its 
MCL as the chairman, Madam Chair, has recognized, meaning they 
could not approve any new deals until Congress reauthorizes and 
appropriates more funds. And I'd like to mention that the DFC 
doesn't give out 100 percent of its funds in grants. Over 90 
percent are loans which are repaid. And for 2024, the DFC lent 
out over 57 billion dollars in loan yet operates with less than 
a 1-percent failure rate.
    Third, the scoring method the OMB, Office of Management and 
Budget, uses needs to be reinterpreted as intended by Congress. 
Presently, OMB scores any money lent by the DFC as a grant 
which is a dollar for dollar and will never be repaid. It's 
more accurate to view these moneys lent on a net present value 
that shows a positive return on investment. By scoring moneys 
lent on a net present value versus grants follows Congress' 
original intent.
    If OMB does not change their method of scoring, excuse me, 
it restricts the DFC's effectiveness and it cannot live up to 
its full potential. For the DFC to expand its reach and its 
impact and grow its capacity, it needs to have more boots on 
the ground overseas who can proactively identify new 
investments. And this will increase its efficient, speed, and 
making investments.
    One last thing here, the DFC needs to be better integrated 
with other foreign development tools of the U.S. Government. 
Grant-based programs such as those led by the previous USAID 
and MCC play a critical role in identifying and de-risking 
investments for the DFC. And this allows for the first 
investment to attract private equity. Not having these tools 
available would be a mistake.
    Lastly, DFC can play a unique and leadership role in 
driving near-and friend-shoring of highly strategic sectors and 
supply chains such as rare earth metals and pharmaceuticals.
    Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Yoho follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
    I now recognize Mr. Mosbacher for your opening statement. 
Sorry for butchering your name.

                   STATEMENT OF ROB MOSBACHER

    Mr. Mosbacher. It's not the first time. Thank you. 
Chairwoman Kim and Ranking Member Bera, distinguished members 
of the committee, it's a great honor for me to have the 
opportunity to testify with respect to the reauthorization of 
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and to be 
joined by my good friend Ted Yoho with whom I worked closely in 
2018.
    Having served three and a half years as head of OPIC and 
having had the privilege since the passage of the BUILD Act to 
serve on the Development Advisory Council which was created 
under the statute, I've had a chance to see firsthand the 
pluses and minuses, the strengths and weaknesses of the DFC.
    I'd say after monitoring the transition from OPIC to the 
DFC and then observing the last several years of performance, I 
believe I can say without qualification that the DFC is not 
only been a huge improvement over OPIC but has also been a huge 
success. The agency went from 3 to 4 billion dollars of 
commitments per year to over 12 billion and from a total 
portfolio of 29 billion to over 50 billion today. And over 70 
percent of those projects are in low and lower-middle-income 
countries.
    Yet, as impressive as that is, it's still a fraction of the 
Belt and Road financing done by China over the past 5 years. 
The question is how to take the DFC to the next level. I 
believe that the committee did an excellent job last year of 
addressing many of the areas that need to improve in H.R. 8926 
and I hope you will continue to build on that base. But before 
reviewing those areas, I want to suggest what underlying 
objectives I believe should drive this reauthorization process.
    In my judgment, the DFC needs to be more proactive than 
reactive, more physically present in strategically important 
markets, and more willing to take on risk that clearly will 
lead to greater private sector investment. In order to achieve 
those objectives, there are several steps that can be taken in 
the reauthorization.
    First, the DFC needs much more flexibility in terms of the 
income levels of countries which the agency is eligible to do 
business. While I believe the principal focus of the agency 
should continue to be on doing deals in low-and lower-middle-
income countries where capital and credit is so scarce, I agree 
that changing the classification from World Bank income 
credit--income levels rather to World Bank lending levels is a 
step in the right direction. I also believe that giving the DFC 
CEO the authority to certify projects in upper-middle-income 
countries is a good change.
    A second essential change and one that is a leftover piece 
of business from the BUILD Act is to fix the way equity 
investments are scored to a net present value approach rather 
than treating those investments as grants. For decades, OPIC 
participated in private equity funds and always as senior 
secured debt. So for the decades that they had investments in 
private equity funds as debt, they nevertheless earned on a 
portfolio basis a 6 percent return. So I don't understand why 
budget officials seem to feel that there's no way of 
effectively evaluating risk when we have decades of experience 
of doing just that.
    A third area of need in improvement that can help expand 
the capacity of the DFC to compete for projects around the 
world is to increase the risk tolerance of the agency so that 
projects attract much more private capital. The more DFC can 
de-risk projects by assuming more risk on their balance sheets 
or the balance sheets of others, the more private sector 
investors will feel comfortable being part of the deals. There 
are a variety of ways to do that, including concessional 
finance, blended finance, small grants and technical 
assistance, first loss grants, and sharing risk with other 
bilateral or multilateral financial institutions.
    The committee recognized the importance of these tools 
through its support for allowing the DFC to accept a creditor 
status that is subordinate to that of other creditors in H.R. 
8926. I hope the committee will strongly encourage the agency 
to be more risk tolerant and be more creative in the use of the 
many tools to de-risk projects that can attract more private 
capital. And I would reward DFC employees that exhibit such 
creativity in structuring deals.
    A fourth area to focus on relates to how to extend the 
coverage of the DFC to be more present in strategically 
important markets around the world. While the DFC could benefit 
enormously from opening some more offices in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia, and the Far East, the quickest way to expand 
their presence and improve their market intelligence is to team 
up with other like minded multilateral or bilateral financial 
institutions. A perfect example is to team up with the private 
sector arm of the Inter-American Development Bank called IDB 
Invest.
    IDB Invest has offices in virtually every country in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and has much greater access to the 
kind of deals that the DFC could help finance, particularly in 
the critical minerals as well as hard and soft infrastructure 
areas. I might add that IDB Invest has 300 people in Latin 
America and the Caribbean areas. We have 2 from the DFC, and 
that may be one more that are actually still working.
    So we believe that it would be much better if we can expand 
presence by teaming up with like-minded institutions. It's also 
important to recognize the role that USAID missions have played 
in helping drive economic growth, trade, and investment 
initiatives through programs like Power Africa, Prosper Africa, 
and the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA.
    Finally, despite all of the aforementioned improvements 
that can be made to the DFC, these will all come to naught if 
businesses that would like to deal with the DFC decline to do 
so because it takes too long to process deals. Unfortunately, 
this is happening way too much. Consequentially, I would urge 
the committee to sit down with the DFC to see how to streamline 
and improve and accelerate the processing of deals. And I 
believe that should include a review of the current 10 million 
dollar threshold for congressional notifications. I'd love to 
see it increase to 50 or 100 if possible.
    So Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, distinguished 
members of the committee, thank you very much for your time, 
and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Mosbacher follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Mosbacher.
    Now I recognize Ms. Collinson for your opening remarks.

                  STATEMENT OF ERIN COLLINSON

    Ms. Collinson. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member 
Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to testify today.
    I'm Erin Collinson, Director of Policy Outreach for the 
Center for Global Development, a nonpartisan think tank based 
here in D.C. The views I share today are my own.
    I want to start by noting as my colleagues here did that 
the BUILD Act establishing the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation was an impressive bipartisan achievement. 
Credit to those, including the two witnesses to my left, who 
noted that despite the size and strength of the U.S. private 
sector, the U.S. Government was falling short in deploying 
strategic, efficient development finance and proposed a 
solution.
    In just 5 years, DFC's portfolio has doubled to nearly 50 
billion, reflecting strong demand for its expanded authorities. 
And today, I want to share four recommendations for DFC's 
reauthorization.
    First, reauthorize DFC promptly. I commend this committee 
for starting that process in earnest last year with the 
bipartisan bill and for holding this hearing. Any 
reauthorization should include a multi-year timeframe to 
provide certainty for business planning, a sufficient increase 
to DFC's 60 billion dollar contingent liability cap, and a fix 
to the budget treatment of DFC's direct equity authority.
    But I want to emphasize that timely reauthorization before 
October is critical. As a development finance institution 
structuring multi-year financing deals, DFC requires market 
confidence and operational certainty. Delays could disrupt 
DFC's deal pipeline and harm America's competitive position.
    Second, maintain a strong development focus. While I 
understand there's interest in affording DFC greater 
flexibility when it comes to country income restrictions, DFC's 
investments have the highest likelihood of delivering impact in 
lower-income countries where lack of access to private capital 
represents a binding constraint. In the Indo-Pacific, DFC has, 
for instance, provided direct loans to water operators in 
Cambodia, taken an equity stake in a business-to-business 
healthcare company in Vietnam, and offered portfolio guarantees 
to financial services groups in Laos in support of the U.S. 
government's countering PRC initiative.
    The BUILD Act set out a mission for DFC to advance 
development outcomes and achieve foreign policy objectives. 
These need not be mutually exclusive, but DFC should focus on 
crowding in private capital where it is scarce, not crowding it 
out where it is abundant. Congress should reaffirm DFC's 
development mandate and urge the agency to adopt a higher bar 
for investments in more advanced economies.
    Third, encourage continued transparency and accountability 
improvements. My former CGD colleagues Todd Moss and Ben Leo--
who were among the early voices calling for a full-service 
development finance institution in the U.S.--once had to with 
the help of an industrious research assistant manually create a 
data base from PDFs to analyze the portfolio of DFC's 
predecessor, OPIC. Thankfully, we've come a long way since 
then.
    DFC now features project-level data in two forms on its 
website. Under the leadership of its first CEO, Adam Boehler, 
they also pioneered the creation of Impact Quotient, a 
framework used to assess the development, impact, and 
prospective projects but also track and measure whether 
projects deliver those expected development outcomes. Congress 
should encourage the merging of DFC's two primary project data 
sets and ensure regular updates and should direct DFC to 
provide disaggregated data on private capital mobilization, 
report more development information about impact at the project 
level, and publish ex-post evaluation results.
    Fourth, remember DFC is part of a broader toolkit. While 
DFC effectively leverages limited resources, there's mounting 
pressure on the agency to work in a variety of sectors, 
regions, and countries. I want to caution against ladening the 
agency with too many directives without a commensurate increase 
in resources and staff.
    DFC has become critical for achieving U.S. objectives 
internationally, but it is not the only channel. I hope this 
committee and its counterparts will take a holistic view and 
consider which tools and instruments the U.S. can deploy to 
operate most strategically in a given setting and look for 
opportunities to strengthen its other tools if they appear to 
fall short.
    Finally, I want to note that while DFC has grown its 
overseas presence, it remains modest. Part of the vision for 
DFC was to leverage the U.S. global footprint, particularly by 
working with USAID mission staff who have often served as DFC's 
boots on the ground. The BUILD Act mandated coordination 
between these agencies, and recent actions to dismantle USAID 
will make DFC's job harder.
    In closing, this committee has a significant opportunity to 
build on a bipartisan win by advancing a timely reauthorization 
that addresses core issues, reinforces DFC's development 
mandate, encourages accountability, recognizes DFC's position 
in a broader development and foreign policy toolkit.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Collinson follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, all the witnesses. I now recognize 
myself for five minutes of questioning.
    The DFC certainly has demonstrated its ability and its 
effectiveness in using our taxpayer money very wisely. As noted 
in my opening statement, in fiscal year 2023 alone, the DFC's 
revenue exceeded costs by 341 million dollars. That is money 
returned to our U.S. Treasury.
    So Mr. Yoho, as you've seen in recent months, we witnessed 
a significant shift in the U.S. approach to international 
development assistance. How can the DFC's model of leveraging 
the private sector to provide a return on investment serve as a 
framework for broader U.S. foreign assistance efforts, 
particularly in helping countries reduce dependence on 
continuing aid?
    Dr. Yoho. Thank you. I think that's the ultimate goal is 
weaning this countries from aid to trade and move that. And the 
DFC can do that with the tools that they have, but only if they 
stay focused on what I call the purity of purpose of what they 
were designed to do.
    When we envisioned this and put this together, we were 
looking at major infrastructure projects that we could partner 
up. And we weren't able to do this with OPIC, the predecessor, 
to partner up with other DFIs from other countries or to bring 
in that private equity. And what they needed, they needed to 
have an investment vehicle that we could come to the table 
first with.
    That's where organizations like MCC or USAID did on their 
grant basis. I know USAID right now is this terrible image, but 
yet there was some good that they did. And we want to make sure 
that we don't lose that because they're often the ones that are 
on the ground, boots on the ground, that invite in that private 
equity.
    I look forward to you guys fixing this soon, and I'm sure 
you will.
    Mrs. Kim. So continuing on that, I want to talk about the 
equity scoring issues and ask a question to you, Mr.----
    Mr. Mosbacher. Mosbacher.
    Mrs. Kim [continuing]. Mosbacher. In Fiscal Year 1923, the 
DFC committed 9.3 billion dollars in new investments. Of that, 
8.8 billion were direct loans that require only 110 million in 
appropriations. Meanwhile, the 500 million dollars equity 
investment required 500 million in appropriations.
    That treatment of equity investments which assumes that 
every dollar of the investment will be lost is out of step with 
the private sector. The DFC needs an equity fix, which we all 
agree on. That would account for this on a net present value 
basis which evaluates future probability of investment returns, 
bringing the equity investments in line with Congress' original 
intent.
    That fully allows the DFC to invest in countries that 
advance the U.S. objective in the long run. So could you talk 
to us about OPIC never having the ability to make equity 
investments, Can you explain to us why the DFC's ability to 
make equity investment is so important and how would this 
ability have changed your approach to OPIC?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Well, yes. I mean, we did not have the 
authority to do equity investments. And it actually cost us in 
terms of many deals. Even going in to private equity funds 
which OPIC did for years as senior secured debt, we were sort 
of the skunk at the party because when you exited those funds, 
OPIC came out first, got its principal back plus interest 
before any of the other investors got a return.
    It was not well received internationally. And many who are 
our allies did not like to be in funds with us. Today, I would 
say equity is even more important than it was back then.
    Equity is so critical, particularly as we look at how we're 
going to counter China on some of the competitive deals and the 
infrastructure of critical minerals. We have to have access to 
equity authority that's treated on a net present value basis. 
The way I've always explained equity is--or the issue of how to 
account for it on a net present value basis is to say it's a 
little bit like a 100-dollar loan at the bank.
    The bank has a loan loss reserve. That loan loss reserve 
gives you some sense of what's the probability that loan is 
going to default or go off the ditch. We could use a small 
portion of funds as subsidy, it's called in this context, to 
cover loans or cover investments that frankly will probably 
turn out to be very productive. But the lack of capacity 
because we have to charge these on a dollar-for-dollar basis is 
a huge impediment to our performing at that level.
    I'd just say one more thing. When Ted and the group put the 
BUILD Act together, we thought it would be with a 60-billion 
dollar contingent--maximum contingent liability, we thought as 
much as 35 percent of that 60 billion could be invested in 
equity. That's in the bill.
    We anticipated it being a huge piece of our toolkit. And 
clearly, it hasn't been. So that's been an unfortunately piece 
of this.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Ranking Member 
Bera for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I've had a chance to 
actually talk to all three of you, and there has been a lot of 
conversation both in the Biden administration but also in the 
Trump administration about creating a sovereign wealth fund. 
And every once in a while, DFC gets conflated with the 
sovereign wealth fund.
    I think there's healthy concern on our side about the 
differences here. And maybe each of you could just quickly 
comment on why you think these should be separate and the 
differences, maybe starting with Ms. Collinson.
    [Disturbance in hearing room.]
    Mrs. Kim. Let's continue with----
    [Disturbance in hearing room.]
    Mrs. Kim. The committee will come to order. Please proceed.
    Mr. Bera. Ms. Collinson.
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, thank you. So my view is that should 
the U.S. move forward with creating a sovereign wealth fund 
that it should be separate and distinct from DFC. While 
sovereign wealth funds can operate with a range of objectives, 
typically profit is a core motive.
    DFC must practice sound financial management and good 
stewardship of taxpayer dollars as the chairwoman noted. That, 
in some cases, means sending profits back to the Treasury. But 
the promise of market competitive returns is not what drives 
investment decisions.
    I also think that just practically between existing 
statutory requirements and strong congressional interest and 
oversight that the effort to retrofit DFC in some way or pursue 
a substantially different model of operation would run into 
real challenges.
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Yoho.
    Dr. Yoho. I like the idea of a sovereign wealth fund. I 
don't like the idea of it being tied into the DFC. I think it 
clouds the mission. I think it gets messy. And I think if you 
want a sovereign wealth fund, create a separate one. Let the 
DFC focus on what it was designed to do.
    Mr. Mosbacher. And I agree with what they said.
    Mr. Bera. Here's another question. I actually don't know 
the answer to this. Are public pension funds--we have some very 
large public pension funds that are looking for investment 
vehicles. Are they able to operate like private equity? Maybe 
Mr. Mosbacher on the DFC.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, so here's the way I think of public 
pension funds, particularly in countries in which the DFC is 
doing business. If we de-risk projects enough so that you 
attract serious private capital to those deals and you start to 
build out infrastructure projects with that kind of 
participation in the private sector. Once those projects are 
operational, then at that point you have a chance to sell a 
package of assets to a pension fund that would be willing to 
take 8 or 9 percent blended return.
    And that's where we should go because that will 
dramatically increase the traffic in terms of projects and 
pipeline and all that sort of thing. And I have that as a hope 
and dream. And I don't think it's too far fetched.
    Mr. Bera. And is that something that we'd have to do 
legislatively? Or do they currently have----
    Mr. Mosbacher. No, all we need to do is encourage the DFC 
and others to be more creative about risk taking.
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Yoho, I think you touched on--and the 
chairwoman touched on a little bit of the OMB scoring and how 
that does get in the way. If you want to expand on that a 
little bit.
    Dr. Yoho. Yes, the equity scoring, it was designed in the 
bill as Mr. Mosbacher brought up. That was at 35 percent that 
they could take an equity stake in. And OMB, I feel, is 
misinterpreting this.
    I think it doesn't need really a legislative fix. It's just 
they need to interpret it the way Congress intended. And I 
think if you do that, if you put the pressure on them, they'll 
have to do it.
    This is an investment vehicle that's going to make this 
country stronger. It's going to make the people we invest in 
stronger. And it falls into that making American safer, 
stronger, more prosperous.
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Mosbacher, you have other vehicles that are 
obviously out there in terms of multilateral development banks 
like the World Bank and so forth. Can you tell us how that 
complements--you touched on it a little bit about how it 
complements working with----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes. Well, so when you speak of the World 
Bank, I mean, the 800-pound gorilla of private sector lending 
is the IFC, International Finance Corporation. They're sort of 
the IFC and then there's everybody else. But the everybody else 
matters.
    So teaming up like I mentioned with IDB Invest I think 
brings deals in, gives us much better market intelligence, 
allows us to share risks. So we leverage dollars much more 
effectively. And so I think it has all pluses. And I would 
recommend that, not just in terms of Latin America and the 
Caribbean but also Africa, Asia, the Far East.
    Mr. Bera. Great. And again, it does seem like we've got a 
number of tools in our toolkit to compete effectively. We've 
got those tools in our toolkit to work with like valued allies, 
others that share our values. And we don't have to compete with 
competitors like the PRC and the Belt and Road Initiative on 
our own.
    We certainly can do this and develop those markets. So 
again, let's strengthen these institutions, not weaken them. 
And with that, I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Chairman 
Emeritus, Chairman McCaul.
    Mr. McCaul. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me say, Mr. 
Mosbacher, great State of Texas.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, sir.
    Mr. McCaul. Appreciate your service and your father as well 
being Secretary of Commerce.
    And Ted, great seeing you again. You are our champion in 
this area. This is your legacy. It's your baby, the BUILD Act, 
the Development Finance Corporation. I know you of all people 
have been very frustrated at the implementation which I would 
argue did not follow Congress' original intent.
    Let me ask you this. As the author of the bill, we 
reauthorized the DFC last Congress. The Senate, of course, did 
not pass it. But as you pointed out, it really just--all it 
needs is an interpretation by OMB to fix this problem.
    The BUILD Act of 2018, 22 U.S.C. Section 9621(d), equity 
investments, it says, a corporation is authorized to make 
equity investments. And then it goes on to say at the end, the 
corporation may not own more than 35 percent of the outstanding 
voting stock or other voting interest of any entity. As the 
author of this bill, what is your interpretation with respect 
to the equity investment provision?
    Dr. Yoho. I think it's crucial. I mean, it really increases 
the leverage that the DFC has. And it also brings in that much 
more of private equity bringing that into that without using 
the way it was designed and really hamstringing this.
    It's not going to reach its full potential if OMB doesn't 
change how they interpret what you just read. I think it's a 
misstep by OMB. And I hope they see the errors of their way and 
really utilize this thing.
    If you think about where it started with, OPIC. That was 
where we kind of built this model from, and Rob was great at 
working with us. They were authorized or appropriated 65 
million dollars. I think it was in 2014. But they returned 265 
million dollars. Take that same concept and put multiple 
factors in there of what we can do. The return to the American 
taxpayers, something that's pretty much self funding, and----
    Mr. McCaul. I continually say, I mean--my time. I think it 
not only is a great return for the American----
    Dr. Yoho. Yes.
    Mr. McCaul [continuing]. taxpayer, but it counters our 
adversaries, particularly China and Belt and Road, which we are 
failing. The DFC was not implemented properly. It went off on--
just like USAID went off on programs that had nothing to do 
with the core mission, like, drag shows and the like.
    Now because of that black eye, it makes DFC even more 
imperative that it succeed. But I want to get on the record 
here today so that if we have the same problem we did last 
Congress and the Senate doesn't pass this, we do have the fix 
right here from your testimony and that is, was it your intent 
when you authored this bill that the scoring be at the net 
present value?
    Dr. Yoho. Absolutely.
    Mr. McCaul. No question?
    Dr. Yoho. There's no doubt about that. And I don't know if 
Rob or----
    Mr. McCaul. Mr. Mosbacher.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, just to elaborate, it seems like the 
authorizers and appropriators are generally in agreement it 
should be on a net present value basis. But then when we bring 
the budget committee and the CBO and the OMB into the 
conversation, we're at a deadlock. So I would just plead for 
creativity.
    We're not exposing the taxpayers to undo risk. And as you 
indicated, I mean, this is an agency that's been self-
sustaining for years, has made money for years, partly because 
they've been so conservative on their risk appetite which we're 
asking to loosen it up a little bit. But we need some--we need, 
I think, a meeting of the minds among the jurisdictional folks 
on the Hill.
    Mr. McCaul. And I agree. So Madam Chair, I hope we can pass 
this and I hope the Senate wakes up and--it's vitally 
important. And I think the Senate, SFRC, they recognize this as 
well. Hopefully we can pass it. If not, I think we have the 
answer right here before us.
    Last question, Mr. Mosbacher. I've never understood the 
idea that a country like China can self-designate as a 
developing nation therefore qualifying for low interest or zero 
interest loans. That defies logic and reason. It also allows 
them to fund the Belt and Road Initiative where they then take 
the money and use usurious interest rates on truly developing 
nations. What are your thoughts on that?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Well, my thoughts on that are they probably 
wouldn't be as successful as they've been if there was anybody 
else on the field to contest it. But there's not. So we haven't 
been around. We haven't been on the field.
    I would argue--and I know I sound like a broken record 
here. But I'm a private sector guy. I've spent all my life in 
the energy industry.
    I look at deals and look at what the risk is in that 
country of doing business there. And if it looks too great, I'm 
going somewhere else. So I guess what I'm saying is this agency 
can take more risk and we can find more ways of reducing the 
risk such that you have more private capital and there's an 
alternative to China.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Sherman 
for his five minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Sherman. I want to join the ranking member in praising 
USAID. And the shuttering of USAID and its termination of 
foreign assistance projects could very well harm DFC which has 
relied on USAID mission staff to help generate projects. Ms. 
Collinson, does the shuttering of USAID cause a problem?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes. Thanks, Congressman. I think it does. 
Obviously, USAID and DFC share a development mandate broadly. 
But they have a very different model.
    And whereas USAID provides complementary grant assistance 
and historically the largest share of the agency's funding has 
supported humanitarian response and global health services, 
they have really played a critical role where DFC's overseas 
presence has been lacking. And they even set up--help stand up 
DFC's mission transaction unit which has been key to deal 
origination but also sort of helping to monitor and track 
deals.
    Mr. Sherman. There's some people who are even on the 
committee last--when we dealt with USAID who attacked USAID for 
having tourism development projects because they thought USAID 
had to be just food. They didn't realize AID stood for 
development or Agency for International Development which, of 
course, includes tourism.
    I've been involved for at least a couple decades in this 
with Mr. Mosbacher. I wrote the OPIC reauthorization bill in 
2007 which the House passed and the Senate didn't, thus proving 
the wisdom of Nebraska in having a unicameral legislature. 
There were certain provisions we had there that I want to make 
sure that we have this time.
    One of those is a requirement that the private sector 
entities that are substantially involved certify that not only 
they but everyone in their corporate family is abiding by U.S. 
sanctions, particularly those on Iran. Because we had a lot of 
pushback then that said, well, we'll have on subsidiary benefit 
from this program while we'll have a different subsidiary 
violating American sanctions.
    We need to have whichever entity is benefiting from the 
program, whichever private sector entity, certify that none of 
their sister corporations, parent corporations, or subsidiary 
corporations, or nephew corporations are violating our 
sanctions on Iran. Would that pose a problem in making this an 
effective bill, Mr. Mosbacher?
    Mr. Mosbacher. No, sir.
    Mr. Sherman. Good. We also had a provision in there that I 
don't know if it's still relevant, but it wouldn't hurt to put 
it in, to not fund an anti-Armenia railroad defined as a 
railroad that jogs around Armenia connecting Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. We had that, I believe, in the bill or in your 
regulations. Did that cause a problem, Mr. Mosbacher?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Not to my knowledge.
    Mr. Sherman. Good. We also had provisions, I believe, that 
were in current statute dealing with companies not boycotting 
Israel. Was that a problem to carry out?
    Mr. Mosbacher. No, sir.
    Mr. Sherman. And at times, the board has had at least one 
member from organized labor and one member from small business. 
Is that currently applicable and does it cause a problem?
    Mr. Mosbacher. I don't think that's still applicable, but I 
will get an answer for you because there's someone here from 
the agency.
    Mr. Sherman. OK. And back in the day when it was imposed, 
was there a problem?
    Mr. Mosbacher. No, there was not. I worked very well with 
that representative.
    Mr. Sherman. OK. Now there's a lot of talk here about going 
to high-or mid-income countries. I believe Ms. Collinson said 
that. Is there a way to structure the bill so that we give a 
preference to low-income countries or at least low-mid-income 
countries without necessarily prohibiting high-mid-income 
countries?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, Congressman. And I think actually the 
bill passed last year by this committee sort of helped try to 
strike the right balance. I would probably go a little further 
in terms of some guardrails around high-income investments. But 
it did, in fact.
    Even though it expanded DFC's ability to invest in some 
high-income countries, it also put--allowed it to do--or 
preference low-and lower-income--lower-middle-income countries. 
And I should say I agree with Mr. Mosbacher that the upper-
middle-income certification as it currently stands is not as 
workable as it needs to be.
    Mr. Sherman. I would ask you to submit some ideas, Mr. 
Mosbacher and Mr. Yoho. Submit ideas on how we can tighten that 
language. And I yield back.
    Mr. McCaul.
    [Presiding.] The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes Mr. 
Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to our 
witnesses today. I appreciate the testimony. As you all know, 
the Belt and Road Initiative since 2013 has invested over a 
trillion dollars across the globe, expanding the reach of the 
Chinese Communist Party's malign investments and debt trapped 
diplomacy.
    I have said on this subcommittee and also in my capacity as 
a member of the select committee on the strategic competition 
with the CCP that as Americans, we shouldn't try to compete 
with China or counter China by becoming more like China. 
Imitating their industrial policy, misallocating capital is 
actually their Achilles heel. And it's exacerbating their own 
debt crisis.
    Our advantage is that we're capitalists. Our advantage is 
that we allocate capital effectively and efficiently. And so 
let me just ask any of you all to comment on whether or not the 
DFC has the proper resources it needs because I think the model 
of attracting private capital and allocating that capital 
effectively is a better way of delivering returns but also 
geopolitical objectives than China's scattershot misallocation 
of resources.
    Am I right about that? Do we counter China better by 
looking at investments that deliver returns? And should we 
avoid bad deals just because China is there? I'll start with 
you, Mr. Mosbacher.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, I would argue that our biggest 
competitive advantage is the fact that we have a free market 
rule of law capitalist approach. They have a State owned 
enterprise autocracy. They don't have to make returns, although 
they like to be repaid for their money. But we have no business 
emulating the Chinese in terms of all investment model or 
structure. So I think we played our strengths which is 
entrepreneurial capitalism.
    Mr. Barr. Ted, good to see you, my former colleague, 
Congressman Yoho. Great work on the BUILD Act. Appreciate it. 
Let me ask you to comment on the equity scoring piece. Do we 
attract more private capital into these deals if we fix the 
equity scoring?
    Dr. Yoho. Absolutely.
    Mr. Barr. How would that attract more private capital to go 
along with DFC?
    Dr. Yoho. Because we can leverage a lot more. The way it is 
right now, it's a dollar for dollar. Giving out a million 
dollars, it's a million dollar loss, as OMB looks at it 
erroneously versus looking return on investment.
    So we're really leveraging that. And that's what the 
private sector is looking for. Plus we bring in de-risking of 
that of a project. And as we do that, that's more attractive to 
the private equity.
    Mr. Barr. I appreciate that, and I appreciate all of the 
witnesses' testimony in support of also expanding the aperture 
of DFC and allowing DFC to move into higher income countries, 
Panama being the great example, Congressman Yoho, that you 
cited. The fact that Panama is ineligible for DFC investment is 
really one of the reasons why China has moved in. And I've been 
to Panama twice, and I've talked to high ranking government 
officials there.
    They want to do business with the United States. They would 
prefer U.S. private capital. And this is the win-win where 
United States could displace China and take back de facto 
control of the canal to the benefit of national security.
    Congressman Yoho, if DFC correctly focused on combating 
national security threats as opposed to just this development 
objective, would that be a better way to counter China in the 
Panama Canal?
    Dr. Yoho. Yes, but it wouldn't just be national security. I 
would look at the whole picture. As you brought up, we're 
capitalist. We bring this to the table. People want to do 
business with people they know, like, and trust.
    You hear it over and over again. It's easy to get money 
from these other countries. But we don't trust them. We don't 
like them. And that's what we bring to the table. And I think 
if we do that, we're going to win just on what we have to 
offer.
    Mr. Barr. Mr. Mosbacher, should DFC play a role in Ukraine? 
How could the DFC help the reconstruction of Ukraine in a way 
that could deter further Russian aggression?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, I think the DFC could be enormously 
valuable in helping support economic rebuilding at all levels. 
I mean, one of the things that the DFC has done and OPIC before 
most effectively for years was to support small-and medium-
sized businesses. And that's the way you rebuild economies. But 
then----
    Mr. Barr. What would you say to those who say that DFC or 
formerly known as OPIC would support the agenda of the 
globalists?
    Mr. Mosbacher. I think we support our own agenda. I don't 
see--I'm not sure what the globalist agenda is. But my sense is 
particularly on small-or medium-sized businesses but also 
infrastructure. And infrastructure is going to have to be 
rebuilt. But the DFC is as good as anyone in the government at 
knowing how to do this.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Could I just add one thing, Mr. Chairman? 
You asked the question, Congressman Barr, about having the DFC 
and private equity funds. The reason that OPIC was able to be 
such an important catalyst for the private equity funds over 
the years where it was in the deal as debt was because once you 
got the U.S. in the deal, it all of a sudden became much more 
attractive to private sector investors. And that's exactly what 
would happen if you have DFC in equity funds.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    Mr. McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Amo.
    Mr. Amo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As others have mentioned, 
the Development Finance Corporation provides enormous return on 
investment for the American taxpayer. By working with the 
private sector to build development projects, whether it's 
strengthening mineral supply chains in Angola or expanding fish 
farms in Vietnam, the DFC advances the United States' foreign 
policy goals and our economic interests.
    The DFC opens up markets to American businesses, thereby 
reducing the reliance on foreign aid and shifting our 
relationship toward an equal playing field where American 
investment advances American diplomacy. In doing so, it's the 
perfect counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative, a coercive 
financing scheme that pressures countries into accepting 
unfavorable investment terms while forcing them to look the 
other way on China's human rights abuses.
    If we want government that is both efficient and effective, 
then Congress must reauthorize the DFC to extend and expand 
their track record of success. Thankfully, we already have a 
blueprint in hand, the bipartisan DFC Modernization and 
Reauthorization Act of 2024 which passed through our committee 
last Congress. This bill would make reforms to strengthen 
American competitiveness while authorizing the DFC to continue 
its unique role for another 7 years.
    I use that word intentionally because the DFC does play, in 
fact, a unique role. First created in 2019, the DFC 
consolidated the various development finance tools from across 
the Federal Government, including USAID and the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation to better coordinate our 
development finance work. And while the DFC consults with USAID 
on projects related to foreign assistance, they serve separate 
and distinct roles.
    That raises some alarm on the Trump administration's 
activity to openly float moving some of USAID's work into the 
DFC as they try to unlawfully shut down USAID. So Ms. 
Collinson, could you please explain how USAID and DFC's roles 
are different? How would shutting down USAID while folding some 
of its work into the DFC harm the DFC's core functions?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, thank you, Congressman. I mean, as I 
mentioned before in my testimony, I think one of the biggest 
deleterious effects of USAID's dismantling for DFC will just be 
not having sort of folks on the ground in missions who can help 
with deal origination in particular. Again, they helped set up 
this mission transaction unit that was really critical in that 
arena. But also, as DFC is trying to do a much better job of 
monitoring and tracking their impact, if there are not USAID 
staff there, they just have much less presence. And DFC's 
presence overseas is quite limited.
    Mr. Amo. Thank you. And as we know, the DFC is a key tool 
in the United States as the United States deploys our support 
to our ally, Ukraine, in their fight for survival against 
Russia's unlawful invasion. Last year, I lead a bipartisan 
letter requesting that the DFC requesting that the DFC scale up 
their work in Ukraine to support the Ukrainian economy and 
business community.
    Ukraine's economy is vital to success in this war. A 
stronger Ukrainian economy benefits the war effort, supports 
Ukraine's capacity for reconstruction, and reduces future 
reliance on foreign aid. I'm glad, especially glad that the 
UFC--the DFC rather, committed to providing over 400 million in 
additional political risk insurance for companies investing in 
Ukraine. Again, Ms. Collinson, how does the DFC political risk 
insurance for private sector investments in countries like 
Ukraine support those countries' economies and encourage 
American companies to invest?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, maybe I'll start by just noting that 
the political risk insurance tool that DFC had is actually a 
pretty unique one. There's a few other actors that have a 
comparable tool, the multilateral investment guarantee agency 
being one of them. But it's really been shown to be catalytic 
and fragile in conflict affected states in particular. And you 
could imagine just being able to offer and take on at least--
assume a part of that noncommercial project risk in a setting 
like Ukraine has really been a vital way to grow private 
investors' confidence in the economy and lend both to the 
economy now but also Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction down 
the road.
    Mr. Amo. Thank you. With that, I yield back the rest of my 
time.
    Mrs. Kim. [Presiding.] Thank you. I now recognize our vice 
chair of the committee, Representative Radewagen, for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member 
Bera.
    [Speaking foreign language.] Good afternoon. Today, we're 
discussing one of the most important programs to counter the 
PRC's Belt and Road Initiative, the Development Finance 
Corporation.
    Congressman Yoho, I too want to echo my thanks to you for 
your leadership in writing this legislation. This hearing comes 
at an apt time for my home district. As I've stated in previous 
hearings, American Samoa is now surrounded on three sides by 
other Pacific Island nations that have signed major deals with 
the PRC.
    America needs to be present and active in the Pacific. If 
we aren't, Americans will be cutoff and isolated from the 
mainland. The DFC is a great tool in our playbook to invest in 
the Pacific's future.
    My question for all three of you, my home, the Pacific 
Islands, we face significant challenges in securing investment 
for essential projects in infrastructure. How can Congress and 
the Administration collaborate to encourage greater risk 
tolerance among private sector companies, enabling them to 
invest in the less secure yet highly impactful areas?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Congresswoman, there are a variety of tools 
that the agency has that can significantly reduce the risk to 
private sector investors. So if you're talking about how do we 
attract investors to areas that are starved for capital, you 
need two things. One, equity, because it's fine to support 
financing our debt, but many of the companies in some of the 
spaces that we're talking about desperately need equity as 
well.
    So equity is one. And two is to reduce, again, the risk of 
a project which you can do by establishing small grant and 
technical assistance or a whole host of things that will 
encourage private sector investment. And that would be my 
suggestions.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you. Congressman?
    Dr. Yoho. I agree with that. And being from where you are, 
you're a long way from anywhere. And so how do you get capital 
there? How do you get people to invest in that?
    The best way is to have the de-risking of it. And you also 
have to have a partner that is credible, somebody that has the 
clout like the U.S. Government with a vehicle like the DFC. But 
can the DFC, can they man it on the ground?
    That's where organizations like the MCC, I'm a big fan of 
that, between 17 countries off of foreign aid. And so working 
with companies or agencies like we have there or that arm of 
USAID that was first on the ground with boots on the ground to 
do those things to carry a project forward, they work hand in 
hand with DFC. And let the DFC go in there with the big guns, 
the big equity, and bring in that private capital.
    Of course, that all ties into, what do you need in your 
country? What is the most vital thing? And it's usually 
infrastructure where it starts.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Ms. Collinson?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, no, I don't have too much to add. I 
think I agree with both of their points.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back 
the balance of my time.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Representative 
Olszewski for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Olszewski. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member. I 
appreciate all of our witnesses' time today as always. I want 
to dig a little bit into two issues that you both mentioned 
today.
    One is something I support, expanding the amount of 
countries that can be lended to. Our focus include more higher 
earner countries. But as we open up those countries, even if we 
extend preference for the low-middle-income nations, do you 
have any thoughts on how we can operationalize ensuring that we 
actually don't just express a preference but actually ensure 
that we execute on that?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, I think one of the ideas--and I know 
Mr. Mosbacher and I have some common ground here because we've 
discussed it, including as part of modernizing foreign 
assistance network which we both participate in. But one idea 
would be to think about having sort of a reporting requirement 
from DFC to come to Congress and let them know should the 
balance start to move in a certain direction.
    You maybe put a threshold on high-income investments or 
certain upper-middle-income and high-income investments and 
say, we want to hear from you. Why? It gives a lot of 
flexibility but also sort of puts a check on the system in the 
event that you feel like it's getting too far in one direction 
away from the mandate.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, I mean, so just to build on her 
comment, you can use percentages. So at the end of a fiscal 
year, I think last year, they did 181 projects. If more than--I 
mean, if less than two-thirds of those projects were in low-and 
lower-middle-income countries, then you could require that they 
come before a committee like this and explain why is it your 
not focusing as much on the low end.
    Same thing could go for high-income countries. My personal 
view is--and you all did this last year in 8926--I would 
eliminate the focus on just the European group of countries and 
make it much broader but say no more than 10 percent of all the 
projects done in a given Fiscal Year can be in high-income 
countries. And if they are, then you have to come explain it to 
Congress.
    Mr. Olszewski. That's helpful as we consider 
reauthorization which I think I'll just join the chorus of 
bipartisan support for here. I also wanted to just pick up a 
little bit on the conversation around USAID and actually turn a 
little bit to workforce at DFC itself. I know that in fiscal 
1925, there was a goal to expand the U.S. workforce up to 700 
staff.
    Obviously, we've seen lots of conversation around D.C. 
these days about reducing staff size. So as we're talking about 
providing higher borrowing limits, that we're talking about 
allowing markets to go into more countries, as we think about 
reauthorization in the context of what we've already talked 
about at USAID and what's happening with staff generally in the 
U.S. Government, what should this committee be thinking about, 
just sort of account for those limitations? Or is that any 
reason to be concerned as we do that work?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, Congressman, I think that's a great 
question. And I would just start by noting that sort of OPIC, 
DFC's predecessor, really ran lean in terms of staff and 
portfolio exposure. And so DFC has really had to take an active 
role in staffing up as it was growing its portfolio.
    And as you noted, it was quite successful over time. But it 
took quite a while to get to this 700 or near 700 number. And a 
lot of those roles that they're hiring for are not the typical 
federal workforce position.
    So something like underwriting capacity, you can make quite 
a bit of money in the private sector doing that. And so being 
able to recruit those people and the right people to do this 
work takes time. And I think it's really that important to 
ensure that the folks that they have hired and that they have 
the ability to continue to hire if we want to have the kind of 
ambition for growth at the agency.
    Dr. Yoho. I agree with that. You've got to have the boots 
on the ground to be able to start a project. And with your 
previous question, you don't forget the low-income countries.
    You expand your portfolio, and that's the whole purpose of 
raising the maximum contingency liability because that way you 
can focus developing countries moving from aid to trade. Then 
you have your other countries that you say, well, strategically 
from a geopolitical standpoint, this is where we should be 
investing, whether it's critical minerals or whatever. But I 
agree with what she says, and it's imperative we have the boots 
on the ground.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes, and I would just add particularly if 
you're going to focus more on infrastructure and critical 
minerals as a priority, those deals are very labor intensive 
for lawyers. And I know that makes a lot of people nervous, but 
that's fact.
    Mr. Olszewski. Thank you, all. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Representative 
Sheri Biggs for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you to 
the witnesses for participating today. As President Trump has 
sought to refocus America's influence in the foreign policy 
sphere, the Development Finance Corporation has taken on new 
importance as the primary vehicle for America to demonstrate 
soft power abroad by providing valuable resources and support 
to combat the People's Republic of China's influence.
    Through alternative financing for critical infrastructure 
and development projects, the DFC empowers our allies and 
partners with the means to achieve self-determined economic 
growth while shielding them from the predatory debt and 
coercive influence inherent in the PRC's Belt and Road 
Initiative. So in a testament to fiscal responsibility, the 
agency generates significant returns operating profitability 
with a net income surpassing 500 million dollars across fiscal 
years 1923 and 1924. It is clear that the DFC is an effective 
and value-driven alternative to PRC investment.
    However, the DFC's current operational framework presents 
certain limitations. The legislation that governs the agency 
prioritizes investments in low-income countries with 
restrictions on the ability to operate an upper-middle-income 
and especially high-income nations. While this focus is 
valuable, it creates practical challenges when engaging with 
strategically significant countries like Panama, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Brazil.
    With that being said, I would like to direct my first 
question to Dr. Yoho. Good to see you today. In your 
experiences, what are the key areas where DFC supported 
projects are in high demand within middle-income countries?
    Dr. Yoho. You know, if you look at the different countries 
around where we're invested, the majority are in the lower to 
middle-income countries. Where we're restricted is, like, in 
Panama. We can't go into Chile. We can't go into Costa Rica.
    You look at the geopolitical areas that we can't go into. 
We should be able to go into, like, New Zealand, some of the 
other nations in Europe that we could go into that would really 
bolster our national security. And I don't want to go across 
this too much.
    I don't want to compete against China. I think we can 
outperform them by the product and our values. And if we invest 
in these, those countries will be included in that, those 
middle--lower and middle income. I hope that answers your 
question----
    Mrs. Biggs. It does.
    Dr. Yoho [continuing]. or got close.
    Mrs. Biggs. But I do have a little second part to that. So 
what do you feel that are the potential benefits of increased 
DFC involvement in these nations? You kind of answered that, 
but----
    Dr. Yoho. I think the biggest thing is the work that we can 
do to change the dynamics in a lower-income country. We're 
moving them from aid to trade. That was something that was one 
of the impetuses behind the DFC. How do we get countries from 
that?
    Then we built on models from OPIC and MCC. But then we look 
at where can we strategically invest that will counter somebody 
that's wanting to gain influence in our hemisphere. And I think 
that's so important that we use this strategically but also on 
the other side raising countries out of that economic disaster 
that they sometimes have.
    Mrs. Biggs. Great. Thank you. And just one more quick 
questions for Mr. Mosbacher. A critical component of our 
strategic competition involves energy security. How do you 
propose we ensure that the DFC can effectively support high 
impact energy projects in strategically important middle-income 
and high-income nations?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Well, I think energy is an essential 
component of any economic progress. So I believe we need to be 
as flexible as possible in honoring the fuel source that the 
host country has that it may want to use, even though that fuel 
source may not be to someone's liking. But I'm a big believer 
in a wide open, sort of all of the above type approach. And the 
DFC should be available to try and help countries implement 
legitimate energy deals that will advance the economic growth 
of the country.
    Mrs. Biggs. Great. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Ryan 
Mackenzie for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Mackenzie. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
to all of our panelists. I don't know if I could've asked for a 
better segue into my question than the latest comment from Mr. 
Mosbacher.
    I want to particularly focus on DFC and its investment in 
energy because as was mentioned, such a critical component to 
developing countries around the world. And we see the increased 
demand for energy in so many areas of our lives. And so what I 
see, though, when I look at DFC and the list of projects is a 
concerning focus solely on climate focused solar, low carbon 
transition, green loans, climate mitigation.
    These are all a grab bag of buzz words that are listed in 
all of the projects on DFC's website. What is absent from that 
is any investment in fossil fuels. And I have heard from 
developing countries, I had an ambassador to a developing 
country in my office just the other day who said that he is 
seeking out and has been unable to get so far but is still 
seeking for an American investment into natural gas in his 
country because they have a depositor reserve of that.
    He feels like that would be the best thing to help develop 
their country and move them forward economically and with 
energy reliability. So when I look at the DFC's website, 
though, my concern only gets worse when I look at the criteria 
that is laid out from 2024--April 2024, the environmental and 
social policy and procedures. And the reason that's so 
concerning is because it seems like it is projecting an 
unnecessary screening on the types of investments the DFC is 
even going to receive in applications let alone what they 
ultimately determine is the criteria that they're going to use 
to select those projects.
    But that messaging and that criteria alone that is laid out 
there, you're going to stop people from even coming to DFC with 
these potential types of projects. So what I would like to 
raise as a question is in a time where we are seeing the 
markets and investors moving away from ESG toward purely 
profitability and also other criteria that they want to set on 
their own deals, I would like to hear from each of you what 
your thoughts are on that policy and procedure in DFC and what 
we should do about it going forward.
    Mr. Mosbacher. Well, let me start by saying that when I 
said each country should have the right to choose what type of 
fuel source they use, I was suggesting that if a country is 
sitting on top of a bunch of natural gas, they ought to have 
every right to try and build a natural gas fired power plant. 
But I don't think the DFC is automatically opposed to that. I 
think, in fact, each administration has priorities. The last 
administration had prioritization of renewable energy sources.
    This administration can move toward a more balanced 
approach and I would recommend that. In terms of the comments 
you made about standards, I agree we can overdo it. I do think 
sometimes some of the standards we have probably run some 
companies off.
    But I also believe we have to find the right balance. In 
other words, if we go in and make a mess of a country because 
we've not abided by just reasonably balanced approaches in 
terms of the environment or impact on the people that may be 
displaced by a project, then we're sort of cutting off our nose 
to spite our face. We're undermining our effectiveness. So I 
think you need a balance in there. And in terms of energy 
source, I'd be for mostly whatever they want in their country.
    Dr. Yoho. Along that--I agree with that. But I think when 
you're looking at the DFC to go into a country, you're looking 
to build an economy in developing countries. The primary thing 
they need is infrastructure. The primary infrastructure is 
energy.
    You can't build manufacturing or any of that unless you 
have a reliable baseline energy. And you're not going to get it 
on solar and wind. They can augment it and supplement it. But 
you need to go and meet the resources within that country. Help 
them develop it responsibly. And so I think that's what we 
should focus on.
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, I mean, I would certainly hope that DFC 
doesn't rule out renewable energy where those are a good 
source. I will say I agree that I think where lack of energy 
access is a real challenge where there are places of energy 
poverty in low- and lower middle-income countries. They need 
energy to be able to run an economy. And so we shouldn't be 
ruling out natural gas, particularly when that's a fuel source 
we use regularly at home.
    Mr. Mackenzie. Great. Well, thank you and I appreciate Mr. 
Mosbacher's comment, particularly around the balance. And I 
think that is something that we can achieve, both environmental 
responsibility and stewardship but at the same time developing 
those energy sources that are reliable, affordable for these 
developing countries. So I think we need to bring back that 
balance, and I'm concerned that this policy and procedure in 
place puts too much of a focus and an emphasis on a certain 
category. So I would like to see that broadened as we move 
forward in discussing DFC and what we can do to make it even 
better than it already is. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Representative 
Schneider.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I want to thank Chairwoman Kim 
and Ranking Member Bera for holding this important hearing on 
reauthorizing the U.S. International Development Finance 
Corporation. Let me take a special privilege, Congressman Yoho.
    It is so good to see you. We miss you on this side of the 
dais. But you look more relaxed and calm on that side of the 
dais. And thank you for your leadership on this project.
    The DFC was created by the bipartisan BUILD Act, two 
parties working together. I think it represents one of our 
Nation's strongest tools to bolster international development 
while also advancing American strategic interest abroad. 
China's Belt and Road Initiative expands its own global 
footprint.
    Mr. Yoho indicated that over the last 10 years, 12 years, 
they've invested more than a trillion dollars in contrast to 
the U.S., a fraction of that at 70 billion dollars. DFC has to 
provide a compelling alternative to China. It has to be one 
that upholds transparency, respects environmental standards, 
and reinforces good governance. And it has to be one that 
advances U.S. interests.
    One area that I'm particularly interested in, the Abraham 
Fund, announced following the history Abraham Accords between 
Israel, UAE, and the United States. It was designed precisely 
for these purposes, to enhance regional economic cooperation, 
support peace, and present a tangible alternative to 
authoritarian investments. Unfortunately, as of today, 
questions remain about the Abraham Fund's operational clarity 
and the commitment of the current administration to fully 
realize its potential.
    For the DFC to succeed, especially in strategic initiatives 
like the Abraham Fund which has broad range of implications, 
timely reauthorization as was recommended earlier, increased 
flexibility in equity investment scoring, and greater risk 
appetite are all essential. Equally important is ensuring 
transparency and effective oversight to reinforce confidence 
among our private sector partners. I look forward to exploring 
how Congress can ensure DFC remains an effective tool for 
development and strategic competition, particularly is 
strategically vital regions.
    But I'd like to again focus on the Abraham Fund. If I can 
ask the witnesses, do any of you have a sense of the current 
status of the fund and have applications for project stalled? 
If so, any sense why? Looking behind that, I'll ask you, 
Congressman Yoho, because we worked together on so many things. 
How important is having this soft power of a program like the 
DFC to promote not just American interest but American 
relationships around the world, specifically in the context of 
China's efforts to expand and increase its influence around the 
world?
    Dr. Yoho. It's vital. It's vital. If we're not at the 
table, somebody is going to fill that void. We've got to be 
there. People have to know we're reliable, we're trustworthy.
    We're going to be there not just for the now but for 50 
years from now. And I think if we fund this, if it goes 
through, a rapid reauthorization, and enhance what the House 
did last Congress, build on what you did, that sends a strong 
signal. The worst thing you can do is pull back, and you know 
nature abhors a vacuum.
    Somebody is going to fill that vacuum. Somebody is going to 
fill it with their ideology. So you want it to be Western 
ideology, liberal democracies. Or do you want it to be 
authoritarian? That's the choice that we have to offer.
    Mr. Schneider. And Ms. Collinson, you in your 
recommendations I think gave wise counsel to us. Remember that 
DFC is part of the broader U.S. development and foreign policy 
toolkit. The current administration has basically wiped out aid 
completely and celebrated that. Can you touch on if we don't 
have that in our toolkit, what is left for us and what are the 
implications of that?
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, no, again, I would echo I think that 
USAID's dismantling is a real problem for DFC and particularly 
when it comes to deal origination and tracking, the impact that 
it can deliver on the ground. I do hope that DFC will be able 
to work increasingly with the State Department, also with the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation which they set up their own 
platform for collaboration precisely to try to do that in the 
places where MCC invests. And I think it'll be really important 
as Mr. Mosbacher pointed out to work with a lot of DFIs to try 
to share intel and develop deals collaboratively if we don't 
have the kind of presence on the ground that we expected.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And I'll use my last 10 seconds 
just to make a statement because whether we like or not, if the 
United States turns its back on the rest of the world, the rest 
of the world is not going to throw up its hands and stand 
still. They'll proceed forward and China will lead the way.
    They will lead it for their interest of China as you said, 
Mr. Yoho. We need to engage with the rest of the world. And the 
United States created the American century in the last century 
because of our engagement, things like the Marshall Plan and 
other work.
    We can do things no other nation is able to do because of 
who we are, because of our values, because of our philosophies 
and our systems. And to turn away from that I think is a grave 
mistake. I hope we can turn the other way. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you very much. I would like to recognize 
Representative Zinke for your 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Zinke. Well, thank you for coming. So a couple things, 
one, I agree with flexibility. I agree with equity. I'm not 
sure percentage I would agree with you on. I think it should be 
aligned with the policy of the United States with executive and 
the Congress. So it is that from where our policy is driven and 
should be driven.
    So a couple things, USAID has come up a lot. And of course, 
USAID has gone through a lot of scrutiny as it should. But when 
you have transgender medical clinics in India or condoms for 
Taliban, we can go through the list after list after list after 
list.
    So some of it then is spread to you because you have a 
relationship with them. So on your loans, do you have a single 
data base? Because when I was in Interior, I went in and I 
canceled every loan until I could figure out where they're 
going. It took us a while.
    And we're seeing the same thing with USAID, canceling it. 
So you haven't been in the papers lately. Do you have a data 
base of where your loans are, your outstanding loans?
    Mr. Mosbacher. Yes.
    Mr. Zinke. Is that data base accessible to the United 
States Congress?
    Mr. Mosbacher. It should be. I believe that there are some 
platforms like the FATAA.
    Ms. Collinson. Yes, so technically, DFC is, I believe, 
required to report to the foreignassistance.gov dashboard under 
FATAA, the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, 
which BUILD Act extended its purview to. Right now, it's just 
reporting grant and technical assistance on that dashboard 
because there's been some--but there is----
    Mr. Zinke. And I've heard this from multiple. It's amazing. 
The Department of State does not have a list, one that's a data 
base that you can query on loans, on grants. And if you have 
one, I would love to see it.
    And what fidelity because a lot of things are just titles. 
And whether you love or hate them, DOGE, what it has done is 
open up files that when you and I are in Congress, we couldn't 
access. When I was a Secretary, I couldn't access the files. 
Evidently, just a few can. And we're trying to run ahead if 
there's files out there, I would like you to share them----
    Ms. Collinson. So maybe, Congressman----
    Mr. Zinke [continuing]. so we can see and defend.
    Ms. Collinson. Sorry, just to clarify. DFC does post. It 
has two data bases actually on its website that have project 
level data. Now they're a little bit lagged, so we're missing 
the most recent data. But you can query and search.
    One of them has more fields than others. You get greater 
granularity. But I think those are both areas where Congress 
should push the DFC for even greater transparency.
    Mr. Zinke. And perhaps we don't want to make every loan a 
billboard for debate, right? Because we give you the authority, 
and we should for you to make a deal, as long as it's in line 
with U.S. policy. I agree with that. But I think the chairs and 
the ranking member should have access to see it. I think that's 
fair and prudent. I'd like to see that.
    Last, up close, the five meter target, we could go to a 
government shutdown. So what does that do you? I just want to 
know. A government shutdown, how does that affect your mission 
if we go to a government shutdown? Sir?
    Dr. Yoho. Well, I don't work for them----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Zinke. No, I know. What do you think it would do?
    Dr. Yoho. It'll do like any other government shutdown. You 
press a reset button and everything has got to start all over. 
All those contracts that were negotiated, if the government 
shuts down, they have to renegotiate all those contracts. It's 
a waste of money, and let's hope we don't do that.
    And as far as the oversight, all those loans are on a book 
somewhere and the Inspector General. And they have a board of 
people that approve these things. It's up to Congress when you 
get the Inspector General report to hold them accountable.
    We always talked about transparency and accountability up 
here. It's happened under this administration. And if you don't 
like what they did, shame on us because we didn't act. It's 
happened. We can't change it. Let's move forward and make it 
better.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Mosbacher. Congressman, if I could just add to that. 
Businesses have every right to--understand there needs to be 
some certainty and predictability about contracts they have. To 
the extent that we have a stop and start funding system in our 
government that impacts private sector partners of our 
government, it damages our capacity to attract new business.
    Mr. Zinke. I agree. I'm hoping we're not at that point. And 
with that, I wish you a lot of luck. I know you have a lot of 
influence on there. And for the record, I do agree with the 
program. But it needs greater scrutiny like anything else.
    We can justify taxpayer dollars when we know about them. 
And we should have that debate whether we should or shouldn't. 
But we never should have to debate with fraud, abuse, and 
waste. And that we should all stand firm on. And with that, I 
yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Representative Zinke. And with respect 
to your question about transparency, if you go on the dfc.gov 
website, you will see the list of countries where DFC is 
funding projects. If you click on each country, it will also 
give you a whole list of the programs that are already being 
funded. I think that would be a helpful tool.
    We have a lot of discussion here, but one thing is for 
sure, despite its short life-span, the DFC has really emerged 
as a key U.S. national interest and security tool. With this 
commitment to making America stronger and more competitive 
leader and partner on the world stage, I think we have a 
tremendous opportunity to improve and strengthen its operations 
and how DFC's impact is felt around the world.
    The CCP as we know is funding critical infrastructure 
projects and signing security pacts across East Asia and the 
Pacific region and throughout the world. But we know the U.S. 
remains the economic and security partner of choice. With that, 
we must provide our partner nations and allies with an 
alternative to exploitative state-led initiatives.
    This is not something the U.S. Government can do alone. We 
need partners. We need to also incentivize and mobilize our 
U.S. private sector to unleash economic opportunities and 
investments abroad.
    I look forward to working with all of you as we go through 
this reauthorization process. We'll engage in further 
discussions to make it even stronger and tighter and make DFC 
the best security tool that we need.
    I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony 
and answering all of our questions. I also want to thank the 
members who have participated.
    The members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses, we'll ask you to respond to those 
in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 
days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials 
for the record subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the committee now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


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