[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:
                 STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT 
                            CHINESE INFLUENCE
=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                                 OF THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             June 10, 2025

                               __________

                           Serial No. 119-23

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]        


Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov                       
                     
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
61-418PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025                  
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                      
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, 
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
    American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

              James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                 Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                   YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             AMI BERA , California, Ranking 
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                      Member
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       BRAD SHERMAN, California
    American Samoa                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam                   GABE AMO, Rhode Island
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                 Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director
                        
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                            REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                   Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Young Kim.............     1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Ami Bera........     2

                               WITNESSES

Statement of Gregory Poling, Director and Senior Fellow of The 
  Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency 
  Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies.....     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
Statement of Barbara Weisel, Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie 
  Endowment for International Peace..............................    13
  Prepared Statement.............................................    15
Statement of Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair, Southeast Asia 
  Studies, Brookings Institution.................................    23
  Prepared Statement.............................................    25

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    56
Hearing Minutes..................................................    58
Hearing Attendance...............................................    59

                        Questions for the Record

Questions submitted to Dr, Lynn Kuok from Rep. Biggs.............    60
Questions submitted to Mr. Poling from Rep. Biggs................    63
Questions submitted to Mrs. Weisel from Rep. Barr................    64

 
                  BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:
       STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT CHINESE INFLUENCE

                              ----------                              


                         Tuesday, June 10, 2025

                  House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,
                              Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. The Subcommittee on East Asia and 
the Pacific will come to order. This hearing aims to explore 
strategies for countering China's influence within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, while enhancing 
the United States' engagement in the region. I now recognize 
myself for opening statement.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN YOUNG KIM

    Again, welcome to the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee's 
hearing titled Building Bridges, Countering Rivals: 
Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence. This 
hearing presents an opportunity for us to examine China's 
growing footprint in ASEAN and to discuss ways the U.S. can 
counter it by strengthening cooperation across economic, 
security, diplomatic, and law enforcement sectors.
    China has long prioritized Southeast Asia in its foreign 
policy, using diplomacy, infrastructure investment, and trade 
to entrench its influence. In contrast, U.S. economic 
engagement has stumbled. Initiatives like the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for 
Prosperity aimed high but failed to deliver meaningful market 
access or address trade imbalances.
    Despite our inability to engage economically, we continue 
to build robust relationship with countries like the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. But we too often 
underestimate ASEAN's collective weight in our own Indo-Pacific 
strategy.
    We need to ensure the United States has a genuinely 
responsive and effective strategy to remain the partner of 
choice in ASEAN and ask ourselves, where have our past 
strategies in Southeast Asia fallen short? What legislative 
tools can strengthen our regional position? Are our frameworks 
aligned with ASEAN partners' priorities?
    Despite China's reach, the United States is the preferred 
long-term partner of choice for many ASEAN countries. In the 
2025 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 52.3 percent favored the 
United States over China, recognizing our leadership in 
investment, security, innovation, and shared values.
    On security, the United States has made real strides, 
expanding maritime security with the Philippines and partnering 
with other South China Sea nations on law enforcement, maritime 
safety, and capacity-building training, enhancing disaster 
response and maritime governance capabilities.
    Economically, however, we are underleveraged. While China 
remains ASEAN's top trading partner, the region is a $4 
trillion market with enormous potential, especially in critical 
minerals, regional trade, and development financing. The threat 
of Chinese dominance isn't going away. China is aggressively 
pursuing deals, over 100 secured just this April with Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and Cambodia. These efforts reflect Beijing's 
recognition of growing U.S. engagement and its desire to blunt 
it.
    We must show ASEAN partners that China's promises rarely 
deliver lasting benefits. We also need a bold, whole-of-
government strategy, one that affirms our leadership, 
reinforces our alliances, and upholds the sovereignty and 
rules-based order that underpins a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and 
your expertise will guide us in crafting stronger, smarter U.S. 
policy in Southeast Asia.
    So let me now recognize the ranking member from California, 
Mr. Bera, for your opening statement.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA

    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    I want to thank the witnesses for being here on what is a 
timely conversation in an important region, Southeast Asia.
    Southeast Asia is home to more than 650 million people and 
has some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, 
critical sea lanes, and key partnerships in our interest as we 
look at peace and prosperity and sovereignty in the Indo-
Pacific. Collectively, the Southeast Asian ASEAN nations 
represent the fifth-largest economy in the world, and it's our 
fourth-largest export market. So what we do here in Congress, 
the choices that we make, the partnerships and deals that we 
put together, matter intensively.
    That is why I really do have some concerns about the Trump 
administration's approach. Obviously, sweeping tariffs have 
created a lot of uncertainty in the region. But hopefully, it 
creates some opportunities.
    Not each country has been looked at equally, and if I think 
about a country like Singapore, this is a country that we have 
a free trade agreement with, we have mechanisms to resolve 
issues, and we have a $2.8 billion trade surplus with 
Singapore. So we are doing quite well with a country like 
Singapore.
    I would also think about the opportunities--in my 
conversations with some of our ASEAN Ambassadors, they don't 
want to be put into a position where they have to make a choice 
between China, which is in their neighborhood, or the United 
States. But the uncertainty that has been created by the Trump 
administration approach has brought into clear focus that they 
don't want the United States leaving their markets either.
    So this is a time to engage in trade negotiations and 
perhaps look for those opportunities where we can reduce those 
trade barriers. As someone who was a supporter of TPP, as much 
as I would love to go back and see if we could join the CPTPP, 
that probably is a ways off. But can we do digital trade? We 
ought to be able to do digital trade. It is in our interests, 
and certainly, it is in their interests.
    Now, if Vietnam is willing to contemplate going to zero 
tariffs, let's engage in what that looks like. Can we work with 
countries in the region like Indonesia to help develop 
redundant supplies of critical minerals and develop their 
geothermal capabilities? We ought to think about that. Can we 
work with places like Vietnam that do have energy resources in 
their EEZ that are being harassed by the PRC? We ought to work 
there.
    And the Philippines, certainly, they have experienced the 
brunt of much of the harassment in South China Sea. How do we 
work with nations like the Philippines and others to continue 
to deepen and return to where we historically have been with 
the Philippines?
    So there is many more opportunities. Again, the Trump 
administration's approach is not how I would go about doing 
this, but we are where we are. We have got to double down on 
our conversations, look for those partnerships, create those 
redundant supply chains, and bring the Southeast Asian nations 
closer together, not as a choice between China and the United 
States but recognizing the unique assets, the unique 
opportunities, the vibrant young population, and the dynamic 
economies of the region.
    So, with that, Madam Chairwoman, let me go ahead and yield 
back. I am going to look forward to hearing the testimony of 
the witnesses.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record. And we are now 
pleased to have distinguished panel member witnesses before us 
today on this very important topic.
    First, Mr. Gregory Poling is Director and Senior Fellow of 
the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency 
Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. Thank you for joining us.
    Ms. Barbara Weisel, nonresident scholar at Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, thank you for being with us.
    And Dr. Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia 
Studies at the Brookings Institution.
    This committee recognizes the importance of the issues 
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak to us 
today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, 
and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 
minutes to allow time for member questions.
    Let me now recognize Mr. Poling for your opening statement.

                  STATEMENT OF GREGORY POLING

    Mr. Poling. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Kim, Member 
Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am 
honored to share my views before you today on the topic of 
U.S.-ASEAN cooperation to combat China's influence in the 
region.
    Before I begin, I should note that CSIS, my home 
institution, does not take policy positions, so the views 
represented are mine and mine alone.
    In my testimony, I have been asked to address both U.S. 
cooperation with ASEAN in the maritime domain, particularly 
South China Sea, and more broadly on the geopolitical front. 
And I am happy to say that, on the first, I think the U.S. and 
its allies and partners, particularly the Philippines, are 
doing a remarkable job of holding the line in the face of 
Chinese coercion.
    On the second, the broader competition for influence in the 
region, I worry that the U.S. is putting at risk what has 
traditionally been its stronger position over China and most of 
the countries of Southeast Asia. When it comes to the South 
China Sea, China seeks to control all activity, peacetime and 
military, in clear violation of international law. This is a 
direct threat to U.S. national interests, longstanding U.S. 
commitments to freedom of the seas, which has been an abiding 
U.S. interest since the earliest days of the republic.
    It is also a direct threat to our oldest ally in the Indo-
Pacific, the Philippines. This has been recognized by 
administration after administration, Republican and Democrat. 
And the U.S. has done a remarkable job in both showing its own 
flag, pushing back on Chinese coercion, and helping build the 
maritime capacity of partners and allies in the region to 
maintain their own presence in disputed waters, even in the 
face of what China now has: the largest Navy, the largest Coast 
Guard, the largest missile force in the world.
    Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China, for the last decade 
plus, has engaged in a campaign of coercion in what is often 
called the gray zone, just below the level of military force, 
using Coast Guard vessels and Militia vessels to intentionally 
create risks of collision, to bully and intimidate smaller 
states into giving way in the South China Sea.
    That campaign had a great deal of success for the better 
part of a decade. For the last 3 years, that has not been the 
case. For the last 3 years, starting at the end of the Rodrigo 
Duterte administration in the Philippines but accelerating 
under the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., we have 
seen the Philippines stand tall for the first time in quite a 
while.
    The Philippines engaged in a nearly year-and-a-half-long 
standoff with China from 2023 to 2024 in order to resupply and 
repair its facility the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas 
Shoal, an underwater feature, despite the largest presence of 
Chinese Militia and Coast Guard we have ever seen deployed in 
the South China Sea.
    By December 2023, the Philippines were sailing two to three 
ships up against 50 Chinese vessels, didn't blink, managed to 
get through, often with a U.S.-paid overhead and with the 
U.S.'s repeatedly stated commitment to defend the Philippines 
should China use force. And it was China that blinked, not the 
Philippines, in that standoff.
    On the oil and gas front, we have seen Vietnam, for the 
first time in many years, developing new oil and gas fields 
despite a persistent Chinese Coast Guard presence in its 
waters. Malaysia, over the last 2 years, set new records for 
drilling offshore wells in disputed waters. Even Indonesia, 
which has traditionally not viewed itself as a part of this 
dispute, has begun to receive forceful bullying and coercion 
from the China Coast Guard because of new oil and gas fields it 
is developing, and it has done so anyway.
    What we see is a Chinese strategy that is clearly 
floundering. And all the U.S. really needs to do is continue 
course in order to make sure that China continues to flounder. 
Where I am more worried is on our overall influence in the 
region.
    As Chairwoman Kim said, if you look at public opinion 
polling, elite opinion polling, U.N. voting records, 
educational data, the U.S. remains the partner of choice. The 
United States is more trusted. Its leadership is more sought 
after globally. It is more popular in most places in Southeast 
Asia.
    In the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. has enormous leads 
over China in every metric you could imagine. In Indonesia, the 
largest country in the region, Indonesians are conflicted, but 
in general they dislike China a great deal more than they 
dislike the U.S., although that did flip last year, and I worry 
that it will remain the case in the future that China may begin 
to edge us out in Indonesia.
    While you have pro-Chinese elites in charge in places like 
the military junta in Burma or in Cambodia, when you look at 
public opinion polling, Cambodia and Burma are the third and 
fourth most pro-American publics in Asia. Even in Laos and 
Thailand, the U.S. holds its own. It is really only in Malaysia 
where we see China making any considerable ground on this issue 
of soft power, of influence, of whose leadership do you 
support.
    And to be clear, the U.S. cannot win a geopolitical 
strategic competition with China with military and economic 
might alone. At the end of the day, it is a competition over 
the rules and institutions of the international order. And that 
requires other countries to agree with us more often than they 
agree with China.
    That means that we need to not forget the power of 
attraction, not just coercion and compulsion, that we have to 
be the preferred partner, not just the partner that one has to 
side with. And so, as we have seen the winding down----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Can you please wrap up? Sorry.
    Mr. Poling. Yes, ma'am--on USAID, VOA and Radio Free Asia, 
as we've seen the pauses on Fulbright and student visa 
interviews, I worry that we are undermining that multi-decade, 
latent advantage we have in being the preferred partner. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Poling follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    I now recognize Ms. Weisel for your opening statement.

                  STATEMENT OF BARBARA WEISEL

    Ms. Weisel. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, 
and distinguished members of this subcommittee for the 
invitation to appear before you today. My name is Barbara 
Weisel, and I am currently a nonresident scholar at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but previously spent 
nearly two decades working on Southeast Asia at USTR and have 
many thoughts on your question on how the U.S. can strengthen 
ties to ASEAN to counter China.
    As well recognized by members of this committee, Southeast 
Asia is an important U.S. economic partner. It is our fourth-
largest export market and a central player in global supply 
chains. U.S. businesses have long been invested in these 
dynamic markets, and their ties have expanded in recent years 
as businesses, with U.S. Government encouragement, sought to 
diversify away from China.
    ASEAN countries stood to benefit directly from these 
diversification efforts and hoped they would help strengthen 
economic ties to the U.S., commensurate with our expanding 
military relations. But the U.S. imposition of tariffs has 
created anger and confusion in ASEAN regarding their relations 
with the U.S. and resentment about the unilateral nature of 
U.S. actions.
    While ASEAN countries have long been concerned about 
China's dominance in the region, they see the imposition of 
tariffs as a much more immediate threat and direct assault on 
their economies. Facing a five-alarm fire set by the United 
States, they will not only avoid antagonizing China, their 
largest two-way trading partner, but welcome its overtures of 
greater economic cooperation.
    It is also likely that the U.S. will reach bilateral 
agreements with ASEAN in the coming weeks or months. To 
accommodate the U.S., Southeast Asian countries will commit to 
lower their tariffs and address longstanding trade barriers and 
increase purchases of U.S. LNG, agriculture planes, and other 
goods.
    At the same time, they will pursue de-risking strategies 
that lessen their economic dependence on the U.S. and expand 
trade and investment ties to China and other partners. So, 
while the U.S. may see some immediate results from the tariff 
leverage it has exerted over Southeast Asian countries, if 
China is the threat about which the U.S. is most concerned, 
then we need to keep our eye on the ball.
    We need to build an affirmative ASEAN economic strategy 
that relies on carrots, not just sticks. This strategy should 
build trust and certainty and deepen our economic partnership. 
It also should capitalize on ASEAN's interest in keeping the 
U.S. engaged in the region, create room for Southeast Asian 
countries to work with the U.S. on curbing unfair trade 
practices from China, and foster ASEAN integration to promote 
regional stability and security.
    Let me briefly offer five proposals for deepening economic 
ties. First, we should promote development of the Southeast 
Asian critical minerals sector and U.S.-ASEAN critical minimal 
supply chains even as we work to build our own capabilities in 
this sector. These efforts should include negotiation of 
critical minerals agreements with select Southeast Asian 
countries. These agreements should include criteria for trusted 
critical mineral supply chains and guaranteed supplies of 
critical minimal resources for U.S. industry, as the Japanese 
Government has successfully done.
    Second, the U.S. should swiftly pursue a plurilateral 
digital agreement with Southeast Asian countries trying on the 
commitments the U.S. Government is pursuing in its bilateral 
agreements with ASEAN countries. Maintaining U.S. leadership 
and setting digital trade rules is vital, given this sector's 
role in U.S. innovation and economic growth and to ensuring the 
U.S. remains at the forefront of the AI revolution. Doing so 
also would support U.S. efforts to counter China's model of 
digital authoritarianism.
    Third, the U.S. should propose a customs cooperation 
initiative that demonstrates its willingness to work in 
partnership with ASEAN as a group to tackle this priority 
issue. Many Southeast Asian governments already are 
strengthening rules in this area, but a U.S.-ASEAN customs 
cooperation agreement would better position ASEAN to deal 
collectively with transshipment from China.
    Fourth, Congress should fully fund U.S. economic statecraft 
tools, including reauthorization of DFC this year. Similarly, 
to promote U.S. exports, Congress should reauthorize the 
Export-Import Bank next year and ensure adequate funding for 
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
    And last, the U.S. should consider regionalizing the trade 
commitments it is negotiating bilaterally with ASEAN countries, 
building out an ASEAN agreement with rules of origin that limit 
nonparties from benefiting and including rules in critical 
areas to U.S. competitiveness.
    In exchange, the U.S. should gradually eliminate tariffs on 
imports from Southeast Asian parties to the agreement. A 
regional agreement with reciprocal commitments would 
incentivize Southeast Asian countries to deepen supply chains 
with the U.S. in ways that can promote U.S. manufacturing and 
exports.
    Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views, 
and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Weisel follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you, Ms. Weisel.
    Let me now recognize Dr. Kuok for your opening statement.

                     STATEMENT OF LYNN KUOK

    Dr. Kuok. Thank you so much, Chairwoman.
    Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. It is 
an honor to be able to contribute to this important 
conversation on strengthening U.S. engagement with Southeast 
Asia, a region that is at the geographic as well as the 
strategic heart of the Indo-Pacific.
    You have both outlined why Southeast Asia matters, so let 
me just say that despite its economic and strategic importance, 
the region remains a weak link in U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement.
    U.S. influence in the region is declining, and China is 
gaining ground. Both yourself, Chairwoman, and Greg mentioned 
how the United States is the partner of choice. But in a 
regional survey in 2024, the survey showed for the first time 
the majority of respondents in Southeast Asia actually choosing 
to align with China over the United States if they were forced 
to choose. Now, that margin was slim, overall 50.5 percent 
versus 49.5 percent. But support dropped dramatically in some 
countries, including all three Muslim majority countries by 
about 20 percentage points.
    The 2025 survey you mentioned reflected a modest U.S. 
rebound, but it was conducted very early in the year, from 
early January to mid-February, and preceded several 
developments, most notably the April 2 announcement of tariffs. 
This hit all countries in Southeast Asia, including some of its 
poorest. Cambodia, Laos, and war-torn Myanmar face a 49 
percent, 48 percent, and 44 percent tariff level respectively.
    These Liberation Day tariffs have triggered a strong 
backlash in the region. ASEAN leaders recently expressed deep 
concern over these unilateral tariff measures, and the 
Singapore prime minister warned that they undermine the global 
trading order that the United States helped build and declared 
bluntly that these are not actions that one does to a friend.
    What began as frustration over limited U.S. engagement, or 
limited U.S. economic engagement, in the region is now concern 
over counterproductive policies. Washington is not just missing 
an economic action in Southeast Asia; it is inflicting real 
damage. Tariffs, as well as aid cuts, are hurting Southeast 
Asian countries.
    Now, for years, relatively weak U.S. engagement was offset 
by the important security role it plays. But that, too, is 
increasingly cast in doubt as Washington recalibrates away from 
longstanding allies and partners in Europe and the President 
openly questions defense commitments. Lack of clarity around 
U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific compounds these concerns as the 
possibility of a grand bargain or even a more limited economic 
detail entailing concessions to Beijing on issues vital to 
allies and partners, such as the South China Sea or the U.S.-
Philippine Alliance, sows further doubt about American intent, 
consistency, and staying power.
    U.S. standing in the region has also been badly hurt by its 
handling of the Gaza crisis. Now, although a loss for the 
United States doesn't necessarily mean a win for China, Beijing 
has been very proactive about continuing to deepen its regional 
ties through trade, through investment, through infrastructure, 
and through consistent diplomacy.
    And as you mentioned, Chairwoman, in the weeks after the 
April 2 tariffs, Beijing visited Southeast Asia and concluded 
113 deals. And even if few of those materialize, the signal was 
clear that China is a consistent and reliable economic partner, 
while the United States throws a wrecking ball at the global 
trading system.
    Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are a serious 
irritant in its relations with its neighbors, particularly the 
Philippines and Vietnam. But I think China has been remarkably 
adept at containing the fallout both with the use of economic 
incentives as well as quiet diplomacy.
    Southeast Asia does not want to choose between the two 
countries, and they will continue to hedge for as long as 
possible. But China's growing sway hampers Washington's ability 
to engage bilaterally and multilaterally in the region to 
strategic effect.
    I have detailed policy recommendations for the U.S. 
Government and legislative proposals in my written testimony, 
but very broadly, these touch on three areas that the United 
States must act on: first, economic engagement. For the region, 
economics is security, and failing to understand this leaves 
Washington on the back foot. Congress can lead by, first, 
reviewing tariffs; second, advancing targeted trade agreements 
in strategic sectors, like digital infrastructure and critical 
minerals; and third, bolstering funding support for 
infrastructure and development.
    The second main area that the United States needs to work 
on is strengthening its alliances and partnerships in Southeast 
Asia. It has done well with the Philippines, but what is 
necessary at the moment is commitment at the very highest 
levels to treaty commitments and expanding economic and 
strategic engagement with key regional players, including 
Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
    And finally, the third area, defending international law 
and maritime rights--international law reduces conflict risks 
and advances concrete U.S. interests. The second Trump 
administration should maintain the strong stance that it 
adopted during its first term, when it made regular lawful 
assertions of passage rights and freedoms of the seas and when 
it affirmed the merits of the 2016 tribunal decision, a step 
that the previous administration had failed to take.
    Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of the 
subcommittee----
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Well, let's continue the 
conversation during----
    Dr. Kuok. Sure.
    Mrs. Kim. of California.--question and answer period.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Kuok follows:]
   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you so much. I appreciate 
all of the witnesses giving your opening testimoneys and for 
the recommendations that you are making. And we can hopefully 
get into that more.
    And let me start with the first round of questioning. As 
you all mentioned, we want to be the partner of choice, and our 
ASEAN partners are waiting for us to show up. And we need to 
provide a clear and consistent economic framework for the Indo-
Pacific region. But unfortunately, we have--U.S. has struggled 
to regain momentum in economic engagement following its 
withdrawal from TPP.
    So, Ms. Weisel, what elements of the TPP and IPEF prove 
effective and ineffective, and how can future agreements 
demonstrate strong commitment to Southeast Asia's developing 
goals while safeguarding our U.S. interests?
    Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question. I think, in terms 
of TPP, I mean, TPP is now in force. The U.S. is not a party to 
that agreement. So it was a successful agreement 
notwithstanding the fact that we are no longer a party.
    I think that what was successful about TPP was, first, that 
it was a very high-standard agreement and included a lot of 
issues that had not been part of previous trade agreements that 
advanced rules that were of importance to U.S. economic 
competitiveness, including on things like intellectual 
property, on state-owned enterprises and competition in other 
areas.
    In looking back at what we would want to do were we to 
pursue a free trade agreement with the region, I think there 
are definitely additional areas/updates that you would want to 
consider and things that we learned, for instance, over the 
last couple years about resilience of supply chains, about our 
competition with China, that you would want to add to an 
agreement like that that were not issues then. But as in all 
free trade agreements, there are new generations of agreements, 
new issues that you need to think about and incorporate in 
updated agreements.
    IPAF, I think, was, in my view, more of a political 
agreement than an economic agreement and that the purpose of 
that was to demonstrate to our trading partners that we were 
going to be engaged in the region. We wanted them to commit to 
a range of issues related to areas of mutual concern, including 
related to supply chains.
    But we were not prepared to discuss market access in any 
way, and I think that that really hobbled the effort. I also 
think that our decision not to engage on digital trade was 
problematic and something that we would want to revisit going 
forward.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    As we strengthen our strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific, 
particularly with ASEAN partners like the Philippines, Subic 
Bay, which I visited, is again emerging as a critical location 
for U.S. logistics and operational planning. And our defense 
cooperation agreement with the Philippines grants us access to 
sites like Subic. But we must balance our military presence 
with Philippines' constitutional limits on foreign bases and 
sensitivities to national ressentiment, which has historically 
complicated our security cooperation.
    Mr. Poling, keeping this delicate balance in mind, what 
specific capabilities or pre-positioned assets would most 
enhance deterrents at Subic?
    Mr. Poling. Thank you, Chairwoman. The most important thing 
for the Philippines--well, I suppose there is two. One, it 
needs asymmetric capabilities, much like Taiwan or anybody else 
facing a giant neighbor. This is not a footrace the Philippines 
can possibly win.
    So seeing more deployments like the NMESIS right now, 
Tomahawks paired with Philippines' own midrange land-based 
capabilities like the BrahMos missiles they bought from India, 
is key. It allows the Philippines to hold Chinese vessels in 
the South China Sea at risk in a situation in which there is no 
number of hauls that they could possibly be sold or loaned that 
would make up for the asymmetry they face.
    The second is presence. At the end of the day, there is no 
military solution to the South China Sea. The Philippines needs 
to be able to show the flag. And they have done a remarkably 
good job with a very limited Coast Guard and Navy. We need to 
see more uncrewed platforms. We need to see more cheap vessels. 
We need to see more support for Philippine basing in the 
islands, and that doesn't mean U.S. boots on the ground, but 
the U.S. could be providing more funding for the Philippines to 
buildup its own facilities, as China and Vietnam do as well.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    One of the most pressing challenges in the region is 
China's dominant grip on critical mineral supply chains, 
especially for material vital to clean energy and defense 
technologies. And we mentioned Indonesia is the world's top 
producer of nickel. This is critical for battery technologies. 
But it is alarming that Chinese companies control 75 percent of 
Indonesia's nickel-refining capacity.
    Ms. Weisel, what are the implications of China's choke hold 
on critical mineral supply chains for the U.S. and allied 
nations?
    Ms. Weisel. Well, I think we are seeing the results of that 
choke hold in our industries today where China can limit access 
to critical minerals, and then it also controls these critical 
minerals from other countries. So I think all of this is quite 
disturbing and just reinforces the need for the U.S. to 
establish its own supply chains with the region.
    I think, as I mentioned in my testimony, Japan has had 
quite a good deal of success in trying to limit its reliance on 
Chinese critical minerals by promoting its relationships with 
the region. They have an organization called the Japanese 
Organization for Metals and Energy Security that has the 
purpose of ensuring stable supplies of critical minerals and 
energy for Japan.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you----
    Ms. Weisel. The result of that, and something I think we 
should be looking at, is that they have been able to 
successfully diversify their sources of critical minerals. And 
in the funding that they use for this organization that's known 
as JOGMEC, they have----
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Yes. Sorry, my time is up. So let 
me yield my time to Ranking Member Bera for his questioning.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And we can stick to the topic of critical minerals. Japan 
built those redundant supplies after facing economic coercion 
and retaliation from China, I think, in terms of choking off 
some of those. And we are certainly at risk and experiencing 
some of that potential risk right now. So there is an 
importance in expedience to not just develop our own domestic 
supplies but also look at, in a strategic way, how we go into--
you know, whether that is Vietnam, Malaysia, other--Indonesia--
and build redundant supplies.
    And I would argue, in the Biden administration, the mineral 
security partnership gives us some vehicles by which to work 
with countries like Japan, Korea, and others to help build 
those and perhaps even go into--you know, the Koreans are going 
into Mongolia--perhaps go into other areas.
    But this is--I would agree with you, Ms. Weisel, that I 
think this is a key area where we can deepen our relationship 
in a positive way with Southeast Asian nations, and we should 
do so.
    And, Chairwoman, I think we have a hearing actually coming 
up soon looking at that particular issue.
    Let's go back to digital trade for a second. While I wish 
we could go back to TPP, I clearly thought digital trade was 
something that we would get under the Biden administration, and 
obviously it didn't happen. It is in our interest, certainly in 
the region's interest.
    We can work off some of the existing digital trade models, 
whether that is taking the digital trade chapter out of USMCA 
or looking at some bilateral pieces. But maybe, each of you, if 
you wanted to just touch on the importance of getting a digital 
trade deal done.
    Maybe we will start with Dr. Kuok and then work to the left 
with the region.
    Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. In terms of the importance 
of a digital trade agreement, China is embedding its digital 
norms in the region through its deals with countries like 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, et cetera. And once those norms--the 
technology and the norms--are embedded, it becomes quite 
difficult to reverse.
    So, there is very little downsides to moving quickly on 
this issue. And the U.S. should be alert to it, lest it be in 
the same position as it is now in terms of critical minerals 
where it allowed China to invest in Indonesia, since Indonesia 
banned the export of nickel and allowed China to invest heavily 
in its nickel processing.
    The United States was asleep at the wheel in that respect, 
and I think it needs to redouble its efforts in terms of 
reaching and arriving at a digital trade agreement with 
Southeast Asian countries.
    Mr. Bera. Right.
    Ms. Weisel?
    Ms. Weisel. Yes, I would just add that China is active in 
this region. They have just recently updated their China-ASEAN 
agreement, which now includes additional digital commitments. 
And there is active cooperation between the two. So I think 
that is something that we really should keep a close eye on.
    But I also would note that the EU is engaged with a number 
of ASEAN regions, and the EU has a different approach to 
digital trade rules than we do. So, absent the U.S. direct 
engagement in the region, we are ceding it to others.
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Poling?
    Mr. Poling. I would just reinforce that last point. We have 
325 million people in a world of eight billion and growing. We 
can either help set rules in partnership with others, or we can 
end up taking the rules.
    What we have already seen is almost everybody in Southeast 
Asia has now adopted a European-style GDPR regime. They did 
that because we had no alternative. And they asked and asked 
and asked, and we didn't present it.
    Later this year, ASEAN will likely release its own digital 
economic framework agreement. We don't know what rules will be 
in there, but they won't be rules that the U.S. helped set. And 
that will be the story as long as we decide to take our ball 
and go home.
    Mr. Bera. Great. While IPEF would not have been the 
approach that I would have taken. It was an approach that the 
Biden administration took. And in our conversations, we looked 
at it as a high-standard negotiation, but not each country 
could actually meet--whether it was the labor standards, 
environmental standards, et cetera.
    And I think how I pitched it to the administration--and I 
would pitch it to the Trump administration--was in a modular 
way, right? It is easy for us to do a trade deal with Singapore 
and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It is essential for 
us to do a trade agreement with Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Philippines, Malaysia.
    And each of those countries may not, at this particular 
moment in time, be able to meet those high standards. But if we 
use a carrot approach, if we use--and I agree with you. It is 
not really a trade deal without market access because obviously 
that is what folks want.
    If the Trump administration is listening, I would strongly 
urge us to--in a bipartisan way--to try to figure this out. And 
if we don't set the norms and the rules, somebody else is, and 
we may not like them when we wake up.
    I will yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize Representative Moylan of Guam for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman.
    And as Guam often serves as first point of contact with the 
U.S. for many ASEAN countries, I am very enthusiastic about 
further advancing our relationship with them. In the early 
2024, the U.S. surpassed China as ASEAN's largest export 
market. This dynamic economic development underscores the 
importance of strengthening our economy tie with the regional 
group.
    However, the potential benefits of ASEAN are not limited to 
economics alone. ASEAN also plays a critical role in promoting 
regional stability and maritime security, deepening the 
cooperation for natural disasters and more.
    Given China's growing influence in the region, it is 
imperative that we develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance 
our engagement with ASEAN, counter China's influence, and 
secure our national interests in the region.
    As for the economic aspect, the U.S. is the largest source 
of cumulative foreign district investments, FDI, in ASEAN and 
overtook China as the largest export market this year. Now, 
while we need to address unfair trade practice in general, we 
also need to consider the potential ramifications of proposed 
tariff increase on ASEAN countries since many of them have 
export-dependent economies.
    To avoid the risks of these countries deepening their 
economic dependence to China, we should update our strategic 
engagement with them to promote economic prosperity both in the 
region and the U.S. and to build a more resilient supply chain.
    When it comes to regional security and maritime security, 
the most urgent issue is China's aggression in South China Sea. 
Many incidents of harassment against Philippine ships by 
Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been reported. And although 
ASEAN members don't all share the same stance toward China, if 
we can encourage them to share a common position on this issue, 
it would serve a powerful voice to deter further aggression.
    Mr. Poling, could you describe how opinions among ASEAN 
members are divided on South China Sea disputes? Also, how can 
the U.S. encourage them to adopt a more unified position to 
secure freedom of navigation and maritime security?
    Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congressman. The Philippines is 
obviously the farthest on this spectrum if we were to lay it 
out. It has been the most forward-leaning in defending its 
rights. It has been the clearest in articulating the legal 
nature of its rights and its objections to China's through its 
arbitral victory.
    Just behind the Philippines have been Vietnam. There is no 
country on earth, when you look at polling, that has more 
skepticism or anxiety about China or views China more as a 
revisionist threat than Vietnam, and that is because of China's 
aggression toward Vietnam in the South China Sea.
    Vietnam has been quietly supportive of the Philippines' 
arbitral victory in 2016. It has forged bilateral--quiet 
bilateral--Coast Guard cooperation with Manila. It has engaged 
in its own large buildup of its facilities in the Spratly 
Islands in order to contest Chinese control.
    After that, there is a steep drop-off, I am afraid, of the 
other claimants to the waters or islands of the South China 
Sea. Indonesia, which hasn't often considered itself a 
claimant, has probably been the most forward-leaning in 
contesting Chinese activity. And Indonesia has had the clearest 
articulation, other than the Philippines, of what is illegal 
about China's claims.
    Malaysia has tended to bury its head in the sand and try to 
ignore the issue, at least at the political level. Of course, 
Indonesian Cost Guard personnel and naval personnel are as 
frustrated by China as anybody. Of the non-claimants, Singapore 
has really been the only one that has taken a firm position on 
the illegality of China's claims.
    And I think we have to recognize that there will never be a 
coherent ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia--they are not going to invite Chinese retaliation on 
themselves in support of the Philippines or Vietnam. And so 
there has to be a claimants' grouping, but not an ASEAN 
grouping.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Weisel, based on your experience in the U.S. 
Government, including U.S. trade representative, how do you 
assess the potential impact of the proposed tariff increase on 
ASEAN members? What do you see as the most effective way to 
advance our economic interest in the region? Sorry; you have 
very little time.
    Ms. Weisel. I think that the actions, as I said in my 
statement, have really put the U.S. at a disadvantage. The U.S. 
is seen as kind of impulsive, unpredictable, unilateral actions 
that is causing ASEAN to reflect on what it needs to do to 
hedge the risk against the U.S. and is forcing them to lessen 
their reluctance to work with China because they have no other 
choice.
    If they are going to be threatened by the United States, 
then they are going to be more open to working with China. And 
we have put them in that position.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize Representative Amo of Rhode Island for 
your 5 minutes' questioning.
    Mr. Amo. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
    And thank you to our witnesses for being here. As we have 
discussed, ASEAN is just an essential partner to the United 
States. It is an opportunity for American power but also for 
global collaboration. And I believe the Biden administration 
understood this and made ASEAN central to our Indo-Pacific 
strategy.
    But I am concerned about the Trump administration's foreign 
assistance freeze, the chaotic tariffs, and what that has done 
to really take an axe to our relationship with ASEAN nations. 
And of course, as we have discussed already today, this really 
works against our efforts to counter China's influence in the 
region. And Trump's chaos and uncertainty has undermined our 
credibility as a partner while doing its part to hurt American 
businesses.
    Even worse, China is already stepping in to fill the void 
that we have left behind, and in one particular way I want to 
highlight in my time today. I am worried about a potential axe 
to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, as 
we all know, the DFC. The DFC provides an enormous return on 
investment to the American taxpayer, advancing the United 
Sates' foreign policy goals and our economic interests, a true 
definition of a win-win.
    And the United States private sector is consistently the 
largest source of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN 
region. The DFC is also a perfect counter to China's Belt and 
Road Initiative, providing an alternative to that coercive 
financing scheme. In the first three and a half years of the 
Biden administration alone, the DFC advanced over $1.4 billion 
in private sector investments in the ASEAN countries.
    So, Dr. Kuok, as we work on legislation to reauthorize the 
DFC, how do you think we can ensure that the DFC continues 
working successfully in the ASEAN region to support our allies 
and combat China's growing influence?
    Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think you are 
right to point out the strategic damage that the withdrawal of 
aid has done to the United States. Two caveats on aid--first, 
having aid in and of itself might have hurt, U.S. ability to 
engage with some of the regional governments who saw aid as 
meddling from the United States, or some forms of aid as 
meddling from the United States. And there are some reports 
that suggest that the strategic return on U.S. aid was unclear.
    Nonetheless, the sudden and abrupt withdrawal of aid from 
the United States to some of these countries sends an 
unfortunate message of U.S. callousness, especially when it 
impacts programs that mean the difference between life and 
death in these countries, such as humanitarian assistance, 
health programs, and demining, which as you pointed out, China 
has already stepped in to fill.
    On development finance, this is clearly something that the 
United States need to step up on. And I urge greater focus in 
this respect. China's Belt and Road Initiative, which you 
mentioned, was initiated in 2013. Amendments or revisions to 
the Build Act came in 2018, some 5 years after China's Belt and 
Road Initiative.
    Since then, the United States has had various 
infrastructure initiatives, development and infrastructure 
initiatives, including the Build Back Better World, which was 
then repackaged as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure 
Investment. And all of this is all well and good and very much 
appreciated in Southeast Asia, but it hasn't yet shown any 
concrete development in Southeast Asia.
    So urgency is the key here. Otherwise, it starts to feel 
like old wine in new bottles. So, certainly, the region is in 
urgent need of infrastructure development, and all of this 
should have happened yesterday. If not, today or tomorrow would 
be great.
    And this is not just in the region's interest. It is in the 
U.S.'s interest, as well, as it seeks to reduce regional 
reliance on China as well as increase U.S. access in the region 
as well.
    Mr. Amo. Well, thank you.
    I see my time is close to expired, so I will yield back. 
Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    I would like to now recognize the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, Representative Mackenzie, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I appreciate the testimony today. It is a very important 
topic as we seek to combat the rising influence of China. And I 
think we all would like to make sure that we have greater bonds 
between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries that we are talking 
about here today.
    So, for Ms. Weisel, we have seen in the trade disputes 
between the U.S. and China the restrictions that have been 
placed by China on critical minerals coming into the U.S., and 
what that means for our economic vibrancy is felt all across 
our economy, potentially.
    And so are there opportunities that you see for us to build 
greater relationships with other countries in the region so 
that we could have a diversified supply chain in this area?
    Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I 
think there absolutely are opportunities to build closer ties 
and stronger supply chains. We know this from going back to the 
first Trump administration when the U.S. was encouraging 
companies to build China-plus-one strategies, and ASEAN 
understood that they were going to be a beneficiary of that.
    Several of the ASEAN countries have important critical 
minerals and are looking to develop their supply chains. They 
see the United States as an important partner in helping them 
build both their--build out their critical mineral supply 
chains and that they are quite interested in partnering with 
us.
    And I think that what we need to show here is consistency. 
So some of the signals that we sent, for instance, that we want 
to build our own supply chains but we have a 232 investigation 
going on in critical minerals--so, if they partner with us, are 
they then going to be subjected to 232 tariffs that are going 
to undermine the cooperation that we are seeking to build?
    If we can overcome some of those kinds of concerns and come 
up with the kind of financing that we need to support industry 
in building those supply chains, I think we have some very 
interested partners in ASEAN.
    Mr. Mackenzie. And that is great to hear because I think we 
saw that coming out of the trade and tariff disputes back in 
2018, 2019, is that countries were willing to take on supply 
chain initiatives outside of China, working with the U.S. And I 
think that was actually a good benefit from that trade dispute 
in 2018/2019.
    I think we have the potential again this time with tariffs. 
There are two different issues going on. There is certainly the 
reciprocity issue that we see across the board being dealt with 
in a lot of countries, and then there is China that is unique. 
The tariffs that are being placed on China are significantly 
higher than in other countries.
    And I think we have the same potential ahead of us here 
because countries were shaken in 2018/'19, doing business with 
China. They started getting out. Those that stayed, 
anecdotally, have come to regret that. And they have said, 
``You know what? We got the warning shot in 2018/'19. We didn't 
fully listen to you. We didn't get out. We didn't move our 
supply chains fast enough.'' And I think that that has the 
potential to be something that is going to speed up here in 
this latest round of tariffs.
    So, if you are saying that that willingness is there, then 
the potential for that supply chain disruption with the higher 
tariffs placed on China, I think, is very real. And I think 
ASEAN countries should be ready to take on that American 
business. Get away from China. And I think we have the 
opportunity to have stronger bonds going forward.
    I will close with one other question for you is, when we 
look at this disruption in trade going on right now, I would 
like to hear from you what other opportunities outside of 
critical minerals do you see as the greatest opportunity for 
ASEAN countries to take on? Is it medical devices? Is it basic 
manufacturing, electronics? What do you see as the biggest 
opportunity for those economies to take on?
    Ms. Weisel. I think that they are very interested in 
working with us on the digital economy and strengthening their 
digital trade with the United States but also within each of 
these countries. They have large numbers of young people who 
are really digitally educated and do see that as the future of 
their economies. I think that they see opportunities of working 
closely with our digital industries and finding ways to align 
our regulatory approaches.
    Mr. Mackenzie. All right. Well, I appreciate that. And 
thank you again for testifying. I think we have great 
opportunities that lie ahead for the U.S. and ASEAN 
relationship and look forward to working on those together with 
everybody interested.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    And I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, 
Representative Castro, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman. Chair Kim, I appreciated 
working with you to reintroduce the bipartisan Partner with 
ASEAN Act today. This bill would give ASEAN the same diplomatic 
privileges and immunities that other major multilateral 
institutions already enjoy, a step that I believe would 
strengthen ASEAN's centrality and U.S. regional ties.
    So I wanted to ask, Mr. Poling, how important is it for the 
U.S. to follow through on this legislation and demonstrate that 
we treat ASEAN as a strategic partner.
    Mr. Poling. I think it is quite important, particularly at 
a time when ASEAN questions whether the U.S. will follow 
through on a great many commandments it makes. The legislation 
has been pending for I think 3 years. It was first introduced 3 
years ago. At a time when ASEAN fears that the U.S. will 
withdraw from multilateral engagement, at a time when the State 
Department has suggested that it will shut down the 
Multilateral Affairs Shop within EAP, which is in charge of 
ASEAN affairs, this can send an important countervailing 
message.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you.
    And I want to ask Dr. Kuok--recent polling suggests that 
public polling in the United States has dipped in majority 
Muslim Southeast Asian countries following Israel's war in 
Gaza. And so how has the war in Gaza affected the region's 
public opinion of the United States?
    Dr. Kuok. As mentioned earlier, the drop in support for the 
United States since the recent Gaza crisis has been precipitous 
in Muslim majority countries, about a 20 percentage point drop 
in support for the United States since the Gaza crisis. And 
support for China in Muslim majority countries is averaging 
about 70 percent amongst Muslim majority countries. And this 
was in the most recent poll, as well, the 2025 poll which saw a 
slight decrease in support for China and increase in support 
for the United States, but still very poor support for the 
United States amongst these Muslim majority countries, and even 
amongst Singaporean respondents, because Singapore has a 
minority Muslim population--sentiment is also quite bleak about 
the United States and its either inaction or its active support 
of Israel. And so that has hurt perceptions of the United 
States.
    The poll has most clearly reflected the drop in support for 
the United States amongst Muslim majority countries, but it 
hasn't been limited to Muslim majority countries or even the 
Muslim population. The humanitarian crisis is clear for all to 
see.
    Mr. Castro. And then I want to ask you, given those things, 
what the long-term implications for U.S. credibility and 
influence in the region are, particularly the longer this goes 
on.
    Dr. Kuok. How much it impacts the United States' ability to 
influence the region will depend on the situation on the ground 
and on the extent to which, humanitarian aid is able to reach 
victims of this crisis. So it will wax and wane accordingly.
    That said, countries in the region are very pragmatic. So, 
regardless of that crisis, I think it will hurt sentiment, but 
nonetheless, countries will seek to work with the United 
States. And we see that from, say, Malaysia, whose prime 
minister has been the loudest and most vocal in terms of 
criticizing the United States for its support of Israel.
    Before Malaysia took up the chair of ASEAN, it actually 
expressed that it would seek, as ASEAN chair, to work with 
various important partners, and it mentioned a whole list of 
partners but left out the United States. Since then, Malaysia 
has sought to clarify that it seeks to continue to work with 
the United States. So, even then, it wants to work with the 
United States, but the U.S. has to be there to offer up 
economic and security options.
    Mr. Castro. Well, and speaking of the economic part--I have 
45 seconds left. Let me ask you about the effect of the tariffs 
on public opinion, as well, because that's another major issue.
    Dr. Kuok. It is unclear at the moment what the effect of 
the tariffs have been on Southeast Asia. The 2025 poll I 
mentioned was conducted from early January to mid-February, so 
before the U.S. disengagement from Europe, before the U.S. aid 
cuts, as well as before the tariffs.
    But I think it cannot but hurt the United States, given the 
steep tariffs, as I mentioned, on many of the poorest, some 
amounting to almost a 50 percent tariff rate. And these 
countries cannot afford these tariff rates. They are not only 
going to have an economic impact on the region but, as the 
Singapore prime minister pointed out, an impact on the global 
trading system, which will then hurt these countries. And it 
will hurt the United States as well.
    It might win a little bit in terms of gaining an inch, but 
it will lose a yard because--in terms of its strategic ability 
to influence the region and getting the region to align with it 
on issues important to it-- the U.S.
    Mr. Castro. I have just run out of time. Thank you.
    Dr. Kuok [continuing]. will be on a back foot. Thank you.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina, 
Representative Biggs, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
    And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
    So my first question is for Mr. Poling. So, in your 
testimony, you emphasized the strategic utility of the U.S. 
Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, particularly in countering 
China's gray zone tactics through partnerships, capacity-
building, and shipwrighter agreements.
    Given the success of China's nonlethal coercion via its 
Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, what additional steps would 
you recommend the United States take beyond current initiatives 
to strengthen and expand the U.S. Coast Guard engagement in the 
region? And how can these efforts be better integrated with the 
needs of front-line states like the Philippines and Vietnam?
    Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congresswoman. I do think that it 
has been important to see now a small presence of U.S. Coast 
Guard cutters, usually one at a time conducting training 
activities in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Coast Guard is stretched 
too thin. We have to acknowledge that it is not going to play a 
direct role in helping support, say, Philippine activity in the 
South China Sea. That is going to remain a Navy role. But the 
more the Coast Guard can be funded to forward-deploy to the 
Indo-Pacific, engage in shipwrighting in the Pacific Islands, 
in training and capacity-building in Southeast Asia, the 
better.
    The Philippines has done a remarkable job in standing up to 
China. And so far, the threat of U.S. intervention under the 
Mutual Defense Treaty is what has kept this in the gray zone 
where, so far, the Philippines can handle it. The most 
important thing, from my perspective, that we can--continue to 
reinforce the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and that 
we continue to fund the 10-year security sector assistance road 
map that we have promised to help modernize the Philippine 
military.
    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. So I would like to kind of continue 
our discussion. You point out to the Coast Guard's 
effectiveness in building regional trust and countering grey-
zone tactics. Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, 
what political and operational challenges must be overcome to 
expand U.S. Coast Guard deployments and agreements, such as the 
shipwrighter programs or deployed cutters in the region? And 
what specific support should Congress support to achieve this 
expansion?
    Mr. Poling. I don't think it is possible for the U.S. to 
negotiate a shipwrighter agreement for the South China Sea. The 
nature of the dispute, its multilateral nature, makes it all 
but impossible, and it would be far too politically sensitive 
in the Philippines for, I think, even the Philippines, our 
closest and oldest ally in the region, to ask.
    But more Coast Guard presence to help the Philippines 
bolster its own capability would be welcomed, and the key there 
is simply funding. The last time we saw significant increases 
in Pentagon budgets, there was efforts to cut the Coast Guard's 
funding. We need to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is an 
important tool of the U.S.'s power and credibility, not just 
the Navy.
    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for that insight.
    So my next question is for Ms. Weisel. Your testimony 
emphasizes DFC's role in catalyzing private investment to 
advance both development goals and U.S. strategic interest, 
particularly in Southeast Asia. In that context, how can the 
U.S. interagency better integrate on-the-ground insights to 
improve risk mitigation and foster a more stable investment 
climate for DFC-supported projects across ASEAN?
    Ms. Weisel. Well, I think as we look to restructure the way 
that we are supporting companies in the region, there is going 
to be an important opportunity to ensure that agencies that are 
on the ground in ASEAN are working together and coordinating 
closely. So you have the Commerce Department playing a 
particular role. You have the State Department having at least 
traditionally played another role, and the aid agencies, also, 
on the ground in these various countries.
    As we are thinking about restructuring all of this, it is 
really important that we have input from all of these various 
agencies about what the priorities are and the ways that all of 
them can contribute to supporting DFC and U.S. business going 
forward. We have talked about here how important it is to be 
able to rethink the way we are looking at this, given the 
competition that we are facing not just from China but from 
other countries that are competing in the region.
    And so I think we need to have a very serious look at the 
way we have been coordinating in the past and what we need to 
do going forward.
    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for your insight.
    And with that, I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, 
Representative Olszewski, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Olszewski. Thank you so much, Chair Kim.
    Thank you to Ranking Member Bera and to all of our 
witnesses today. I just want to first say how much I completely 
agree that the U.S. must strengthen our support for our ASEAN 
partners in the Indo-Pacific, so I really appreciate you all 
being here and your comments today.
    We know this means defending a free and open region in the 
face of security threats posed by the PRC and also means 
offering a reliable economic alternative in developing 
financing for countries like Laos that are saddled with PRC 
debt, and it also means supplying the kind of foreign 
assistance that USAID and our other development agencies have 
delivered to ASEAN and its member states for more than four 
decades. So just lifting up our actions and words, and so 
appreciate the opportunity for the conversation.
    I know there has been a lot of talk--I want to turn a 
little bit to solutions through people-to-people ties. And so I 
was hoping that we can focus on that. I believe that we should 
be building on the friendship shared by our combined one 
billion people, and I am proud that Maryland's Johns Hopkins is 
leading the way.
    In 2023, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 
Studies launched the U.S.-ASEAN Institute for Rising Leaders. 
However, President Trump's budget request seeks to end this 
critical educational and cultural exchange.
    Ms. Kuok, perhaps you can speak to--or Dr. Kuok; I am 
sorry--could you speak to the importance of engaging with youth 
and emerging leaders in ASEAN countries and for the long-term 
U.S. relationship with the region? How would ending educational 
and cultural exchange programs in the region affect U.S. 
influence there and open doors for the PRC to expand its 
influence? And if there is time, I invite our other witnesses 
to answer as well.
    Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. I have to admit not to have 
thought very much about this issue because it almost seems very 
obvious that the United States is inflicting a grievous act of 
self-harm when it ends educational programs for the young 
people of the region, who will tomorrow be the leaders of their 
countries.
    So, clearly, this is a wrong-footed move, and it will hurt 
the United States. I mean, if you look at the youths in the 
region today, I think just anecdotally, some of them have been 
put off from coming to the United States because of some of 
these concerns.
    But more broadly, as you know, a couple of weeks ago, the 
Shangri-la Dialogue of defense ministers took place in 
Singapore. And at that dialog, Defense Secretary, Hegseth 
talked about how our futures are tied together--the futures of 
the countries of the Indo-Pacific are tied together. Yet it 
feels so much like the region is under an onslaught from this 
part of the world.
    So it doesn't feel very much like a shared future, and I 
cannot imagine that it feels very much like a shared future for 
the young people whose futures are thrown into uncertainty by 
some of the more thoughtless actions of the administration.
    Mr. Olszewski. Your thoughts on that particular topic?
    Ms. Weisel. I would just add that a good case study of this 
is Vietnam, which used to train all of its officials and send 
people to Russia for education. And then, the Vietnamese 
government started sending students to the US and Europe. They 
started going to Europe. And you saw a change in the attitudes 
of those people toward improving relations with the United 
States and deepening cooperation.
    So you do have these case studies that underscore the 
importance of these educational links.
    Mr. Poling. I would add that there is no country in 
Southeast Asia that reports in the ISEAS survey every year that 
they want to go study in China. There are several now where 
they have to go study in China; the other doors closed.
    In general, the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. are the 
preferred educational destinations, especially for Vietnam, 
which provides the third-largest group of foreign students in 
the U.S. and the Philippines. Pausing interviews for student 
visas, canceling Fulbright exchanges--this is only going to 
harm the U.S. in the long term.
    Mr. Olszewski. I appreciate that.
    Madam Chair, I think that reinforces the lessons that we 
learned when we were all in the Pacific Islands recently 
together on the trip that you helped lead. So I appreciate our 
witnesses that--and think it sort of speaks to our committee's 
obligation to lift up these kinds of programs for--particularly 
for--I loved the comment about the leaders of tomorrow and 
thinking about our engagement in that way.
    And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.
    I recognize the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Barr, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Barr. Kentucky.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. Kentucky. Oh.
    Mr. Barr. It is Okay. It is Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair, 
for your excellent leadership and holding this hearing.
    And let me key in on Dr. Kuok's testimony when she talked 
about these ASEAN countries don't--or Southeast Asian 
countries--they don't want to be forced to choose. This does 
corroborate some of the public comments and some of the 
analysis from our embassies when I travel to Thailand, 
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines.
    But privately in our meetings with our counterparts, they 
do want to choose. They want to choose the United States. That 
has not changed from the Biden administration to the Trump 
administration. I would argue, especially Indonesia, a vibrant 
democracy--they want to choose. They want to choose the United 
States, and that hasn't changed from one administration to the 
other.
    In fact, I remember very vividly, when we were in Jakarta, 
hearing a very stern admonition from the foreign minister, 
Marsudi, how terribly upset the Indonesians were and other 
ASEAN country leaders where that President Biden skipped the 
ASEAN conference.
    So this sense of a vacuum--it is not unique to now. It 
existed before the Trump administration. I think it is not a 
change in policy on trade that has given us this challenge of 
needing to deepen our ties with them.
    In fact, I want to challenge the critics of the Trump 
administration's trade strategy a little bit when they claim 
that the President's efforts to negotiate more reciprocal deals 
are pushing ASEAN nations toward Beijing or making these 
nations more vulnerable to Xi Jinping's acts of coercion.
    In fact, what is the objective of the Trump trade policy? 
It is actually to deepen our economic ties. It is to reduce the 
trade barriers to American exporters. And so, if the end goal 
of this is more reciprocal trade between the United States and 
ASEAN, this has enormous potential to reverse the sentiment 
expressed by Foreign Minister Marsudi that the Biden 
administration was not paying enough attention to ASEAN.
    So, Ms. Weisel, I totally agree with your testimony when 
you talk about a regional agreement that should consolidate and 
expand ASEAN commitments to eliminate tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in goods and services across the region. You say it 
also should require new treatments on customs and trade 
remedies.
    And then you say in exchange, the United States should 
gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian 
partners to the agreement. That sounds exactly like the America 
First Trade Policy. We are asking them to lower their trade 
barriers to American exporters, and in exchange, we will reduce 
tariffs on them.
    Why does this policy not create an opportunity for greater 
economic integration between the United States and ASEAN to the 
detriment of the malign influence of Beijing?
    Ms. Weisel. Well, as I said at the outset, I think that 
they feel that the tariff threat hanging over them is a five-
alarm fire. It has caused potentially tremendous damage to 
their economies with all of the uncertainty and the threats.
    I think that all of the ASEAN countries do indeed want to 
engage more deeply with the United States. They want to have 
greater economic cooperation. But they want to do so as equal 
partners in this negotiation. So, as we look to see areas where 
we can cooperate, a priority for them is reciprocal access.
    In other words, they would take on the rules that we are 
pushing, and in areas that are important to US like customs, 
digital trade and others. But they would like to see concrete 
benefits in return.
    Mr. Barr. And I am running out of time, but--and I take 
your testimony in good faith that you argue that the Trump 
policy does have the opportunity to open up U.S. exports to 
Southeast Asia, but you still maintain that they will de-risk 
from the United States as a result of this. I am not sure that 
is necessarily true. If we get better, more integrated economic 
deals as a result of the policy, I think they will de-risk from 
China.
    I don't have much time left, but I would love--maybe in a 
second round, Madam Chair--to talk about outbound investment 
into China and what is going to replace that if we restrict 
outbound investment in China. Does that create opportunities 
for more U.S. investment into ASEAN as a way to relocate supply 
chains?
    Mrs. Kim. of California. My ranking member has just left 
for another engagement, and I wasn't planning on doing a second 
round, if you don't mind.
    Mr. Barr. Okay.
    Mrs. Kim. of California. So you can submit your questions, 
and hopefully our witnesses may be able to respond in writing.
    But I do have some closing comments, if I may. It is really 
evident from today's hearing that we need to do more to create 
a responsive and effective Southeast Asia focused strategy. 
That begins with bolstering and strengthening our bilateral and 
multilateral relationship with ASEAN members.
    Our witnesses today, you have all trotted out key 
suggestions--and thank you so much for that--on how we can 
advance our interests diplomatically, economically, and 
militarily. So it is imperative moving forward that we are able 
to deliver results in a whole-of-the-government manner.
    If we are going to be the counterbalance that the region is 
counting on us to be, success can be achieved to the extent our 
strategies, policies, frameworks align with the needs of our 
regional partners.
    Additionally, we need results showing that a viable 
alternative to the CCP's state-driven economic model is 
available. We cannot allow Southeast Asia to be dictated by 
Beijing standards, and we must use every available tool to 
advance our economic agenda while punishing China's unfair 
trade practices.
    And now is the time for action. I encourage the 
administration and my colleagues across the aisle to work 
together to ensure that our policies would put us in a position 
to be the trusted partner in the region.
    So I want to thank you again for your valuable testimony 
and answering our members' questions. The members of the 
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the 
witness, like Rep. Barr has, and we will ask you to respond to 
those in writing. And pursuant to the committee rules, all 
members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and 
extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 
limitations.
    So, without objection, I declare the committee stands 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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