[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                                 OF THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
                               AFRICA

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              June 5, 2025

                               __________

                           Serial No. 119-22

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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 Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov 
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                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, 
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
    American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

              James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director 
                 Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director 
                                 ------                                

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                  MICHAEL LAWLER, New York, Chairman 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
 DARRELL ISSA, California                Florida, Ranking Member
 TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              BRAD SHERMAN, California
 RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
 THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
 RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
 MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      GEORGE LATIMER, New York

               Sarah Miller, Subcommittee Staff Director
                        
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                            REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                   Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........     1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Sheila 
  Cherfilus-Mccormick............................................     3

                               WITNESSES

Statement of David Schenker, Taube Senior Fellow at Washington 
  Institute for Near East Policy and Former Assistant Secretary 
  of State for The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs................     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7
Statement of Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at Washington 
  Institute for Near East Policy.................................    16
  Prepared Statement.............................................    18
Statement of Jon B. Alterman, Brzezinski Chair in Global Security 
  and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International 
  Studies........................................................    24
  Prepared Statement.............................................    26

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    50
Hearing Minutes..................................................    51
Hearing Attendance...............................................    52

                        Material for the Record

Statement for the Record submitted by Hon. French Hill...........    53

 
                    AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA

                              ----------                              


                         Thursday, June 5, 2025

                  House of Representatives,
       Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa
                              Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in 
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Lawler 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Lawler. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 
Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to 
assess U.S. national security interests as relates to Syria and 
discuss potential policy options to further them. I now 
recognize myself to give an opening statement.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER

    Syria is at a turning point. The fall of Bashar al-Assad 
this past December following four decades of authoritarian rule 
has created conditions for unprecedented change for Syria and 
for the Middle East. This change comes with significant risk.
    The Syrian war dating back to 2011 has left most of the 
country in ruins, destroyed by years of indiscriminate bombing 
by Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. The costs of 
reconstructing this broken country will be in the tens of 
billions, even by the most modest assessment, and investors 
face significant hurdles as they work to navigate the complex 
sanctions regime that has emerged after four decades of Assad 
family rule.
    While there are rightfully many who seek to break down 
barriers, advocating for sanctions relief to ensure 
reconstruction can take place, and put Syria on a path of 
success, we must not lose sight of core U.S. interests in this 
rush to embrace Syria's new regime.
    There remain significant questions about Syria's new 
interim authorities led by U.S.-designated foreign terrorist 
organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, a former Al-Qaeda 
affiliate, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Despite his hardened past, the 
interim president continues to verbally signal a commitment to 
reform, though his ability to deliver remains to be seen, which 
is why we must be explicit with our goals for Syria.
    This includes the counter-ISIS mission, which has been a 
central part of U.S. foreign policy since 2014. We must set 
clear expectations for the interim authorities on what we 
expect from them with respect to counterterrorism cooperation 
to prevent a resurgence and assume responsibility for detention 
centers holding thousands of ISIS members and affiliated 
individuals in the northeast.
    And concerns about extremism are not, by any means, limited 
to ISIS. Iran and its proxies have long used the country as a 
sanctuary space to plan and carry out attacks, including 
against Israel, while Russia sees Syria as a strategic 
launchpad to undermine our interests not just in the Middle 
East but much further afield, from Africa to Europe.
    There must be clear red lines when it comes to Iran and its 
proxies', as well as Russia's, ability to operate in Syria. 
Preventing Syria from being used as a sanctuary space is vital 
not just for the U.S. but also for Syria. This will, no doubt, 
be one of the metrics used as the international community 
measures the success of Syria's transition and by extension for 
the prospects for further economic relief.
    For Syria to succeed and reestablish itself on the 
international world stage, it must take action to prevent 
extremism from thriving once again, including by signaling a 
commitment to inclusive governance by establishing a positive 
working relationship with our Kurdish partners, the Syrian 
Democratic Forces. They have been at the forefront of the 
campaign to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
    On that basis, the Trump administration has rightfully 
taken steps to waive U.S. sanctions on a limited and temporary 
basis, giving al-Sharaa sufficient time to demonstrate he is 
able to turn his words into actions. But this is not, I have to 
stress, a full embrace of al-Sharaa or those he continues to 
surround himself with.
    We must use this opportunity to press him on key U.S. 
priorities, notably as relates to counterterrorism, while also 
retaining limitations on U.S. sanctions relief to ensure Iran 
and Russia cannot benefit financially.
    Al-Sharaa has expressed a concerning willingness to embrace 
Moscow, despite Putin's complicity in war crimes against the 
Syrian people. For Russia, their presence in Syria is not just 
about the Middle East; it is a vital staging ground essential 
to everything they do in Africa and Eastern Mediterranean.
    We underestimate the strategic importance Syria holds for 
the Russians at our own peril. Make no mistake: what happens in 
Syria does not stay in Syria. The country has consistently 
demonstrated its ability to impact and shape affairs far 
outside its borders, from Europe's migrant crisis to ISIS to 
the war in Ukraine.
    When Secretary Rubio testified before Congress last month, 
he said, quote, ``There is no guarantee that by outreach and 
working with the transitional authority in Syria, things are 
going to work out. It may work out; it may not work out. But if 
we don't reach out and try, it is a guarantee not to work 
out.''
    And I echo the Secretary's sentiment and just came back, 
along with the ranking member, from a trip to the Middle East, 
including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan. And that was the 
sentiment shared there as well. We want to give this an 
opportunity to work but are fully cognizant of the consequences 
of failure here.
    During this hearing, we will further examine Syrian 
stability and the vital role Syria and the Syrian people play 
in the Middle East.
    I now yield to the ranking member, Sheila Cherfilus-
McCormick, for her opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK

    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
convening this important hearing on developments in Syria 
following the fall of the brutal Assad regime.
    I welcome our expert panelists for this afternoon, all of 
whom have robust knowledge of Syria, the broader Middle East, 
and core U.S. interests at this time of immense transition and 
opportunity.
    As Chairman Lawler noted, we recently returned from a 
congressional delegation to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan. 
In many meetings, developments in Syria were front and center. 
Excitement was palpable among our regional partners over the 
opportunities that changes in Syria and Lebanon present.
    Across the Middle East, U.S. allies and partners have 
welcomed change in leadership in Damascus with the hopes to 
support our robust construction work, investments in critical 
infrastructure, and increased humanitarian assistance to the 
millions of Syrians who require urgent aid as of today.
    I stand and support the Syrian people, who look to a new 
future and a government that does not engage in systemic 
campaigns of violence and repression against its own citizens. 
I welcome the Trump administration's initial engagement with 
the new Government of Syria, including the decision to lift 
certain sanctions through the General License 25 and issuing a 
180-day waiver on the Caesar Act sanctions.
    However, while the President is correct to say that this is 
Syria's moment to shine, helping Syrians musts meet this moment 
requires a clear plan. This is noble. However, I do not believe 
that this can be achieved without providing incentives that 
would allow the new Syrian Government to create and enable an 
environment and a strong institution which is needed.
    Congress has not received any such details on the 
administration's plan to implement sanction relief effectively, 
nor a more coherent strategy that the administration on its 
priorities for U.S.-Syrian relationships.
    I hope the vacuum the executive branch has created brings 
members from both sides of the aisle together to work on 
legislation that establishes clear priorities for further U.S. 
engagement with Syria, including with respect to inclusion and 
fully representative governance, protection of religious and 
ethnic minority groups, continued counterterrorism cooperation, 
and more.
    A conditions-based sanction relief policies with clear time 
lines and matrices is critical for Syria's security, regional 
security, and the United States' national security. I look 
forward to working with my colleagues on legislation to address 
this. Absent such congressional leadership, I fear the U.S. 
Syria policy would be characterized by a haphazard, ill-
conceived, move-fast, break-things approach that has been a 
characteristic of the Trump administration to date. The stakes 
for Syrian people are too high and a peaceful Syria is too 
critical to our own interests to be reckless and unfocused.
    Incentives for direct deliverables for Syria are critical. 
U.S. policy on Syria must continue to prioritize effective and 
multilateral counterterrorism operations, securing high-value 
ISIS detainees, restoring critical life-saving humanitarian aid 
that contributes to deradicalization, elimination of chemical 
weapons and stores and unexploded ordnances, and capability-
building for the interim government's security forces.
    It also requires robust engagement with our regional 
partners, including Jordan. At the exact moment when a change 
in Syria requires a full set of foreign policy tools to advance 
U.S. interests, the Trump administration has not only proposed 
a gutting of the State Department, but numerous United States 
stabilization and assistance programs active in Syria and 
within neighboring countries have been cut.
    Today, because of the Trump administration's policies, our 
regional partners in the Middle East are asking whether we keep 
our word, whether our adversaries are betting that we won't. I 
welcome the opportunity to speak with our panelists about the 
policies and strategies we should be working on to ensure this 
moment of cautious optimism for Syria's people is not wasted 
and the United States' interests in the region are protected.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.
    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses 
before us today on this important topic: Hon. David Schenker, 
Taube Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy and previously Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs under President Trump's first 
administration; Dr. Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Jon B. Alterman, 
Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    This committee recognizes the importance of the issues 
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us 
today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, 
and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 
minutes in order to allow time for member questions.
    I now recognize Mr. Schenker for his opening statement.

                  STATEMENT OF DAVID SCHENKER

    Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Representative--
Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick, honorable members. I 
appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
    The future of Syria matters greatly to the United States. 
Under Assad, Syria was a source of regional instability and a 
persistent threat to Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan, among others. 
Assad's fall represents an opportunity for Syria, Washington, 
and its regional partners.
    There has been a lot of perseverating lately about Ahmed 
al-Sharaa. To be certain, he is no panacea. At a minimum, he's 
an Islamist and likely a bourgeoning authoritarian. 
Notwithstanding lingering doubts, though, I believe al-Sharaa 
is much better than Assad.
    He might not succeed in unifying and stabilizing Syria. 
Five months after the fall of Assad, though, al-Sharaa is the 
only game in town. The Trump administration should invest 
diplomatic capital to help him succeed. Time will tell whether 
suspending crippling U.S. sanctions was the right decision. A 
gradual process may have had more success at shaping the new 
government, or perhaps continued U.S. economic pressures would 
have scuttled al-Sharaa's already unlikely attempt to stabilize 
a fractious and scarred Syria.
    As with many U.S. policy decisions, the initiative to 
suspend sanctions was not a choice between good and bad, but 
rather a choice between bad and worse. Washington has no doubt 
ceded some leverage, but I believe Trump made the less bad 
decision; that is, to give al-Sharaa and the new Syria a 
chance.
    Meanwhile, al-Sharaa is meeting some expectations on 
important issues. He is cooperating with the U.S. on 
counterterrorism and undoubtedly will continue to do so. It is 
important that U.S. forces remain in Syria until conditions are 
conducive to withdrawal.
    Foreign fighters constitute an even bigger challenge for 
al-Sharaa. Terrorists, militia men, and foreign Jihadis played 
a key role in toppling Assad. So these men are not going to be 
expelled. Now, at al-Sharaa's request, the administration has 
consented to the integration of some 3,500 of these fighters 
into a unit of the military. While expedient, it is difficult 
to imagine that this decision won't have problematic long-term 
implications for discipline, accountability, and public 
confidence.
    Integration of these Jihadis doesn't solve the problem. It 
defers it. Post-Assad Syria will not be a democracy. Still, 
Washington does have an abiding interest in the protection of 
minorities, a modicum of human rights, and some kind of 
political representation for Syria's ethnic and religious 
communities. I am talking about the Kurds, Druze, Christians 
alike. An inclusive Syria, I believe, will mitigate toward 
stability.
    Going forward, Washington should set and convey 
expectations to al-Sharaa on terrorism, foreign fighters, and 
governance and be prepared to reimplement sanctions if Syria's 
trajectory dictates.
    Al-Sharaa's relations with Israel are also another 
challenge. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has been occupying 
and bombing Syria, at times justifiably. At the same time, the 
government is interdicting Iranian weapons shipments destined 
for Hezbollah.
    Over time, direct discussions between Israel and Syria, 
which are reportedly underway, could help build some trust 
between the parties, stabilize the border, and lead to more 
normal relations between these longtime enemies.
    Another concern is that a weak Syria will invite foreign 
meddling. At present, Iran is unwelcome, but the jury is out on 
Russia. But Turkey and Israel both appear to be working to 
establish military spheres of influence in Syria. Israel 
bordering on Turkey, in my opinion, would be a recipe for 
heightened tensions, and the Trump administration should be 
pressing Israel and Turkey to establish, at a minimum, a 
hotline to preempt unintentional escalation.
    In sum, Syria faces a lot of challenges. The new government 
in Damascus will need U.S. political support and robust 
diplomatic engagement to succeed. The U.S. can help with 
coordinating reconstruction, keeping ISIS at bay, and 
implementing banking sector reforms necessary to reopen Syria 
for business while at the same time encouraging the government 
to be more inclusive.
    It will be difficult for Washington to balance expectations 
and be patient, but the potential benefits for the United 
States and its partners of a stable, benign Syria that rejects 
the so-called axis of resistance are enormous.
    Thank you. I have submitted testimony for the record, and I 
will look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schenker follows:]
   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Schenker.
    I now recognize Dr. Borshchevskaya for her opening 
statement.

                STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA

    Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick, 
honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today. With your permission, I am submitting my written 
testimony, and I am going to summarize it.
    We now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape 
the balance of power in the Middle East. Bashar al-Assad's 
dictatorship is over, but the window of opportunity it presents 
is going to close fast.
    Russia seeks to replace our influence and remake the world 
order with itself at the center. Syria is and has been 
essential to that strategy. Nothing about the fall of Assad 
changes Moscow's overall plans and objectives, but it does give 
us a window of opportunity to foil Vladimir Putin's plans.
    As Chairman Lawler said in his opening remarks, what 
happens in Syria tends to not stay in Syria. This is why we 
need to ensure Russia does not reestablish a foothold there. 
Knowing that, my testimony will now focus on several key issues 
of vital importance to the U.S.
    First, the Eastern Mediterranean is crucial to Russia. That 
is why the goal of control there is consistent in centuries old 
for the Russian State. Make no mistake about it: this goal will 
outlast Vladimir Putin. It is part of how Moscow views its 
strategic positioning vis-a-vis the West.
    Second, Assad is gone, and Russia may change tactics but 
not its strategic objectives. These tactics will focus on 
staying in Syria, on leveraging economic influence, and 
positioning Russia as a protector of minorities. Syria has been 
fundamental to Russia's success in leveraging its influence for 
the last decade across the Middle East. Russia retains this 
influence as it seeks to use it to undermine the United States. 
And if Moscow can navigate the new Syrian regime, the Kremlin 
can continue to exert influence.
    Assuming the United States does not want to see its 
position weakened in the region--and I would suggest that that 
would be disastrous--the U.S. must ensure that Russia does not 
reestablish control in Syria.
    To that end, the U.S. could utilize its influence through a 
carrot-and-stick approach to block Russia's ability to leverage 
power. The U.S. can achieve it through the following: first, by 
tapping into the strength of Ukrainians; facilitate greater 
ties with Syria and further empowering Ukrainians all across 
the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria, the U.S. can 
facilitate economic and diplomatic ties between the two 
countries, for example, by supporting Ukraine's wheat 
deliveries to Syria. And all across the MENA region, the U.S. 
can facilitate a push for Ukrainian technology, arms trade, and 
information.
    Over the last 3 years, the Ukrainian military has 
integrated Western and post-Soviet military systems and made 
impressive innovations in the arms industry. And we saw an 
example of that most recently with Ukraine's drone attack on 
Russia this past weekend. We saw how creative, how powerful, 
that attack was. The U.S. now has significant opportunity to 
partner with Ukraine to help transform and modernize Middle 
East states that have been traditional Russian client states.
    Second, continual engagement with the Syrian Government--
this engagement should include demonstration that if this 
government meets certain guideposts, it will be able to unlock 
aspects of a normalized relationship, which it desires.
    And last, limiting Russia's resources through additional 
sanctions and tackling Russia's so-called ghost fleet of 
illicit oil tankers--as the United States and Europe ease or 
suspend sanctions against Syria, they must balance the need to 
help Syria recover with the need to block Russia's ability to 
profit from this recovery and use its economic tools to gain 
control. This could also include additional sanctions against 
Russia and entities that work with Russia and working with 
Turkey to crack down on the ghost fleet's legal violations and 
ecological threats.
    I began my testimony by telling you that this is a once-in-
a-generation opportunity. Let me reiterate here that this 
window is closing quickly. While we deliberate, Russia is 
strengthening its partnerships with Iran, China, and North 
Korea. Ensuring Russia does not reestablish a position in Syria 
is bigger than Syria, but it is also bigger than even Russia 
alone. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Borshchevskaya follows:]
   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Borshchevskaya.
    I know recognize Dr. Alterman for his opening statement.

                  STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN

    Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member 
Cherfilus-McCormick, distinguished members of the committee.
    Let me start by expressing my condolences over the passing 
of Mr. Connolly. He and I met almost forty years ago when he 
was working for Senator Pell, and I was a very young aide for 
Senator Moynihan. Then, as now, I was in awe of his energy, his 
creativity, and his dedication to public service. His loss is a 
loss to this committee and to the country.
    As Chairman Lawler said, Syria stands at a profound 
inflection point. Syrians celebrate having overthrown a brutal 
dictatorship, but they don't know whether they will live under 
another dictatorship, a theocracy, a democracy, or a failed 
State.
    The questions before Congress are clear. How much should we 
care about Syria's future? How much can we shape it? And how 
should we proceed? On the first point, make no mistake: Syria 
is important to U.S. national security. It borders key U.S. 
allies Israel, Turkey, and Jordan. The country hosts an active 
Jihadi movement, and elements in the country have a long 
history of cooperation with Iran.
    Syria's new leaders are overwhelmed by their domestic 
needs. They are navigating the wreckage of 50 years of 
dictatorship and 15 years of civil war. The economy has 
operated on bribery, government shakedowns, and Captagon drug 
sales for years. Infrastructure is crumbling, and there is a 
critical shortage of capable administrators.
    The government also faces severe security dilemmas. Two of 
the most important are how to handle tens of thousands of 
Syrians who supported Assad's repression and how to manage 
Jihadi movements that include thousands of foreign fighters who 
have been important allies of Syria's new leaders.
    Our impact in this context is going to be limited. We will 
have the most influence shaping Syria's external environment. 
Multiple countries have keen interests in Syria's future, and 
that creates some dangerous dynamics. Turkey sees itself as the 
dominant external actor, and it has worked closely with Hayat 
Tahrir al-Sham, Syria's current rulers. Turkey views Syrian 
reconstruction as both a security imperative and also a 
business opportunity.
    Israel's interests sharply conflict with Turkey's. The 
Israeli leadership views Syria's new leaders as Jihadist or 
Jihadi-adjacent. After decades with Hezbollah threatening 
Israel from Lebanon, Israel is creating a buffer zone along 
Syria's border while working to weaken Islamist forces in the 
Syrian Government.
    Iran seeks to maintain a foothold in a country where it 
invested tens of billions of dollars and maintained a strategic 
pathway to Hezbollah. And as Anna suggested, Russia similarly 
attempts to preserve its military bases and what's left of 
decades of influence and investment in Syria. Europe wants a 
peaceful Syria to stem the refugee flow, and the Gulf States 
want to keep Iran marginalized.
    In this, Syria faces a critical danger beyond Jihadi 
capture. It could become a battleground for regional proxy 
wars, much like Lebanon was in the 1970's and 1980's. The 
growing hostility between Israel and Turkey, exacerbated by the 
Gaza war, poses particular risks. Countries may adopt unsavory 
allies to undermine each other in Syria, and the effects could 
spread regionally.
    The Trump administration correctly relaxed sanctions, and 
it has given Syria's new government an opportunity to 
demonstrate its intentions and capacity. Still, that policy 
needs some adjustment.
    First, while appointing a Syria envoy was constructive, 
choosing somebody who is simultaneously Ambassador to Turkey 
creates a conflict of interest that will make balancing between 
the regional players much harder. Ambassador Barrack's two jobs 
will be in conflict much of the time.
    Second, we can't exert influence over allies and partners 
while they pour aid into Syria and we completely abstain. 
Humanitarian engagement here serves U.S. self-interests and 
isn't mere charity. Groups we oppose throughout the Middle East 
build grassroots support through social services, and we can't 
afford to be absent on the aid front.
    We don't have to fully understand Ahmed al-Sharaa's 
motivations or trust his background, which includes troubling 
associations with some of the region's most vicious terrorists. 
Given our justified uncertainty, we should support him 
modestly, test him continuously, and ensure that our allies 
remain aligned with our policy.
    I see great potential in Syria, as I think many of us do, 
and we also see Syria's risks. We need a policy that makes the 
former more likely and heads off the second. A modest 
conditional U.S. strategy anchored in coordination with allies 
and partners offers the best opportunity to advance U.S. 
interests.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Alterman follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Alterman.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Ms. Borshchevskaya, what are Russia's main objectives in 
Syria, and how has Assad's fall shaped its ability to achieve 
them?
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. At present, Russia is working very hard 
to ensure it retains a presence in Syria. At this stage, they 
are being relatively quiet, but they are watching. They are 
engaging in discussions with the current Syrian Government. And 
as I mentioned in my written remarks, Russia is trying to 
position itself as a protector of minorities.
    The most striking example of that is one that I mentioned 
in my testimony where, according to Russian Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Russia had given several thousand 
people refuge at Hmeimim during an outbreak of violence on the 
coast.
    So I think, at this stage, Russia is taking a very cautious 
wait-and-see approach and slowly building ties and retaining 
influence. But make no mistake: this is toward a larger goal.
    Mr. Lawler. And how could the Kremlin use Syria's 
transition as an opportunity for financial gain? From that 
perspective, what guardrails need to be in place to prevent 
that from happening as we consider how best to lift Syria's 
complex and multifaceted sanctions regime?
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I think Russia's-one big advantage 
Russia has is its trade relationships with the Gulf States. And 
as we are now seeing Gulf States looking to engage economically 
with Syria, given the fact that Russia has these strong 
relationships with these countries--so many Russian oligarchs 
have fled to the Gulf after Russia's invasion of Ukraine--
Russia could find ways to cement ties through second and third 
parties, and that would be hard to trace. And that is something 
that we need to continuously monitor and look to block.
    Mr. Lawler. Mr. Schenker, how might the power vacuum in a 
post-Assad Syria be exploited by regional actors like Turkey?
    Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman. I think, as Jon Alterman 
said a few minutes ago, you do have Turkey that not only has 
relations with HTS but also with the Syrian National Army, 
other active militia in the country, and shares, frankly, their 
ideological, in a way, fellow travelers. They are Islamists, as 
well, the Government of Turkey. And I think there is 
opportunities for them to make inroads, influence, with the new 
government. They are a more trusted partner than many.
    At the same time, on the ground, there's a real 
possibility--we see, right now, Qatar trying to get in. We see 
Saudi Arabia, as well, that frankly, in my view, is a better 
influence. But all these groups will be competing, and if they 
compete to see who can spend more to rebuild Syria, maybe that 
is a good thing. But if they compete for political influence, 
this could lend to corruption or further radicalization.
    Mr. Lawler. I think, to that end, Israel has sought to curb 
the growing Turkish influence in Syria. In recent months, 
Israel has become increasingly forward-leaning in terms of its 
willingness to take action within Syria's borders to contain 
the threat, though there have been efforts to have discussions 
between Israel and Turkey.
    What can the U.S. do to make sure that both sides' 
interests are protected in this transition?
    Mr. Schenker. Thank you. Certainly, I think that the United 
States should be working with Israel and Syria if they need our 
help, to get together and chat quietly to deconflict, to gain a 
better understanding of where each party is at, what their own 
concerns are.
    You are not going to have a successful Syria, frankly, if 
you can't have Syrian Government forces operating south of 
Damascus. So what can be done to reassure Israel? And what can 
be done going forward to--on areas that are overlapping, where 
both al-Sharaa and Israel agree? ISIS has to be fought. 
Palestinian groups may have to be restrained. And these are 
things that both Israel and Syria can work on jointly.
    Mr. Lawler. Last, al-Sharaa has pledged to establish 
inclusive governance in Syria and certainly prevent the country 
from becoming a staging ground. I think, obviously, he has said 
a lot of the right things. That was a takeaway, certainly, from 
my conversations in Saudi Arabia and Israel and Jordan. But 
obviously, the proof will be in the pudding.
    So what is your assessment of his willingness to deliver on 
these promises thus far, and does he have an effective command 
and control of the various militia troops on the ground?
    Mr. Schenker. Those are two good questions but two separate 
questions. I think in terms of inclusive governance, the answer 
is this is very much a work in progress. They had committee 
meetings to talk about the constitution or the temporary 
constitution. These were widely panned, I think, by minority 
groups as being performative, that there wasn't a real 
inclusion--other types of things that have appeared that the 
nature of the Syrian State is defined as being a Muslim State 
in the constitution. This, to many in Syria, is viewed as 
exclusionary.
    And the appointment of, certainly--let's--we can go beyond 
just minorities, so the inclusion of women in government is 
also, I think, striking how low it is.
    As for command and control or control over these militias, 
the answer is no. I think he controls a very small part of 
Syria to date and is even working to incorporate in an 
effective manner the SDF, the Kurdish U.S.-backed 
counterterrorism partner. This, too, I think, is a challenge, 
if for no other reason that al-Sharaa himself has appointed 
Jihadi to be in charge of Hasakah, who has perpetrated 
atrocities against Kurds before.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
    I now recognize Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, and thank you 
for your testimony. Being actively participating in the 
recovery and reform of Syria is top line for us to make sure 
that Syria has a real chance of succeeding. And I think our 
goal really is to be one of the strongest partners to Syria but 
also to be the most influential. And right now, we are 
competing with Russia, and we are aware that Russia now has two 
bases that it does have control over.
    But I wanted to first start with the first half. How can we 
be successful in being the strongest partner to ensure we have 
stability? Do you believe that--I know we lifted the sanctions, 
but what are some of the reforms or strings that you would like 
to see attached when it comes to incentivizing them to make 
sure that they are actually moving in a forward movement that 
we can trust and believe in? Oh, that question is for Dr. 
Alterman. Well, actually, first--I was actually going to ask it 
to all you guys, but I will start with you.
    Dr. Alterman. Thank you. I think, first, we are all friends 
from many years ago, and I think we also fundamentally agree on 
many of the issues in Syria, as many of you do.
    Look. I think the way we become a force multiplier is 
partly we are active on the ground, but I think even more 
important is we have an ability to rally our partners and 
allies in a way that no other country does. As you have heard 
from several of us, there is a real challenge of Israel and 
Turkey mixing it up, but there are other parties, too.
    And to me, there is partly an issue of what our aid should 
be, but I don't think we should spend a lot of time trying to 
create the perfect incentive, the perfect conditions, the 
perfect consequences of bad action. I think it is much more 
important that we make sure all of our friends and allies are 
rowing in the same direction. It is not at all clear to me that 
they will. It is not at all clear to me that they want to.
    And to me, this is really--it is partly an aid issue, but I 
think more fundamentally, it is a diplomacy issue, and it is 
the administration speaking with one voice about some very 
complicated issues where I think the administration may not 
agree internally on all of the issues. But I think we have to 
speak with one voice, act with one hand, and persuade our 
allies and partners to join with us rather than undermine each 
other, which I think will really undermine the chances for 
recovery in Syria.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, you mentioned that we need 
to use all of our diplomatic tools. And right now, our tool kit 
has been diminished due to the cuts we have seen with USAID. So 
I wanted to narrow in. Are there any that you think are 
imperative for us to actually have some guardrails so we can 
say these need to be in place so we can help move them along in 
a positive direction?
    Some of the responses we got when we were overseas also--
there is an ambivalence about this new administration and 
government. So how can we put guardrails, if anybody has any 
suggestions? What needs to be incorporated to help that along? 
And I will open that up to you.
    Mr. Schenker. Ranking Member, I think at a minimum we 
should be working on--you know, now that we have had these--
suspension of sanction, you still won't see--what they need is 
really a huge flow of foreign direct investment, of--to build, 
actually, a financial life, right? There is no economic life in 
Syria to speak of.
    And with the suspension and with the prospect of--after 180 
days of reimposition of sanction, if performance is inadequate 
for some reason or another, this does not inspire confidence of 
investors. So this requires that we help the Government of 
Syria to help themselves through banking reforms, through 
cleaning up their counterterrorism and financing, et cetera, so 
that we can start to--people can start to rely on banks, and 
they can actually do business. That is at a minimum.
    But there are no guardrails, right? We are relying on one 
person here. This is key personnel. And he--it is remarkable, 
really, you know, the irony that we are relying on a U.S.-
designated erstwhile terrorist to secure all these disparate 
factions of Syria in this broken society. So I think it is also 
important to be thinking about executive protection.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, my last question, if I can 
have a moment--I really wanted to get to the two bases which 
are under Russian control. Do you believe that Russia will be 
successful at maintaining control and influence over those 
bases?
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I think that remains to be seen, 
but I think Russia has a real chance in maintaining a nominal 
degree of control. And that is very important because that is 
Russia's ability to project power into multiple directions, 
into NATO's southern flank, into the Middle East, and into 
Africa.
    And beyond that, if I may, to your earlier question about 
what can we do, I agree with David. The reality is there are no 
guardrails. But I think we could aim to demonstrate that we are 
committed to Syria and that we are going to be consistent.
    Russia came into Syria 10 years ago at a time when there 
was a vacuum. And any vacuum that there is, Russia is going to 
fill. So I think if we can demonstrate a consistency in 
interest--because one of the biggest problems that many of our 
partners have with us is that we are inconsistent. We say one 
thing, and then we change policies. Sometimes we don't know 
what the policy is.
    And if we can demonstrate that we are committed, that this 
is important for us, and that we are willing to do what it 
takes, be it, as David described, through helping Syria 
navigate banking reform but also empowering other actors who 
are our partners in Syria--essentially, filling in the need 
that otherwise Russia would fill--I think that would be an 
important step forward.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, 
Representative Wilson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Lawler. And I 
want to say amen to your opening comments--additionally, how 
important this hearing is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    All the members are here, which is outstanding. And Ryan 
Zinke has just joined us all the way from Montana. And then I'm 
really grateful that we have Congressman Cory Mills here, who 
actually was in Damascus last month to support the people of 
Syria.
    So we are just so grateful for what we see as a historic 
decision by President Donald Trump to lift all sanctions on 
Syria. I believe it was a masterstroke that has the potential 
to lead to a complete realignment of the Middle East with 
stability, peace, and prosperity for all the people.
    It is particularly important to me because last November, I 
had the distinction and honor of being identified by the 
dictator Bashar al-Assad as an enemy of the State. I take that 
as a great honor. Three weeks later, he fled to Moscow, where 
he should be, with war criminal Putin. What a great team they 
are.
    But again, it is so exciting to me, the people of Syria 
standing up for freedom and democracy. In one move, President 
Trump has boxed out China from the whole of the Arab world. He 
has additionally provided for helping expel Russian bases which 
are logistics for the Russians, for war criminal Putin, 
maintaining dictatorships in Africa. He has also prevented the 
Iranian regime from resurgence and taken a major step to put 
pressure on ISIS.
    As Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified to the 
committee a few weeks ago, it is important to immediately lift 
the sanctions. And that has truly been done. I also appreciate 
that the Syrian Government has limited the activities of the 
Russian bases. And at the same time, though, we need to do more 
to completely expel the Russians.
    The new Syrian authorities should remember war criminal 
Putin's massive crimes of mass murder in Aleppo. This also led, 
with the mass murder, to historically unprecedented dislocation 
of over half the people of Syria from their homes, their 
mosques, their schools, their businesses, their churches--
nearly 12 million people. In modern times, it is inconceivable 
that so many millions could lose everything they have, and half 
a million people were murdered.
    Turkey and Jordan have been so appreciated for securing 
millions in refugee camps. And with that in mind, Dr. 
Borshchevskaya, you have done great with your identification of 
how to remove the Russian bases. And I would like to know what 
our other colleagues, Dr. Schenker and Dr. Alterman--how can we 
help them remove these bases?
    Mr. Schenker. Well, I'll give a first crack at that. I 
think the Government of Syria is disinclined toward Russia and 
Iran for the reasons that you mentioned. Russia and Iran helped 
the Assad regime kill half a million Syrians in what resembles 
a genocide and to force 12 million Syrians into exile in 
something that resembles ethnic cleansing. And so they are 
disinclined.
    And we have seen already that the Government of Syria, the 
Sharaa government, has canceled contracts with STG Engineering, 
a Russian engineering firm that was developing Tartus' port, 
the civilian port in Tartus, and signed an $800 million with 
Dubai Port World from the Emirates. This is a positive step, 
but this is going to require, I think, ongoing diplomatic 
engagement.
    Iran also--there is no direct flights right now. The ties 
are not great. I think they are wary, and they keep on 
intercepting and interdicting Hezbollah weapons that Iran is 
sending into Syria to traverse into Lebanon. So they are doing 
the work, but I think they need be pushed over the finish line. 
And they are going to need something eventually to fill that 
vacuum, to replace Russia.
    Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman.
    If I may, I think to add to what David said, and to 
underline it in some ways, this persistent attraction of Russia 
is if the Government of Syria feels it may need a veto on the 
Security Council. And the Russians are so unscrupulous that 
even after contributing to the death of hundreds of thousands 
of Syrians, I think they are willing to execute their veto for 
a partner that does something for them.
    And I think the Sharaa government, at this point, may not 
want to abandon that option. The more secure they feel that 
things are moving in the right direction, the less they feel 
they need somebody to veto things for them, I think the less 
attractive the Russians are because on many levels--commercial, 
military, and so on--the Russians aren't a very attractive 
partner.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, I hope they say that America, Saudi 
Arabia, Tokyo, Jordan, Qatar, UAE are much better partners than 
war criminal Putin.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Wilson.
    I now recognize the gentleman from California, 
Representative Sherman, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. President Trump is a tough negotiator when he 
is dealing with Americans or Canadians. He has eliminated the 
vast majority of our sanctions, and we still don't have a 
pledge that he will be--that the Russian bases will be 
eliminated.
    So you have one country that did not support Assad in any 
way, that does not have military bases in Syria--the side that 
was bombing the current government's forces retains those 
bases. Now, we have acquiesced in 3,500 foreign Jihadis 
fighters being, quote, ``integrated'' into the military. This 
is a force that could be, to the extent they have any 
ideological control, pulling Sharaa in the wrong direction.
    It is argued that abandoning those forces would also be a 
problem. These 3,500--what portion of the total foreign 
fighters are the 3,500 that are now being integrated? Is it 
substantially all, or----
    Mr. Schenker. Yes, the reports suggest that it is the vast 
majority of them. Of course, there were earlier reports that 
al-Sharaa had given key posts to--and senior-level posts within 
the Ministry of Defense, and the military, about a dozen----
    Mr. Sherman. Are those reports accurate?
    Mr. Schenker. Yes. The earlier reports about the dozen, 
yes.
    Mr. Sherman. So it is one thing to us to acquiesce and them 
joining the military because you gotta do something with them, 
perhaps. But the idea of giving them key posts seems extreme. 
And I guess the question is, have we surrendered our sanctions 
regime in return for sufficient controls on the foreign 
fighters, for sufficient controls on Russia and its bases?
    I was here when Obama was incredibly concerned about the 
use of chemical weapons by Assad. We took the Chemical Warfare 
Treaty seriously. Has this new regime disposed of any 
stockpiles of chemical weapons and the ability to create those 
weapons?
    Mr. Schenker. Should I go again?
    Mr. Sherman. Yes. Go ahead.
    Mr. Schenker. Thanks. As for the foreign fighters, I don't 
know what the administration has requested. Initially, they had 
requested that these people be expelled. Obviously----
    Mr. Sherman. But they have acquiesced officially, more or 
less, in the integration.
    Mr. Schenker. Correct.
    Mr. Sherman. And as a de facto matter, they've acquiesced 
in these foreign fighters getting important government 
positions. But if you could talk a little bit about the 
chemical weapons and the capacity to manufacture----
    Mr. Schenker. Yes. These were in the initial Trump 
administration requests of the Government of Syria, and in 
fact, this is one of the good news stories. The Syrians have 
provided access to the chemical weapons watchdog, and then just 
today, the IAEA was in Syria. They went out to Deir ez-Zor to 
look at Kibar and the remains of that and four other nuclear 
facilities.
    Mr. Sherman. So at least we are looking, and I assume that 
we have at least a commitment to dispose of these weapons of 
mass destruction.
    Dr. Alterman. Congressman, one of the things that is most 
remarkable about Ahmed al-Sharaa is he has managed to convince 
all kinds of pretty difficult people that he is fundamentally 
on their side. Whether it was Zarqawi, whether it is Ayman 
Zawahiri or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi his secret.
    Mr. Sherman. And Donald Trump.
    Dr. Alterman. Well, but his secret ability seems to be that 
he can convince people that, fundamentally, he is with them. I 
think he does it within his government. He does it outside of 
his government.
    Mr. Sherman. I want to sneak in one more question. Do we 
foresee a Syria in which the Kurds, the Druze, and others will 
have effective control of their area, cooperate with the 
government but still have autonomy and their own military 
presence? Or do we see the government in Damascus trying to, in 
effect, conquer and disarm the Druze and the Kurds?
    Dr. Alterman. Well, I think the Kurds are an especially 
difficult case and this regard. But as I said, this is why I 
think it is so important that we not have Syria turn into a set 
of regional proxy wars, because if that happens, that will 
endanger all of the minority communities and the stability and 
the territorial integrity of the country.
    Mr. Sherman. So, certainly, we should have gotten clearer 
guarantees for the Christian community before we eliminate the 
sanctions. Of course, we can restore those sanctions at any 
time. But it appears as if we have given them almost everything 
they want and gotten an--you know, aside from the chemical 
weapons, which of course is their obligation anyway, we have 
gotten very few concessions.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Sherman.
    I now recognize Representative Kean for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here 
today. As we evaluate the State of Syria following the fall of 
the dictator Bashar al-Assad, we must ensure that the U.S. 
continues to support our allies in the region. This includes 
promoting peace and cooperation between Syria and Israel.
    Dr. Borshchevskaya, recent reports cite direct meetings 
between Israel and Syria in efforts to ease tensions between 
the two nations. What actions should the U.S. Government be 
taking to encourage Syria to continue to pursue peace with our 
important allies in Israel?
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. I think the United States can continue 
to stay engaged diplomatically and signal to Israel that a 
stable Syria is--a stable, whole Syria, a Syria that is not 
weak and divided--is also in Israel's interest. I think also, 
to a certain extent, engagement with Azerbaijan--that has 
facilitated meetings between Israel and Turkey on the conflict 
between Turkey and Israel that David had mentioned in his 
opening remarks.
    So I think staying engaged diplomatically would be very 
important, and it would be, again, demonstrating consistency in 
our commitment to Syria.
    Mr. Kean. Well, are--Dr. Alterman, you mentioned in your 
testimony--and this is--I would like to say this for the other 
two panelists as well--what--how to test the current regime in 
Syria that--what other steps are necessary--and I may have this 
for the entire panel--to test that they're actually going 
through on the commitments?
    Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman. I think we need lots 
of tests. I think we have to test them continually on how they 
treat various minority communities, how they treat Jihadis. And 
the Jihadi issue is difficult because, as we know in Iraq, 
firing all the members of the Ba'ath Party helped create an 
insurgency in Iraq. You don't want to have that. You have a 
problem with the Jihadis; their countries don't want them back.
    So is there some way where you can separate people who can 
be reformed from people who can't be? I think this is something 
we should be working with allies and partners to continually 
evaluate. I don't think there is any test that is going to make 
me feel comfortable and feel we can start ignoring things in 
Syria. I think what we have to do is we have to work with 
Syrians and work with others to come up with a wide array of 
things, a constant set of report cards, and talk about where 
this is going. Where do we have to nudge it? And where are 
things encouraging and we want to encourage them further?
    Mr. Kean. Israel's safety and security is paramount. So how 
do we ensure that--you know, Dr.--excuse me, Mr. Schenker, what 
steps has the U.S. taken to support counterterrorism efforts in 
the Middle East?
    Mr. Schenker. Well, there is an ongoing liaison, 
Congressman, between Israel--sorry, between Syria and the 
United States. There is exchange of information. And Syria has 
acted on--against impending terrorist attacks.
    We know earlier that al-Sharaa, back when he was Jolani, 
cooperated with the Turks in Idlib Province. So this type of 
ongoing intelligence--and this makes not only Syria safer from 
ISIS but also makes Israel safer.
    At the same time, we now see what appears to be the 
beginnings of communications between the al-Sharaa 
administration and the Government of Israel. And they, too, can 
do some liaisons, some counterterrorism cooperation. And Israel 
can test Syria on this.
    This is going to take some time to build trust, but this is 
a border--Israel already occupies swaths of Syrian territory 
right now. There have been--and just was, I think, this past 
week--a few mortars fired toward Israel from what we believe 
are Palestinian groups. Israel says they are going to hold the 
al-Sharaa government responsible.
    We will see going forward if they respond to information or 
if they expel Palestinian terrorist groups from Damascus. This 
is an open question. They have arrested some. But this is also 
an ongoing work in progress.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Kean.
    I now recognize Representative Mfume for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    My thanks to the witnesses also. I don't want to be 
redundant, but there was something that caught my ear a moment 
ago.
    Mr. Schenker, you described--and I hope I am adequately 
repeating this--the regime in Syria as being a disparate 
erstwhile group of U.S.-designated terrorists. You don't have 
to comment. I am just saying it caught my ear. Am I incorrect?
    Mr. Schenker. Al-Sharaa. I described al-Sharaa----
    Mr. Mfume. Al-Sharaa.
    Mr. Schenker [continuing]. and the country being a 
disparate group of ethnic groups and religious groups. But al-
Sharaa in particular is a----
    Mr. Mfume. Yes.
    Mr. Mfume. You know. Yes.
    Mr. Mfume. So it is a sad situation. I mean, it is a scary 
situation, particularly from those of us who look abroad. I 
think this 180-day pause is a position and point of concern for 
a lot of people. I just want to be on the record and say I just 
don't trust Syria. I have not trusted them since they committed 
all sorts of heinous crimes against innocent people.
    This Damascus government I am not convinced is any better 
than the government that they took down. I could be wrong and 
would love to be wrong. And I am not paranoid, but I think a 
little paranoia is good sometimes. In other words, I don't 
believe that Humpty Dumpty fell. I think he was pushed.
    And in this instance, I just don't believe that the Syrian 
Government in Damascus is everything they say they are until 
they take some concrete steps so that the outside world and 
community will understand that they are correct. And I agree 
with the assumption that somebody made earlier that Russia 
would easily trade a veto to be able to get another partner. 
And the partner might want a veto so bad that they find 
themselves shaking hands.
    It is all very, very kind of scary. But let me ask you, do 
you believe that the administration, our Secretary of State, 
and others have done enough to ensure that this current regime 
in Syria has not and will not re-create the same conditions 
that previously existed, especially in regards to the support 
of terrorist groups and the tamping down of human rights? I 
would just like to get your opinions on the record.
    Let's start with A, Mr. Alterman. If we are looking for an 
order here, let's go alphabet.
    Dr. Alterman. Okay. I think this is a process and not an 
event, sir. I think this is going to be ongoing. It is going to 
take years. I share all of your discomfort. I spoke to a friend 
who has been a journalist in the Middle East for decades. He 
spoke to Ahmed al-Sharaa, and he said, I spoke to him and got a 
sense that we are going to see not Bashar al-Assad again but 
Hafez al-Assad ascend again.
    Hafez al-Assad--not his son, but certainly not a friend of 
the United States, certainly not a force for stability in the 
Middle East. Could we be going there? We could be going there. 
I don't think there is any policy where we just do the policy 
and we are done. I think this is going to be a process of 
years.
    He will try to settle in what he--what his government--
whether he will be in power and what his government will look 
like in 2 years', 5 years' time. I don't know. He doesn't know. 
It is quite possible that he will misjudge how to deal with 
radicals in his own midst. It is quite possible that he will 
fall prey to some sort of Israeli-Turkish differences.
    I don't know how this is going to go, but I think we have 
to constantly be watchful for all the reasons you say----
    Mr. Mfume. Paranoid.
    Dr. Alterman. Paranoid people have enemies, right?
    Mr. Mfume. Yes, they do.
    Dr. Alterman. And there are a lot of enemies in Syria, and 
there is a lot of bad stuff that has happened in Syria and will 
happen in Syria.
    Mr. Mfume. Okay. Let me just get a couple more responses 
in. Thank you very much for that. I appreciate it.
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. You know, I also share your 
concerns. And let me start by answering your question with the 
following. I was born in the Soviet Union. I remember when it 
fell apart. I was a child at the time, but I remember it very 
well. There was a sense of euphoria that Russia was going to 
transform into a liberal-style democracy. We saw what happened, 
and Russia went back to its authoritarian past.
    So I share your concerns. I think the fact of the matter 
is--you know, to answer your question, it is very hard to know 
what there is to be done. Has the administration done enough? 
There is only so much we can do to look forward. We have to 
take it one step at a time.
    We don't have a lot of leverage. And the fact that 
sanctions can be snapped back quickly, that there is this 180-
degree window, that is an important leverage that we have. But 
the fact of the matter is there is not a whole lot beyond that.
    I think--as I said in my opening remarks, I think that the 
most important thing we can do is to stay engaged and give 
consistent benchmarks and to demonstrate that we are going to 
hold this government responsible to those benchmarks.
    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much.
    My time is expired. I think the key here is gradualism. 
That is how we proceed, not with giant steps, but little bitty 
steps that we measure daily, weekly, and monthly in this 
process.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative.
    I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Baumgartner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you 
for this very important committee hearing.
    Syria has a special place in my heart, not just for the 
immense geopolitical importance of this troubled part of the 
world, but roughly 30 years ago, my first trip to the Middle 
East was as a Kurd scholar to Syria and Jordan. And I spent a 
really meaningful summer in Damascus and Aleppo and saw, at the 
time, what I had hoped was going to be a world new possibility 
and opening right before the peace--what would eventually be a 
peace agreement with Jordan and Israel and so much potential in 
Syria, and certainly potential that has not been realized. In 
fact, it has gone much the other way these last 30 years.
    I very vividly remember, when I was at the U.S. Embassy in 
Iraq during the surge, the challenge of foreign fighters coming 
across the border from Syria. And then, as Iranian influence 
grew throughout the region as the U.S. stepped back, we saw 
some of the consequences there.
    I also appreciate that all three of you testified to the 
importance of deliberate, thoughtful, strategic action by the 
U.S., I think much in contrast to what we saw, particularly 
under the Obama administration, when we saw an offhand comment 
by John Kerry open the door for Russia to enter the region. We 
saw a red line by President Barack Obama then not enforced by 
the U.S. Government, and then a statement by President Obama 
that Russia entering Syria was going to be a quagmire for them, 
that it was all a mistake.
    I would just ask, perhaps, you, Anna--and I will just call 
you Dr. Anna. When you are a Baumgartner, you honor sympathy 
for challenges on last names. But could you contrast or give 
some thoughts on U.S. Government policy in the last 15 years, 
kind of just haphazard--what I would call haphazard, but I 
would like to hear your comments--versus what we would like to 
see in a thoughtful strategy.
    In the briefing document today, I saw a list of conditions 
from the State Department that they had put on the Government 
of Syria to sort of come into the union with the West and the 
U.S. And as I was looking, I thought it is a good list of 
conditions, but I also thought wouldn't it be helpful if we had 
a list of conditions--not the same conditions, but conditions 
for Syria's neighbors of behavior that we would like to see 
there?
    Perhaps, specifically, what would we like to see from 
Turkey and Israel in addition to--I think it is a given that 
they would have a hotline to avoid a proxy war, but what would 
be one or two things we would like to see from each of Syria's 
neighbors with respect to Syria? But both--so some commentary 
on the haphazard nature, perhaps, and then what we would like 
to see from their neighbors.
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. Well, first, you know, the Obama 
administration saw Russia essentially as part of a solution 
rather than the problem as the ongoing Syria tragedy developed. 
And so, to me, what I highlighted over the course of my work is 
that Russia cannot be part of the solution. Putin had taken 
advantage of that perception.
    These events that you refer to, such as the statement that 
Syria was going to be a quagmire for Russia, Secretary Kerry 
opening the door for Russia and so forth--there was this 
confusion about what Russia was, what it could do, and 
therefore--and then the belief that Russia could help disarm 
Assad. Remember, this was Assad's biggest backer, who frankly 
created Assad's chemical weapons in the first place. He could 
not possibly disarm him.
    So what I would like to see is more consistency and clarity 
that we need to compete with Russia. Russia cannot be part of a 
solution, especially not after helping Assad destroy this 
country, because our credibility is on the line at this point.
    In terms of what we would like to see beyond the hotline, 
well, I would like to see more diplomatic engagement, more 
commitment to empowering other actors, like I mentioned, 
potentially such as Azerbaijan, who has already stepped into 
this role, but also looking--to take your question a little bit 
further beyond our partners--looking to create linkages between 
European and Middle East theaters.
    That is why I highlighted the importance of empowering 
Ukrainians, tackling Russia's ghost fleet, looking at the 
bigger strategic picture, because that is how Russia is looking 
at it.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Baumgartner.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.
    I want to thank the witnesses. I have so many questions. 
How do we help make sure that al-Sharaa succeeds? How do we 
protect minorities? How do we orient Syria toward our allies 
and away from enemies like Iran, but at the same time, how do 
we make sure allies like Turkey don't move the S-300's to Syria 
to get out of CAATSA? Things that we need to worry about.
    But, Dr. Borshchevskaya, you talked about Russia and the 
Soviet Union, and I started thinking as I'm sitting here about 
history. The Soviet Union lasted 69 years. To understand where 
Russia goes after the Soviet Union, you have to understand 
where it was before and, you know, look back to the 800's.
    Syria history goes back even farther, and you have more 
ethnic groups than you can count. When the civil war started 
12, 13 years ago, I remember using--I guess it was 2011, 14 
years ago--using a metaphor of a corkscrew and that there were 
so many different groups in there. And as countries around and 
even the U.S. got involved, we essentially tied ourselves to 
that corkscrew. And every time the corkscrew turned, it pulled 
us further and further in.
    We didn't know what the outcome would be. Ultimately, 
finally, Assad left. Al-Sharaa rises to power. Those threats 
seem to have been cut in many ways, but we still are very 
much--as you all have said, we have interests in Syria, and not 
just our interests. We have interests and concerns with 
countries who are trying to stay in Syria: Russia, Iran, and 
others.
    So my question is, given this narrow window of opportunity 
that you have talked about that we are looking at, the desire 
of Russia to make sure it maintains its access to the Eastern 
Mediterranean that is so critical for its view, China trying to 
make sure it has its play, Iran, et cetera, what do we need to 
do as the United States, most importantly--and I am just going 
to go down one, two, three from left to right. What does 
Congress need to do to make sure that we are protecting our 
interests, protecting our long-term hopes and aspirations for a 
new region? I say this as the chair of the Abraham Accords 
Caucus. Syria is talking about being part of the Abraham 
Accords. And I will leave it at that.
    So Dr. Alterman?
    Dr. Alterman. Thank you very much, Congressman. First, I 
think you are thinking about this in exactly the right way. If 
you think about who wants instability in Syria, it is the 
people we are most concerned about. It is the Iranians and the 
Russians who seek to exploit instability because they see Syria 
settling down as helping us and undermining them. I think that 
is partly why we need to work so closely with our partners and 
allies.
    I was talking to a friend over the weekend and mentioned I 
was testifying. He said, ``So no State Department witnesses?'' 
I mean, I think one of the things Congress can do is you can 
engage with the administration----
    Mr. Schneider. We would like to.
    Dr. Alterman [continuing]. and make sure--no, and make sure 
that they have worked out both where they are--and to say I am 
very concerned about Ambassador Barrack trying to play both the 
Turkey role and the Syria envoy role because it then becomes 
very hard to reassure the Israelis----
    Mr. Schneider. And I want to give others a chance to 
respond, but I will say if you do everything half-assed, you do 
nothing well. And so I agree with you.
    Dr. Borshchevskaya?
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure, and I agree with Jon on what he 
just said. I mean, to add to that, I think Congress can make it 
clear that Syria is a priority, that it will highlight these 
issues on a regular basis; it will engage in conversations and 
monitor and look for potential points of leverage.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
    Mr. Schenker?
    Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I actually agree 
with what Jon said about Tom Barrack. I have a section in my 
written testimony about this. I don't think he can do two jobs 
of one person simultaneously well, in addition to the conflicts 
of interest.
    What I do say one of the things he can do--and I don't know 
if you have already done this, but you know how you have the 
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. 
People who undermine the stability or countries who undermine 
the stability of Syria can also be sanctioned or otherwise 
treated differently. I mean, just an idea.
    Mr. Schneider. I like that idea.
    With my last few seconds, I will just make an observation. 
I mentioned the Soviet Union was 69 years. Assad family took 
power in 1971, 25 years after Syria was established as a State. 
We can think of those in long periods.
    But just doing some research as I was sitting here, the 
Ottomans ruled Syria for 400 years. Before that, the Arabs 
ruled Syria for almost 900 years, the Byzantines for 300 years. 
The Romans were there. And that is just the modern history of 
Syria. It goes back ten of thousands of years.
    I think if we are going to understand Syria, we need to 
understand the history of the different ethnic groups in the 
area. But it is also imperative that we understand the 
topography of the area, the importance of the Euphrates River 
running from the north--southeast--or south--yes, southeast, as 
well as the mountains running vertical from south to north, 
because to fail to understand that, we will fail and make 
mistakes with unintended consequences.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. I now recognize Representative Zinke for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to turn my attention to the PKK, which is a Marxist 
terrorist organization. I do think it was a mistake of this 
government to arm them because the enemy of our enemy is not 
necessarily our friend. And because of the Kurds, I think we 
made a mistake to think that all Kurds are the same, just like 
all Irish the same except the IRA.
    Now, having said that, the Kurds, or the Syrian Government 
as it is, has said that they are disarmed. I would like your 
opinion on what that disarmament really means, and are they?
    And, doctor, if you would go first--Dr. Anna.
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I mean, first, let me just say I 
think the announcement that the PKK was disarmed is 
historically important. When I think about the key PKK, I think 
about the fact that it was the Soviet Union that helped empower 
this organization in the first place. So I think, if it is in 
fact disbanded, it is a step in the right direction. I----
    Mr. Zinke. Do you think they are really disbanded?
    Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I don't have accurate information 
that they really have disbanded, and I think that it behooves 
us to continue monitoring this issue. But I don't have that 
information.
    Mr. Zinke. Dr. Alterman, your opinion?
    Dr. Alterman. I don't think they have decided what this all 
means yet. I am not sure the Turkish Government is confident 
what it all means yet. It is an opening, and it requires 
watchful waiting.
    I agree with you on many of the threats, but I also think 
we shouldn't close the door on the possibility that this 
conflict is entering a very different phase than it has been in 
for many years.
    Mr. Zinke. And sir?
    Mr. Schenker. I agree with Jon, Congressman. I think that 
this is a start. I think it is far from clear that the PKK has 
put down its weapons and all the people that were at one time 
adherents of the PKK--that they are finished.
    Mr. Zinke. So the ISIS individuals that are imprisoned--
there are a number of them. The former PKK is guarding them. 
What should be our policy, other than sending them to El 
Salvador?
    Mr. Schenker. Well, the policy has been, Congressman, the 
repatriation, ultimately, of these people to go back to the 
countries that they were from and that they would be 
responsible for them in those countries.
    As you know, no country wants to take back former members 
of ISIS. It has been a very slow process. Iraq has taken back 
some. Other countries--Oman has taken back some people, I 
believe. Our policy should be for the Government of Syria 
ultimately to be responsible for these camps.
    Mr. Zinke. Doctor, do you agree?
    Dr. Alterman. I once again agree with my old friend, David 
Schenker.
    Mr. Zinke. So how big of a threat are they if they were 
released into the population?
    Mr. Schenker. I think you would see, Congressman, the 
immediate resurgence of ISIS in the area, absolutely.
    Mr. Zinke. I agree.
    And doctor?
    Dr. Alterman. There is no question in my mind that some 
people can be reformed. There is also no question in my mind 
some people cannot be reformed, and you would see increased 
ISIS--there already is, of course, ISIS activity, and you would 
see more of it.
    Mr. Zinke. In the interest of time and letting my 
colleagues also give questions, I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Zinke.
    I now recognize Representative Mills, the chairman of the 
Oversight Subcommittee, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Schenker, I wanted to go back to one of the things you 
talked about. You said that they want to show inclusivity, but 
nothing has been done yet. But my understanding is that you 
have the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Hind Kabawat, 
who is Christian. You have Amjad Badr, who is the Minister of 
Agriculture, who is Druze. So would you like to kind of reState 
what you meant by that statement, just to be clear?
    Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I was talking 
about if you look at overall composition of the government 
between, for example, men and women, and also if you look at 
what these communities said after the constitutional meetings 
and the consultations about whether their inputs were 
appreciated, taken into consideration, incorporated into the 
draft documents, I think that there was a lot of complaints 
from the communities.
    Mr. Mills. Speaking on the documents, I mean, in 2025, 
under al-Sharaa, he signed an agreement with the Druze 
representatives from Sweida Province, which integrated the 
Druze into the entire State institutions. So this is obviously 
a very pivotal step, something that not even Assad or any of 
the others were willing to do.
    And in talking about inclusivity, as you know, even some of 
our own allies are just now starting to incorporate women into 
ministries, Ambassadorial positions, et cetera, based on 
cultural understandings and nuances.
    You also mentioned the IAEA, which is a very important 
part. But OPCW, who is actually the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has been in there on multiple 
occasions inspecting every single one of the actual sites, and 
to include 22 sites just in the last week and a half and how 
they would actually look at safely--this is the key thing; 
people think that you can just go ahead and pick up these 
chemicals and just toss them out in the trash, and we are going 
to be good--but safely be able to dispose of this so they can't 
be utilized in the future.
    We also talked about--and I agree with this. This is going 
to be one of those relationships that we have to not only be 
cautious of based on backgrounds and past experiences, but it 
is going to be a ``trust but verify'' relationship. And we know 
that very well in any conflict, post-conflict, areas.
    But if we took the broad-brush approach that someone's past 
therefore defines their future, we wouldn't have alliances with 
Japan and Germany to this day. And so I think that we need to 
keep this in mind because what I have seen so far is the 
current administration there has not only partnered with Iraq 
CTS and the U.S. to help counter ISIS operations, they have not 
only continued to stop the illicit weapons transfers of Hashd 
al-Sha'bi and the Iranian regime-backed militia groups through 
Syria into Lebanon to be utilized to attack, but just today, 15 
antitank guided missiles and 30 crates of heavy caliber 
ammunitions that was concealed by smugglers in a truck headed 
to Hezbollah was blocked and prevented from being able to be 
utilized against Israel.
    So I say this to explain that not actually looking at a way 
to try and work with the Syrian people to get an inclusive, 
democratically elected, free Syrian Government only opens the 
door for our adversaries like Russia, who, when I spoke with 
President al-Sharaa, said that he already had a proposal on the 
table by Russia that they were demanding that be signed. And he 
refused because he said, ``I would rather partner with the West 
and start developing our Nation.''
    When he talked about Iran, he said that we have not only 
pushed Iran out, but we will never allow Syria to be a proxy 
State of Iran. They can have a diplomatic opening of their 
consulate or their embassy, but we will even limit the number 
of visas for Iranians to come here because we know their 
influence, operations, and their capabilities. This is a man 
who fought in combat on both the good side and the bad side. So 
he understands how these operations work.
    So what would be a greater risk: not looking to work with 
Syria and make them an ally and help the regional stability and 
protect the great State of Israel, or to allow them to fall 
into the hands of the predatory manners of Russia and Iran and 
China?
    Mr. Schenker. Congressman, I agree with you wholeheartedly. 
As I said earlier, the chemical weapons--the WMD, the IAEA, the 
counterterrorism cooperation--these are high points. I think 
there is some criticism on the inclusivity part, but I am all 
for working with this government. This is the only game in 
town, and it is our opportunity to lose. So we should be on the 
ground floor.
    Mr. Mills. And I think that not even allowing China into 
the palace, which is something that he has done, shows even a 
further desire to work with the West. I think that helping to 
establish good neighbors, as Robert Frost--the ``Good fences 
make good neighbors'' relationship with Israel--will protect 
our allies there.
    I think that people understand that if you study the 
geopolitics of the Middle East, making sure Syria is stable 
will ensure that we can have a stable Middle East, which is 
President Trump's America-first agenda and promise.
    Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Mills. I echo your 
sentiments.
    I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony 
and the members for their questions. The members of the 
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the 
witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing. 
Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to 
submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the 
record, subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


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