[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                                   

 
    REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY 
                               MANAGEMENT

=======================================================================

                                (119-13)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
    ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 25, 2025

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
             
             
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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 60-422 PDF          WASHINGTON : 2025
                       
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             

             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking 
              Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  District of Columbia               Arkansas,
Jerrold Nadler, New York               Vice Chairman
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Daniel Webster, Florida
John Garamendi, California           Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaott Perry, Pennsylvania
Andre Carson, Indiana                Brian Babin, Texas
Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Greg Stanton, Arizona                Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah
Patrick Ryan, New York               Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Mike Collins, Georgia
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio,           Mike Ezell, Mississippi
  Vice Ranking Member                Kevin Kiley, California
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Vince Fong, California
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Tony Wied, Wisconsin
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Tom Barrett, Michigan
Robert Garcia, California            Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska
Nellie Pou, New Jersey               Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr., 
Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan     Pennsylvania
Laura Friedman, California           Jeff Hurd, Colorado
Laura Gillen, New York               Jefferson Shreve, Indiana
Shomari Figures, Alabama             Addison P. McDowell, North 
                                     Carolina
                                     David J. Taylor, Ohio
                                     Brad Knott, North Carolina
                                     Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
                                       Northern Mariana Islands
                                     Mike Kennedy, Utah
                                     Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri
                                     Vacancy
                                ------                                7

      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
                          Emergency Management

    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, 
             Chairman
  Greg Stanton, Arizona, Ranking 
              Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Mike Ezell, Mississippi
  District of Columbia               Kevin Kiley, California
Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan     Tom Barrett, Michigan
Shomari Figures, Alabama             Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr., 
John Garamendi, California           Pennsylvania
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
Laura Friedman, California,            Northern Mariana Islands
  Vice Ranking Member                Mike Kennedy, Utah
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri,
                                       Vice Chairman
                                     Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)



                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the 
  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 
  Management, opening statement..................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 
  Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, 
  opening statement..............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     8

                               WITNESSES

Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 
  Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    11
Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida Division of Emergency 
  Management, oral statement.....................................    22
    Prepared statement...........................................    23
Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania County, North 
  Carolina, oral statement.......................................    27
    Prepared statement...........................................    30
Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas, on behalf of 
  the National Association of Counties, oral statement...........    36
    Prepared statement...........................................    38

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish, 
  Louisiana, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell.........    45

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and 
  Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. 
  Kristen McDonald Rivet.........................................    65




                             March 21, 2025

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Reforming FEMA: 
Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, 
and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, March 25, 2025, at 10:00 
a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive 
testimony at a hearing entitled, ``Reforming FEMA: Bringing 
Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' The 
hearing will broadly examine the current state of emergency 
management, including ways to reform the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and Federal disaster assistance. At 
this hearing, Members will receive testimony from stakeholders 
and experts in emergency management and disasters.

                             II. BACKGROUND

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR DISASTERS

    FEMA is the Federal Government's lead agency for preparing 
for, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from 
disasters and emergencies related to all hazards--whether 
natural or man-made.\1\ FEMA's primary authority in carrying 
out these functions stems from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) (P.L. 100-
707, as amended).\2\ The Stafford Act authorizes three types of 
declarations: (1) major disaster declarations; (2) emergency 
declarations; and (3) fire management grant (FMAG) 
declarations.\3\ The Stafford Act authorizes the President to 
approve states' requests for a Federal disaster declaration 
when ``the situation is of such severity and magnitude that 
effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and 
affected local governments.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Dep't of Homeland Security, FEMA, (Feb. 3, 2023), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/employee-resources/federal-emergency-management-
agency-fema.
    \2\ Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707.
    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PRESIDENTIALLY DECLARED MAJOR DISASTER

    When state and local resources are overwhelmed and the 
``disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective 
response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the 
affected local governments,'' \5\ the Governor of the affected 
state may request the President declare a major disaster.\6\ 
FEMA's primary Stafford Act programs for disaster recovery in 
the aftermath of a major disaster are in the Public Assistance 
(PA) Program and the Individual Assistance (IA) Program.\7\ 
Following a major disaster declaration, FEMA also provides 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ FEMA, A Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process and Federal 
Disaster Assistance 1, available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/rebuild/
recover/dec_proc.pdf.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PA Program, authorized primarily by Sections 403, 406, 
and 428 of the Stafford Act, reimburses state, tribal, and 
territorial governments, as well as certain private non-profits 
for rebuilding damaged buildings and infrastructure.\9\ The 
Federal cost-share for PA is 75 percent, but may be increased 
by the President.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See FEMA, Assistance for Governments and Private Non-Profits 
After a Disaster, (Feb. 23, 2023), available at https://www.fema.gov/
assistance/public.
    \10\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The IA Program is authorized primarily by Section 408 of 
the Stafford Act. The IA program includes the Individuals and 
Households Program (IHP), Mass Care and Emergency Assistance, 
the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program, Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance, Disaster Legal Services, and Disaster 
Case Management. IHP is the primary FEMA program used to assist 
disaster survivors; it includes housing assistance and other 
needs assistance. Housing assistance includes money for repair, 
rental assistance, or ``direct assistance,'' such as the 
provision of temporary housing.\11\ The current limits for IHP 
assistance is $42,500 for housing assistance and $42,500 for 
other needs assistance.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ FEMA, Individuals and Households Program, (Feb. 3, 2023), 
available at https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/program.
    \12\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5174.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes HMGP, which is 
based on a percentage of PA funding, to provide grants to 
state, tribal, and territorial governments for mitigation 
projects that: (1) are cost effective and (2) reduce the risk 
of future damage, hardship, and loss from natural hazards.\13\ 
The purpose of this grant program is to fund practical 
mitigation measures that effectively reduce the risk of loss of 
life and property from future disasters. State, tribal, and 
territorial governments may use their HMGP funds to assist 
families in reducing the risk to their homes from natural 
disasters. The Federal cost share for HMGP is 75 percent and 
the remaining 25 percent can come from a variety of sources 
(i.e. a cash payment from the state or local government).\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (Dec. 27, 2022), 
available at https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/hazard-mitigation.
    \14\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                III. FEMA'S RESPONSE TO RECENT DISASTERS

HURRICANES HELENE AND MILTON

    In 2024, FEMA provided assistance for 120 Presidentially 
declared emergencies and major disasters including: five 
hurricanes that made landfall, multiple unnamed severe storms, 
wildfires, and an active tornado season that impacted many 
states across the country.\15\ However, the most significant 
disaster of 2024 was Hurricane Helene, which made landfall near 
Perry, Florida on September 26, 2024, as a Category 4 
hurricane.\16\ As Helene traveled across the Appalachian 
Region, it resulted in catastrophic flooding, landslides, and 
tornadoes. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina) received a major disaster 
declaration associated with Helene.\17\ Alabama received an 
emergency declaration.\18\ The destruction of Hurricane Helene 
resulted in 219 storm-related deaths,\19\ including 106 in 
North Carolina alone.\20\ That makes it the deadliest storm to 
hit the mainland United States since Hurricane Katrina.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ FEMA, Declared Disasters, available at https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/declarations.
    \16\ Kate Payne, Hurricane Helene Kills At Least 44 and Cuts A 
Swath of Destruction Across the Southeast, AP News, (Sept. 27, 2024), 
available at https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-helene-florida-
georgia-carolina-e5769b56dea81e40fae2161ad1b4e75d.
    \17\ FEMA, Hurricane Helene, available at https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/current/hurricane-helene.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, U.S. 
Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, available at https://
www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/events.
    \20\ North Carolina Dep't of Health and Human Services, Hurricane 
Helene Storm Related Fatalities, available at https://www.ncdhhs.gov/
assistance/hurricane-helene-recovery-resources/hurricane-helene-storm-
related-fatalities.
    \21\ Ana Faguy & Brandon Drenon, Helene is Deadliest Mainland US 
Hurricane Since Katrina, BBC, (Oct. 3, 2024), available at https://
www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1k70rnrp4xo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Just two weeks later, Hurricane Milton formed in the Gulf 
of Mexico and rapidly intensified to a Category 5 
hurricane.\22\ By the time Milton made landfall near Siesta Key 
on October 9, 2024, the storm had weakened to a Category 3 
hurricane, but it brought a front of deadly tornadoes and storm 
surges to Florida.\23\ This was the third hurricane in 13 
months to impact Florida's Big Bend region.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Brad Brooks and Leonora LaPeter Anton, Hurricane Milton Leaves 
At Least 10 Dead, Millions Without Power in Florida, Reuters, (Oct. 10, 
2024), available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hurricane-milton-
weakens-it-marches-across-central-florida-homes-destroyed-2024-10-10/.
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Chelsea Harvey, Third Hurricane in 13 Months Slams Florida's 
Big Bend, E&E News by Politico, (Sept. 27, 2024), available at https://
www.eenews.net/articles/third-hurricane-in-13-months-slams-floridas-
big-bend/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to 
Congress, FEMA has obligated $6.65 billion for Hurricane Helene 
and $2.7 billion for Hurricane Milton.\25\ While 2020 holds the 
all-time record for Presidentially declared emergencies and 
major disasters due to declarations related to COVID-19, at 
230, the size and severity of Stafford Act declarations in 2024 
has drawn Congressional attention to FEMA's resource 
constraints and response challenges.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ FEMA, February 2025 Disaster Relief Fund Report, (Feb. 12, 
2025), available at https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_ocfo_feb-2025-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf [hereinafter 
Disaster Relief Fund Report].
    \26\ Adam B. Smith, 2023: A Historic Year of U.S. Billion-Dollar 
Weather and Climate Disasters, NOAA, (Jan. 8, 2024), available at 
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2023-historic-
year-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters; Letter from Sam 
Graves, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure to Deanne 
Criswell, Administrator, FEMA (Oct. 11, 2025) (on file with Comm.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

LOS ANGELES WILDFIRES

    Starting on January 7, 2025, a series of 12 wildfires, 
including the Palisades and Eaton fires, burned more than 
40,000 acres across the greater Los Angeles area.\27\ The 
wildfires burned for several weeks and were only 100 percent 
contained on January 31, 2025.\28\ Twenty-nine people died as a 
result of the wildfires, and more than 18,000 structures were 
destroyed.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ CAL Fire, 2025 Incident Archive, available at https://
www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025.
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Minyvonne Burke & Liz Kreutz, What We Know About the Victims 
Killed in the California Wildfires, NBC News, (Feb. 12, 2025), 
available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-wildfires-
what-we-know-victims-killed-rcna188240.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to 
Congress, FEMA has obligated $1.27 billion for the Los Angeles 
wildfires.\30\ The Los Angeles wildfires sparked a wider debate 
about California's resource management, after reports began 
circulating that water systems used to fight the Palisades and 
Eaton fires could not maintain the continuous high water 
pressures needed for fire hydrants at high elevations. In the 
first days of the fires, firefighters were forced to overly 
rely on water supplied by fire hydrants to suppress the 
wildfires since hurricane force winds meant they could not use 
planes and helicopters to drop water.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Disaster Relief Fund Report, supra note 25.
    \31\ Karla Rendo, More Pacific Palisades Residents Join Lawsuit 
Against LADWP, City Over Water Supply Failure, News4 Los Angeles, (Mar. 
8, 2025), available at https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california-
wildfires/more-pacific-palisades-residents-join-lawsuit-against-ladwp-
city-over-water-supply-failure/3649420/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   IV. HISTORICAL ISSUES AND REFORMS

    FEMA was originally created by Executive Order to carry out 
the President's authority in providing Federal disaster 
assistance.\32\ FEMA was later merged into the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and its authorities dispersed 
throughout the Department under the direction of the Secretary 
of DHS.\33\ Following the poor response after Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, Congress enacted the Post Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006. PKEMRA re-established FEMA as a 
distinct entity within DHS, designated the FEMA Administrator 
as the President's advisor on Federal emergency management, and 
authorized FEMA for the first time in statute.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Exec. Order No. 12127 (Apr. 1, 1979).
    \33\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296.
    \34\ Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
295.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since PKEMRA, Congress has enacted several other major 
reforms to improve FEMA, including:

     LIn 2013, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery 
Improvement Act (SRIA, P.L. 113-2) which included reforms to 
speed up and streamline recovery efforts, reduce costs, and 
improve the effectiveness of several disaster assistance 
programs authorized by the Stafford Act, namely the PA Program, 
the IA Program, and the HMGP.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2.

     LIn 2018, Congress passed the Disaster Recovery 
Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA) following Hurricanes Maria and Irma 
which hit Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands.\36\ 
DRRA made additional reforms to speed up and improve disaster 
response and recovery as well as established funding for FEMA's 
pre-disaster mitigation program, currently called Building 
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).\37\ In 2018, 
Congress also enacted the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 that 
included additional reforms intended to improve disaster 
recovery, generally, as well as specifically in Puerto Rico and 
the United States Virgin Islands.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254.
    \37\ Id.
    \38\ Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123.

    In addition to these major reforms, the Committee has 
moved, and Congress has enacted, targeted reforms intended to 
improve FEMA assistance and coordination across the Federal 
Government in responding to disasters. Despite these reforms, 
issues remain. For example, there are currently over 1,000 open 
major disaster, emergency, and fire management declarations 
dating back to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.\39\ There are over 
5,000 open projects from 2005 and 2017 (prior to Hurricanes 
Maria and Irma).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ E-mail from FEMA Congressional Affairs to Elizabeth Granger, 
Professional Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (Mar. 3, 
2025, 4:48 PM EST) (on file with Comm.).
    \40\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     V. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

    On January 24, 2025, President Trump announced, through 
Executive Order, the creation of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Review Council (Council).\41\ The stated 
purpose of the Council is to, ``[evaluate] whether FEMA's 
bureaucracy in disaster response ultimately harms the agency's 
ability to successfully respond.'' \42\ The Executive Order 
highlights the need for the Council to review FEMA in the wake 
of recent disasters, like Hurricane Helene. The Executive Order 
also points out that despite spending $30 billion in disaster 
aid each of the past three years, FEMA has left many disaster 
survivors without the resources they need.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Exec. Order No. 14180, (Jan. 24, 2025), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/council-to-assess-the-
federal-emergency-management-agency/.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Council will be co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Secretary of Defense, with any additional 
members of the Council being appointed by the President. The 
Council must hold its first public meeting before April 24, 
2025, and will need to issue a report to the President 190 days 
after that first meeting.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             VI. CONCLUSION

    Last year was a challenging year for disaster response and 
recovery. Hurricanes Helene and Milton highlighted the need for 
additional reforms to our Nation's current emergency management 
system. The more recent California wildfires further charged 
the debate about what role states should play in reducing their 
own disaster risks. These disasters, along with President 
Trump's Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council, 
have begun a broader conversation about what the future of FEMA 
should look like going forward. As this Subcommittee looks to 
bring back common sense in emergency management, the following 
witnesses will provide much-needed insights from a variety of 
perspectives.

                             VII. WITNESSES

     LMr. Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice Team, United States Government Accountability Office
     LMr. Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida 
Division of Emergency Management
     LMs. Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania 
County, North Carolina
     LAdrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County, 
Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties


    REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY 
                               MANAGEMENT

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2025

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
               Buildings, and Emergency Management,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in 
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order.
    The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be 
authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's 
hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The chairman also asks unanimous consent that Members not 
on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee 
at today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into 
the record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
    The Chair now recognizes himself for the purpose of an 
opening statement for 5 minutes.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
    CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC 
              BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

    Mr. Perry. I want to thank our witnesses for being here 
today to discuss reforming FEMA and how we can bring common 
sense back to Federal emergency management.
    After witnessing the Federal Government's response to 
Hurricane Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles 
wildfires, I, like many Americans, was shocked by many of the 
stories I heard coming from these communities. I know members 
of this committee have proposed, and Congress has enacted, 
reform after reform to make FEMA and the Federal emergency 
management system work better. Despite these efforts, it seems 
that nothing improves.
    This is not meant to be a beatdown of FEMA, but we can't 
just keep going the way we have been and expect different 
outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth seems to have 
only become more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when 
disaster strikes.
    Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for States and local 
governments to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and 
response, yet many of these programs move too slowly, 
preventing timely and effective action when it is most direly 
needed.
    I mean, for 46 years, individual regions should have been 
reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of 
emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including 
the cost and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.
    What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is 
demonstrative of that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support 
the response and recovery in the mountains of North Carolina. 
In California, we saw a lack of preparedness by State and local 
officials--from a lack of water for firefighting to 
disorganization on the ground, despite literally billions of 
taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation, 
preparedness, and firefighting.
    On top of all that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA 
disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina--which 
is over 20 years ago--and well over 5,000 open projects. This 
raises serious questions about the Federal Government being the 
best institution to respond to localized disasters.
    Federal disaster assistance was created to support State 
and local governments when absolutely necessary, when the 
resources required exceed the ability of local agencies to 
respond. Unfortunately, the result has been to utilize FEMA as 
the first responder to every disaster occurring throughout the 
Nation.
    This almost absolute reliance on the Federal Government is 
dangerous and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first 
responder in disasters. States and local governments are. They 
know their communities best. They understand the risks, what 
their communities need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to 
respond quickly to emergencies.
    It is critical, therefore, that State and local governments 
make disaster preparedness a priority and that they budget for 
it--let me say that again--and that they budget for it, have 
the right people and training in place, and ensure that they 
have the capacity and capability to respond.
    The current system creates a perverse incentive for States. 
States are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in 
their own emergency response and preparedness plans because 
they know they can rely on FEMA stepping in every time even if 
it is inartful at best.
    Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by 
self-imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond 
effectively when called upon or even close out projects going 
back 20 years.
    FEMA's ability to function effectively was further 
undermined as the previous administration pushed its open 
border, equity, and climate agenda onto the Agency, resulting 
in disaster funding being diverted to ridiculous projects like 
planting trees to address urban heat islands. It's no wonder 
that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and issued 
an Executive order on State and local preparedness.
    I am hopeful that this hearing will provide valuable 
insight, as T&I is the lead House committee on FEMA and Federal 
emergency management, because meaningful reform is, obviously, 
absolutely urgently needed.
    With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on 
these topics.
    [Mr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress 
 from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
    Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss 
reforming FEMA and how we can bring common sense back to federal 
emergency management.
    After witnessing the federal government's response to Hurricane 
Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles wildfires, I, like most 
Americans, was shocked by many of the stories I heard coming from these 
communities. I know Members of this committee have proposed, and 
Congress has enacted, reform after reform to make FEMA and the federal 
emergency management system work better. Despite these efforts, it 
seems that nothing has improved. This is not meant to be a beatdown of 
FEMA, but we cannot just keep going the way we have been and expect 
different outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth has only become 
more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when disaster strikes.
    Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for states and local governments 
to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and response, yet many of these 
programs move too slowly, preventing timely and effective action when 
it is most direly needed. For 46 years, individual regions should have 
been reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of 
emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including the cost 
and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.
    What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is demonstrative of 
that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support response and recovery in 
the mountains of North Carolina. In California, we saw a lack of 
preparedness by state and local officials--from a lack of water for 
firefighting to disorganization on the ground, despite billions of 
taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation, preparedness, and 
firefighting.
    On top of all of that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA 
disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina, and well over 
5,000 open projects. This raises serious questions about whether the 
federal government is the best institution to respond to localized 
disasters.
    Federal disaster assistance was created to support state and local 
governments when absolutely necessary--when the resources required 
exceed the ability of local agencies to respond. Unfortunately, the 
trend has been to utilize FEMA as the first responder to every disaster 
occurring throughout the nation.
    This increase in reliance on the federal government is dangerous 
and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first responder in 
disasters. States and local governments are. They know their 
communities best--they understand the risks, what their communities 
need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to quickly respond to 
emergencies.
    It is critical, therefore, that state and local governments make 
disaster preparedness a priority--that they budget for it, have the 
right people and training in place, and ensure that they have the 
capability to respond.
    The current system creates a perverse incentive for states. States 
are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in their own 
emergency response and preparedness plans because they have come to 
rely on FEMA stepping in every time.
    Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by self-
imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond effectively 
when called upon or even close out projects going back 20 years.
    FEMA's ability to function effectively was further undermined as 
the previous administration pushed its open border, equity, and climate 
agenda onto the agency, resulting in disaster funding being diverted to 
projects like planting trees to address urban ``heat islands.'' It is 
no wonder that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and 
issued an executive order on state and local preparedness.
    I am hopeful this hearing will provide valuable insight, as T&I is 
the lead House Committee on FEMA and federal emergency management, 
because meaningful reform is urgently needed.

    Mr. Perry. And the Chair now recognizes the ranking member, 
Representative Stanton, for 5 minutes for his opening 
statement.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG STANTON OF ARIZONA, RANKING 
MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, 
                    AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you all for attending this important hearing titled 
``Reforming FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal 
Emergency Management.''
    I am the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I 
take Federal disaster assistance delivery very seriously, and I 
look forward to conducting oversight on FEMA's important work.
    FEMA is where Americans look for help, critical help after 
what is likely the worst day of their lives. So it is critical 
that the Agency be postured to respond at all times. For most 
of its life, FEMA has been an apolitical entity: red State or 
blue State, it didn't matter. FEMA stayed focused on the 
mission to help all Americans and kept out of the political 
fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.
    Following the recent catastrophic disasters in California 
and South Carolina, President Trump has focused more on 
spreading misinformation than helping Americans in need. 
Specifically, after the tragic wildfires in Los Angeles, he 
threatened to condition disaster relief on policy matters that 
have nothing to do with emergency management. This is simply 
wrong and shakes the trust that Americans have in their 
Government to come to their aid after a catastrophe. That is 
what FEMA is all about.
    We should have a discussion about how to improve FEMA, but 
as a baseline, we should acknowledge the need that we have in 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, specifically there to 
help States and localities when an emergency goes beyond their 
ability to immediately deal with it.
    Yesterday, DHS Secretary Noem added to that uncertainty 
facing disaster survivors when she said that we are, quote, 
``we're going to eliminate FEMA,'' unquote, in a Presidential 
Cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, quote, 
``great job,'' unquote.
    I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditioning aid 
for emergency disaster assistance. Whether a State is red or 
blue, they are American, and they are entitled to the support 
of their fellow Americans on their worst day. So I condemn 
calls to condition emergency disaster assistance in the 
strongest possible terms and urge elected leaders to never make 
such comments again.
    Unfortunately, threats of conditioning lifesaving 
assistance is not the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In 
February, Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency 
entered FEMA and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have 
accessed secure Government systems that include disaster 
survivors' personal information and slowed the delivery of FEMA 
assistance.
    I am deeply troubled to learn that all FEMA grants are now 
subject to additional review to ensure that they are 
complementary to President Trump's political agenda. And 
Federal employees are living in fear that they will be fired if 
they approve the wrong grant payment.
    Federal employees should not be concerned about approving 
grant disbursements approved by this body, Congress, in a 
bipartisan way. In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse 
payments that are mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I 
will not stand by quietly if we see illegal action related to 
the disbursement of FEMA grants. The Agency cannot violate the 
Impoundment Control Act.
    I am deeply concerned at the influence of DOGE at FEMA, 
which contains no emergency management experts at DOGE, and 
that they are going to steer the Agency in the direction of 
another Katrina.
    Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked 
into the Department of Homeland Security without proper 
consultation from professional emergency managers. FEMA was 
weakened by being subsumed into DHS without proper consultation 
with emergency management professionals. The result was 
unnecessary catastrophic loss of life, the worst in modern 
disaster history. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of 
the past.
    That said, reforming FEMA properly does not mean we should 
avoid change altogether.
    In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better. Last summer, 
extreme heat caused temperatures in my district that were 
nearly unlivable. We lost over 600 of our fellow citizens to 
extreme heat and extreme heat islands.
    We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for over a 
month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed 
during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The 
heat in our State literally caused roads to crack, cars to 
melt, and hundreds of lives lost.
    However, FEMA was not to be found in Arizona because the 
Agency has not yet adapted to emergency disasters like extreme 
heat. Heat is a silent killer. It advances quietly and lingers. 
The longer it lingers, the more devastating the impact.
    So, we must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look 
forward to working with the Agency to ensure that they have the 
resources and authority they need to respond to disasters all 
across the country.
    So, I look forward to this important hearing, hearing from 
my colleagues.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [Mr. Stanton's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress 
from the State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 
        Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    Thank you, all, for attending today's hearing entitled, ``Reforming 
FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' As 
the new Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, I take federal disaster 
assistance delivery very seriously, and I look forward to conducting 
oversight of FEMA's important work.
    FEMA is where Americans look for help after what may have been the 
worst day of their life. So it is critical that the Agency be postured 
to respond at all times. For most of its life, FEMA has been an 
apolitical entity--red state or blue state, it didn't matter. FEMA 
stayed focused on the mission to help all Americans and kept out of the 
political fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.
    Following the catastrophic disasters in South Carolina and 
California, President Trump has focused more on spreading 
misinformation than helping Americans in need.
    Specifically, after wildfires devastated Los Angeles, he threatened 
to condition disaster relief on policy matters that have nothing to do 
with emergency management. This is simply wrong and shakes the trust 
that Americans have in their government to come to their aid after 
catastrophe.
    Yesterday, Secretary Noem added to the uncertainty facing disaster 
survivors when she said that, ``we're going to eliminate FEMA'' in a 
cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, ``great job.''
    I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditions for emergency 
disaster assistance. Whether a state votes red or blue; they are 
American and are entitled to assistance. I condemn calls to condition 
emergency disaster assistance in the strongest possible terms and urge 
elected leaders to never make such comments again.
    Unfortunately, threats to condition lifesaving assistance are not 
the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In February, Billionaire 
Musk's so-called ``Department of Government Efficiency'' entered FEMA 
and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have accessed secure 
government systems that include disaster survivors' personal 
information and slowed the delivery of FEMA assistance.
    I am deeply troubled to have learned that all FEMA grants are now 
subject to an additional review to ensure they are complementary to 
Trump's political agenda. And federal employees are living in fear that 
they will be fired if they approve the wrong grant payment. Federal 
employees should not be concerned about approving grant disbursements 
approved by Congress!
    In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse payments that are 
mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I will not stand by quietly if 
we see illegal action related to the disbursement of FEMA grants. The 
Agency cannot violate the Impoundment Control Act.
    I am deeply concerned that the influence of DOGE at FEMA, which 
contains no emergency management experts, are going to steer the Agency 
in the direction of another Katrina.
    Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked into the 
Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation from 
professional emergency managers. FEMA was weakened by being subsumed 
into the Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation 
with emergency management professionals. The result was the most 
catastrophic loss of life in modern disaster history. We cannot afford 
to repeat the mistakes of the past.
    That said, reforming FEMA thoughtfully does not mean we should 
avoid change altogether. In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better.
    Last summer, extreme heat caused temperatures in my district were 
nearly unlivable. We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for 
over a month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed 
during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The heat in 
our state literally caused roads to crack, cars to melt--and hundreds 
of lives were lost.
    However, FEMA was nowhere to be found because the Agency has not 
yet adapted to emerging disasters like extreme heat. Heat is a silent 
killer. It advances quietly and lingers. The longer it lingers; the 
more devastating the impact.
    We must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look forward to 
working with the Agency to ensure they have the resources and authority 
they need to respond to disasters all across the country--not just 
hurricanes on the east coast.
    That is why I am grateful that this Committee has invited a panel 
of emergency management experts to testify here today about their 
suggested reforms for emergency management. You are all the kind of 
folks we should be consulting before making any change to FEMA 
function. Thank you for taking the time to be here today, and I look 
forward to hearing your testimony.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full 
committee, Representative Larsen, for 5 minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, subcommittee Chair 
Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Stanton, for convening 
today's hearing.
    Emergency management in the U.S. today stands at a 
crossroads. As the Nation grapples with the devastation caused 
by Hurricanes Helene and Milton, the wildfires in L.A., and 
other disasters across the country, FEMA's role has come under 
intense scrutiny.
    The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane 
Helene and the L.A. wildfires alone exceed $200 billion. 
Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic 
events will require robust congressional oversight, 
supplemental funding, and Presidential leadership.
    Instead of uniting the Nation, though, to rebuild what has 
been lost, the administration has unfortunately exploited and 
politicized these disasters. The President has spread 
misinformation in the wake of these tragedies, threatened to 
condition disaster aid, and doubled down on the suggestion to 
eliminate FEMA altogether.
    Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, quote, ``we're going 
to eliminate FEMA,'' end quote, during a Cabinet meeting. No, 
we are not.
    These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the 
women and men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives 
to helping fellow Americans respond to and recover from 
disasters.
    FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during, 
and after disasters.
    States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity 
to respond to a disaster. As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator 
during President Trump's first term, aptly stated, ``Emergency 
management is locally executed, State managed, and federally 
supported.''
    FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options 
and resources are exhausted. Eliminating FEMA would not make 
communities safer, would not reduce insurance premiums, would 
not improve outcomes for disaster survivors. Instead, it would 
shift the burden of disaster response and accountability from 
the Federal Government to State and local governments.
    The Democrats have long championed improvements to the 
delivery of disaster assistance. It isn't new to us that FEMA 
needs to be reformed. Last year, many bipartisan FEMA-related 
bills were discussed in this committee, and we attempted to 
pass them out of the House: Representative Titus' Disaster 
Survivor Fairness Act to reform FEMA's Individual Assistance 
Program; Representative Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement 
Act to make FEMA's programs better equipped to address the 
impacts of wildfires; and Representative Neguse's Disaster 
Management Costs Modernization Act to build State and local 
emergency management capacity.
    Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA 
reforms and getting reform right. However, it requires careful 
consideration and input from emergency management 
professionals.
    For example, the President has suggested that disaster 
assistance could be fixed by simply providing block grants for 
recovery to impacted States. FEMA already offers a block grant 
option through the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures 
program authorized by section 428 of the Stafford Act. However, 
States rarely use this authority due to the perceived risks 
involved.
    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term 
disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in 
delivering outcomes and similarly has been the subject of 
bipartisan scrutiny.
    If you want these reforms to Federal emergency management 
to succeed, the reforms must be informed by the challenges 
faced by existing programs and built on recent progress.
    For instance, in 2019, Congress authorized the creation of 
a predisaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to 
enhance community resilience against disasters while reducing 
recovery costs for individuals, as well as State and local 
governments as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act. And I 
want to thank the Trump 1.0 administration for advocating for 
this and for the President for signing that bill.
    So, any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the 
Agency's capability to support resilience projects and not 
diminishing them.
    So, I look forward to discussing possible solutions to 
improve FEMA and outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel 
of qualified experts that we have before us today.
    I want to thank you all for being here, and I look forward 
to your testimony.
    I yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 
    from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking 
Member Stanton, for convening today's hearing.
    Emergency management in the United States stands at a critical 
crossroads.
    As the nation grapples with the devastation caused by Hurricanes 
Helene and Milton, the wildfires in Los Angeles and other disasters 
across the country, FEMA's role has come under intense scrutiny.
    The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane Helene and 
the Los Angeles wildfires exceed $200 billion.
    Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic events 
will require robust congressional oversight, supplemental funding and 
presidential leadership.
    Instead of uniting the nation to rebuild what has been lost, the 
Administration has unfortunately exploited and politicized these 
disasters.
    The President has spread misinformation in the wake of these 
tragedies, threatened to condition disaster aid and doubled down on his 
suggestion to eliminate FEMA altogether.
    Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, ``we are going to eliminate 
FEMA'' during a cabinet meeting. No, we are not.
    These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the women and 
men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives to helping their 
fellow Americans respond to and recover from disasters.
    FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during and after 
disasters.
    States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity to 
respond to a disaster.
    As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator during President Trump's first 
term, aptly stated, ``Emergency management is locally executed, state-
managed and federally supported.''
    FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options and 
resources have been exhausted.
    Eliminating FEMA would not make communities safer, would not reduce 
insurance premiums, would not improve outcomes for disaster survivors.
    Instead, it would shift the burden of disaster response and 
accountability from the federal government to state and local 
governments.
    Democrats have long championed improvements to the delivery of 
disaster assistance.
    It isn't new to us that FEMA needs to be reformed.
    Last year, among many FEMA-related bills, we attempted to pass:
      Rep. Titus' Disaster Survivor Fairness Act to reform 
FEMA's Individual Assistance Program;
      Rep. Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement Act to make 
FEMA's programs better equipped to address the impacts of wildfires; 
and
      Rep. Neguse's Disaster Management Costs Modernization Act 
to build state and local emergency management capacity.

    Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA reforms. 
Getting reform right, however, requires careful consideration and input 
from emergency management professionals.
    For example, President Trump has suggested that disaster assistance 
could be fixed by simply providing block grants for recovery to 
impacted states.
    FEMA already offers a block grant option through the Public 
Assistance Alternative Procedures program authorized by Section 428 of 
the Stafford Act.
    However, states rarely use this authority due to the perceived 
risks involved.
    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term 
disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in 
delivering outcomes and has similarly been the subject of bipartisan 
scrutiny.
    If we want reforms to federal emergency management to succeed, they 
must be informed by the challenges faced by existing programs and built 
upon recent progress.
    For instance, in 2019 Congress authorized the creation of a pre-
disaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to enhance community 
resilience against disasters while reducing recovery costs for 
individuals as well as state and local governments.
    This passed as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, and I want 
to thank the Trump 1.0 Administration for advocating for this and for 
the President signing that bill.
    Any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the Agency's 
capability to support resilience projects--not diminishing it.
    I look forward to discussing possible solutions to improve FEMA and 
outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel of qualified experts 
before the Subcommittee today.
    Thank you all for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
    I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for 
being here, especially the ones who have traveled a great 
distance today.
    Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain the 
lighting system to our witnesses who may not have been here 
recently or maybe ever. There are three lights in front of you. 
Green means go, yellow means you are running out of time, and 
red means to conclude your remarks.
    The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses' full 
statements be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of 
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses 
have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to 
them in writing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record 
remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and 
information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in 
the record of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5 
minutes.
    With that, Mr. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes for 
your testimony, sir.

  TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; KEVIN GUTHRIE, 
 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT; 
  JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA COUNTY, NORTH 
   CAROLINA; AND ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, 
    TEXAS, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

  TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Currie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 
Stanton, and other members of the subcommittee. It is an honor 
to be here today to talk about GAO's work on FEMA.
    I think the hearing and the discussions around reform are a 
great opportunity to address many longstanding challenges that 
we and many others have identified for years and years.
    We have looked at Federal response and recoveries for 
years, going from Guam to Puerto Rico and everywhere in 
between. And what we have seen is an increasingly complicated, 
fragmented, inflexible, and lengthy process that seems to get 
harder and harder by the year.
    FEMA and the rest of the Federal Government have spent over 
$500 billion in the last 10 years on disaster aid. There are 
currently over 30 Federal agencies that are involved in 
disaster assistance, and many of these programs, which pay for 
rebuilding the same types of infrastructure, have overlapping 
or duplicative requirements.
    Just as an example, the Department of Transportation, FEMA, 
and HUD programs can all be used to build similar 
infrastructure, but they may require completely different 
paperwork, different environmental reviews, have different 
rules, and, most difficultly, are on different timelines, which 
makes it virtually impossible to synchronize those programs for 
recovery.
    This is a major reason why recovery takes up to 20 years, 
as you said, Mr. Chairman. Two years ago, we actually issued a 
report outlining the systemic problem and came up with a number 
of options that Congress could take to reform the system. These 
ranged from simple options to better streamlining current 
programs, registration websites, things like that, all the way 
to more significant changes like complete reorganizations and 
overhauls of disaster agencies themselves.
    On top of this, as you said, FEMA's workforce is 
overwhelmed. There are over 600 major disasters and, as you 
said, over 1,000 fire disasters, and all types of disasters 
going back many, many years that require staffing to address 
each one of those, and thousands of projects.
    Last we looked at it, FEMA was 35 percent short of its 
staffing needs based on the expectations on the Agency, and 
there is now a never-ending disaster season.
    The workforce structure was created at a time when large 
disasters were very rare, and it needs to be reformed. And it 
is not just about the numbers, but the whole structure needs to 
be reformed to be more responsive.
    Also, I want to talk about individual survivors. We have to 
shift to programs that are not Government centric but are 
survivor centric. And when I say that, I mean they have to be 
geared towards helping a person get the assistance they need at 
the worst time of their life.
    A big problem at FEMA are antiquated technology and 
financial management systems. These need to be fixed in order 
for FEMA to be able to deliver the technology solutions that we 
already have in the private sector to try to intake people and 
get them the assistance they need.
    The last thing I would like to talk about are just a few 
cautions to consider for this committee as you look to reform 
the system and for the administration. First is the National 
Response Framework. I think we have to be really careful not to 
break what is not broken. We have to not forget Hurricane 
Katrina and what we fixed after that.
    The National Response Framework provides steady funding and 
coordination mechanisms that all levels of Government 
understand at this point, and I think the structure works well.
    We also have to remember the capacity differences across 
the country. Some States and counties and cities have the 
resources and the capacity to manage disasters. Many others we 
see just don't, and that is not going to change any time soon. 
These are always going to need State and Federal support to 
provide the response that we need to help those citizens.
    And then last, it is not just about FEMA. If we look to 
reform FEMA but don't fix the whole disaster response and 
recovery system, it is not going to fix the problem, and I 
think that is very important to consider as we move forward.
    So I look forward to your questions and the discussion.
    [Mr. Currie's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and 
             Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
          Disaster Assistance: Improving the Federal Approach
                               Highlights
What GAO Found
    There is a growing emphasis on how the federal government can 
improve its approach to disaster recovery. In the last 10 years, 
appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448 billion, 
plus an additional $110 billion in supplemental appropriations so far 
in fiscal year 2025. Recent disasters such as Hurricanes Helene and 
Milton, the wildfires in California, and this month's destructive 
tornadoes across the Midwest and South demonstrated the need for 
government-wide action to deliver assistance efficiently and 
effectively and reduce its fiscal exposure (see figures 1 and 4). Given 
the rise in the number and cost of disasters and increasing challenges 
related to the delivery of federal disaster assistance identified in 
GAO's work, Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance was 
added to GAO's High-Risk List in February 2025.
    To improve the federal government's delivery of disaster 
assistance, GAO has found that attention is needed to improve processes 
for assisting survivors, reduce fragmentation across federal disaster 
assistance programs, strengthen the disaster workforce and capacity, 
and invest in resilience. For example, GAO has recommended that 
Congress should consider establishing an independent commission to 
recommend reforms to the federal approach to disaster recovery, which 
is fragmented across more than 30 federal entities. GAO also reported 
on various options for reforming the federal approach to disaster 
recovery, such as better coordinating and consolidating programs across 
agencies and simplifying processes for survivors, among other things.
    Further, GAO recommended that the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) develop and implement a methodology that provides a more 
comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction's ability to respond to a 
disaster without federal assistance. Without an accurate assessment, 
FEMA runs the risk of recommending to the President that federal 
disaster assistance be awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it. 
FEMA has taken past steps to do this but has not fully implemented this 
recommendation. GAO also found that FEMA's workforce is overwhelmed by 
the increasing number of disasters and other emergencies. Strengthening 
the disaster workforce will be a critical part of better delivering the 
assistance that communities and survivors need to recover.
Why GAO Did This Study
    Natural disasters have become costlier and more frequent. In 2024, 
there were 27 disasters with at least $1 billion in damages, compared 
to 14 in 2018. Disasters in 2024 resulted in 568 deaths nationwide.
    Further, federal disaster declarations and the expectation for 
federal support have increased. In addition, federal support for 
disaster recovery can last for years. For example, FEMA is managing 
over 600 open major disaster declarations--some of which occurred 
almost 20 years ago, according to the agency.
    This statement discusses GAO's new disaster high-risk area, and 
related work on reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to 
disaster assistance, among other things.
    This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 2020 
through February 2025. For this work, GAO analyzed federal law and 
documents related to disaster assistance and interviewed officials 
across relevant federal, state and local agencies. GAO also conducted 
site visits to recent disasters areas, among other actions.
What GAO Recommends
    As of March 2025, GAO has approximately 60 open recommendations 
related to disaster assistance. There are also four matters for 
congressional consideration. These recommendations and matters are 
designed to address the various challenges discussed in this statement. 
Agencies have taken steps to address some of these recommendations. GAO 
will continue to monitor agency efforts to determine if they fully 
address the challenges GAO has identified.
                               __________
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our past work on the 
federal approach to disaster recovery.
    Hurricanes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and other natural 
disasters affect hundreds of American communities each year. Due to the 
rising number of natural disasters, there has been a growing emphasis 
on how the federal government can improve its approach to disaster 
recovery. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
calculated that, in 2018 the U.S. experienced 14 disasters that each 
cost more than $1 billion in total economic damages. By 2024, the 
number of disasters costing at least $1 billion almost doubled to 
27.\1\ That same year, at least 568 people died, directly or 
indirectly, as a result of those disasters. Recent disasters 
demonstrate the need for the federal government to take action to 
deliver assistance efficiently and effectively and reduce its fiscal 
exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National 
Centers for Environmental Information, ``U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather 
and Climate Disasters'' (2025). These data are not direct costs to the 
federal government and are produced using a detailed methodology 
reflecting overall U.S. economic damages, including insured and 
uninsured losses to residential, commercial, and government/municipal 
buildings.

      Hurricanes Helene and Milton occurred within 2 weeks of 
one another in 2024 and affected some of the same areas in the 
Southeast (see fig. 1). These two disasters resulted in over 200 deaths 
and are expected to cost over $50 billion, according to the National 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

      On January 8, 2025, the President approved a major 
disaster declaration for historic wildfires in Los Angeles County, 
California. The wildfires were unprecedented in their size, scope, and 
the damage they caused. The Palisades and Eaton fires resulted in 29 
deaths and the expected financial cost is still unknown as of March 
2025.

      In mid-March 2025, destructive tornadoes and severe 
storms occurred across the Midwest and South over a three-day period. 
The storms resulted in over 40 deaths, and the number of states that 
will need federal assistance is still unclear as of March 2025.

    Figure 1: Road Repair Following Hurricane Helene, North Carolina



    My statement today is based on our most recent High-Risk update in 
February 2025 as well as our prior work identifying key programmatic 
challenges the federal government faces related to the delivery of 
federal disaster assistance.\2\ This statement includes information on 
our work related to 1) improving processes for assisting survivors, 2) 
reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to disaster assistance, 
3) strengthening Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) workforce 
and capacity, and 4) investing in resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions 
More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To conduct our prior work, we analyzed relevant statutes such as 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,\3\ 
regulations, agency guidance and interagency coordination documents, 
such as the National Disaster Recovery Framework.\4\ We also 
interviewed officials across relevant federal agencies and state and 
local officials involved in disaster assistance, and conducted site 
visits to communities impacted by recent disasters in California, 
Florida, and North Carolina, among other actions. More detailed 
information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found 
within each of the issued reports cited throughout this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5121 et seq.
    \4\ Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Recovery 
Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 
accordance with all sections of our Quality Assurance Framework that 
are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and 
perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 
meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. 
We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 
conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions 
in this product.
                               Background
    Disaster assistance includes providing support to communities and 
survivors for response to, recovery from, and resilience to man-made 
and natural disasters. For fiscal years 2015 through 2024, 
appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448 
billion.\5\ In total, FEMA approved over two million households for 
federal disaster assistance in 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ This total includes $312 billion in selected supplemental 
appropriations to federal agencies for disaster assistance and 
approximately $136 billion in annual appropriations to the Disaster 
Relief Fund for fiscal years 2015 through 2024. It does not include 
other annual appropriations to federal agencies for disaster 
assistance. Of the supplemental appropriations, $97 billion was 
included in supplemental appropriations acts that were enacted 
primarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, in 
December 2024, the Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2025, appropriated $110 billion in supplemental appropriations for 
disaster assistance, not included in the $448 billion. Pub. L. No. 118-
158, div. B, 138 Stat. 1722 (2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Disaster Relief Fund, administered by FEMA, pays for several 
key disaster response, recovery, and mitigation programs that assist 
communities impacted by federally declared emergencies and major 
disasters. Annual appropriations to this fund have varied but generally 
increased from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure 
2. Other federal agencies have specific authorities and resources 
outside of the Disaster Relief Fund to support certain disaster 
response and recovery efforts.

Figure 2: Disaster Relief Fund Appropriations in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 
                         Dollars, FY 2000	2024


      Note: Fiscal year 2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of 
sequestration. Supplemental data include contingent appropriations and 
    all appropriations under the heading of ``Disaster Relief'' or 
  ``Disaster Relief Fund'' including the language ``for an additional 
 amount.'' Appropriations do not account for transfers or rescissions. 
  Deflator used was drawn from the FY2024 Budget of the United States 
    Government, ``Historical Tables: Table 1.3_Summary of Receipts, 
Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current Dollars, Constant (FY 
         2012) Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940-2028.''

    We have also previously reported that long-term recovery can be 
challenging, and project costs can increase the longer a recovery 
lasts.
    For example, in February 2024, over 6 years after Hurricanes Irma 
and Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico in 2017, we reported that FEMA 
and Puerto Rico had taken actions, such as providing advance 
disbursements of funds to grant recipients to help jump-start permanent 
work construction to rebuild.\6\ However, grant subrecipients that 
received awards from FEMA through an expedited process identified 
increased project costs that pose risks to the completion of work. For 
example, officials from Puerto Rico's Aqueduct and Sewer Authority said 
that the costs for one water treatment plant project exceeded its 
original estimate by 42 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery 
Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further, the number of federal disaster declarations and the 
expectation for long-term federal support have increased. As shown in 
figure 3, federal support for disaster recovery can last for years. For 
example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major 
disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in 
various stages of response and recovery. For instance, as of February 
2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects as part 
of the Public Assistance program for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
2005.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ FEMA's Public Assistance program provides assistance for debris 
removal efforts; life-saving emergency protective measures; and the 
repair or replacement of disaster-damaged publicly owned or certain 
private non-profit facilities, roads and bridges, and electrical 
utilities, among other activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Figure 3: Time Frames and Activities in Disaster Preparedness, 
                   Response, Recovery, and Resilience



    The frequency and intensity of recent disasters have severely 
strained FEMA, affecting its ability to deliver assistance as 
effectively and efficiently as possible. We added Improving the 
Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance to our High-Risk List in 
February 2025, given the rise in the number and cost of disasters and 
increasing programmatic challenges identified in our work.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ At the beginning of each new Congress, we issue an update to 
our High-Risk series, which identifies government operations with 
serious vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or 
in need of transformation. See GAO-25-107743.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are approximately 60 open recommendations related to this new 
high-risk area, as of March 2025. In addition, there are four open 
matters for congressional consideration to help address the nation's 
delivery of disaster assistance, specifically related to fragmentation, 
property acquisitions, and housing issues.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ GAO-25-107743.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Improving Processes for Assisting Survivors
Rural Assistance
    Survivors face numerous challenges receiving needed aid, including 
lengthy and complex application review processes. Federal agencies are 
taking steps to help improve disaster assistance to survivors. For 
example, in 2023, the Small Business Administration (SBA) implemented 
the Disaster Assistance for Rural Communities Act to simplify the 
process for a governor or tribal government chief executive to request 
an agency disaster declaration in counties with rural communities that 
have experienced significant damage.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Pub. L. No. 117-249, Sec.  2, 136 Stat. 2350 (2022) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. Sec.  636(b)(16)). See also at 13 C.F.R. Sec.  
123.3(a)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We found in February 2024 that rural areas face unique challenges 
in seeking SBA assistance following a disaster.\11\ For example, we 
found that disaster survivors may not be aware of SBA's disaster loans. 
We recommended that SBA should distinguish between rural and urban 
communities in its outreach and marketing plan and incorporate actions 
to mitigate the unique challenges rural communities face in accessing 
its Disaster Loan Program. SBA agreed with our recommendation, and we 
will continue to monitor its progress to address it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ GAO, Small Business Administration: Targeted Outreach about 
Disaster Assistance Could Benefit Rural Communities, GAO-24-106755 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Block Grants
    Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-
DR) funds provide significant, flexible federal recovery funding for 
states and localities affected by disasters and generally support long-
term recovery. However, in December 2022, we reported that HUD does not 
require CDBG-DR grantees to collect accurate data on critical 
milestones.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Better Information is Needed on the 
Progress of Block Grant Funds, GAO-23-105295 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
15, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A HUD-funded 2019 study on the timeliness of CDBG-DR housing 
activities found that all but one of the eight grantees in the study 
faced challenges in developing a grant management system. HUD could 
better ensure that its grantees identify problem milestones and address 
delays in assisting survivors by requiring grantees to collect and 
analyze timeliness data, as we recommended. As of February 2025, HUD 
said it had explored options for requiring grantees to collect 
milestone data and was evaluating how best to address this 
recommendation to ensure the needs of disaster survivors are met in a 
timely manner. We will continue to monitor its progress to address this 
issue.
Flood Insurance
    Federal law created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to 
reduce the escalating costs of federal disaster assistance for flood 
damage, while also keeping flood insurance affordable. The NFIP 
transferred some of the financial burden of flood risk from property 
owners to the federal government. In our 2025 High-Risk List we 
reported that FEMA has developed a legislative proposal to improve the 
program's solvency and address affordability, among other reforms.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See GAO-25-107743.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, Congress has yet to enact comprehensive reforms to NFIP 
that would address the program's challenges. We have other ongoing work 
about the state of the homeowner's insurance market, including concerns 
about the availability and affordability of coverage, and the issue of 
a lack of flood insurance coverage and what can be done to address it.
 Reducing Fragmentation of the Federal Approach to Disaster Assistance
    The federal approach to disaster recovery is fragmented across more 
than 30 federal entities. These entities are involved with multiple 
programs and authorities and have differing requirements and 
timeframes. Moreover, data sharing across entities is limited. This 
fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to 
successfully navigate multiple federal programs.
    Congress and federal agencies have taken steps to better manage 
fragmentation, such as through interagency agreements and reducing 
program complexity, but challenges remain. In our November 2022 report, 
we identified 11 options to improve the federal government's approach 
to disaster recovery based on our review of relevant literature, 
interviews with federal, state, and local officials; and a panel of 
experts.\14\ See table 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related 
to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option 
and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to 
improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. We 
attribute statements from experts collected as part of the panel 
discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes 
statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery: 
Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-104956 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).

    Table 1: Options To Improve the Federal Government's Approach to
                            Disaster Recovery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Develop new coordinated efforts to clearly and consistently
 communicate about recovery programs.
2. Provide coordinated technical assistance throughout disaster
 recovery.
3. Develop models to more effectively coordinate across disaster
 recovery programs.
4. Develop a single, online application portal for disaster recovery
 that feeds into one repository.
5. Standardize requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.
6. Simplify requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.
7. Further incentivize investments in disaster resilience as part of
 federally-funded recovery programs.
8. Identify desired recovery outcomes and develop a mechanism to track
 these across programs.
9. Prioritize disaster recovery funding for vulnerable communities
 across all federal programs.
10. Consolidate federal disaster recovery programs.
11. Adjust the role of the federal government in disaster recovery.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of relevant literature; interviews with federal,
  state, and local officials; and a panel of experts. GAO-25-108216


    Certain options identified could be acted on within one or more 
agencies' existing authorities, while others may require congressional 
action to implement.\15\ In our report, we detailed the key strengths 
and limitations that the panel of experts identified about each of 
these options. For example, one option is to develop a single 
application for disaster recovery assistance that feeds into one 
repository. This portal could help applicants, including state and 
local governments and individual disaster survivors, identify which 
federal programs fit their specific recovery needs based on their 
eligibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Other than where we have made prior recommendations related to 
certain options, we do not endorse any particular option. Rather, our 
November 2022 report identifies possible implementation methods and the 
strengths and limitations of each option. Experts who participated in 
our panel agreed that the federal government's approach to disaster 
recovery needs to be improved. They discussed ways to make it operate 
more efficiently and effectively and to better incorporate incentives 
for improving disaster resilience and address equity concerns. See GAO-
23-104956.

      For strengths, experts said implementing this option 
could improve the applicant experience by streamlining the application 
process for disaster survivors and state and local applicants. This 
option could also help address state and local government capacity 
limitations by reducing the amount of work needed to complete multiple 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
applications for different disaster recovery programs.

      In terms of limitations, experts discussed the costs 
associated with the development and management of the system, cross-
agency privacy and data sharing concerns, and the fact that this option 
would not necessarily reduce the complexity of the federal disaster 
recovery programs.

    Another identified option is to consolidate disaster recovery 
programs across federal agencies. This option could be implemented by, 
for example, providing a single federal disaster recovery block grant 
that identifies funding options by sector. It could also be implemented 
by reorganizing existing federal disaster recovery programs into a 
single agency focused on disaster resilience and recovery efforts.

      For strengths, experts said that consolidating federal 
disaster recovery programs could reduce the administrative burden on 
disaster survivors and state and local governments. They also said that 
implementing this option could reduce the number of federal funding 
streams for disaster recovery, which could reduce the complexity of 
carrying out disaster recovery projects.

      In terms of limitations, experts said that implementing 
this option by reorganizing government agencies would be difficult and 
may create additional risks. Specifically, experts noted that 
consolidating programs or creating a new agency would not necessarily 
reduce the complexity of implementing programs.

    In our November 2022 report, we recommended that Congress should 
consider establishing an independent commission to recommend reforms to 
the federal approach to disaster recovery.\16\ Such a commission should 
follow our leading practices for interagency collaboration.\17\ In 
January 2025, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate that would 
establish a Commission on Federal Natural Disaster Resilience and 
Recovery to examine and recommend reforms to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the federal government's approach to natural disaster 
resilience and recovery, and for other purposes.\18\ We will continue 
to monitor the progress of this bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ GAO-23-104956.
    \17\ GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to 
Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Address Crosscutting Challenges, 
GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023).
    \18\ S. 270, 119th Cong. (2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, on January 24, 2025, the President established the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council (FEMA Review 
Council).\19\ According to DHS, the goal of the FEMA Review Council is 
to advise the President on the existing ability of FEMA to capably and 
impartially address disasters occurring within the United States. The 
council shall also advise the President on all recommended changes 
related to FEMA to best serve the national interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ 90 Fed. 10,082 (Feb. 21, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As administrator of several disaster recovery programs, FEMA should 
also take steps to better manage fragmentation across its own programs, 
as we recommended in 2022. Such actions could make the programs 
simpler, more accessible and user-friendly, and improve the 
effectiveness of federal disaster recovery efforts.
    Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster recovery 
and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to disaster 
survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of recovery 
efforts. In response to our November 2022 recommendations, as of 
February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to streamline the applications for 
two of its recovery programs. However, FEMA will need to demonstrate 
that it has thoroughly considered available options to (1) better 
manage fragmentation across its own programs, (2) identify which 
changes FEMA intends to implement to its recovery programs, and (3) 
take any necessary steps to fully implement the recommendation to 
better manage fragmentation across disaster recovery programs.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ GAO-23-104956.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further, we have found that communities continue to face challenges 
obtaining support to address wildfires. FEMA and multiple other federal 
entities have responsibilities for federal wildfire mitigation, 
response, and recovery efforts, to include the award and management of 
contracts awarded before and during wildfire seasons. Additionally, 
state, local, and tribal governments can enter into mutual aid 
agreements with federal agencies to enable coordinated wildfire 
responses.
    In response to the challenges that wildfires pose for the nation, 
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act required the establishment 
of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission in 2021.\21\ 
In September 2023, the commission issued a set of policy priorities and 
recommendations calling for greater coordination, interoperability, 
collaboration, and simplification within the wildfire system. In 
addition, we have found that as the incidence and severity of massive 
wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find additional 
opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\22\ For example, 
we recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to provide 
immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a process 
to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from Fire 
Management Assistance Grants recipients.\23\ Taking these steps would 
help foster more resilient communities and reduce the future demand on 
federal resources. We are monitoring efforts to address this 
recommendation. See figure 4 for example of wildfire damage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Pub. L. No. 117-58, Sec. Sec.  70201-07, 135 Stat. 429, 1250-
58 (2021).
    \22\ See GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA 
Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2025) 
and GAO, Disaster Contracting: Action Needed to Improve Agencies' Use 
of Contracts for Wildfire Response and Recovery, GAO-23-105292 
(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2023).
    \23\ GAO-25-106862.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Figure 4: Fire Damage Following the Palisades Fire Los Angeles, 
                               California


          Strengthening FEMA's Disaster Workforce and Capacity
    FEMA has long-standing workforce management issues that make 
supporting response and recovery efforts difficult. In recent years, 
the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, 
and other responsibilities have placed additional pressures on FEMA. 
FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and staffing levels has 
limited its capacity to provide effective disaster assistance.
    In May 2020, we reported that FEMA has faced challenges with 
deploying staff with the right qualifications and skills to meet 
disaster needs.\24\ We recommended that FEMA develop a plan to address 
challenges in providing quality information to field leaders about 
staff qualifications. In June 2022, FEMA provided a plan that included 
both completed and ongoing actions to address our recommendation. FEMA 
officials told us that the actions in the plan enhance reliability of 
FEMA workforce qualifications and increases field leadership 
accessibility of workforce information. Such actions should better 
enable the agency to use its disaster workforce flexibility as 
effectively as possible to meet mission needs in the field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address 
Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In May 2023, we reported that FEMA uses different processes under 
various statutory authorities to hire full-time employees and temporary 
reservists.\25\ We found that FEMA had an overall staffing gap of 
approximately 35 percent across different positions at the beginning of 
fiscal year 2022. While the gaps varied across different positions, 
Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower 
percentages of staffing targets met--between 44 and 60 percent at the 
beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important 
functions, including administering assistance to state and local 
governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction 
activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and 
movement during a disaster.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring 
Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 
2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In October 2024, FEMA had only 9 percent of its disaster-response 
workforce available for Hurricane Milton response as staff were 
deployed to other disasters such as Hurricane Helene in the southeast 
and flooding in Vermont.\26\ In addition, FEMA had only 20 percent of 
its disaster-response workforce available for Los Angeles fire response 
in January 2025.\27\ We have made numerous recommendations to help FEMA 
better manage catastrophic or concurrent disasters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ FEMA National Watch Center, National Situation Report (Oct. 8, 
2024).
    \27\ FEMA, National Watch Center, Daily Operations Briefing (Jan. 
8, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, we recommended that FEMA should develop and implement 
a methodology that provides a more comprehensive assessment of a 
jurisdiction's response and recovery capabilities including its fiscal 
capacity.\28\ Without an accurate assessment, FEMA runs the risk of 
recommending to the President that federal disaster assistance be 
awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it. FEMA has taken steps to 
update the factors considered when evaluating a request for a major 
disaster declaration for Public Assistance, specifically the estimated 
cost of assistance, through the federal rulemaking process three 
times--in 2016, 2017, and 2020. However, as of January 2025, the agency 
has not issued a final rule updating the estimated cost of assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to 
Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own, 
GAO-12-838 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The COVID-19 pandemic marked the first time the Disaster Relief 
Fund has been used to respond to a nationwide public health emergency. 
FEMA used its typical process to estimate its obligations for COVID-19. 
However, in July 2024 we reported that FEMA did not meet its accuracy 
goal for actual obligations for COVID-19 in any fiscal year from 2021 
through 2023.\29\ By identifying and documenting lessons learned for 
estimating obligations based on its experience with COVID-19, as we 
recommended, FEMA can better position itself to adapt to similar 
estimation challenges in the future. FEMA did not concur with our 
recommendation; however, we maintain that it is warranted. In January 
2025, FEMA told us it believes the analyses it has already conducted, 
including an analysis of COVID-19 expenditure drawdowns, are sufficient 
to meet the intent of the recommendation. We have requested 
documentation of this analysis and of any associated lessons learned 
related to cost estimation. We will continue to monitor FEMA's efforts 
and provide further information when we confirm any actions taken to 
address the recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ FEMA has a goal for its actual obligations to fall within 10 
percent of the baseline estimate by the end of the fiscal year. This is 
for individual disasters and for the Disaster Relief Fund overall. See, 
GAO, Disaster Relief Fund: Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Could Improve 
FEMA's Estimates, GAO-24-106676 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Investing in Resilience
    Disaster resilience can reduce the need for more costly future 
recovery assistance. In our Disaster Resilience Framework, we reported 
that the reactive and fragmented federal approach to disaster risk 
reduction limits the federal government's ability to facilitate 
significant reduction in the nation's overall disaster risk.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ GAO, Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles for Analyzing 
Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to Natural 
Disasters, GAO-20-100SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FEMA's hazard mitigation assistance programs provide assistance for 
eligible long-term solutions that reduce the impact of future 
disasters, thereby increasing disaster resilience. However, we have 
reported that FEMA can improve its hazard mitigation assistance grant 
programs.
    For example, the Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk 
Mitigation Act of 2021 authorized FEMA to award capitalization grants--
seed funding--to help eligible states, territories, Tribes, and the 
District of Columbia establish revolving loan funds for mitigation 
assistance.\31\ In response, FEMA established the Safeguarding Tomorrow 
Revolving Loan Fund grant program in 2022. In February 2025, we found 
that while FEMA has identified some tools to collect information on the 
Revolving Loan Fund program, FEMA does not have a process for 
systematically collecting and evaluating the information to assess 
program effectiveness across all phases of the program.\32\ We 
recommended that FEMA document and implement a process to regularly 
assess program effectiveness using evidence-based decision-making 
practices to help instill confidence in program participants and better 
ensure the long-term sustainability and success of the program. FEMA 
concurred with our recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Pub. L. No. 116-284, 134 Stat. 4869 (2021) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. Sec.  5135).
    \32\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Improve Guidance and 
Assessment of Its Revolving Loan Fund Program, GAO-25-107331 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FEMA's Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program 
provides pre-disaster mitigation grants to help eligible state, 
territorial, federally recognized tribal and local governments invest 
in a variety of natural hazard mitigation activities. These activities 
focus on infrastructure projects and building capability and capacity 
among local communities. During the 5-year period from fiscal years 
2020 through 2024, FEMA made about $5.5 billion available for these 
grants. As of January 2025, FEMA had announced awards of about $1 
billion.\33\ We are currently reviewing this program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ FEMA, The Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of January 
31, 2025. (Washington D.C. Feb. 12, 2025) For example, of the $500 
million made available in fiscal year 2020, FEMA had announced awards 
for $252 million, as of January 2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, individuals who lack sufficient insurance coverage 
often face greater challenges in recovery. If disaster survivors are 
uninsured or underinsured, they may have to rely more on federal 
disaster assistance. Until recent regulatory changes, FEMA did not 
award any housing assistance to individuals who received at least the 
maximum FEMA award for housing repairs from their insurance company, 
even if there was a gap between their insurance coverage and their 
losses. For disasters with Individual Assistance declared on or after 
March 22, 2024, FEMA will now award housing assistance to those who 
receive insurance payouts that exceed the FEMA maximum award for their 
losses, up to the statutory maximums, if they have eligible unmet needs 
or uncovered losses.\34\ FEMA officials said they expect the amounts of 
Individual Assistance awards to increase due to this change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ FEMA's Individual Assistance program provides financial 
assistance and direct services to eligible individuals and households 
who have uninsured or underinsured necessary expenses and serious needs 
as a result of a disaster. FEMA has also made other regulatory changes 
to the Individual Assistance program intended to improve access to 
assistance for survivors. 89 Fed. Reg. 3990 (Jan. 22, 2024). See also 
FEMA, Biden-Harris Administration Reforms Disaster Assistance Program 
to Help Survivors Recover Faster, (Washington, D.C.: 2024) for more 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In conclusion, by identifying and taking steps to better manage 
disaster assistance and the negative effects of the fragmented approach 
to disaster assistance, federal agencies could improve service delivery 
to disaster survivors and communities, improve the effectiveness of 
disaster recovery, and potentially reduce the federal government's 
fiscal exposure. Our recommendations to the various agencies involved 
in disaster assistance can help Congress identify key areas to address 
the nation's delivery of disaster assistance and reduce the 
government's fiscal exposure. We will continue to monitor agency 
progress and congressional actions.
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his 
testimony.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Guthrie for 5 minutes.

    TESTIMONY OF KEVIN GUTHRIE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA 
                DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 
Stanton, also Ranking Member Larsen, and other distinguished 
members of the committee for the invitation to testify today.
    I am Kevin Guthrie. I am the executive director of the 
Florida Division of Emergency Management. Throughout my tenure, 
I have led the division through numerous major events, 
including hurricanes such as Ian, Michael, Dorian, Isaias; as 
well as wildfires, floods, tornadoes, and the Surfside building 
collapse.
    I have also assisted in national immigration efforts, like 
Operation Vigilant Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in 
Texas. In my 30-plus years of experience at the local and State 
level, I have responded to over 50 major incidents.
    Under Governor Ron DeSantis' leadership, FDEM has become a 
model for the future of emergency management. This is due to 
our professionals' dedication and the lessons learned from our 
experience in a disaster-prone State.
    Florida looks forward to working with you and President 
Trump's administration to improve the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. We have learned the importance of effective 
coordination across all levels of Government.
    FDEM allows the philosophy that emergencies are federally 
supported, State managed, and locally executed. We emphasize 
collaboration with local governments supporting the response 
efforts instead of dictating them. This approach has allowed us 
to build on local best practices and continuously improve 
Florida's emergency management capabilities. This collaborative 
model is enhanced by the critical support that the Federal 
Government provides.
    FDEM operates year round, requiring funding even for 
nondisaster periods. While Federal grants help maintain our 
capabilities, we need to focus Federal support on expanding 
State and local capacities.
    States must have flexibility to build their systems without 
relying on Federal funding during a noncrisis period. One way 
to solidify this approach is through Federal block grants for 
emergency management. Block grants will allow States to quickly 
allocate funding for response and recovery operations, reducing 
bureaucratic delays and staffing needs at the Federal level.
    As we look to future improvements, one key area, as 
mentioned, is the integration of modern technology into our 
response systems. Florida has led the way and has modernized 
emergency management by digitizing workflows and improving data 
input processes. This has improved our efficiency, reduced 
delays, and expedited payment processing, cutting the time it 
takes to process invoices from 61 days during Hurricane Ian to 
just 16 days in recent hurricane season.
    Our use of technology has also reduced administrative costs 
and helped streamline disaster response. Data sharing among 
Federal, State, and local agencies is essential to improving 
response times. Leveraging advanced analytics machine learning 
has empowered decisionmakers in Florida to act faster and be 
more accurate than ever before.
    Another critical component of Florida's success has been 
our ability to collaborate with our other States through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, known as EMAC. EMAC, 
which is financially supported by the Federal Government, has 
been essential in States receiving aid that they need when they 
lack the necessary resources to respond and recover 
independently.
    Since 2022, Florida has leveraged EMAC in 6 major disasters 
receiving crucial support from 39 States. While collaboration 
has been effective, there are still areas where Federal 
processes could be streamlined to enhance disaster response.
    There are several ways the Federal Government can improve 
disaster response, such as creating a combined Federal disaster 
declaration process. This would eliminate delays caused by 
separate declarations for separate agencies. Additionally, 
streamlining disaster case management. And last, grant closeout 
procedures would accelerate recovery efforts and reduce 
displacement for survivors.
    All three of these have impacted me directly during my 
tenure with the State of Florida.
    As we continue to enhance our capabilities, Florida also 
emphasizes the importance of operational readiness. FDEM 
maintains a network of strategically located warehouses for 
rapid resource deployment and implements emergency standby 
contracts to ensure fast access to critical resources.
    Routine communication with State, local, and Federal 
partners through the State Emergency Response Team in Florida 
keeps Florida prepared for disaster.
    Sir, in conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude 
for the opportunity to testify before you today. Emergency 
management is a public safety entity that is essential for 
protecting lives and property. By improving Federal support, we 
can strengthen our Nation's disaster response capabilities and 
ensure faster recovery for all Americans.
    I look forward to continued collaboration with you, the 
committee, and the administration to improve these systems.
    Thank you.
    [Mr. Guthrie's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida 
                    Division of Emergency Management
                              Introduction
    Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and other 
distinguished members of the Committee for the invitation to testify 
here today.
    I am Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director of the Florida Division of 
Emergency Management (FDEM). Today I want to share with you what I know 
about Emergency Management. Due to the leadership of Governor Ron 
DeSantis, the State of Florida and FDEM are proud to have become a 
model for the future of emergency management. Florida's success is also 
directly tied to the dedication of our emergency management 
professionals and experience that comes with being in a disaster-prone 
state.
    Leading the profession in prepared and resilient communities, staff 
members provide technical assistance to local governments as they 
prepare emergency plans and procedures, as well as conduct emergency 
operations training for state and local governmental agencies with the 
mission of coordinating, collaborating and communicating with all 
community stakeholders for a more resilient Florida. As Executive 
Director and on behalf of my colleagues in State and Local emergency 
management, we thank you for this opportunity to provide a state 
perspective on the future of Federal Emergency Management. We are 
excited to work with you and President Trump's Administration to 
empower states in their emergency management efforts.
                            Disaster History
    Regarding disasters, as Executive Director, I have led the agency 
through numerous significant events, including Hurricanes Debby, 
Helene, Milton, Idalia, Ian, Nicole, Michael, Dorian, Isaias, Sally, 
and Eta, as well as Tropical Storms Elsa and Fred. Besides tropical 
systems, I have provided support to Floridians through a variety of 
events, including the tragic Surfside Building Collapse, wildfires, 
tornadoes, floods and more. We have also assisted efforts in the 
nation's fight against illegal immigration through Operation Vigilant 
Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in Texas. Additionally, in my 
broader 30 plus years of experience, I have responded to, assisted in 
leading, or led the operations of over 50 additional incidents or 
events in Florida or across the nation.
                            State Management
    We maintain our emergency management approach with conservative 
principles, emphasizing that emergencies should be federally supported, 
state-managed, and locally executed. Where possible, we utilize the 
federal government to bolster, rather than obstruct, state and local 
disaster response efforts. Local response efforts are amplified and 
supported by the State rather than dictated. Where additional support 
is needed, the Florida Division of Emergency Management does not 
hesitate to fill the need but does not take control or micromanage a 
response. We do not dictate what a local response looks like. Our 
willingness to support locals in their varied response efforts allows 
us to identify the best practices which are then shared and improved 
disaster after disaster. Again, we lead the industry in the field, but 
we are not perfect and believe in constant improvement at all ends of 
the emergency management system.
    Regarding federal support, the potential implementation of block 
grants for emergency management is an exciting development. With a 
block grant, an allocation of funding is provided to meet a given 
purpose such as response or recovery operations. If it is properly and 
consistently utilized within the criteria determined by the federal 
government, bureaucratic delays at the federal level are removed and 
states can push out the funding more quickly and effectively. Block 
grants may also allow for large-scale decreases in the administrative 
functions at the federal level.
             Amplification of Efforts Through Partnerships
    FDEM is made up of 225 full-time employees and approximately 170 
temporary employees. During a disaster, we activate our State Emergency 
Response Team (SERT) to maximize our capabilities. The SERT consists of 
our federal partners, State agencies, local emergency management, and 
private sector industries such as power, water, lodging, grocery, 
equipment, and materials. Additionally, Florida's First Lady, Casey 
DeSantis, has activated charitable foundations, volunteer 
organizations, and the faith community as part of our State Emergency 
Response Team (SERT). These entities provide tremendous assistance to 
disaster survivors without cost to the State. This assistance includes 
disaster cleanup, reconstruction, housing assistance, meal service, 
transportation, and more.
    We are not afraid of leaning on and empowering the private sector 
to improve our response and recovery efforts. In many facets of 
emergency management, the State and local governments rely on the 
private sector to do the essentials, whether that be restoring power, 
removing debris, or getting businesses operational as quickly as 
possible to create the necessary environment for a speedy recovery. We 
are not afraid of the private sector and do not care about logos or 
patches during a disaster. We care only about getting the job done.
    State and Local Emergency Management Enhanced by Federal Support
    FDEM operates 24/7, 365 days a year regardless of activation level 
or disaster status. Our staff must maintain operations continually to 
be ready to respond to natural and man-made disasters. In the event of 
a weather event, we usually have notice and ability to make final 
preparations prior to the disaster. In other cases, no-notice disasters 
specifically, our team activates to full capacity and may activate the 
entire SERT. To satisfy continual operations for the State and local 
emergency management agencies, funding is necessary on a non-disaster 
cycle. Base FEMA grants currently fund much of these continual 
operations. Any change or end to these base grants would necessitate an 
alternative funding source either through the State or local 
governments. In the same way that a government continually funds its 
Law Enforcement and Fire Departments, State and local governments must 
find a way to establish emergency management functions without Federal 
financial support for blue sky periods. This will look different state-
by-state and government-by-government. For more populous states, a 
stand-alone State-funded emergency management agency is certainly 
possible. In less populous states, incorporating the functions of an 
emergency management agency into existing capabilities such as the 
National Guard could be an option. Locally, in rural areas, 
incorporating the emergency management functions into the Sheriffs' 
offices or fire departments is expected. In metropolitan areas, the 
emergency management functions could be stand-alone due to the larger 
tax base.
    When public safety, health, and critical infrastructure agencies 
need help they call on Emergency Management. Therefore, Emergency 
Management is a public safety agency and it is incumbent upon each 
government to treat it as such. This means providing funding and 
resources within existing resources and capabilities. Regardless of how 
each state or local government would establish emergency management 
functions without federal financial assistance, it is critical that all 
federal support be focused on expanding capability rather than 
maintaining capability. Federal grants should not support long-term 
staffing at the State or local level.
    With this new paradigm in place, federal support can be targeted 
specifically for disaster events as the needs arise, and without a 
large bureaucracy in place at the federal level.
       Embracing Standardization of Data and Improved Technology
    FDEM has embraced modern technology to improve how data is used for 
operations. The first step in embracing technology is to streamline 
business operations and gain efficiencies to digitize current document 
workflows. The second step is to focus on the inputs of good, 
structured, digital information into the system(s) at the lowest 
possible level eliminating the need for bureaucratic reviews and 
approvals. In Florida, this has accelerated disaster response efforts, 
improved efficiency, reduced bureaucratic delays, and expedited payment 
processing after disasters. Efforts have not only helped the State work 
faster during an emergency but also ensure taxpayer money is managed 
responsibly. Embracing technology and activating data assets directly 
impacts our ability to ensure residents can recover and the economy can 
get back up and running faster than ever before.
    We have seen tremendous returns on investment in technology. For 
every dollar targeted at technology modernization, we have an estimated 
$530 in business efficiency. Additionally, the time it takes to process 
thousands of invoices following a disaster has decreased by 73%. During 
Hurricane Ian, FDEM averaged 61 days to process invoices. For 
Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton, this improved to just 16 days.
    The inability of data to flow from local to state to federal 
government through efficient use of technology is responsible for the 
delays and years long frustrations experienced in emergency management. 
We have proven that these delays can be reduced by up to 90% in some 
cases, all while decreasing long-term and temporary staffing needs.
    Collecting, analyzing, and governing relevant data is integral for 
providing reliable, actionable information for emergency operation 
decision-makers before, during, and after an emergency. We deployed an 
anomaly detector to identify and mitigate financial risks, including 
potential fraud, waste, and abuse, by detecting abnormalities when 
processing invoices for payment. With 99% accuracy, the anomaly 
detector identified three major invoice irregularities in the first 30 
days.
    Data is essential for Federal, State, and local officials as well 
as emergency management leaders charged with protecting and serving 
residents. By leveraging advanced analytics and machine learning, FDEM 
has empowered its leaders to transition from manual information 
collection and research into a modern, data-drive approach.
             Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
    In the event of large disasters, the Federal government has 
supported Florida financially and operationally. Additionally, states 
across our nation have lent support to Florida when we have needed it 
most.
    Since 2022, Florida has leveraged the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC) to request aid during six (6) disaster 
events. Over these incidents, 39 states across the nation stepped up to 
assist Florida by providing crucial assistance and bolstering Florida's 
response efforts. Through EMAC, Florida has received essential assets 
such as Swiftwater and Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) teams, fire 
response units, Incident Management Teams (IMTs), Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) support, voluntary liaisons, and National Guard 
assistance. These resources play a critical role in ensuring an 
effective disaster response.
    Throughout the six (6) disasters since 2022, including Operation 
Vigilant Sentry (OVS) and five (5) hurricanes--Ian, Idalia, Debby, 
Helene, and Milton, Florida has received a total of 7,444 personnel and 
associated equipment with total costs amounting to $74,731,312.50. 
These coordinated efforts have been instrumental in helping the state 
navigate disaster impacts over the past several years.
    The successful coordination of the EMAC, financially supported by 
the federal government, has been essential in ensuring states receive 
the aid they need when they lack the necessary resources to respond and 
recover independently. We want the federal government to continue 
administering and supporting EMAC to facilitate efficient and effective 
disaster response across the country.
    While many states, including Florida, have received significant 
financial support from American taxpayers during disasters, few states 
could fully fund disaster response and recovery without federal 
assistance. Thanks to responsible fiscal stewardship and a positive 
economic climate, Florida remains resilient--but ongoing federal 
support remains critical in times of crisis.
                    Additional Federal Efficiencies
    Combined Federal Disaster Declaration: When a disaster occurs, the 
federal government often claims to bring all forces to bear in 
response. Unfortunately, this is not always the case due to separate 
disaster declaration processes for different federal agencies. While a 
declaration by the President may be declared quickly for FEMA, other 
agencies such as the US Department of Agriculture or the US Department 
of Commerce (Fisheries and Aquaculture) require a separate lengthy 
process for disaster declaration. This separate process leads to 
significant delays in response to the agriculture and aquaculture 
industries. A combined declaration for all federal agencies would end 
these delays.
    Data Sharing: During response and recovery, the State and Federal 
agencies are often duplicating data gathering efforts as there is no 
``one-stop-shop'' for services. Disaster survivors are constantly 
filling out federal and state forms, applications, portals, and more. 
While there are challenges associated with data sharing, it is 
absolutely crippling for federal agencies to be prohibited from data 
sharing agreements with the State and locals. Remedying data sharing 
issues, as part of an annual ``blue sky'' process, will ensure a 
coordinated and less burdensome delivery of services to survivors, 
rather than duplicative and siloed data collection efforts and 
programs.
    Disaster Case Management: For disaster survivors, case management 
is a lengthy process, severely limiting available services and 
resources to survivors until months after the event occurred. By the 
time resources become available, many survivors have moved away or 
missed crucial deadlines in applications for assistance. The recovery 
of a community is stifled when its population moves away. Ensuring 
rapid deployment of disaster case management and funding can get 
survivors back on their feet more quickly will reduce the long-term 
costs of extended displacement.
    Disaster Grant Closeout Procedures: Current policy implies that all 
work must be completed on a public assistance project prior to 
application for reimbursement. This requirement causes excessive delay 
and long-term extension of disaster closeout and creates significant 
vulnerability to de-obligation. Allowing grants to cover partial work 
will facilitate quicker project accomplishment while getting funding to 
those communities that struggle to facilitate project completion due to 
limited revenues and cash flow.
                             Best Practices
    Warehousing & Deployable Resources: The Florida Division of 
Emergency Management (FDEM) maintains a network of strategically 
located warehouses, each designed to fulfill critical functions in 
statewide emergency response and disaster preparedness. These 
facilities serve as primary distribution hubs for essential resources, 
ensuring that life-sustaining supplies such as food, water, and 
emergency equipment are readily available for rapid deployment when 
disasters strike. In routine operations and smaller-scale emergencies, 
we are responsible for maintaining operational readiness, overseeing 
inventory management, and coordinating response efforts. However, in 
the event of a large-scale activation, additional surge personnel, 
including contractors, National Guardsmen, and State Guardsmen--are 
mobilized to expedite the efficient deployment of critical commodities. 
Beyond basic supplies, FDEM's warehouses are equipped with a wide range 
of specialized assets designed to support complex emergency operations. 
These include power generation equipment, high-capacity water pumps, 
personal protective equipment (PPE), flood prevention systems, mobile 
command vehicles (MCVs), heavy machinery, and sleeper trailers to 
accommodate on-site response teams. By maintaining these resources, we 
bolster the state's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to 
emergencies, mitigate disaster impacts, and safeguard lives and 
property.
    Emergency Standby Contracts: FDEM has implemented Emergency Standby 
Contracts as a proactive disaster management strategy, recognized as a 
national best practice. These pre-established agreements allow vendors 
to stage and procure critical resources in advance, ensuring faster, 
more efficient response efforts. This approach streamlines logistics, 
reduces delays, and helps protect lives and property by securing 
essential personnel, equipment, and supplies ahead of time. The 
contracts cover vital resources such as disaster support personnel, 
incident management teams, shelter staffing, medical personnel, care 
sites, transportation services, equipment, and emergency fuels. 
Contracts for emergency supplies and services--mirror best practices 
found in our state-level logistics operations (e.g., resource bundling, 
turn-key solutions, multiple vendors, allow for state/local level piggy 
backing, etc.). This cuts red tape during procurement, accelerates 
resource deployment, and leverages economies of scale.
    Routine Cycle of Preparedness: Throughout the year, the Florida 
State Emergency Resource Team (SERT) focuses on routine communication 
with our local, state, and contracted partners. Florida's emergency 
management framework is robust. The SERT is one of the most experienced 
in the Nation and is well-suited to address a wide range of complex 
incidents and events. For most natural and man-made emergencies, our 
state-level capacity, including rapid incident monitoring, logistical 
support, and specialized technical expertise (e.g., nuclear and 
radiological preparedness), ensures we can respond effectively. To 
better respond to these disasters, the SERT has digitized many of our 
mutual aid processes to include the FEMA reimbursement document. These 
efforts have allowed for quicker response and reimbursement for our 
first responders. Florida is the centralized emergency management 
coordination hub for disasters. To continue to excel in this, the SERT 
coordinates meetings with city, county, and tribal partners to forecast 
potential challenges and develop plans to address concerns. Quarterly, 
the SERT meets with command staff to strategize and discuss how to 
better respond to natural and man-made disasters. It is through these 
partnerships and routine communications that Florida leads the nation 
in mutual aid support provided across the country and our response 
times during a disaster.
                               Conclusion
    To conclude, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. Emergency Management is critical, and the time is now to 
implement improvements that will change the way we do business and 
ultimately better serve the citizens of the United States.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his 
testimony.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Laughter. You are recognized 
for 5 minutes.

   TESTIMONY OF JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA 
                     COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA

    Ms. Laughter. Thank you, Chairman and members of the 
committee.
    Nine days. For 9 days, my county's emergency responders and 
I bore witness to the aftermath of the most devastating natural 
disaster to hit our community in over 100 years.
    We witnessed a family's terror when their little boy was 
injured in a landslide, taking their home off its foundation. 
We witnessed a very pregnant mother desperately trying to dry 
out her empty trailer with dehumidifiers so that she would have 
somewhere to bring her baby home to--all of her possessions in 
a dumpster nearby.
    We witnessed the elderly man in his home too overwhelmed to 
start the process, with mold creeping up the walls around him 
within days of the flood.
    For those 9 long days, our community was trying to grapple 
with the destruction of Helene, trying to chart a path forward, 
searching for answers to questions, and without the key partner 
who was supposed to be at our aid, without FEMA. And it would 
be 2 weeks after the storm before more than a single worker 
arrived, despite repeated pleas for help.
    Locally, we knew housing was going to be one of the 
greatest challenges. Immediate needs post-storm are the basic 
necessities we all understand: Clean water, food, and shelter.
    FEMA's temporary shelter assistance is ill-fitted to meet 
the needs of rural America. Our citizens who qualified for TSA 
found hotel choices to be in Greenville, South Carolina, or 
Charlotte, North Carolina, both 2 hours outside of our county, 
leaving untenable options to stay in damaged homes, bunk with 
family and friends, or leave their job, school, and community 
behind for an unknown time.
    Appalachians don't leave our home, our land, or the fabric 
of our community. So the TSA vouchers may as well have been 
Monopoly money.
    Even after FEMA's arrival, the negative impact of delay in 
FEMA response was compounded by ongoing communication 
challenges, changing FEMA staff assignments, and contradicting 
information and directions that stalled progress for my 
community.
    In the written testimony, you will even see where our 
sheriff and I were repeatedly given opposite updates on door-
to-door response by FEMA representatives that could have 
resulted in conflicting public messages, except for the fact 
that in my community, the sheriff and I work side by side in 
emergency response, communicating regularly.
    At 21 days and with tireless advocacy, we were granted a 
meeting with FEMA housing mission leaders. We received an 
overview of the housing options coming, along with identifying 
some obstacles that we would face.
    For instance, we were able to explain the inadequacy of 
HUD's fair market rent methodology in our rural community and 
how that would hamstring any possibility of rentals being an 
option if the FMR was used to establish allowable rents.
    We were heard and a request was elevated immediately to 
approve an increase in the allowable FEMA rate. Even with the 
increase, rental assistance could not meet the needs of those 
whose homes were destroyed, and more options would be needed.
    Ultimately, we found that housing process requirements 
under FEMA are too rigid to apply effectively in our 
mountainous community. For those who could leverage that 
assistance option, progress was only made after establishing 
weekly FEMA and State EM calls with us locally to cut through 
miscommunication and establish accountable discussions.
    At times, our county would face contradictions from 
different FEMA siloes, as you will also find documented in the 
written testimony. While putting our county resources to task 
trying to support the FEMA mission, we would also feel the 
sting of the deep conflict and contradiction of FEMA being both 
disaster response and regulator of local flood plain management 
programs.
    Threats of losing NFIP status and future disaster funding 
in our community made it harder to assist families in repairing 
their homes, meet immediate human needs post-disaster, while at 
the same time, other FEMA workers were working with us to 
support housing among limited solutions.
    Contradicting guidance and unclear processes were also 
frustrating to vulnerable survivors, and lack of answers led to 
deteriorating public trust and faith in FEMA, but not because 
the people deployed were not genuine and service-oriented 
people. It was because the workers themselves were stuck in a 
system designed to prioritize process and policy over common 
sense and responsiveness.
    We saw these workers hamstrung to help us with a lack of 
training across functions and a system difficult to navigate 
even for them. While there were genuine attempts to be 
responsive to the local needs, like approving private roads and 
bridges for assistance in western North Carolina, the decisions 
on requirements attached were made in bubbles far away from our 
community that did not engage local leadership, meaning that 
guidance is still fraught with concerns about the ability to 
meet the requirements that will be imposed.
    Transylvania County lost homes, infrastructure, and 
possessions, but somehow we did not lose lives [inaudible]. 
What I can't imagine is how our sister counties who lost whole 
towns are navigating these processes when the recovery is far 
more complex and the sting of loss so much deeper.
    Communities facing recovery need assistance with our 
counties representing the frontline response and need realistic 
solutions and meaningful engagement before a disaster.
    The stated mission of a responsive FEMA can be achieved, 
but only when the local voice is not just heard, but is also 
involved in solution building so that practical boots-on-the-
ground insight can be engaged upfront. Only then can we 
effectively and efficiently support our survivors.
    My community, all of our communities, our people across the 
country, and the FEMA workers themselves deserve better. 
Together we must do better.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share about my community's 
experience.
    [Ms. Laughter's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania 
                         County, North Carolina
   County Post-Hurricane Helene Response and Recovery Experience and 
                                Feedback
    This document is intended to provide constructive feedback with our 
conclusive statements in bold and explanation of the elements of the 
response and recovery experience in Transylvania County post Hurricane 
Helene that led us to those conclusions. We have included suggestions 
for improvements from our perspective. The appendices included provide 
backup documentation to this document but are not the full scope of 
documented and undocumented communication that has occurred between 
Transylvania County and FEMA.

    Statement 1: When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a 
system in place to support response and recovery because local 
governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to handle 
a response at that scale during non-response times. Overall, FEMA staff 
our county engaged with seemed genuine in their desire to help, but 
faced some of the same frustrations with communication, procedures, 
processes, and difficulty navigating the system as we did. Any redesign 
of a system to deliver that support needs to prioritize the local 
government voice, be adaptable to different conditions and ensure 
responsiveness to local needs during and after disaster.
    This document expresses the experience and frustrations that we 
faced with FEMA because that is the jurisdiction of the hearing, but we 
recognize that in some situations there seemed to be blame to be shared 
for difficulties between both state and federal agencies, but our main 
concern is that the system work at the point of delivery locally and we 
do not have a clear perspective on how the interface between state and 
federal helped or hindered the response. County government is the 
closest governance to our citizens and the very people who form local 
government live disasters alongside the community while also 
responding. There must be response infrastructure to support those 
efforts from other levels of government.

    Statement 2: Transylvania County was left to manage emergency 
response without FEMA in early days and did not get FEMA support until 
numerous and repeated phone calls and emails were made to appeal for 
assistance. Even our federal legislators were puzzled by the delay in 
FEMA arriving or responding. No official reason has ever been offered, 
but this delayed citizens' being able to start the application process, 
left local resources strained without information and lowered 
confidence in the FEMA response from the beginning with our leaders and 
our community.
    No FEMA representatives were present in Transylvania County until 9 
days after Hurricane Helene created the worst disaster to hit our area 
in over 100 years. Flooding, landslides, and wind/tree damage left our 
county looking and feeling like a war zone with the vast majority 
without power, without communication and with devastating damage. Our 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) received one phone call on day 6 from 
a FEMA representative stating they would be on site the following day 
without any arrival or additional call. Receiving any level of service 
took constant advocacy meaning some of our local resources were spent 
trying to get FEMA to engage instead of accomplishing other response 
activities. Status of damage incurred, and needs were communicated for 
days without response.
    When I discussed the delay with one FEMA worker, they suggested the 
lack of assistance uptake from our county, such as those utilizing 
Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA), made it appear as if there 
was less need in our community because of low reported utilization of 
TSA. This seems like it could be a factor, and the data does reflect a 
lower measure of initial assistance uptake; however, data reports did 
not accurately convey the reasons people were not accepting assistance. 
Data points from these reports may still be limited in understanding 
the full impact of Helene in our county. Even damage assessment figures 
were slow to reflect total impact because flooding could be easily 
identified by inspecting floodplain areas, but our county suffered 
landslide and tree damage to homes that were spread out across the 
county and took longer to inventory.
    I recently spoke with a county manager on the other side of the 
disaster in North Carolina that indicated they were not even sure why 
they were in the disaster declaration because they saw very little 
impact from the storm, but that FEMA representatives arrived promptly 
and unannounced right after the storm. The only other plausible reason 
for the delay we have been able to identify is that the main operation 
was put in Hickory, NC and our county was one of the furthest away from 
that base; but plenty of FEMA staff were in neighboring Buncombe and 
Henderson counties well before arriving here and even present in some 
counties during the storm. The FEMA shelter set up immediately at the 
NC Agriculture Center is less than 15 minutes from our county line.

    Statement 3: Both short- and long-term housing response processes 
instilled in FEMA are not suited to be effective in rural America or in 
environments like the mountains. This created a disconnect in the 
practical connection of those who needed help and the options available 
to them with specific issues around what those options meant for their 
families. A lesson learned in our experience is that the FEMA data 
around assistance uptake in long term housing does not adequately 
reflect degree of need in a community and that options that allow 
people to stay on their own property would have been more supportive 
and utilized. Policy makers should consider how protocols apply in 
different settings with the ability to be responsive to communities, 
instead of a one-size-fits-all approach.
    Once life safety is secured in an emergency, our priorities pivot 
to the basic immediate human needs of clean water, food, and shelter. 
The Temporary Shelter Assistance (TSA) program, FEMA's first line of 
assistance to those displaced from their homes, is not set up to 
provide immediate assistance in rural areas because the availability of 
major hotel chains, capacity and established contracts are inconsistent 
or unavailable completely. Our citizens who applied for assistance and 
were approved for TSA in the initial weeks following the disaster found 
that the closest availability for hotels accepting the TSA program were 
in Charlotte, NC, or Greenville, SC, requiring anywhere between a 1- 
and 3-hour drive away from their homes, jobs, and schools. The TSA 
numbers for our county do not reflect the ultimate need for housing 
after the storm because many were not willing to uproot their lives and 
either stayed with friends and family or in their damaged homes. We saw 
the most success for immediate housing needs with North Carolina 
Emergency Management and nonprofits that were able to secure RV units 
for households that could be placed at damaged home sites quickly and 
that did not require meeting floodplain elevation standards and other 
more stringent restrictions since they are mobile units. Unfortunately, 
those resources were not robust enough to assist to the full extent 
needed; however, similar resources could be an improved option in rural 
emergency response both for immediate needs and for the longer term 
while households navigate the lengthy process of determining whether to 
tear down, rebuild, relocate, etc.
    FEMA housing leadership met with us to explain the options coming 
for our residents and explained that long-term housing implementation 
would take time. The long-term housing program has requirements that 
take a significant amount of time to deploy, with some of those found 
to be unrealistic for our community; so, there was no interim support 
unless citizens wanted to leave the area to use TSA. Rental assistance 
is one of the easier options, but there was an existing lack of rentals 
before the storm in our county. FEMA housing leadership explained that 
HUD's fair market rents are used to determine rental assistance limits 
early in our conversations. We provided a history of advocacy and data 
that shows that the methodology to estimate rural community fair market 
rent levels is not an accurate depiction of our county. FEMA 
representatives heard us on this issue and raised the request to 
increase the amount allowed. Even with an approval of doubling the fair 
market rent allowance, our county only saw 10 units immediately 
available under those limits. Households that pursued rental assistance 
and FEMA workers had challenges finding units within the limits. 
Addressing FMR helped the housing mission because it was responsive to 
the local characteristics of the community.
    For long-term housing, FEMA units could not be placed in the 
floodplain, but the homeowners who needed a unit to allow them to 
repair or to have time to go through hazard mitigation/buy out 
processes to determine their best options are in the floodplain and 
could not use the FEMA units unless they could find property outside of 
the floodplain for placement. Most of the commercial mobile home parks 
are in or near the floodplain because in the mountains, floodplains 
provide flat land that can be developed and used for those purposes. 
Additionally, the mobile home parks had limited availability due to the 
pre-existing short housing supply. Our county even pulled tax record 
data to provide all commercial mobile home park sites in the county to 
FEMA personnel to facilitate locating sites, and few were identified as 
possibilities for either available space or for being in the 
floodplain.
    People in our rural community did not want to leave their homes; 
around half those qualifying for long-term housing chose to stay in 
their damaged dwellings, as reflected in FEMA data, often because the 
options offered were not realistic. Even the federally owned campground 
in Pisgah National Forest was eventually excluded as a mass housing 
site because it is in a floodplain, despite it being a federally owned 
site and easily accessible in our county. Additionally, the logistics 
baked into the long-term housing unit placement--such as required 
inspections to meet standardized requirements--are lengthy processes 
even under ideal circumstances. The first FEMA unit placed in our 
county saw an over two-week delay because the fire suppression unit was 
not working, leading to attempted repairs and eventual replacement. 
Typical mobile home placements under building code do not even have 
similar fire suppression units.
    Communication was a challenge in housing planning and response as 
detailed in another section, but systemic issues of policy, procedure 
and protocol were apparent once communication improved, and the 
requirements were understood locally. Weekly calls--which we 
established with NCEM and FEMA in December after repeated communication 
frustrations expressed by the county manager--were instrumental in 
getting consistent information on housing, understanding of the rules 
(such as learning that sites in the floodplain would be rejected) and 
having clear status updates on those being approved for housing and the 
process being followed. While it is our perspective that the process 
needs to be made more responsive and efficient with fewer obstacles, 
understanding the rules made the participation of local officials more 
effective and the communication with the public clearer.

    Statement 4: Some processes were overly complicated, costing time 
and diverting resources from areas that would have addressed more 
immediate needs in the local community. This also created barriers to 
providing efficient and effective service, in addition to eroding trust 
in FEMA as a response partner.
    An example of these overly complex processes occurred when we 
offered a conference room to house a Disaster Resource Center (DRC) to 
get one operational in our county. The site visit required review of 
the conference room to see if it could be used for a DRC involving at 
least 7 FEMA representatives on the site visit and, while here, a call 
had to be made to see if a handicapped bathroom stall in our public 
county government building being an inch too short could be approved in 
order for the DRC to locate. After over a week post-inspection and 
multiple follow-ups from our staff, we were finally cleared to get a 
DRC. We were then told on a Tuesday that the DRC would soft open on a 
Thursday, with staff and resources arriving on Thursday morning, and 
then officially open on Friday. We scheduled our county operations and 
IT staff to be available to assist for Thursday. Wednesday morning, we 
were contacted by our staff in that building that FEMA representatives 
were there to set up the DRC. We diverted our operations and IT staff 
immediately to assist, only to find that the people to staff the DRC 
had been sent to our location, but that the equipment necessary to 
operate had been sent to another county so setup could not occur that 
day. Later that day, a higher-level FEMA official assigned fault to the 
county for the failure to open on time, even though the issue was 
caused by FEMA staff and required equipment being sent to two different 
places.
    When teams arrived to go door to door in impacted neighborhoods, we 
assigned a county staff person to accompany them for the two days we 
were told they would be going door to door. (Note: A third day they 
scheduled without informing county staff resulted in an incident 
referenced elsewhere in this report.) Including a county staff member 
on the visits was to help assure our citizens that these were not scams 
and to facilitate getting assistance to more of our households. While 
in one neighborhood, a homeowner came up to the team and said he knew 
an elderly man in one of the houses needed help with the application. 
He offered to go let the man know the team was coming and then came 
back to let them know he spoke to the man, who was ready and waiting to 
receive help. When the team got to the driveway, one of the FEMA 
workers stated they could not go to the door because there was a no 
solicitation sign and started to move on to the next house. While it is 
understandable to avoid issues with no trespass or no solicitation 
signs, there must be some flexibility when it is clear that help is 
welcomed, like in this situation.

    Statement 5: Siloed internal FEMA communications and no clear 
communication protocols, along with inconsistent communication to the 
County Level Emergency Operations Center, created barriers and 
frustration. Communication challenges seemed to frustrate FEMA staff 
themselves when they worked with us to find answers to questions or 
connect to resources. Prior communication directly with counties before 
an event occurs and not just coordination through state without 
engagement of local government would improve this by establishing 
relationships in advance. This could be even more effective by having 
non-emergency regular opportunities for training and relationship 
building.
    Communication between federal, state, and local governments and 
communication within FEMA posed challenges. Multiple examples 
throughout the response showcase those challenges; a few include:
      After receiving a phone call from FEMA to our EOC that 
someone would be coming the next day and then seeing two days pass with 
no arrivals, the county manager reached out to Congressman Edward's 
office to ask who we could contact at FEMA because we were still 
without support. A name and number were provided, and the county 
manager called that number. She was then handed off because the 
``internal affairs person'' for our county had changed multiple times 
in the same day. Transylvania County staff communicated via phone and 
email with the internal affairs liaison assigned to the county once 
that person was finally identified. When the local government liaison 
arrived in person, it was a different person than anyone who had been 
identified days before, with no communication with us at the local 
level that a change had occurred. We also found none of the information 
we had shared prior had been passed to the new person. Details can be 
found in the timeline attached.

      The FEMA coordinator for our county arrived at our EOC on 
day 9, but with no communication to indicate he was coming that day. He 
began engaging with county staff to understand needs and submitting 
reports into some system, but did not seem to be getting any answers or 
information back. On day 13, the internal affairs liaison arrived with 
no prior communication to the FEMA coordinator already there; because 
the coordinator was unaware anyone else was coming, he could not 
coordinate the meeting who had no prior knowledge of the arrival. This 
prevented him from coordinating with our leadership.

      The Sheriff for our county is part of county government 
with the county manager, and his office is in the same building as the 
EOC. On numerous occasions, the county manager was told that FEMA teams 
were not going door to door, while Sheriff Chuck Owenby was receiving 
phone calls from a FEMA representative in Washington, DC, telling him 
teams were going door to door. This resulted in contradictory messages 
being pushed out to county residents. Both leaders shared with FEMA 
representatives that this was unacceptable, but the issue occurred and 
even damaging to have mixed messages, but it occurred at least two more 
times, and further confusion was only averted because the manager and 
Sheriff were coordinating locally with each other to prevent the 
contradictions from confusing the public. A FEMA representative from DC 
also called Transylvania County dispatch asking racially inappropriate 
questions referencing a racially charged incident has allegedly 
occurred four days prior that was never reported or documented with 
Transylvania County. See timeline and CAD report included in 
attachment.

      Transylvania County staff was given four different 
instructions for how to submit possible housing sites and followed all 
of them in the first six weeks after the storm. The concern over 
housing challenges in the community was communicated in writing prior 
to any FEMA staff arriving, because county staff were well aware of the 
lack of rentals and the challenges with available housing prior to the 
storm. County staff continued to raise the question about sites, 
including an easily accessible campground in the federally owned Pisgah 
National Forest and two private sites owners had offered for 
consideration.

       When county staff inquired about the status of the consideration 
of these sites for housing, FEMA staff would provide a new, different 
method to submit the sites for review, and there appeared to be no 
continuity of information shared among FEMA staff. After the manager 
requested weekly calls on housing with FEMA and NCEM representatives in 
December, the first meeting began with a discussion of the status of 
those sites being considered. The FEMA representative on the call 
pulled up a database which did not have any of the sites submitted by 
the county in it, meaning none of the site submittal pathways given 
previously had worked. The lack of clear pathways and having to re-
explain community conditions around housing meant time and effort from 
our team that could have been spent addressing other recovery issues.

    Statement 6: Changing contacts and inconsistent handoff of 
information established shaky infrastructure that impacted 
communication, trust in partnership and efficiency. We had to re-
explain our local needs, challenges, culture and practical information 
over and over again without getting answers to questions or progress on 
addressing issues. A solid human resource infrastructure is necessary 
to make collaboration effective.
    The timeline included in this report reflects examples of FEMA 
contacts being changed, often with no notice to the county EOC staff 
that a change was being made. Additionally, staff handoff of 
information was inconsistent, ranging from no transfer of information 
at all to a written handoff report and coordinated meetings. When an 
effective handoff occurred, it relieved local staff from the resource 
drain of having to keep re-orienting new FEMA representatives. An 
example of a handoff being well done in the timeline was Heather Long, 
who organized a handoff meeting and prepared a status report to review 
with the incoming replacement, as well as scheduling a meeting with 
county staff to introduce the incoming replacement and ensure 
information on challenges, current issues and needs was addressed in 
the meeting. The re-orientation required by local staff when those 
handoffs were not well facilitated was frustrating, time consuming and 
demoralizing to county staff, in addition to stalling progress of the 
response.

    Statement 7: Conflicting guidance for public assistance process and 
items eligible for reimbursement created confusion and frustration. It 
also led to decisions being made on faulty information to spend local 
funds or make decisions on resource usage based on erroneous 
information that may create additional financial impact to the county 
budget already impacted by the impacts of the disaster.
    The impact of contradicting and changing guidance on the county has 
been challenging and creates financial risk for the county. Guidance 
about reimbursable expenses created additional resource devotion to 
tracking expenses that would later be said could not be reimbursed. 
Early direction included that the local volunteer fire departments had 
to file their own public assistance only to find later that they could 
have fallen under the county's effort, meaning they had to figure out 
how to navigate that process or chose not to seek reimbursement due to 
the amount of resources it would take to pursue it.
    Some of the contradictions and financial impact to the county were 
county resources used by FEMA and the Red Cross in the response. We did 
not charge FEMA or Red Cross rent on any of our properties used for 
shelters or DRC locations because staff recalled being told during a 
meeting the County would be able to claim dates of use and be 
reimbursed per square foot for the space used. This would offset 
utilities and programs that had to be cancelled from those locations so 
that those functions could occupy the space in response and recovery. 
After the DRC closed and all shelters closed, we added this information 
to our Cat B expenses and were then told this was not reimbursable 
despite the earlier guidance. We were told by PDMG we should have 
created a rental agreement with FEMA and Red Cross before they moved 
into those spaces to recoup the cost of our operations. There is no 
reimbursable claim for our facilities being inaccessible to regular 
entities renting space or programs that had to be cancelled. We had 
similar conflicting guidance on covering fees on behalf of survivors 
for debris disposal, permit fees for repair and other expenses that 
have a direct impact on county resources and budget.

    Statement 8: The Just in Time training approach in the field was 
frustrating because there was not anyone available with broader 
knowledge and training, which impacted trust with county citizens. To 
be effective, this training method requires a readily accessible lead 
with a broader knowledge of disaster management.
    An example of just-in-time training having an ineffective result 
occurred with the FEMA teams sent to go door to door for applications. 
County management was initially told the teams would be able to assist 
people who had applied and either did not know the status of their 
application or had been rejected and needed help. Instead, the teams 
told residents they would have to call the FEMA 1-800 number for any 
questions. Residents were not able to get through on the hotline and 
reported waiting hours, only to get disconnected (possibly because 
communications across the county were running on temporary cell 
infrastructure due to the storm damage). In speaking with those on the 
FEMA teams, we learned they had received ``just in time training'' and 
were only trained to help fill out applications. They could not assist 
beyond the form or even refer for assistance beyond the 1-800 number. 
While just in time training can be an efficient tool for deployment of 
resources, teams are ineffective if there is not someone deployed 
alongside that has broader information and context to support the 
services being delivered. The inability to assist beyond filling in 
information on tablets and referring to the hotline frustrated citizens 
and made them lose confidence in the FEMA support they were seeing.

    Statement 9: Flexibility is required to meet unique needs in 
different disasters. Our county's recovery depends on the ability to 
address private roads and bridges, but decisions are made only to have 
FEMA's guidance shift (i.e. recent letter on requirements). It is 
unclear how the funding for this will be managed and what requirements 
would be imposed on local government in the process.
    Western North Carolina has many bridges and roads privately owned 
and maintained. Initially private roads/bridges were not going to be 
eligible for any FEMA assistance except through individual assistance 
means. After consideration of the need in our area, FEMA changed course 
and announced that funds could be used for repair of damaged private 
roads and bridges, but processes and requirements are not yet clear. A 
recent FEMA memo indicates these bridges and roads will be required to 
have an engineer's certification stating the bridge/road was built to 
the same or greater level than prior to the storm. No reliable records 
exist on many of these bridges and roads, however, meaning it is 
unreasonable to expect an engineer to be able to provide this 
certification universally. Lack of clarity about how funds will be 
administered, who will be responsible for holding bonds, guarantees or 
where liabilities will fall mean that repairs are being delayed 
further.

    Statement 10: FEMA as floodplain protection ordinance enforcer and 
FEMA as disaster response created conflicting purposes that were 
logistical challenges to the county being effective at meeting the more 
immediate needs in the community. Disaster funding assistance should 
not be tied to having floodplain control ordinances and programs in 
place as it has historically. The incentive for having floodplain 
management programs should solely be eligibility for subsidized flood 
insurance through NFIP in those communities. Early in the response, 
staff for the Flood Management and Insurance section put pressure on 
the county floodplain administrator to increase requirements on flood 
victims and institute unrealistic requirements for repair permits to be 
issued. Later in March, representatives from FEMA came to audit sample 
assessments conducted by the county floodplain administrator 
determining Substantial Damage or Non-Substantial Damage. Yet FEMA has 
still not resolved all housing placements for those who qualify for 
long term housing assistance from the disaster. The focus on compliance 
and the threat of loss of NFIP status, without consideration of 
immediate human needs, created contradictory priorities and additional 
pressure on the county.
    Transylvania County administers a floodplain protection ordinance 
as required for the county to be eligible to receive funding and 
support from FEMA in a disaster. After the storm occurred, many of our 
residents were committed to staying at their property instead of using 
TSA that would take them out of the area. To restore their damaged 
homes to a livable condition, they were eager to make repairs. 
Initially, our building inspections department that administers the 
floodplain ordinance and our city planning department who also 
administers a floodplain ordinance were told by FEMA staff that they 
needed to require non-conforming structures to come into compliance 
before permitting any repairs. The steps to raise a home or flooded 
trailer include having a surveyor shoot base floor elevations and an 
engineer design the measures to safely raise the structure. There were 
no surveyors and engineers in the area available to even provide this 
kind of service, and the process would require time that the pending 
cold weather would not allow these families. Our staff witnessed 
families throwing away all their possessions and desperately trying to 
use dehumidifiers to make a safe place for their family to stay. I 
toured a flooded mobile home with a woman who was 9 months pregnant. 
Their outlets had been inundated, and there were volunteers eager to 
assist in repair; but our staff was told we might endanger our NFIP 
status if we did not require the floodplain compliance before issuing 
permits to make those repairs. Another elderly man was still living in 
his home even though mold had reached a foot high in the home, posing a 
health hazard to him while awaiting repairs.
    Our staff found a document issued by FEMA indicating we had 
flexibility in the administration of repair permits and timeline of 
compliance with floodplain ordinances. We decided to use temporary 
occupancy permits to address the immediate need for healthy and safe 
shelter over forcing immediate floodplain compliance. FEMA staff from 
the floodplain administration side of the agency also put pressure on 
our building department to propose an increase in base floor elevation 
requirements in the ordinance, while the same department was in the 
middle of trying to address immediate assessment and building 
inspections needed to make homes livable for these families. The 
proposed FEMA changes would have increased the standard those impacted 
would have had to meet in the middle of the recovery.
    An email included in this packet shows where a FEMA representative 
advised the city staff that the county was trying to skirt the 
ordinance because a county structure was being listed by the city as 
having flooded to 50% damage. This occurred despite both photographic 
evidence to the contrary and a sworn building inspector and a 
contractor providing written letters that the building did not have 
water above the basement of the structure. The push by these FEMA 
representatives on floodplain ordinance issues--and even implied 
threats of noncompliance and resulting ineligibility for future 
disaster funding--worked directly against the most urgent mission to 
restore safe shelter to affected families with winter weather pending. 
NFIP eligibility should be enough incentive for local governments to 
have floodplain administration ordinances, and assistance in a disaster 
should not be held hostage over floodplain compliance. Forcing 
compliance should never take precedence over meeting immediate needs in 
a disaster. (Additional documentation attached in appendix.)

    Conclusion: FEMA workers generally want to support communities in 
disasters and are genuine in their desire to help, as evidenced by 
their willingness to leave their own communities to come serve. Our 
experience has been that the issues in process, protocol, 
organizational structure, and ill-designed communication make those 
employees' efforts less effective and efficient in meeting the local 
community's needs. Improvements to the system and well thought out 
methods of creating flexibility to meet the unique needs of an impacted 
community will better serve those impacted in a disaster, as well as 
those who work within the FEMA system. Our county is thankful for the 
progress that has been made in response and recovery, but at the same 
time we recognize that more positive impact could be achieved in a more 
responsive and organized system. We appreciate the opportunity to share 
our experience and feedback.
                              Appendices:
Appendix A: Timeline of FEMA communication through 11-2-24 and sample 
communication challenges

Appendix B: Sample Documentation of Flood Management and Insurance 
Challenges

Appendix C: Sample Documentation Challenges Specific to Housing

Appendix D: Sample Documentation of Conflicting Public Assistance Rules 
from FEMA

Appendix E: Documented Example of Effective Handoff between FEMA 
Liaisons by Heather Long

    [Editor's note: The appendices, totaling 174 pages, are retained in 
committee files and available online at: https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/PW/PW13/20250325/117940/HHRG-119-PW13-Wstate-LaughterJ-
20250325.pdf]

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady for her 
testimony.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garcia for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, 
       ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

    Mr. Garcia. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for having 
me today.
    My name is Adrian Garcia, and I am a county commissioner in 
Harris County, Texas, and I am here on behalf of the National 
Association of Counties where I serve as the cochair of the 
Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force.
    Among the many responsibilities entrusted to counties, we 
are on the frontlines of disaster mitigation response and 
recovery. Nearly 900 counties each year receive at least 1 
disaster, Presidential disaster declaration. This results in 
major economic losses, serious effects on communities, and 
immense pressures on local resources.
    Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency 
managers are the first on the scene and play a key role in 
recovery and rebuilding efforts so our residents can return to 
their lives as quickly as possible.
    As major owners and operators of public infrastructure, 
counties are uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts of 
disasters. America's 3,069 counties, parishes, and boroughs own 
44 percent of public roads, 38 percent of the national bridge 
inventory, over 900 hospitals, and directly support one-third 
of the Nation's airports.
    I am here today to underscore the county role in 
strengthening our Nation against disasters and to discuss how 
we can best work together to meet the challenges of today and 
the demands of the future.
    First, FEMA is crucial for communities before, during, and 
after disasters. That said, inefficiencies in the Agency do 
demand urgent reform. Disaster response, recovery, and 
mitigation starts local and absolutely ends local. However, 
these efforts would not be possible without the support from 
critical Federal programs. One such program that counties rely 
on is FEMA's Public Assistance Program.
    PA is crucial for helping communities rebuild after 
disasters, but the lengthy process to receive reimbursement can 
delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to restore 
critical services post-disaster.
    Last year, NACo conducted a survey of its members that 
concluded that one in five counties' longest open PA claim had 
been in processing between 4 and 6 years. Counties urge 
Congress to take decisive action to expedite funding from this 
PA Program, ensuring communities receive the critical resources 
we need for timely disaster recovery and rebuilding.
    Second, removing barriers to funding and resources for 
underserved and disadvantaged communities is absolutely 
critical. Requiring the completion of complex and burdensome 
paperwork by communities who are unfamiliar with the process 
during the most stressful times of their lives can 
significantly impede progress when it is most needed.
    Populations that feel the biggest impact are often our 
underserved and disadvantaged communities who lack the 
resources and capacity to complete applications and meet 
critical deadlines. Implementing plain language into 
applications, reducing bureaucratic redtape, and identifying 
resources available to assist applicants is paramount to 
improving the overall resilience of our Nation.
    Counties are supportive of bipartisan legislation like the 
Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance 
Simplification Act, which would streamline the application 
process and reduce redundant paperwork.
    Finally, counties understand that improving our Nation's 
disaster system relies on a strong Federal, State, local 
partnership. Counties are not merely stakeholders in this 
conversation. Rather, we are a part of the Federal, State, and 
local partnership of Government that together can work together 
to share the responsibility of protecting our Nation and its 
residents from disasters.
    While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our 
State and Federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools 
like funding, human capital, and technical assistance. 
Rebuilding our communities and making them more resilient is 
only possible with the support of our Federal and State 
partners.
    Counties stand ready to work side by side with you to 
improve our Nation's disaster response, recovery, and 
mitigation capabilities to ensure the health, well-being, and 
safety of our Nation and our residents.
    Chairman Perry and Ranking Member Stanton, thank you again 
for the invitation to discuss this critical issue on behalf of 
America's counties.
    This concludes my testimony, and I am happy to take any 
questions. Thank you.
    [Mr. Garcia's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County, 
        Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties
                              Introduction
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of 
the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Association of Counties 
(NACo), thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important 
role counties play in disaster response, recovery and mitigation.
    My name is Adrian Garcia, and I serve as a Commissioner in Harris 
County, Texas. I also serve as the Chair of the Justice and Public 
Safety Policy Steering Committee and Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental 
Disaster Reform Task Force at NACo.
    NACo is the only national organization that represents county 
governments in the United States, including Alaska's boroughs and 
Louisiana's parishes. Founded in 1935, NACo assists America's 3,069 
counties in pursuing excellence in public service to produce healthy, 
vibrant, safe and resilient communities. NACo works to strengthen 
county resiliency by advocating for federal policies and programs that 
help county leaders identify and manage risk and allow counties to 
become more flexible and responsive to disasters. Through sustainable 
practices and infrastructure, counties become better prepared to 
address these issues in a manner that can minimize the impact on our 
residents and businesses.
    Harris County is home to over 4.8 million residents to whom we 
provide critical services, including public safety and emergency 
services, public housing, health and human services, transportation and 
more. We predominantly rely on local property taxes to ensure our many 
responsibilities are met; however, due to constraints on local revenues 
that are enforced at the state level, a strong intergovernmental 
partnership is critical as we work to meet the challenges of today and 
plan for the future.
    For example, in 2017 Harris County was struck by Hurricane Harvey. 
This catastrophic event resulted in widespread flooding, affecting 
approximately 300,000 structures and displacing thousands of residents. 
The storm resulted in at least 89 fatalities in Harris County, with 
many occurring outside designated flood zones, underscoring the 
unpredictable nature of such disasters. The storm's unprecedented 
rainfall overwhelmed our infrastructure, leading to significant 
economic and social repercussions
    More recently, Hurricane Beryl made landfall in July 2024, causing 
extensive power outages that affected over 2.7 million households and 
businesses. The prolonged loss of electricity, combined with extreme 
heat, led to at least six heat-related fatalities in Harris County.
    Paramount among other critical county responsibilities is the role 
of counties in community preparedness. Counties are on the front lines 
of defense before, during and after disasters strike. While state 
statutes and organizational structures vary, local emergency management 
responsibilities are most commonly vested in county governments. 
Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency managers 
are often the first on the scene and play a key role in the 
coordination of local emergency management efforts. Other key county 
staff involved in pre- and post-disaster efforts include local police, 
sheriffs, firefighters, 911 call center staff, public health officials 
and public records and code inspectors. In the aftermath of disasters, 
we coordinate clean-up, recovery and rebuilding efforts so our 
residents can return to their lives as quickly as possible.
    Furthermore, because counties are major owners of public 
infrastructure, we are also uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts 
of disasters before they occur. Collectively, we own 44 percent of 
public road miles, 38 percent of the National Bridge Inventory, 960 
hospitals, more than 2,500 jails, over 650 nursing homes and directly 
support a third of the nation's airports and public transit systems. We 
also own and maintain a wide variety of public safety infrastructure, 
including roadside ditches, flood control channels, stormwater culverts 
and pipes and other infrastructure used to funnel water away from low-
lying roads, properties and businesses. Counties provide extensive 
outreach and education to residents on water quality and stormwater 
impacts prior to and following disasters, and we work to reduce water 
pollution, adopt setbacks for land use plans and are responsible for 
water recharge areas, green infrastructure and water conservation 
programs.
    Over the past 20 years, natural and man-made disasters have 
increased in frequency, severity and cost. On average, 25 percent of 
counties have experienced at least one disaster in each of the last 
three years. In 2023, 849 counties experienced at least one federally 
declared major disaster, 720 counties had at least one disaster 
declaration and 312 counties had at least one emergency declaration 
and. That same year, the nation experienced 28 separate billion-dollar 
disasters, which totaled approximately $93 billion in damages.
    As a result of this uptick in frequency and cost, NACo has launched 
the Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force to strengthen our 
nation's disaster mitigation, response and recovery capabilities. The 
Task Force brings together county officials from across the country to 
advocate for practical, common-sense reforms that improve disaster 
response, recovery and mitigation. Given that counties are on the 
frontlines of disaster management, our direct involvement in federal 
policy reforms is essential to ensure that policies are practical, 
effective, and address the unique challenges faced by local 
communities. By having a seat at the table, counties can advocate for 
streamlined processes and resources tailored to their specific needs, 
leading to more resilient and prepared communities nationwide.
    Counties are not merely stakeholders in this conversation. Rather, 
we are a part of the federal-state-local partnership of governments 
that together share the responsibility of protecting our nation and its 
residents from both natural and man-made disasters. Like the federal 
government, counties are entrusted by taxpayers to provide a variety of 
important services to our residents, and we stand ready to work with 
our intergovernmental counterparts to improve community resiliency and 
mitigate the impacts of future disasters. To this end, counties offer 
the following considerations:

    1.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for 
disaster response and recovery, but operational challenges and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more 
effective and equitable program delivery.

    2.  Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and 
resources, particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities, 
by providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.

    3.  County officials are effective stewards of federal investments, 
and a strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the 
entirety of our public sector responsibilities.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for disaster 
response and recovery, but operational challenges and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more effective and 
equitable program delivery.

    Disaster response, recovery and mitigation starts local and ends 
local. Counties across the country are currently managing large scale 
recovery efforts, while simultaneously continuing to meet our daily 
responsibilities around ensuring our communities remain safe and 
resilient to the next disaster. While we are doing our part at the 
local level, effective response and recovery efforts would not be 
possible without the continued support from agencies like FEMA, who 
administer programs that provide vital resources before, during and 
after disasters. Without FEMA, state and local governments would face 
significant challenges in recovering from disaster due to limited 
resources and coordination capabilities.
    However, FEMA's effectiveness is often hindered by inflexible 
decision-making processes and excessive bureaucratic red tape, 
highlighting the need for reform. The agency's layered approval 
procedures and complex administrative requirements can delay the 
delivery of critical resources to communities in need. We have heard 
countless examples from counties about the challenges of navigating 
FEMA's stringent application processes and slow response times. 
Streamlining decision-making, increasing transparency, and reducing 
unnecessary administrative barriers would allow FEMA to respond more 
swiftly and effectively, ensuring communities receive timely support in 
the aftermath of a disaster.
    One such program that is in desperate need of reform is FEMA's 
Public Assistance (PA) Program. PA is crucial for helping communities 
rebuild after disasters, but the lengthy process to receive 
reimbursement can delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to 
restore critical services post disaster. Last year, NACo conducted a 
survey of members that concluded that one in five counties (20 percent) 
longest open PA claim had been in processing between four and six 
years; almost a third of respondents (28 percent) reported processing 
times exceeding six years. For counties with all outstanding claims 
paid, the majority (71 percent) report typical turnaround times between 
one and three years. Because PA operates as a reimbursement, the cost 
of response efforts is paid upfront using county funds placing 
significant financial strain on counties, who are often forced to take 
out large loans to cover upfront disaster costs.
    NACo has strongly supported the FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief 
Act--passed by this committee in the 118th Congress--and a proposal 
from the FEMA National Advisory Council to treat the first few months 
of PA as a grant versus a reimbursement, which would dramatically 
improve disaster recovery for localities. By offering immediate relief 
through grants for the initial months, communities would have access to 
essential funds more quickly, allowing them to respond to urgent 
recovery needs without the burden of upfront costs. Additionally, the 
FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief Act would reduce the financial 
pressure on communities, allowing for any interest incurred on disaster 
loans to be reimbursed by PA. These measures would help ensure that 
recovery efforts are not delayed due to bureaucratic hurdles or 
financial barriers, ultimately allowing communities to rebuild faster 
and more effectively.

Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and resources, 
particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities, by 
providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.

    Unfortunately, bureaucratic red tape follows a disaster. For 
example, requiring the completion of complex and overly burdensome 
paperwork by communities who may be entirely unfamiliar with system 
protocols and who are attempting to undertake these processes during 
the most stressful times of their lives can significantly impede 
progress when it is needed most. Populations that feel the biggest 
impact are often our underserved and disadvantaged communities where 
resources and capacity to complete applications and meet critical 
deadlines can be severely exacerbated.
    Ensuring no communities are left behind requires reexamining 
current procedures when applying for federal funding. Implementing 
plain language into applications, providing clear timelines and 
identifying resources available to assist applicants during the process 
are paramount to improving the resiliency of our communities. Excessive 
paperwork and lack of clarity can be particularly difficult for 
jurisdictions who may be under resourced or dealing with co-occurring 
disasters, as we saw with many parts of the country throughout the last 
few years.
    Counties have long supported legislation like the Disaster 
Survivors Fairness Act (H.R.1245)--approved by this committee in the 
118th Congress--and the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act (S.861). 
These critical pieces of legislation would streamline the application 
process for federal aid, reducing redundant paperwork and making it 
easier for survivors to access the support they need. By improving 
coordination between agencies and simplifying eligibility requirements, 
these reforms would alleviate the administrative burden on those 
recovering from disasters.

County officials are effective stewards of federal investments, and a 
strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the entirety of 
our public sector responsibilities.

    Counties across the country are working daily to address the needs 
of our residents and make decisions that drive the success of our 
jurisdictions. While we are doing our part at the local level, 45 
states limit the ability of counties to raise revenue in various ways, 
making the intergovernmental partnership vital to meeting our public 
sector responsibilities. Only 29 states authorize counties to collect 
sales taxes, but almost always under various restrictions. 26 states 
impose a sales tax limit and 19 require voter approval. For western 
counties, who are at great risk of flooding and wildfires, state 
restrictions on local revenues can be even more impactful, as much of 
the land within western county boundaries is considered federal land, 
thus removing the ability of a county to levy property taxes.
    While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our state 
and federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools, like funding 
assistance, human capital and technical assistance. Without proper 
federal and state support, county recovery and mitigation efforts may 
lack the full capabilities necessary to rebuild our communities and 
make them more resilient against future disasters. In an environment 
where counties have limited financial flexibility, a strong 
intergovernmental partnership is crucial to community recovery and key 
to the success of future mitigation efforts.
    With that in mind, Congress should prioritize legislation that 
seeks to strengthen intergovernmental partnerships in disaster recovery 
by enhancing coordination, streamlining communication and supporting 
resource-sharing between all levels of government. By promoting pre-
disaster planning, simplifying aid processes and supporting local 
recovery efforts, lawmakers can ensure a more effective and coordinated 
response to disasters.
                               Conclusion
    Counties are on the front lines of the pre- and post-disaster 
efforts, and without proper federal assistance, recovery and mitigation 
efforts may lack the full support necessary to rebuild our communities 
and return the lives of our residents to normal.
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of 
the Subcommittee, thank you again for inviting me to testify here 
today.
    Counties stand ready to work side-by-side with our federal and 
state partners to make our communities more resilient and ensure the 
health, well-being and safety of our citizens.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman, as well as 
thanking all the witnesses for their testimony.
    We will now turn to questions for the panel, and the Chair 
recognizes himself for the first round of questions.
    I am going to start with you, Ms. Laughter. I read through 
a bunch of what you submitted. I will admit I didn't read 
through every single bit of it. It is voluminous: emails and 
correspondence. And as the county manager, I am not sure--maybe 
you never thought about the mission of FEMA, but it is to 
coordinate between the Federal agencies and, of course, State 
and local agencies. But it was never designed to be the command 
and control and do all the work, right. But that is kind of 
what is expected of it now.
    And it seems to me, as the person that is trying to figure 
that out in the aftermath of this devastating disaster, like, 
you don't have time to figure it out. You are just trying to 
deliver, right.
    I remember the two times we were flooded out of our home. 
One time we stayed in the fire hall before we moved to a 
neighbor's house that wasn't affected, somebody we didn't even 
know just offered to come take us in. And then the other time 
was at the township building.
    And I am thinking about it, but it seems to me, as I read 
through your correspondence here, much of your county didn't 
even exist, right. There wasn't any--there might not have been 
a township building, a fire hall, or a neighbor's house to go 
to.
    And so I am just wondering, from your experience, I mean, 
you couldn't get answers even about a federally owned property 
for which to place temporary housing on. You couldn't get any 
answers on that, let alone the housing.
    If you were going to give everybody here, which I think are 
very interested in trying to figure out how to make this work, 
what would be the one message--as a person who has lived 
through it and experienced it and have been frustrated by it 
and seen people like you described, living in trailers filled 
with mold and having no prospect whatsoever of anything 
changing any time soon, what would be the one message regarding 
what FEMA--how it would be different in your eyes if it were 
going to work?
    Ms. Laughter. At local government, we were looking for 
resources. We needed assistance, and what we could not find 
were how to leverage those resources. The resources that we 
were offered, like TSA, were very clearly not suited for my 
community. And so I think the message that I would have is 
that, number one, communication.
    If there are resources being offered, we need to understand 
what those terms are upfront so we can even evaluate whether or 
not they are going to be effective in the community.
    The second is, there has to be some responsiveness. 
Wherever we identified issues, whenever we identified resources 
like the Federal property, we had to follow up on that 
ourselves.
    We were living a disaster in our own lives. We were living 
a disaster with our community, and yet we were having to follow 
up repeatedly in order to try to get any progress or any 
answers or even find out if our requests were being heard 
anywhere.
    I submitted that property no less than four times in four 
different ways and still when I got on a call in November to 
ask about housing, they pulled up a database, and none of those 
requests managed to get into the database.
    So I think the two messages are that the communication 
structures have to be robust. They need to happen before the 
disaster so that we know who even to call. And we also need to 
know upfront how to use these resources or make those resources 
more flexible so that whenever we identify what the needs are 
and how that is going to play out in our community, we can use 
them.
    Mr. Perry. Do you have any indication at this point why it 
took so long for FEMA to even show up? Like, right after this 
happened, obviously everybody knows what has happened, but it 
took days and days. And I think, it is my understanding, when 
they finally did show up, they were headquartered like 90 miles 
away, which is a fair drive, right, especially in bad 
conditions.
    Do you have any indication now what took them so long?
    Ms. Laughter. I have never been given a reason. I can 
hypothesize. I think the fact that we are on the edge of the 
disaster was part of it. It is hard to get through the 
mountains. You don't get places very easily.
    The only other thing I can imagine is that our numbers, 
like, for TSA did not look like they were high, which could 
indicate on a data front point that we didn't need help, but 
they weren't high because it wasn't an applicable solution for 
Transylvania County.
    Mr. Perry. Okay.
    I have got a lot of questions and a little bit of time here 
for each one of you.
    Mr. Guthrie, you perfected I think or at least honed a 
fraud prevention program in your State. Can you briefly outline 
how that might be applicable to FEMA, because there is a huge 
amount of fraud in the FEMA dollars that are spent, and we 
would, obviously, like that not to be the case.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, for that question.
    In Florida, we knew that there was the propensity to have 
fraud, waste, and abuse, and what we did, starting about 2 
years ago, we built a program that we want to get good, 
structured data into our system that helps us get good, 
structured data and it allows us to utilize large language 
modeling machine learning and, to a certain point, some 
generative AI to predict when we may have a duplicate payment 
or the payment doesn't actually check the box for the contract. 
In other words, a vendor has charged us more than they should 
have.
    So, again, it focuses from a standpoint of getting the 
good, structured data into the system, and then we use machine 
learning on the backside to do that. And we are detecting, just 
in the recent months, we had three situations for about 
$600,000 that we flagged for potential fraud, waste, or abuse. 
And then we put eyes on that to then investigate it and correct 
the anomalies that were in the invoices, and it was just that. 
It was an anomaly in the invoices where we were charged a 
different rate when we should have been charged a lower rate.
    But it did end up saving taxpayer dollars just in the last 
3 months, $600,000.
    Mr. Perry. I appreciate the response.
    I am way over my time. So I yield and recognize the 
gentleman from Arizona, Ranking Member Stanton.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    My first question is for Mr. Guthrie, Florida's executive 
director for emergency management.
    Florida is arguably one of the States most capable of 
responding to disasters on its own, but you do rely on Federal 
assistance from FEMA and the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact, EMAC system, when responding to catastrophic events.
    At yesterday's Cabinet hearing, Secretary Noem did indicate 
her desire to eliminate FEMA. The President indicated support 
for that plan to eliminate FEMA.
    From your perspective, how would post-disaster outcomes for 
Floridians be impacted if FEMA were eliminated?
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question.
    At the end of the day, we need Federal support. I go back 
to what you mentioned in your opening statement, sir. Federal 
support, State managed, locally executed. We need to focus on 
the State-managed part. That has been a part of that phrase 
since Brock Long was the FEMA Administrator.
    But we haven't focused on the State-managed piece. We keep 
going back to the Federal Government. We need to focus more on 
that State-managed piece and actually make sure we are managing 
disasters at the State level we are allowing local levels to 
execute in a commonsense approach while we need Federal 
support.
    Now, if that looks like a FEMA of the future, which I think 
all emergency managers nationwide would agree, FEMA needs to be 
reformed. That is a task that takes, obviously, Presidential 
and congressional action to eliminate FEMA.
    So we want to work with the Federal Government. We want to 
work with the President. We want to work with the legislature 
on what that looks like in the future.
    But to the point, we do need Federal support. Florida can 
probably handle 95 to 97 percent of what we do on a day-to-day 
basis, but, for example, in Hurricane Helene and Milton, we 
needed 1 million gallons of fuel. We went to FEMA. We went to 
the Department of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency to 
meet that need.
    So, again, even a highly capable capacity State like 
Florida from time to time needs Federal support.
    Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.
    Mr. Currie, the Federal law is very clear about the 
qualification requirements for the FEMA Administrator. The 
President has named Cameron Hamilton the senior official 
performing the duties of Administrator.
    In your opinion, does he possess the qualifications that 
are legally required to run the Agency?
    Mr. Currie. Well, we have actually been asked to look at 
this and the legality of him serving in that role under the 
Federal Vacancies Reform Act, which GAO has a role in that. And 
so we will do that and have that result pretty quickly.
    But I will say that the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act is pretty clear about the requirements for FEMA 
Administrator. It requires two things. One is the person have 
significant emergency management experience, and the other 
thing is at least 5 years of executive experience. So that is 
what the law says.
    But I want to be very clear that the ideal state is have a 
Senate-confirmed Administrator. The Senate confirmation process 
is the process for vetting a candidate's experience and their 
ability to do that job effectively.
    Mr. Stanton. We saw in Katrina just how horrifically wrong 
it can go if you have someone who is the head of FEMA who 
doesn't have experience in emergency management. It is 
critical. So we want to get that done as soon as possible.
    Mr. Currie, in your role at the GAO, you understand the 
risk of overhauling Federal programs without proper 
consideration. FEMA underwent significant reorganization 
without proper input from emergency managers before Hurricane 
Katrina, and that did contribute to those tragic outcomes.
    What should this administration and this Congress consider 
to ensure that we don't cripple FEMA's lifesaving 
responsibilities when attempting to reform this critical 
agency?
    Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir.
    Like I said in my opening statement, we can't break what is 
not broken, and the only people that can tell you that are our 
first line emergency managers and responders.
    There are things that work well in the current system. The 
problem is, you don't hear good news often. There are things 
that work. We want to keep those. We want to fix the things 
that don't work.
    The other thing I will say is we have to fix the root 
causes. If we just move agencies, rename agencies, rename 
programs, but don't fix the root causes, none of this is going 
to change.
    Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.
    I want to go next to our local elected official, Mr. 
Garcia. Can you also explain how disaster response in your 
county would be impacted without access to Federal resources or 
support after a disaster?
    Mr. Garcia. Ranking Member, without access to Federal 
resources or funding, our county's disaster response would 
absolutely be severely compromised. Local governments simply 
don't have the financial capacity or staffing to manage large-
scale recovery efforts, meaning vital services like debris 
removal, infrastructure repairs, emergency sheltering would be 
delayed or inaccessible.
    Federal support is essential for ensuring a coordinated and 
effective response, allowing us to restore public safety, and 
meet the needs of our residents as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields 
back, and I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 
Ezell, for 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Ezell. That is Ezell, and I appreciate that.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you all for being here today.
    Mississippi is no stranger to storms. Most notably, as we 
have talked about, Katrina, where we lost the lives of over 
1,300 people and $125 billion in damages.
    In 2005, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act, which reestablished FEMA as a distinct 
entity within DHS.
    As we approach the 20-year anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina, I am still waiting for FEMA to respond to claims in my 
district associated with this devastating storm. It is 
unacceptable and a perfect example of how the Federal 
Government has let our people down.
    I am proud to have led, co-led, and passed several bills 
that seek to improve FEMA. Bills like H.R. 2254, the Don't 
Penalize Victims Act; H.R. 152, the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Coordination Act; and H.R. 153, the Post-Disaster Assistance 
Online Accountability Act.
    I was thrilled when President Trump recently announced the 
creation of the FEMA Review Council to evaluate FEMA 
bureaucracy and disaster response. FEMA has spent $30 billion 
in disaster aid each of the past 3 years, yet many disaster 
survivors and taxpayers still lack the resources they need.
    I have been working closely with FEMA to address 
outstanding issues in my district, and I look forward to seeing 
how we can improve the process for future disasters because we 
know they are going to happen.
    Before I get too far, I want to enter a document from St. 
Charles Parish, Louisiana, reflecting some of the reforms we 
have discussed for the Agency.
    I want to ask Mr. Currie----
    Mr. Bresnahan [interrupting]. Without objection, so 
ordered.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, 
              Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the 
Subcommittee: Louisiana is no stranger to disaster. It has certainly 
shaped who we are as people, strengthening our resolve and reminding us 
to take care of our neighbors. As President of St. Charles Parish in 
Southeast Louisiana, I appreciate the opportunity to share some of the 
many challenges I've experienced firsthand with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) before, during, and after disasters. Thank you 
for allowing me to share the experiences of Southeast Louisiana as you 
consider critical reforms to this agency.
    In recent years, St. Charles Parish and the State of Louisiana have 
faced significant challenges due to natural disasters coupled with 
skyrocketing insurance costs. Since 2020, five major storms hit the 
State of Louisiana--Hurricanes Laura, Delta, Zeta, Ida, and Francine. 
While we are unfortunately all too familiar with real-time emergency 
management and disaster recovery, I believe this experience makes our 
state a strong voice for the nation in shaping what federal emergency 
management should look like moving forward and ensuring FEMA returns to 
its core mission of helping people when disaster strikes.
    One of President Trump's initial actions upon taking office this 
year was to sign an executive order establishing the FEMA Review 
Council. I applaud President Trump for taking bold actions early in his 
administration to underscore the importance of restructuring this 
agency. Just about anyone who has encountered FEMA knows all too well 
there is plenty of room for improvement. I welcome the opportunity to 
assist Congress in enacting real reforms to improve the federal 
government's ability to better deliver assistance to those in need.
    One program in particular is in dire need of attention and has 
already negatively impacted tens of thousands of Americans, many of 
whom live in Southeast Louisiana. The National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) has been essential in safeguarding American property owners 
against the financial devastation of floods. However, time and time 
again, we have been forced to fight with FEMA over the gross lack of 
transparency in the NFIP, particularly with the disastrous Biden-Harris 
enacted Risk Rating 2.0 system.
    In 2023, I led a lawsuit on behalf of St. Charles Parish after we 
were denied public records requests demanding the calculations behind 
the Risk Rating 2.0 rate-setting system. Policyholders in my state have 
seen their premiums skyrocket, with some expected to increase from $500 
to over $5,000. It is outrageous that FEMA simply will not justify the 
math that led to these premium hikes, even when subject to 
Congressional inquiries. As FEMA itself expected, this policy has 
forced hundreds of thousands to drop their coverage altogether, leaving 
an alarming number of uninsured property owners in Louisiana and across 
the nation and jeopardizing the financial stability of the entire NFIP.
    This has led to deep mistrust of FEMA because the agency has 
refused to say how local and state mitigation initiatives affect their 
methodology. St. Charles Parish has invested millions of local taxpayer 
dollars to construct new levees and pumps. Yet, we still have residents 
priced out of their homes. Property owners implementing protective 
measures often see little to no reduction in their premiums. This 
oversight discourages proactive risk reduction and fails to reward 
efforts that decrease overall flood risk. Instead, FEMA should work 
with state and local governments to ensure their Risk Rating 2.0 model 
accurately reflects our communities' real risk so we can direct 
resources to mitigate, protect, and achieve affordable flood insurance 
rates. As a public entity, FEMA must reveal the calculations that have 
driven up prices and work with local leaders to implement a policy that 
maintains affordability--a goal it has significantly strayed from under 
the Biden-Harris administration.
    Another problem that deserves the focus of the FEMA Review Council 
is how to improve the federal government's ability to better deliver 
assistance to those in need. The council should solicit input to 
implement reforms that ensure the swift and efficient deployment of 
FEMA aid to state and local governments, as well as to individuals and 
businesses in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. I believe states 
are better equipped to deliver disaster assistance. Currently, state 
agencies are responsible for administering FEMA regulations. We need to 
explore policy solutions that allow states to deliver aid efficiently 
without the cumbersome bureaucratic processes and environmental reviews 
that drastically slow recovery efforts when people are most in need. To 
that point, St. Charles Parish is still waiting for millions of dollars 
from Hurricane Ida in 2021. I firmly believe streamlining processes, 
cutting red tape, and empowering state and local governments to act 
quickly will accelerate recovery efforts, minimize economic losses and 
alleviate the suffering of impacted communities.
    As President of St. Charles Parish, I urge the Subcommittee to 
consider the perspectives and recommendations of the local and state 
leaders who have responded to and managed the recovery efforts in the 
wake of natural disasters. By addressing the shortcomings of the NFIP 
and enhancing the efficiency of FEMA's assistance programs, we can 
better serve our communities in their darkest moments, ultimately 
saving lives and livelihoods.
References:
      E&E News. ``Hundreds of Thousands Drop Flood Insurance as 
Rates Rise.'' 2024. https://www.eenews.net/articles/hundreds-of-
thousands-drop-flood-insurance-as-rates-rise/
      WDSU. ``Louisiana Parish Leads Lawsuit Against FEMA Over 
Flood Insurance Hikes.'' 2023. https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-
fema-flood-lawsuit/43700966
      NOLA.com. ``How Much Will Your Flood Insurance Rise? 
Check This Map.'' 2023. https://www.nola.com/news/environment/how-much-
will-your-flood-insurance-rise-check-this-map/article_acc5a67e-e458-
11ed-9482-438f8ebca9f2.html

    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    Mr. Currie, the GAO has done a great job, has done great 
reports, on the problems with Risk Rating 2.0. Each community 
across the Nation has invested many resources to manage its 
membership in the NFIP.
    The primary issue with the Risk Rating 2.0 is a lack of 
transparency regarding the algorithm. This results in 
communities being unable to make decisions to target resiliency 
projects, plan future growth, formulate effective policies, or 
simply ensure that they are not wasting resources.
    Its impact today is felt more than ever. With the rising 
cost of housing, this policy hides the actual cost of home 
ownership.
    Mr. Currie, could you reflect on the damage and concerns 
attached to the lack of transparency of Risk Rating 2.0?
    Mr. Currie. Thank you.
    FEMA has a huge challenge with the National Flood Insurance 
Program. The idea behind Risk Rating 2.0 is the right one, 
which is you want to assess each house's individual risk to a 
disaster and not just assume that everybody in an area has the 
same exact risk.
    The challenge is that if your house is at higher rise, your 
premiums are going to be higher. So they are trying to get the 
program to the point of solvency or close to solvency because 
it has never been solvent. It is $20 billion in debt.
    And honestly, sir, it is up to the Congress now to decide 
what they want this program to be. Do they want it to be an 
insurance program, or do they want it to be a Federal disaster 
assistance program?
    As long as premiums do not cover the cost of the program, a 
large portion of the flood insurance program is a disaster aid 
program.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    What reforms could resolve the possible damage that Risk 
Rating 2.0 can have on families and communities, in general?
    Mr. Currie. Well, there are a number of different options 
that have been put out there, for example, State or Federal 
programs to help supplement homeowners of a certain income 
level or a certain income threshold, just like we do with other 
programs who are basically going to be priced out of a certain 
market because they can't afford the flood--well, they barely 
afford the mortgage and then barely afford the flood insurance 
on top of that.
    So there are a number of options like that, but, 
unfortunately, there are no easy options that will drive down 
the cost. It is going to be very expensive, and somebody has to 
pay for the cost, either the taxpayer, the State, or the 
Federal Government.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    Should some of the procedures within NFIP be standardized 
and transparent to ensure that communities can effectively use 
the resources?
    Mr. Currie. Absolutely. I mean, that's key. And FEMA, 
through its flood mapping project, should be very transparent 
about the risk of each individual property. And so, I mean, 
they have a long way to go in implementing this program and 
making sure there is transparency.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    If I may have just another 30 seconds?
    Mr. Bresnahan. No objection.
    Mr. Ezell. In my home State of Mississippi and also along 
the gulf coast, after the hurricane, FEMA just came in there 
and blanketed just about the whole area that was flooded and 
just moved all the flood maps.
    Since then and since I have been in Congress, I have worked 
tirelessly trying to get some sort of order back in place so 
that we could--this is a once-in-a-lifetime storm, and it has 
not happened again. And I've just got to say that it has been 
very frustrating. They have the flood maps, but they don't know 
how to implement them, and we are waiting for those things to 
get implemented. And that is very frustrating to people who are 
trying to buy, build, or have a life, a future on the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast.
    So with that, if you have any way that you can tell them to 
hurry up and get those things adopted, we sure would appreciate 
it.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I 
recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. McDonald Rivet, for 
5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you very much.
    I want to start just by thanking Chairman Perry and Ranking 
Member Stanton for holding this hearing on what seems to be a 
bipartisan level of frustration.
    I represent a community in Michigan, Midland, Michigan, 
that 5 years ago saw multiple dams fail after heavy rainfall. 
In fact, I personally ran one of the evacuation centers. It 
caused massive flooding and water levels reaching as high as 35 
feet above normal levels.
    Thankfully, no one died in that, which I actually just 
think is a miracle. But it resulted in over $200 million in 
damages, and not only did it decimate our infrastructure like 
our roads and bridges, it destroyed homes that families have 
lived in for generations and small businesses that families had 
dedicated their entire lives to.
    So here we sit 5 years later. Ms. Laughter, I hear your 
story, and it just resonated so deeply with me. It is a 
continuous struggle, a continuing struggling in order to 
resolve the pieces that FEMA came in to help.
    But what we see over and over again, like multiple Federal 
programs, is that the intent of FEMA and the amazing people who 
work there is dying under a cumbersome bureaucracy that is so 
frustrating, particularly for local people who don't have the 
experience of dealing with big Federal bureaucracies and are 
just at the point of giving up.
    Our local communities are owed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, which is nothing in a Federal budget but everything in 
a local budget.
    So I do want to just say that I understand the frustration, 
but what I am not understanding is the suggested remedy, which 
is a suggested elimination of FEMA and also the suggestion that 
this actually can be solved at a local level if States and 
locals would just budget more appropriately, which having been 
a State senator on the Appropriations Committee, I can tell you 
States cannot handle this just by budgeting, handling this on 
their own and, in particular, when we are simultaneously 
considering extensive cuts, including $880 billion from our 
Medicare program. I mean, it just defies common sense.
    But I do think we have to do something because we can't 
tolerate this. And my local community still sits there and 
waits, and I hope it doesn't take 5 years for you.
    But I hear you, Mr. Currie, when you were talking about, 
okay, what can we do. We know that block granting is also a 
very difficult solution because most Federal block grants, 
again, as a State appropriator, come with burdens, like 
incredibly complex and burdensome regulations.
    But you said, let's address the root causes. Everything 
isn't broken. But I didn't hear you say what those root causes 
are, and I would love to hear them.
    Mr. Currie. Sure.
    Let me take the grant issue. And so a lot has been talked 
about recently about switching FEMA to a block grant. I am not 
so much as concerned with the name of the grant. A block grant 
just means, theoretically, that you provide all the funding 
upfront, and the State manages it instead of the Federal 
Government holding the money and doling it out slowly, which is 
what the FEMA process is.
    The root cause is that the process is too complicated, and 
there are too many rules and overlapping requirements and 
inconsistency for the years that go on with recovery.
    Turnover in staffing plays into this, too, and different 
cultural changes at FEMA. So the problem is that you have an 
infrastructure project that could take 10 to 15 years to 
rebuild, and all throughout there are cost changes, and you 
have to go back and forth to the Federal Government. It is 
very, very confusing.
    I think what we are trying to do is we want to come up with 
something where the Federal Government still provides the 
support that the States will never be able to come up with, 
like you said, but it does so in a way that they provide it to 
the States where there is flexibility, but there is still the 
appropriate oversight and control. And that is the balance you 
are trying to strike.
    With block granting, you give up some of the control at the 
Federal level and the oversight, but you give the States more 
flexibility. But you don't design the block----
    Ms. McDonald Rivet [interrupting]. I am sorry to interrupt 
you, but I am aware of my time. I just want to say, in your 
experience, and I know this is a bit of an unfair question, but 
have you ever seen a Federal-to-State block grant that did not 
come with its own set of rules and overlapping requirements?
    Mr. Currie. It does. But we have to build it better in this 
case. So, for example, with the Community Development Block 
Grant, disaster recovery, one of the challenges with that is, 
is that you try to build the whole program upfront and then 
turn it over to the States, and that takes too long.
    So the money doesn't get there quick enough. We have to 
build this system and the rules and requirements upfront, get 
the States up to speed on it, get everyone familiar with the 
process, build their system, so they can manage this amount of 
money so it can be turned over much quicker. And that is very 
possible to do.
    Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I 
recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Kennedy, for 5 minutes 
for questions.
    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member Stanton. And today's hearing is more than just about 
FEMA reform. It is about shifting the center of gravity away 
from bloated Federal bureaucracy and toward capable States that 
are closest to the people that they serve.
    In Utah, we know how to do more with less. We invest wisely 
and build strong partnerships between the State and local 
governments. That same principle--clear, locally led 
coordination between State and local governments--should guide 
how we approach emergency management across the country. 
Whether it is wildfires in California, hurricanes in the 
Southeast or earthquakes and flooding risks in Utah, we must 
ensure the Federal Government is a reliable partner, not a 
bureaucratic bottleneck. FEMA should be empowering States and 
counties, not burying them under redtape.
    When agencies grow too large and too distant from the 
people they serve, they lose the ability to act with urgency, 
efficiency, or local understanding. Emergency management is 
just one example, but it is a critical one.
    I support President Trump's Executive order establishing 
the FEMA Review Council. We need that top-to-bottom review, and 
I look forward to working with the committee to play a leading 
role in it.
    I had a few questions for--we will start with Mr. Currie 
and Mr. Guthrie. We have talked about block grants and both of 
you have mentioned that in your testimonies.
    Can you give me some more specifics about if we were to do 
something like that, how would you do that without fraud, 
waste, and abuse, but also cut the redtape and allow that money 
to be used immediately? And start with you, Mr. Currie.
    Mr. Currie. Yes. Sure. Well, I think there is a 
misconception that with a block grant that there is no 
oversight; that Congress appropriates the money, and they write 
a check to the State, and it's done. That is not how it works.
    Most block grants, the State and the Federal Government 
work together to develop very specific rules and requirements 
and controls and audit processes. It's just more of the money 
is delivered upfront. So it is going to take some time, if you 
develop this into a block grant, to train and build the States' 
capacities. Some States, like Florida, probably is going to be 
very quick; other States it is not, other communities it is 
not.
    And so it is possible to do this. But I also think this 
needs to be very different than other block grants that we have 
created before.
    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question. And it somewhat 
goes to the previous Congresswoman's question as well.
    I will give you two examples of where we can really speed 
this up. Number one, environmental historical preservation. In 
the emergency management community--I have several State 
directors sitting behind me--that is where projects go to die. 
It could take 4 to 6 years to get that done.
    Every State has an environmental and historical 
preservation officer. Why are we duplicating effort on that? 
Let the State do their job, let us document the file and put 
that as a part of the file. We can speed that process up by at 
least 90 percent savings and time.
    I will give you another example. The Consolidated Resource 
Center. I would move to abolish the Consolidated Resource 
Center. Again, that is where people send us RFIs, numerous 
RFIs, hundreds of RFIs, requests for information. Again, the 
State is responsible for managing its grant. Whether it is a 
block grant or if it is a traditional grant, we do that.
    But the number of RFIs that come out--and one of our 
individuals from Alabama talked about he literally had to give 
some type of minute piece of information in a debris removal 
claim. That's insane.
    So those are two examples of where that is already 
happening at the State level. To document those State actions, 
it should be a part of the file, and we move on.
    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you for those suggestions.
    And, Mr. Garcia, if I could ask you a question about the 
counties. And I agree with the potency of counties, and I think 
that was a big part of your statement.
    The question that I had is, is the hierarchy that you would 
consider associated with counties? Because the Governor is 
generally in charge of the State.
    The idea of the Federal Government, for example, giving 
grants to a county directly and subverting the role of the 
Governor, I am curious how you would--if you were to see 
Federal funds flowing, would you have those funds go directly 
to counties, or would you have them go to the Governor and 
subsequently to the counties? What is your thought about that?
    Mr. Garcia. Well, some counties have capacity like Harris 
County. We are very fortunate in that regard. But not everybody 
does. And so we absolutely need to find ways to work with both 
entities where you work through the States in some regards.
    But, for example, in places like Oregon, Oregon is a State 
that has experienced some delays in reimbursements for the 
recovery process, but places like Hamilton County has had to 
suspend current bids because they are just struggling with some 
of that process. But I think you find ways to work both with 
the counties and the States who have capacity and some who 
struggle with it.
    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you very much for that answer.
    Mr. Chair, I am committed to helping bring common sense and 
efficiency to this program. It is an essential program, but I 
think there are better ways that we can do that. And thank you 
to the witnesses for their willingness to come and educate us 
about this.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I 
recognize the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes 
for questions.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you very much. Earlier, the ranking member 
of the full committee mentioned--and I appreciated it--the 
Disaster Survivors Fairness Act that I have introduced with my 
colleague from North Carolina, Representative Edwards, 
Republican.
    This would streamline Federal assistance for disaster 
victims and expand FEMA's authority to help make homes more 
resilient for future disasters. I am pleased that NACo endorsed 
this legislation. It was a pleasure speaking to you, 
Commissioner Garcia, and other members of NACo about this topic 
earlier.
    In your testimony, you urge Federal policymakers to remove 
barriers to funding and resources for underserved and 
disadvantaged communities. How would creating a universal 
application for individual disaster assistance help in that 
effort that you mentioned?
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you for the question. The reality is that 
making sure that the barriers were removed, as I mentioned in 
my testimony, is very, very important. It is critical that we 
make it plain language, as suggested in the two pieces of 
legislation that I have mentioned, the survivors and 
simplification acts. Those speak to the challenges that many of 
our underserved and disadvantaged communities struggle with.
    Ms. Titus. Okay. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate the 
support. I was looking for a little more detail on how it will 
be helpful, but that is good enough.
    I represent Las Vegas, and we don't have a lot of 
hurricanes in Las Vegas except we could probably make one if we 
decided that would be a tourist attraction. But anyway, one of 
the weather hazards that we do have is extreme heat. And this 
past year, we had the hottest day ever in Las Vegas, 120 
degrees.
    And statistics from the National Weather Service show that 
heat kills more people than hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes 
combined in any given year. There were over 520 heat-related 
fatalities in Clark County last year alone. So I have an 
Extreme Weather and Heat Response Modernization Act so FEMA can 
more aggressively include extreme temperatures, especially 
heat, in its disaster planning and have the resources to deal 
with it.
    I wonder if all four of you would take a minute just to 
talk about how extreme heat is impacting the communities you 
serve and how this would be helpful. Maybe we start with Mr. 
Currie.
    Mr. Currie. Sure. I am familiar with the statistic you 
mentioned, too, that heat kills more people than all the other 
disasters combined.
    The challenge right now for FEMA is the whole system relies 
on quantifying damage to figure out if they provide help. And 
heat is a very difficult thing to quantify in their current 
system.
    I agree with you that there is no better thing to quantify 
in terms of an impact and loss of life. But right now, their 
declaration process relies on damage to infrastructure, and it 
is very hard to show acute damage to infrastructure from heat.
    And so that is one of the reasons that you don't see more 
disaster declarations. So I think we are going to have to look 
at that if we are going to change it.
    Ms. Titus. Kind of hard to say when it starts and when it 
stops, like a storm or something.
    Mr. Currie. Yes. And it does damage infrastructure.
    Ms. Titus. Yes.
    Mr. Currie. I mean, it damages roads, bridges. I mean, it 
is just harder to quantify it acutely because it happens, like 
you said, over a long period of time.
    Ms. Titus. Railroads. Anybody else?
    Mr. Guthrie. We do have extreme heat situations inside of 
southeast Florida, specifically Miami. But this is a great 
example of the federally supported, State managed, locally 
executed.
    In southeast Florida, they plan for that as a part of their 
hazards that they respond to on a local level, and they do that 
on a day-to-day basis when we have those issues. If they need 
assistance from the State, they ask for assistance from the 
State. So the system does work in Florida.
    Ms. Titus. With cooling stations and things like that?
    Mr. Guthrie. Yes.
    Ms. Titus. I think the chairman mentioned it wasn't a good 
idea to plant trees to offset heat islands. I couldn't disagree 
more with that. But anyway--so locally you are doing some 
things?
    Mr. Guthrie. Locally. Southeast Florida, southwest Florida, 
those counties approach it differently. But they are locally 
executing on that situation.
    Ms. Titus. Anybody else real quick?
    Mr. Garcia. I do want to offer that in my precinct, just as 
an example, I have a public works department. We absolutely and 
my staff told me that the heat damage can be identified in 
various pieces of infrastructure. But as it was stated, it is 
very difficult to quantify.
    But we do know that extreme heat is an issue for many of 
our NACo members, and we do have data that we can pass along to 
you to help craft some thoughts around that issue.
    Ms. Titus. That would be great. I know our ranking member 
represents the Phoenix area, and we share some of these common 
problems. So that would be very helpful.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I 
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, for 5 
minutes for questions.
    Mr. Kiley of California. Good morning. Mr. Guthrie, I 
commend the work you have done in Florida to strengthen your 
State's capacity to respond to disasters quickly and 
effectively and to thereby mitigate and minimize the threat to 
life and property.
    Unfortunately, my own State of California has not been 
quite so forward-looking in terms of its disaster response 
capabilities, and this was put on shocking display for the 
whole world with the recent tragic catastrophic fires in Los 
Angeles, as we bore witness to an empty reservoir, to fire 
hydrants that wouldn't release water, and other basic failures 
of preparedness for which the residents of Los Angeles are now 
paying such a high price.
    So do you have, number one, some best practices that you 
might share with our State for how it can do better in the 
future, and, number two, thoughts on how the ongoing effort to 
reform FEMA might actually itself help to spread those sort of 
practices?
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. 
First and foremost, in Florida, we do not respond based on 
whether or not we are going to get federally reimbursed. The 
Governor of the State of Florida, the legislature, support 
emergency management holistically, and they expect us to 
respond not worrying about if we are going to get reimbursed or 
not.
    Unfortunately, not every State, every city or county has 
that option. They have to wait to respond to see if they are 
going to meet a threshold or so on to seek FEMA reimbursement.
    I think another thing that was very, very obvious to me in 
that particular disaster is you had the local officials, such 
as a fire chief, sheriff, and things of that nature, but 
nowhere on that dais or that podium did you see the emergency 
manager. They were treating it as--in my opinion, sir, they 
were treating it as still a fire. They were treating it still 
as a traffic issue.
    They had a much more complex issue, and I know that Nancy, 
the California State director, was involved. But, again, 
emergency management was not there on the day. The Los Angeles 
County Emergency Management director was buried in the back. I 
never saw the city of Los Angeles Emergency Management 
director.
    And this is more of a systemic problem across the country, 
in that, what is emergency management? That is something our 
own national emergency manager's association is grappling with, 
and we are going to try to help define for Congress and others 
in the future is, what is emergency management. We could all 
agree that this is what emergency management does.
    I think those are some of the issues. As far as FEMA goes, 
I know that Regional Administrator Bob Fenton was there, and he 
was heavily involved during that timeframe in the Hurst fire 
that you speak of. FEMA was present.
    However, again, State managed, getting it to the point 
where you can get that State involvement very early on, working 
with your local emergency managers to push funding down, start 
doing the things--for example, in the Hurst fire, the attorneys 
paralyzed that response worried about the environmental hazard 
that was going on to clean up the debris. We deal with that 
every single day across this country. We know what to do. Let 
us separate it, let us put it in the appropriate landfill--tier 
1, 2, or 3--based on the hazardous material, and let us move 
forward.
    Do not stop the operation because there is hazardous 
material. We deal with that every single day.
    Mr. Kiley of California. Thank you. That is a great 
insight. And I should mention, the individuals you mentioned, 
Mr. Fenton, Ms. Ward, work well with my office. It is clearly a 
systemic issue here that we need to reform.
    Mr. Currie, a question I had for you is that some of the 
grants that FEMA makes available for sort of predisaster 
efforts--like the BRIC grants, the PDM grants--they don't allow 
for predisaster water infrastructure for fire suppression to be 
an eligible use; so, fire hydrants, upgrading lines, tanks that 
would actually sort of be critical in some cases for immediate 
response.
    And this is important for several communities I represent 
that are high fire risk, such as the Tahoe Basin. And, in fact, 
the Caldor fire, which is 2021, one of the factors that was 
cited for why it didn't ultimately engulf communities in South 
Tahoe was the availability of water infrastructure for fire 
suppression.
    So why is it that that is not an eligible use, and is that 
something you think we ought to change?
    Mr. Currie. Yes. What I found over the years is that a lot 
of times when people say it is not eligible under FEMA, it is 
just because it was not approved. There is not a law or a 
requirement that says they can't do it. All these mitigation 
programs rely on the State or the local government to provide a 
justification or a benefit-cost analysis to FEMA, and then FEMA 
decides based on all the other project requests it is getting, 
if it meets their threshold. And then in that case, they 
didn't.
    It's not that it's not allowed. It's just that--and this is 
a very common problem with these mitigation issues. These are 
very complicated projects, and FEMA oftentimes--the paperwork 
required to get the approvals is just extremely difficult.
    And if you are a large county or a large State with the 
capacity to do that, then you might have the resources to put 
that together. If you are a smaller county or a Tribe or 
something like that, you don't have the resources to put a good 
justification together, so you don't get the funding.
    Mr. Kiley of California. I know we are a little over time 
here. But just to clarify, are you saying that for PDM and BRIC 
grants, that is an eligible use; it is just a matter of where 
the threshold is set, or is there a needed----
    Mr. Currie [interrupting]. I will go back and check on the 
requirement. I am just saying that what I found is a lot of 
times when it is deemed ineligible or it is not approved, it is 
because FEMA--it doesn't meet some sort of cost-benefit 
threshold as opposed to that specific kind of project not being 
able to be approved. It is just they haven't demonstrated that 
the benefits are going to exceed the cost.
    Mr. Kiley of California. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I 
recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Friedman, for 5 
minutes for questions.
    Ms. Friedman. Thank you very much. And I want to thank the 
witnesses for their testimony, being here.
    I have to say that it is hard as a Los Angeles Congress 
Member sometimes to hear Los Angeles, at the time when it is 
reeling from disasters and when victims are still living in 
hotels, somehow seeming to be blamed for their own disaster.
    I really appreciate Mr. Guthrie's response to Mr. Kiley's 
question about what California could do better, because it is 
important that we do evaluate our response to disaster, do 
audits to make sure that we improve. And so your very good 
suggestions about disaster management are something that I am 
very interested in, and I appreciate your saying them.
    I do feel that I have to respond a bit about the idea that 
somehow these fires were caused because of not having pressure 
in hydrants or reservoirs being empty. Yes, a reservoir was 
down for repair, and we should always look at what our 
timetables are, and fire hydrants were not designed to put out 
a thousand fires in a residential neighborhood simultaneously. 
There is not a fire system in this country that would be able 
to function adequately under those kinds of conditions.
    But due to what's happening with climate change and 
changing conditions, we are going to have to look at our 
infrastructure and make investments to counter conditions that 
this country has never seen.
    I grew up in Florida. And my entire childhood, I believe 
there were two hurricanes, my whole childhood. And now we see 
multiple hurricanes every single year.
    So we have extreme weather events happening around this 
country, and we have got to make investments in our 
infrastructure and our emergency response to counter that. And 
we can't pretend that it is not because of climate change as 
well. And so efforts that we can make in this body to slow that 
change down are also going to help save lives.
    So, I have been working on fire issues for many, many years 
in the California Legislature. California has invested hundreds 
of millions of dollars over the past several years, year after 
year, to beef up our response to, add more resources for 
fighting fires, for fire resiliency, and we saw those resources 
deployed in these fires with hundreds and hundreds of 
firefighters on the line, more air response than we have ever 
seen in this Nation's history; where really hurricane winds 
driving embers in a time of year that normally is wet, and with 
record dryness instead.
    And we are going to, unfortunately, have to keep putting 
those resources on the ground. Now, I have introduced my first 
two bills around supporting wildfire victims with the Don't 
Penalize Victims Act, which would ensure that charitable 
donations are not used to unfairly penalize victims of natural 
disasters. I appreciate the members of this committee to making 
that a bipartisan bill.
    We also have introduced a Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act 
to stop price gouging around this country after natural 
disasters.
    I also believe in holding FEMA accountable. We have had a 
lot of concerns in Los Angeles around air quality, soil, and 
water pollution because of these disasters, and I would love to 
see FEMA doing more monitoring on a regular basis so that the 
people in Los Angeles know whether or not they need to take 
precautions if they send their kids to school in Pasadena or if 
their water has been contaminated or whether or not they can 
plant things in their garden if they are worried that their 
soil has become contaminated. We haven't seen FEMA take that 
seriously, and I would like to see that happen.
    I do have a quick question about disaster aid, and we have 
heard a little talk about that. But, unfortunately, this 
administration has said that they want to hold Californians 
accountable, and that they, I think, want to punish the people 
of California, not for anything about their response, but just 
because this administration doesn't like their policies around 
things like voting rights or around our commitment to 
diversity.
    So I have a simple yes-or-no question. For Ms. Laughter, 
when Hurricane Helene hit North Carolina last year, did 
President Biden condition disaster aid against major policy 
changes in that State? It was a yes-or-no question.
    Ms. Laughter. No.
    Ms. Friedman. Thank you.
    Mr. Guthrie, when Hurricane Milton hit Florida last year, 
did President Biden condition disaster aid on the people of 
Florida?
    Mr. Guthrie. No.
    Ms. Friedman. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I would 
hope that this administration does not play games with people's 
lives.
    Lastly, I want to ask about staffing. FEMA has been on the 
ground in Los Angeles helping people, and they are very 
grateful that there are FEMA officials there. I am very worried 
about the mass layoffs that we are seeing to public employees, 
and I have had people in Los Angeles say, when I show up to 
that office, are there going to be enough people there to help 
me?
    I want to know whether you think workplace cuts are going 
to make it easier or harder for people after a disaster to get 
a live person on the phone or someone to sit in front of them 
and help them out with whatever issue they have. I will start 
with Mr. Garcia, I think.
    Mr. Garcia. Absolutely, workforce depletions do bring 
challenges. Local communities and NACo county members need in 
many regards that human capital that brings that technical 
assistance that helps to get the funding necessary to help 
those communities recover and rebuild.
    So we do need the people behind all the other Federal 
guidelines and framework.
    Ms. Friedman. Thank you. Mr. Currie, would you like to 
respond?
    Mr. Currie. It is not going to help. That is my easy 
answer.
    FEMA will always marshal the resources towards response and 
the disasters that have just happened. What the cuts do is it 
affects the disasters that happened 6 months ago, 1 year ago, 6 
years ago. So it is a cumulative effect because of how many 
disasters they are dealing with.
    Ms. Friedman. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I 
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
    Some of my professional background lends a voice to this 
topic. In my previous life, I worked in the heavy highway 
construction, and my family company partnered with States and 
local communities on all efforts, like rebuilding Interstate I-
95 after the tragic collapse. We also worked in Fort Myers 
after Hurricane Ian, rebuilding power distribution systems 
where I saw firsthand the devastation and how locally executed, 
State-managed, and federally supported programs could be 
exceptionally beneficial. I have also seen how bureaucratic 
redtape can impede relief.
    During COVID, FEMA offered grants to hospitals to address 
challenges, like finding adequate PPE and medical supplies, as 
well as address workforce shortages. Even though the public 
health emergency ended nearly 2 years ago, Pennsylvania 
hospitals are still waiting on $690 million in grant 
applications.
    In September of 2023, Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties in my 
district experienced historic flooding. Our State emergency 
agency estimated the damage to be $25 million, including the 
loss of lives. In April of 2024, FEMA denied the State's 
request for major disaster declaration.
    As GAO points out, there are more than 30 Federal entities 
involved in disaster recovery. This was a clear sign to 
Pennsylvania that we can't always count on the support of FEMA 
for disaster relief, which brings me to my questions on how 
States can best prepare for and deliver relief before, during, 
and after disasters.
    So my first question for Mr. Guthrie, in your written 
testimony, you discuss Florida's Division of Emergency 
Management implementing emergency standby contracts as part of 
your proactive management strategy.
    How can States replicate this practice to have dedicated 
vendors on standby ready to deploy for various types of natural 
disasters that States can experience?
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question, sir. It is very 
easy to do.
    These are zero-dollar contingency contracts put in place 
where we already know who the bidders are. One of the issues 
with FEMA is, when you need a--for instance, a direct housing 
program, they have to then go to contracting right then and 
there. We know we are going to need direct housing all over 
this country. We should have that already done so that that 
speeds that process up by months.
    We have done that in Florida. I will make it available--as 
I have already told my partners from other States, I will make 
all of our contracts available as a starting point to take the 
scope of work, copy and paste it, put it into their terms and 
conditions and fast forward that methodology for any State, any 
city, or any county that wants to do that, sir.
    Mr. Bresnahan. So not all disasters can be predicted. What 
are some best practices Florida uses to have flexibility with 
these contracts to ensure adequate response from vendors while 
protecting taxpayer money?
    Mr. Guthrie. So I have some of the best attorneys in the 
world. They always get to a yes. And what they allow us to do 
is they advise me of risk where we may be getting outside the 
four corners of a document, or they will get me to a yes where 
I can stay within the four corners of the document so that I 
don't have to do another emergency procurement to get into the 
four corners of the document.
    And those that are attorneys understand what I am saying 
there. That is one way; having a good attorney that knows their 
job, which is to advise the principle on risk versus reward. 
Sometimes we have to take the risk. And knowing the 
consequences of that ahead of time, it is always good to have a 
good attorney for that.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Mr. Guthrie, Ms. Laughter, and Mr. Garcia, 
when communities suffer from disasters, it can also be an 
opportunity to build back stronger, more resilient 
infrastructure. But oftentimes, we see 21st-century communities 
being rebuilt with 20th-century infrastructure.
    How have your respective States and counties engaged in 
long-term planning to ensure rebuilt infrastructure is more 
resilient, more secure, and incorporates the latest in digital 
technologies and digital infrastructure? Mr. Garcia, Honorable 
Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. In Harris County, we are absolutely 
putting the Federal resources that we have been fortunate to 
receive into resilient initiatives. For example, in Harris 
County, we received $51 million to help with the buyout program 
to take people out of flood-prone areas. And we are doing a 
whole lot more to make sure that resilience is at the top of 
our work process.
    Ms. Laughter. We are interested in any way that we can 
improve for the future. I think one of the things that has to 
be taken into account, though, is that whenever we receive 
grants or we receive support from Federal or State agencies, if 
there are restrictions around that that make it harder for us 
to make decisions and make those investments, then it becomes 
counterproductive.
    Mr. Guthrie. So we have done a comprehensive reform on 
this. We have come out with Florida legislation that preempts 
cities and counties from doing bureaucratic things when it 
comes to permitting. That is one thing that we have done.
    We have worked with the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes and 
the national BuildStrong Coalition for ensuring we have good 
building codes. We have the best building code in the United 
States, and strong building codes do work. You can see that all 
up and down our coastline.
    Those are just a couple of examples that we have done where 
we have been able to do this much faster.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you for the testimony and your time, 
and I yield back.
    I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, 
for 5 minutes for questions.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
for the issues that you are raising. I would like to just pick 
up on what Ms. Friedman was referring to earlier and make sure 
that we fully understand where we are with requirements in 
order to receive FEMA assistance.
    Mr. Currie, is there any example in the past where a FEMA 
assistance program, disaster assistance, was conditioned on in 
any number, in any way? Are you familiar with any of that?
    Mr. Currie. I am not familiar. The only thing I would be 
familiar with is if it is conditioned on using that for 
resilience purposes, for building back better than it was 
before.
    Mr. Garamendi. I do want to come to that.
    Mr. Guthrie, you answered no to the question that Ms. 
Friedman raised about conditions. Is it your view that there 
should be conditions for the emergency assistance being 
available to a disaster area? Should there be preconditions?
    Mr. Guthrie. There should not be preconditions. However, 
again, to the mitigation piece, benefit-cost analysis, should 
we be applying a BCA to a situation where we want a house out 
of the flood plain, we want to build a house stronger; just 
because we meet a number, does that make sense? I don't think 
so.
    So I think there should be some preconditions to some 
programs that say we should waive this or we should make this 
stronger.
    Mr. Garamendi. Fair enough. And I would appreciate your 
coming back with the specifics that you are referring to. 
Certainly, flood, we have been in and out of that for the 15 
years I have been here; and, yes, we are making some progress.
    The other area that I want to go to deals with the GAO 
report. You had 60 recommendations in the GAO report. It would 
seem to me that this committee would be--its time would be very 
usefully spent going through those.
    Mr. Currie, in your testimony, you highlighted, I think, 
four specific areas. I would like you to revisit those in the 
next minute or so, the four priorities that are on your mind 
for the legislative policy changes that this committee should 
spend time on--that you believe we should spend time on.
    Mr. Currie. Yes. Those 60 recommendations cut across four 
areas, as you said. First is streamlining the Federal disaster 
recovery process because it is fragmented.
    Mr. Garamendi. Fragmented among multiple agencies.
    Mr. Currie. Exactly; 30 agencies, to be sure.
    Better delivering disaster aid to survivors, making that 
easier for individual survivors.
    Reforming the FEMA workforce is number three.
    And then number four is using our resilience dollars and 
making resilience programs easier to navigate for State and 
local governments.
    Mr. Garamendi. All right. And in each of those areas you 
had specific ways in which the improvements could be 
accomplished, that is, legislative.
    Mr. Currie. Yes, absolutely. Well, actually, 2 years ago, 
before the reform discussions even started, we recommended that 
Congress set up its own commission to look at disaster 
recovery, because we were so frustrated that the agencies for 
years, we were making recommendations, they weren't 
implementing them. And also, this issue cuts across so many 
committees of jurisdiction. So it is rare that we recommend 
something like that, but we thought the problem was large 
enough that it was warranted.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, you have given me direction on how I 
should spend my time, and hopefully the committee would 
similarly spend time on the details of each of these, 
streamlining multiple Federal agencies, maybe eliminate or at 
least change the way in which they, presumably, should work 
together.
    Individual Assistance Programs, could you be a little more 
specific about that?
    Mr. Currie. Well, changing our aid programs to the 
individual survivor from being Government centric to customer 
centric. And what I mean by that is, right now, the survivor 
has to extract the money out of the Federal Government through 
a lengthy, frustrating process. And because of that, they don't 
get everything they could possibly get.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie, you are nodding your 
head, and the rest of you would think this is something we 
ought to deal with?
    Mr. Guthrie. Yes, sir. I mean, the mere fact that a 
homeowner may have to wait 4, 5, or 6 years to get back to 
where they need to be. What we want, all of us want, is that 
homeowner back on their property in their home.
    Mr. Garamendi. I am almost out of time. For the four of 
you, if you could present to the committee, and certainly to me 
and my colleagues, the specific kinds of reform that you think 
are most necessary on the Individual Assistance.
    On the workforce, we have already talked about the current 
reductions in workforce, and there has been a discussion on 
that.
    With regard to resiliency, FEMA does have a bit of a 
problem in that build back better is not in their lexicon, at 
least in the regulations that they administer. So we need to be 
aware that we need to change and encourage FEMA to look to 
resiliency that is really do build back better, more details.
    I am out of time. Thank you very much, gentlemen and lady.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I 
recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Onder, for 5 minutes 
for questions.
    Dr. Onder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here today.
    Mr. Currie, the GAO has conducted numerous audits of FEMA's 
disaster relief spending. Has your office identified instances 
where FEMA funds have been used to provide aid to illegal 
immigrants, whether it be housing assistance or otherwise, and 
could you provide examples?
    Mr. Currie. Yes. We did a report a year or two ago--I will 
have to get back to you on the specifics--on the Emergency Food 
and Shelter Program, which, as you know, Congress authorized 
that program for FEMA to provide assistance to cities to help 
support the influx of migrants.
    Dr. Onder. Okay. Do you recall when Congress authorized 
that program?
    Mr. Currie. It was in the last Congress, but I have to get 
back to you on the details.
    Dr. Onder. It was 118. Okay. Okay. Given FEMA's mission to 
assist American citizens and legal residents, are there 
oversight mechanisms currently in place to ensure that funds 
are used appropriately for disaster recovery as opposed to 
being diverted to other uses?
    Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. The Disaster Relief Fund is closely 
monitored, and there are many controls over the payments that 
come out of that and go to the States. And it is not just at 
the Federal level. FEMA has its own controls, but then it goes 
to the States.
    Like Mr. Guthrie's State, they have their own controls 
before it goes down to the local level, too. So it is a very 
highly overseen pot of money.
    Dr. Onder. Thank you.
    And, Ms. Laughter, as a county official, have you 
encountered concerns about FEMA's aid distribution being 
inconsistent, influenced by nondisaster factors, perhaps 
political factors?
    Ms. Laughter. We have not seen that. We have seen 
frustration from our survivors of being able to access the 
funds that they should be able to access and difficulty in 
getting any answers.
    The 800 number that a lot of our survivors were referred to 
for a long time could not be connected. So they really 
expressed a lot of the frustration around those components.
    Dr. Onder. Got it. So in your testimony, you also stated 
that, ``When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a 
system in place to support response and recovery because local 
governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to 
handle a response at that scale during nonresponse times.''
    Based on your experience with Hurricane Helene, what role 
do you think the Federal Government should play versus the 
State governments and perhaps the local governments?
    Ms. Laughter. I think they both need to play a role. And at 
the end of the day, at the local government level, we just need 
a system that works.
    Dr. Onder. What do you think can be done to improve 
communication between FEMA employees and the State and local 
officials involved in disaster recovery?
    Ms. Laughter. What we experienced was a lot of siloes where 
we could ask a single question to one worker, they did not even 
know themselves how to get an answer to a question that was 
outside of their training or outside of their silo. So 
communication is a huge component in training.
    Dr. Onder. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I 
recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Figures, for 5 
minutes for questions.
    Mr. Figures. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Mr. Ranking Member, 
for hosting this hearing and for all of the witnesses being 
here.
    I want to start by recognizing Alabama's Director of 
Emergency Management, Jeff Smitherman, who is in the audience 
with us and also thank you for your near 30 years of service to 
this Nation's military. So thank you and thank you for being 
here, and thank you for what you do in the State.
    Our State was just hit by a round of thunderstorms, and 
your office kept us abreast of what was going on and kept us 
well-prepared. Fortunately--well, I guess both fortunately and 
unfortunately, the damage did not rise to a level of a 
Federal--or at least that is my understanding as of this 
morning, that it will not likely rise to the level of a Federal 
emergency, but yet some rural areas did take hits and there 
were some lives lost in that storm.
    Ms. Laughter, I want to do something that I don't think you 
have probably gotten in this process. And that is, I believe it 
was Maya Angelou who once said that people don't remember 
everything about you, but they will certainly remember how you 
made them feel. Sounds like FEMA didn't make you and your 
community feel very good.
    And so on behalf of all of us--I was not in Congress at the 
time--but on behalf of everybody on this committee and 
everybody that serves in Federal Government, I want to say that 
I am sorry, because our Government should be there for our 
people, and I know you guys experienced that in Florida as 
well. So I want to apologize on behalf of all of us and commit 
to doing better and using my position here to make sure that we 
are not making other communities feel the way that you felt. 
And I mean that.
    As a kid that was born in hurricane alley, where names like 
Erin and Opal and Danny and Georges and Katrina and Ivan, they 
mean a little bit something different to me. Hell, I was 
literally born during a hurricane in September 1985, Hurricane 
Elena.
    So I know a little bit about FEMA, I know a little bit 
about communities that need their recovery, need their help. 
But we need it to be efficient, and we need it to be quick, and 
we need it to be effective.
    And so, I want to start--at least my first question is, it 
seems that this problem is bigger than just FEMA. You have 
mentioned 30 agencies being involved in this process. So how by 
fixing FEMA are we resolving the entire problem, or is there a 
broader scope of inquiry that we need to be addressing these 
efforts on?
    We can just go down the row. Mr. Currie.
    Mr. Currie. Yes. Unfortunately, FEMA is the face of 
response and recovery for the Federal Government. But when you 
look at the funding, it is spread all over the Federal 
Government. And each of those agencies has their own rules, 
programs, requirements, and timeframes.
    And so when those all come together, it creates a very 
confusing system and process if you are a State or local 
emergency manager.
    Mr. Figures. Mr. Guthrie.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman. I would say yes, we 
need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and 
structure of FEMA, but I would even say take that to the back 
row. We need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and 
structure of every agency that is a part of the Federal family 
that responds to disasters.
    Because, again, FEMA is a coordinating element. They are 
not the command and control element. They are the coordinating 
element. But when you have--if you are a fishery or 
aquaculture, you have to go through, I believe it is the 
Department of Commerce; if you are in agriculture, you go 
through the U.S. Department of Agriculture; if you have 
something that is on an FHWA roadway, you are going through 
DOT. That is at the public level.
    Imagine if you were an individual that is dependent on 
section 8 housing, you are going through HUD, if you are with 
DCF, you are going through maybe another HHS agency. We have 
got to figure out, again, comprehensive review of the scope, 
mission, and structure of the Federal family to streamline that 
into one single application, whether it is for public sector or 
Individual Assistance sector, we've got----
    Mr. Figures [interrupting]. I don't want to cut you off. I 
want to get Ms. Laughter because I want to get one more 
question in for Mr. Garcia.
    Ms. Laughter. I agree. I think it is more complicated than 
just FEMA. We have an example right now of private property 
debris removal. We have a farmer that has 300 bales of spoiled 
hay from a flood, and he cannot access the private property 
debris removal because he falls under USDA.
    And he also cannot get direction from the same agency of 
how to access USDA in order to get relief. He just needs help.
    Mr. Figures. Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. With so many agencies involved, it does cause 
confusion--or would cause confusion--at all levels for the 
local community, as well as the residents at heart. So 
comprehensive review absolutely is necessary.
    Mr. Figures. All right. Now, Mr. Garcia, just for you. You 
mentioned in your opening testimony, you mentioned about 
underserved and disadvantaged communities. And that 
particularly resonates with me. I am in a very poor district. 
For the most part, individual median income is just around 
$30,000. So these are people that can't afford to rebuild on 
their own.
    So my question for you is, in those communities that have 
been hit by storms, particularly hurricanes, tornadoes where we 
see those blue tarps go on those roofs, we go back too often, 
and those blue tarps are still there years later; in fact, 
sometimes decades later. How can we better streamline resources 
to getting to those communities?
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. And I will tell you that 
streamlining the process is absolutely critical. As I 
mentioned, both the legislation that is being proposed, the 
Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance 
Simplification Act, all those things are going to help us 
remove the barriers that the communities could face. And so we 
need the support by FEMA. So staff shortages at FEMA do not 
help us move forward. All of this is important for us to 
address.
    So simplification, plain language, universal portals, those 
things are absolutely helpful to get the resources where they 
are needed.
    Mr. Figures. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you for the overage.
    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    Are there further questions from any members of the 
subcommittee who have not been recognized?
    Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.
    I would like to thank each of the witnesses for your 
testimony. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


  Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Kristen McDonald Rivet

    Question 1. My office received outreach from a number of 
constituents still affected by the historic 2020 Midland floods. The 
following questions are asked on behalf of members of my community. 
Thank you for your review and prompt response.
    Question 1.a. Is there a process for FEMA to annually review 
Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation 
programs, by interviewing people who are impacted by the process to see 
what is working and what isn't?
    Answer:
Individual Assistance
       In 2020, GAO found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) conducted three different telephone surveys to assess disaster 
survivors' experiences with its Individuals and Households Program and 
used these results to assess program performance.\1\ However, GAO found 
that the methodology FEMA used did not fully align with federal 
standards for statistical surveys, limiting FEMA's ability to use the 
results to determine how well their efforts are working. As a result, 
GAO recommended that FEMA correct and refine the methodology used to 
survey survivors. In December 2022, FEMA took steps to correct and 
refine its methodology used to survey survivors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ These surveys are (1) an initial survey to measure the quality 
of disaster assistance information and services received by survivors 
during the initial application process; (2) a contact survey to measure 
the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by 
survivors while they checked the status of their case online or during 
interactions with FEMA staff; and (3) an assessment survey to measure 
the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by 
survivors after FEMA determines their eligibility for Individuals and 
Households Program assistance. GAO, Disaster Assistance: Additional 
Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program, 
GAO-20-503 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public Assistance
       GAO is not aware of an annual review of the Public Assistance 
program or interviews with applicants for the purposes of identifying 
what is working well and what is not. However, in 2021, FEMA did 
conduct customer satisfaction surveys of Public Assistance applicants 
and grantees with the goal of program improvement. According to FEMA, 
the information collected from customers and stakeholders will help 
ensure that users have an effective, efficient, and satisfying 
experience with the Agency's programs. This feedback will provide 
insights into customer or stakeholder perceptions, experiences and 
expectations, provide an early warning of issues with service, or focus 
attention on areas where communication, training or changes in 
operations might improve delivery of products or service.

       Additionally, in 2023, FEMA issued a report that included 
stakeholder feedback from Public Assistance applicants. The survey 
results were used to further program improvement and develop 
recommendations to FEMA management on streamlining the program.
Hazard Mitigation
       In March 2020, FEMA issued a Summary of Stakeholder Feedback 
report summarizing stakeholder feedback on its hazard mitigation grant 
programs.\2\ According to the report, FEMA solicited input from 
stakeholders as part of its effort to develop the BRIC program and 
reported that stakeholders were overwhelmingly dissatisfied with 
benefit-cost analysis requirements and said that they were a barrier to 
completing grant applications. FEMA received over 5,000 comments and 75 
letters and summarized the contents of these in the Summary of 
Stakeholder Feedback report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See, FEMA, Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building Resilient 
Infrastructure and Communities, (Washington D.C.: March 2020). See, 
GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to 
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).

       In February 2021, GAO reported on challenges state and local 
officials faced when applying for FEMA hazard mitigation grants. GAO 
found that FEMA had developed resources to help hazard mitigation 
applicants--guidance, Fact Sheets, project examples, studies, and 
technical publications.\3\ However, the resources could be difficult to 
locate on FEMA's website and there was no centralized inventory of 
resources to help applicants locate the information. As a result, GAO 
recommended that FEMA create a centralized inventory of hazard 
mitigation resources on its website. FEMA concurred and has since taken 
steps to do so. In June 2022, FEMA finished re-designing portions of 
their website to centralize guidance and other resources on their 
hazard mitigation programs. The reorganization makes these resources 
easier to find and better positions FEMA to help state and local 
applicants successfully apply for grants for mitigation projects that 
enhance disaster resilience. As a result, this recommendation is closed 
as implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to 
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).

    In February 2025, GAO added Improving the Delivery of Federal 
Disaster Assistance to its High-Risk List.\4\ In the new segment GAO 
emphasized the need for FEMA to take steps to better manage 
fragmentation across its own programs, as GAO has recommended. Such 
actions could make the programs simpler, more accessible and user-
friendly, and improve the effectiveness of federal disaster recovery 
efforts. Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster 
recovery and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to 
disaster survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of 
recovery efforts.\5\ As of February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to 
streamline the applications for two of its recovery programs. However, 
FEMA will need to demonstrate that it has thoroughly considered 
available options to reduce fragmentation across its own programs, 
identified those FEMA intends to implement, and then taken steps to 
fully implement this recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions 
More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
    \5\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal 
Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, GAO has found that as the incidence and severity of 
massive wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find 
additional opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\6\ For 
example, GAO recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to 
provide immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a 
process to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from 
state, local, and tribal Fire Management Assistance Grants recipients. 
Taking these steps would help foster more resilient communities and 
reduce the future demand on federal resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA 
Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2024).

    Question 1.b. Has FEMA measured the number of disconnects between 
the initial approved project amount and the actual costs at closeout of 
said projects?
    Answer. GAO has not assessed whether FEMA has systematically 
measured the initial costs of Public Assistance projects against their 
actual costs at closeout. However, it is common that initial project 
costs would increase as the project is completed and eventually closed 
out. For example, GAO reported in 2024 that in Puerto Rico, Public 
Assistance awardees have faced challenges related to disaster recovery 
projects due to the increased costs.\7\ For example, GAO reported that 
subrecipients that have received Public Assistance awards under the 
Accelerated Award Strategy identified increased project costs that pose 
challenges to the full recovery of their facilities. According to 
officials from the four Accelerated Award Strategy subrecipient 
entities, inflation and labor shortages have increased the costs of 
projects beyond their anticipated estimated costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery 
Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 
2024).

    Question 1.c. Has FEMA considered having a FEMA employee who walks 
through the whole recovery journey with the municipality rebuilding? 
What resources would be necessary?
    Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee 
to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However, GAO 
has found that FEMA staffing turnover throughout the lifecycle of 
public assistance projects is a long-standing challenge cited by state 
and local officials. For example, in March 2019 GAO reported that FEMA 
and Puerto Rico municipality officials cited concerns about FEMA staff 
turnover and lack of knowledge about how the Public Assistance 
alternative procedures are to be applied.\8\ FEMA officials 
acknowledged that more personnel with expertise in the alternative 
procedures process were needed to administer Public Assistance and 
assist subrecipients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight, 
and Recovery Challenges, GAO-19-256 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FEMA officials stated that they faced additional responsibilities 
due to COVID-19, while also managing the traditional seasonal peaks of 
disaster activity during the year, which created burnout for many 
employees and increased employee attrition.\9\ Such attrition and an 
increasing workload make it difficult for FEMA to provide individual 
technical support to all grantees as needed. FEMA's workforce 
challenges are a key area identified in GAO's recent high-risk report. 
In recent years, the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and other responsibilities have placed additional 
pressures on FEMA. FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and 
staffing levels has limited its capacity to provide effective disaster 
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring 
Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 
2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, GAO found in May 2023 that FEMA had an overall 
staffing gap of approximately 35 percent across different positions at 
the beginning of fiscal year 2022. The gaps varied, but Public 
Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower 
percentages of staffing targets filled--between 44 and 60 percent at 
the beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important 
functions, including administering assistance to state and local 
governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction 
activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and 
movement during a disaster.
    GAO also found that FEMA has fallen short of its yearly staffing 
target between 2019 and 2022, and that gap continues to grow. For 
example, FEMA only had nine percent of its disaster-response workforce 
available for Hurricane Milton response, according to its daily 
operations brief. Many responders have declined deployments in recent 
disasters because of burnout or severe conditions in the field. GAO has 
made numerous recommendations to help FEMA better manage catastrophic 
or concurrent disasters.

    Question 1.d. Instead of each municipality learning to navigate the 
FEMA assistance process independently, has FEMA considered assigning a 
staffer to that municipality as their recovery expert?
    Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee 
to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However, 
FEMA does have methods for coordinating with municipalities following a 
disaster. Two of these methods include FEMA's Integration Teams and 
FEMA's Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers:
    FEMA Integration Teams. Officials in all 10 FEMA regions that GAO 
interviewed in 2024 stated that they provide resources and support to 
states through FEMA Integration Teams, which are FEMA staff embedded 
within state emergency management offices.\10\ Officials from six FEMA 
regions said that Integration Team members serve as liaisons between 
FEMA and the states in various aspects of responding to disasters. For 
example, officials from these six FEMA regions said that Integration 
Team members provide situational awareness during a disaster response. 
Officials in one region said they have an Integration Team member who 
serves as an Individual Assistance subject matter expert during 
Preliminary Damage Assessments. GAO has not comprehensively assessed 
this program to further determine how these teams may assist 
municipalities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The FEMA Integration Teams were established in July 2017 with 
the goal of embedding FEMA staff with state and territorial partners, 
and to work alongside tribal partners. FEMA Integration Teams provide 
technical assistance and coordination to state, tribal, and territorial 
emergency management agencies in areas such as planning, logistics, 
recovery, and grants management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers. In addition, FEMA 
provides Program Delivery Managers following a disaster declaration. In 
2017, GAO reported that FEMA redesigned the delivery of the Public 
Assistance program to address past workforce management challenges, 
such as shortages in experienced and trained Public Assistance staff 
and high turnover among these staff.\11\ As part of the redesigned 
program, FEMA created, among other things, Program Delivery Managers to 
ensure more consistent guidance to Public Assistance applicants. 
However, in February 2025, GAO reported that FEMA continues to have 
long-standing workforce management issues that makes supporting 
response and recovery efforts difficult.\12\ GAO has started work 
examining FEMA's staffing gaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Enhance 
Implementation of the Redesigned Public Assistance Program Grant 
Program, GAO-18-30 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2017).
    \12\ GAO-25-107743

    Question 1.e. How does FEMA measure if the disaster assistance 
process is working? Does FEMA measure the amount of time from the time 
of the incident to full recovery?
    Answer. FEMA tracks the amount of time from the initial disaster to 
full recovery but does not set any targets or metrics for how long this 
process should take. Disaster recovery can take years to complete 
depending on the severity of the disasters and many other factors, such 
as state and local resources and capacity to manage the recovery. For 
example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major 
disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in 
various stages of response and recovery.\13\ For instance, as of 
February 2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects 
as part of Public Assistance for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ GAO-25-107743
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GAO previously recommended in February 2021, that FEMA use data on 
the timeliness and performance of the Public Assistance application 
process.\14\ GAO made this recommendation to help identify 
inefficiencies and root causes of delays in the Public Assistance 
process and provide FEMA and its local partners with the information 
needed to address them. To address this recommendation, in March 2021, 
FEMA's Recovery Analytics and Public Assistance Divisions published a 
live dashboard tool with timeliness metrics on FEMA's internet, 
accessible to FEMA staff, that captures metrics at the FEMA and 
applicant level and provides data under five performance goals. As a 
result, this recommendation was closed as implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ GAO, 2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal Actions Helped 
Facilitate the Response, but FEMA Needs to Address Long-Term Recovery 
Challenges, GAO-21-91 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FEMA also has a performance measure on timeliness of 
assistance.\15\ Specifically, FEMA measures the average timeliness of 
Individuals and Households Program awards in days. This measure 
assesses how quickly the program provides the first financial 
assistance received by qualified individuals and households through the 
Individuals and Households Program. By evaluating how quickly disaster 
survivors receive financial assistance, the program can assess the 
effectiveness of a critical, customer-facing element of the agency's 
mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report 
Fiscal Year 2024.

    Question 1.f. Does FEMA measure and/or track the amount of time it 
takes the municipality to receive its money at the time of closeout?
    Answer. As noted above, FEMA does track the amount of time from the 
initial disaster to full recovery but does not set any targets or 
metrics for how long this process should take. Project closeout is 
dependent on a on a number of factors including the severity and 
complexity of the disaster and amount of time it takes for the state or 
municipality to provide all necessary projects documentation and 
justifications.
    According to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, 
project closeout requires timely and complete project-level information 
from the Recipient as work is completed.\16\ To initiate project-level 
closeout, the Subrecipient must inform the Recipient that its project 
is complete and the date the work was completed. To ensure a timely 
closeout process, the Subrecipient should notify the Recipient 
immediate as it completes each Large Project and when its completed its 
last Small Project.
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    \16\ FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, Version 4 FP 
104-009-2 (June 1, 2020).
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    Further, the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide states that 
they have a process for obligating Public Assistance funding based on 
the Applicant's schedule to execute the work. If a project is greater 
than one million and the applicant does not need funds for more than 
180 days from the time the Project is ready for obligation, FEMA 
obligates funds based on the project completion schedule. In addition, 
according to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, FEMA 
only provides Public Assistance funding for work completed and costs 
incurred within regulatory guidelines.

    Question 1.g. Does FEMA measure the number of issues suffered by 
the municipality during the process, such as finding that key items 
were left off the disaster-recovery punch list and the assistance ($) 
estimated vs. the result of the bids?
    Answer. FEMA has a performance measure that assesses the percent of 
applicants satisfied with the Public Assistance process and customer 
service. According to FEMA documentation, FEMA conducts a Public 
Assistance Assessment survey that collects satisfaction information 
from applicants after they received an award.
    In addition, in May 2021, GAO reported on Puerto Rico's disaster 
recovery efforts, including its use of Public Assistance awards and 
difficulties it has faced implementing recovery projects.\17\ For 
example, GAO reported that FEMA made progress in approving Public 
Assistance projects, but that FEMA had not comprehensively identified 
or assessed the risk that could affect the success of the remainder of 
Puerto Rico's recovery, such as Puerto Rico's ability to start 
construction on recovery projects. GAO recommended that FEMA, in 
coordination with Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies, identify 
and assess the risks to Puerto Rico's recovery, including Puerto Rico's 
capacity to carry out projects, and identify potential actions to 
manage the risks. In 2024, FEMA finalized a risk management plan that 
documented its framework to manage and monitor risks to the remainder 
of Puerto Rico's recovery. Further, FEMA provided a memorandum 
documenting the FEMA executive leadership's approval to implement this 
plan. FEMA also provided additional documentation on its efforts to 
engage and coordinate with the Government of Puerto Rico on efforts to 
continuously manage and monitor risks to the recovery. As a result, 
these recommendations were closed as implemented.
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    \17\ GAO, Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Approving 
Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery, GAO-21-
264 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2021).
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    Additionally, GAO has reported that the federal approach to 
disaster recovery is fragmented across more than 30 federal 
entities.\18\ These entities are involved with multiple programs and 
authorities and have differing requirements and timeframes. This 
fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to 
successfully navigate multiple federal programs. Congress and federal 
agencies have taken steps to better manage fragmentation, such as 
through interagency agreements and reducing program complexity, but 
challenges remain. In November 2022, GAO identified 11 options to 
improve the federal government's approach to disaster recovery based on 
our review of relevant literature, interviews with federal, state, and 
local officials; and a panel of experts.\19\
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    \18\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal 
Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
    \19\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related 
to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option 
and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to 
improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. GAO 
attributed statements from experts collected as part of the panel 
discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes 
statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery: 
Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-104956 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
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