[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                         [H.A.S.C. No. 119-23]

                    NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 14, 2025


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                               __________
                               
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-761                     WASHINGTON : 2026
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                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                 SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DON BACON, Nebraska                  SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin         GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana             GEORGE WHITESIDES, California
JEFF CRANK, Colorado                 WESLEY BELL, Missouri
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona

               Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                  Austin Richards, Research Assistant
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

DesJarlais, Hon. Scott, a Representative from Tennessee, 
  Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.....................     1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     3

                               WITNESSES

Yaffe, Andrea, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Space Policy.......................................     5
Scolese, Dr. Chris, Director, National Reconnaissance Office.....     6
Whitworth, VADM Frank D., USN, Director, National Geospatial-
  Intelligence Agency............................................     7
Purdy, Maj Gen Stephen G., USPF, Military Deputy, Office of the 
  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and 
  Integration....................................................     9

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    DesJarlais, Hon. Scott.......................................    29
    Yaffe, Andrea................................................    31
    Scolese, Dr. Chris...........................................    45
    Whitworth, VADM Frank D......................................    53
    Purdy, Maj Gen Stephen G.....................................    60

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Bell.....................................................    79

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Wilson...................................................    83
    Mr. Moulton..................................................    84
    Mr. Carbajal.................................................    87
    Mr. Bacon....................................................    88
    Mr. Messmer..................................................    90
    Mr. Crank....................................................    92
                   
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                   NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 14, 2025.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in 
room 390, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott DesJarlais 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT DESJARLAIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 
   FROM TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Dr. DesJarlais. Today's hearing will come to order.
    Pursuant to Rule 4(b)(3), members of the House Armed 
Services Committee who are not members of the subcommittee are 
allowed to participate in today's hearing and will be 
recognized after all subcommittee members have had the 
opportunity to ask questions.
    The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive 
testimony on the policies and programs related to the national 
security space activities.
    Good afternoon to our witnesses, and thank you for joining 
us today.
    Before us, we have--and completing the committee hat trick 
is Ms. Andrea Yaffe, 3 weeks in a row. Thank you--the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. We have Dr. Chris Scolese, 
the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; Vice 
Admiral Frank Whitworth, the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and Major General Stephen 
Purdy, the Acting Assistant Director of the Air Force Space 
Acquisition/Integration. We appreciate your time today and your 
service.
    Dr. Scolese, I understand this will be your last hearing 
with us. We appreciate your service and the good work you have 
done at the National Reconnaissance Office.
    Unfortunately, we still do not have programmatic details 
for the President's budget request for fiscal year 2026, but 
the top line number did give us some hints.
    The space systems and people provided by the organizations 
you all represent are foundational to the security of our 
Nation and the joint force. This is why it is so important that 
we have the ability to fight and win in space.
    It is not enough to simply provide important information 
like missile warning, Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, and 
nuclear command and control in all stages of the conflict. Now, 
we must be able to hold at risk the Chinese Communist Party 
kill web that enables space-based targeting and tracking of our 
terrestrial forces and extends the range and accuracy of their 
weapons. Our ability to break this kill web will determine the 
success or failure of the joint force and its objectives in the 
Indo-Pacific. That requires having the right systems and 
relevant timeline.
    I want to associate myself with Chairman Rogers and Ranking 
Member Smith, who have been calling attention to it--not only 
how we buy things and the broken acquisition processes, but 
also the people doing the acquiring. Specifically, regarding 
the Space Force, they have raised concerns with how these 
acquisition professionals are developed, trained, and given 
opportunities to advance in their careers.
    As we work to make sure we are developing a force that can 
fight and win in space, we must also make sure that the 
platforms they will need to break those kill webs are delivered 
on time and on budget. That starts with having highly trained 
acquisition professionals.
    Every guardian supports the warfighting mission. This means 
that time spent in Space Systems Command figuring out how to 
bring more nontraditional companies into the mix is just as 
important as time spent at Delta 9 conducting orbital warfare.
    This subcommittee is proudly where Space Force got its 
start. We will, in a bipartisan way, continue to push to make 
sure that it stays the course and achieves that original vision 
of improving space acquisitions. I look forward to hearing 
updates today from our witnesses on some of your programs and 
how you are working to speed up that acquisition timeline so 
that we can deliver needed systems to the force.
    Major General Purdy, I am glad to see that you aren't 
standing still, despite serving in an acting capacity. Your 
recent announcement of the new acquisition plan for the follow-
on to the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program, 
or GSSAP, that calls for more commercially developed technology 
and diversity to the supplier base is just the type of 
innovation we need.
    Dr. Scolese, the National Reconnaissance Office's rapid 
deployment of its proliferated constellation of more than 150 
satellites over the past 2 years has not only given you the 
largest government constellation but has been a great example 
of how we can move quickly.
    Vice Admiral Whitworth, the recent awarding of task orders 
for commercial imagery analysis on your Luno A program and the 
funding of the Luno B program focused on commercial AI are 
exactly the kind of commercial integration we need to stay 
ahead of our adversaries.
    Finally, Ms. Yaffe, all these efforts are underpinned by 
our policies in space. How your office is planning for the 
increased testing, training, and changing operational norms to 
support these new systems and warfighting doctrine will be 
incredibly important.
    With that, I now recognize my good friend and ranking 
member, Mr. Moulton, for his opening remarks.[The opening 
statement of Dr. DesJarlais can be found in the Appendix on 
page 29.]

     STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Chairman DesJarlais, and 
welcome to our panel of witnesses.
    Dr. Scolese, I understand this will be your last hearing in 
front of this subcommittee. Thank you for your dedicated 
service to our Nation and your steadfast commitment to 
transforming the National Reconnaissance Office into an 
organization prepared to face the threats we face in space 
today and into the future.
    Our national security space architecture is undergoing a 
significant transformation, and it must transform, because life 
as we know it relies on satellites. The Global Positioning 
System--developed, launched, and operated by the Space Force--
is the most obvious. Most people don't realize all the things 
that depend on Global Positioning System. For example, it 
provides the timing information that makes our entire financial 
system function. Without it, you wouldn't be able to use your 
credit card, withdraw money from a bank account, and Wall 
Street would cease all trading.
    It is also no secret that almost every weapon system in our 
inventory depends on space, whether for communications, 
navigations, or intelligence. Over the past 30 years of United 
States operations in the Middle East, Russia and China have 
watched our reliance on space and have developed, deployed, and 
demonstrated capabilities to hold our satellites, and 
therefore, our way of war at risk. The People's Republic of 
China has now launched over 1,000 satellites into orbit, 70 
percent of those in the last 5 years, and they include systems 
that could be used as weapons in space.
    And as we all know now, Russia is developing a space-based 
nuclear weapon. If launched, it would be in direct violation of 
the Outer Space Treaty and, if detonated, it would degrade or 
destroy nearly every satellite in its path. As I noted before, 
that includes any space-based interceptor constellation that 
might be part of the President's Golden Dome. One push of a 
button could destroy trillions of dollars of investment and 
make Low Earth Orbit unusable for years. Obviously, any Nation 
willing to launch a massive nuclear attack on us would not 
hesitate to quickly take out our defenses.
    Understanding how urgent this race for space superiority 
has become, the last administration continued diversifying 
Department of Defense's space systems by leveraging a massive 
United States advantage, our rapidly expanding commercial space 
industry. Across the board, there are companies outpacing 
Department of Defense innovation in satellite communications, 
remote sensing, space domain awareness, and defending our 
satellites on orbit. Yet, despite consistent pressure from this 
subcommittee, the culture shift to maximize the benefit of 
commercial space continues to meet considerable resistance.
    I am especially concerned about the rumor that the National 
Reconnaissance Office, at the direction of the Office of 
Management and Budget, has slashed commercial imagery funding 
lines in fiscal year 2026 budget. More broadly, the Department 
of Defense's flat top line for fiscal year 2026 undoubtedly 
means that the Space Force will be taking a cut. I was willing 
to criticize the previous administration for failing to invest 
more in space, and I will criticize this one for the same 
failure. This mistake is especially stark when considering the 
billions thrown after Golden Dome with no plan or forethought.
    I know the White House is putting all their hopes and 
dreams into the, quote, ``One Beautiful Bill'' for 
reconciliation, but as my Republican colleagues know, this bill 
faces serious hurdles and there is immense risk in assuming 
that money will be there. Cuts to the Space Force would be 
catastrophic.
    I am also seriously concerned about the health of the 
workforce carrying out these vital missions. Civilians perform 
critical roles in areas like contracting and engineering, and 
the Space Force has been hit disproportionately hard by this 
administration's goal to demonize Federal employees.
    As I said before, America has a robust commercial space 
sector. Most of these people could work fewer hours for a lot 
more money at these companies, but they work for the Department 
of Defense because they care about the mission. Space Force has 
already lost over 14 percent of its civilian acquisition 
workforce at Space Systems Command thanks to Elon Musk, and the 
most talented people with the most other options generally make 
up the voluntary departures under DOGE.
    I am sure Mr. Musk has no problem with having more talented 
people to hire while having lower oversight of his SpaceX 
contracts, but this careless decimation of the Space Force 
civilian workforce is unacceptable and we must stop the bleed.
    These losses are compounded by concerns regarding the 
future for early career acquisition guardians. As the Space 
Force builds out its new officer pipelines, I am concerned that 
prioritizing operations over acquisition, just as the chairman 
mentioned, will negatively impact the Department's ability to 
smartly and flexibly acquire the space capabilities we need and 
lower the expertise within the service to do so.
    If guardians continue to hear from their leadership that 
operations is the only way to contribute to the Space Force, 
they have options to go work for any number of space companies 
who heavily recruit them today. I recall that the committee 
stood up the service part in part because of a desire to change 
the historically poor track record of space acquisitions.
    Space is a fascinating and infinite domain that, until 
recently, we only really experienced through the lens of 
science fiction. But in reality, space has been a part of our 
daily lives since the dawn of the Space Race. Our warfighters 
everywhere--on the ground, under the sea, in the air--depend on 
space. I look forward to today's discussion with our witnesses 
on how best to maintain United States superiority in space and 
how we can address the many concerns that challenge it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the ranking member for his 
comments.
    We will now move to opening statements from our witnesses. 
I would note that your full, prepared statements will be made 
part of the record, but you will each have 4 minutes to make 
your opening remarks today.
    Ms. Yaffe, let's begin with you.

 STATEMENT OF ANDREA YAFFE, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
                           OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Yaffe. Thank you. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you 
for inviting me to testify before you on the Department of 
Defense's national security space programs on behalf of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am honored to appear 
alongside my colleagues from the Department of the Air Force 
and the intelligence community. I am certainly pleased to be 
back.
    The United States seeks a secure, stable, and accessible 
space domain to allow for its continued use for commercial, 
scientific, and national security activities. Space and space 
programs remain central to the Department's core mission of 
deterring conflict and ensuring our national security.
    Space systems enable our nuclear forces, our nuclear 
command, control, and communications, or NC3, strategic 
warning, missile defense, communications, global force 
protection, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 
systems. Space will also be essential to the Golden Dome for 
America architecture. The President, Secretary, and indeed, the 
entire joint force rely on the capabilities provided by our 
space architecture each day.
    China and Russia recognize the United States' reliance on 
space, and they are both developing and fielding counter-space 
capabilities designed to deny our freedom of action in space 
and to target U.S. forces on earth. These developments pose an 
increasing and unacceptable threat to the United States and our 
allies and partners, including the commercial space sector.
    Space superiority is thus crucial to achieving peace 
through strength in the face of these threats, principally 
through deterrence and defense in peacetime, but also by 
enabling the joint force to prevail at all stages of conflict 
if deterrence fails. Specifically, space superiority is 
integral to the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance's 
priorities of defending the homeland and deterring China by 
denying their ability to confidently hold the joint force at 
risk.
    Our ongoing investments seek to ensure the Department can 
establish space superiority, assure critical space-enabled 
missions, retain capabilities to deny adversary hostile uses of 
space, and ensure the joint force continues to have access to 
and freedom to operate in space.
    Space also presents unique opportunities to integrate the 
commercial sector and to increase burden-sharing with our 
allies and partners. The innovative capabilities, scalable 
production capacity, and rapid technology refresh rates of the 
United States commercial sector are competitive advantages that 
the Department is leveraging to enhance our national security 
space programs. There is tremendous potential to build on the 
success of commercial providers to increase the lethality of 
the joint force and enhance our ability to defend the homeland 
and to deter China.
    As for allies and partners, they help ensure the Department 
is effectively postured and positioned around the globe to 
address the growing magnitude and vectors of threats in, from, 
and to space. The aspiration of other countries to invest in 
space security has given rise to new opportunities to cooperate 
across the spectrum of conflict, share the burden of defense, 
and strengthen deterrence.
    The Department remains committed to making the necessary 
investments in our space programs to deter our adversaries and 
if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict. This mission 
requires sufficient and consistent funding and support. Thank 
you for your dedication to our mission and to our 
servicemembers and for the opportunity to testify to you today 
alongside my distinguished colleagues. I look forward to 
answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Yaffe can be found in the 
Appendix on page 31.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Ms. Yaffe.
    Dr. Scolese, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF DR. CHRIS SCOLESE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                     RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

    Dr. Scolese. Thank you. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to join 
you along with my colleagues, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Yaffe, Major General Purdy, and Vice Admiral 
Whitworth, and to represent the people of the National 
Reconnaissance Office.
    For 64 years, the National Reconnaissance Office has been 
at the leading edge of innovation, developing space-based 
capabilities that advance our national security. Today, the 
National Reconnaissance Office is building on that legacy and 
moving faster than ever before, thanks to the technical 
expertise and talent of our small and highly effective 
workforce.
    Today, we are accelerating build-out, launch, and 
operations of the world's most capable, resilient, and 
technologically advanced satellite constellation. We are 
strengthening the capabilities and security of our ground 
architecture, and we are deepening our partnerships across 
government, private industry, academia, and with our allies.
    Our mission is clear: To achieve the President's objective 
of peace through strength. This is especially critical as our 
competitors are seeking to deny our strategic advantage in 
space. With Congress' continued support, we will ensure America 
remains the world's leader in space-based intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
    Over the past 2 years, the National Reconnaissance Office 
has dramatically transformed our space operations, launching 
more than 200 satellites to create the largest and most capable 
government constellation in our Nation's history, providing 
data to our partners sitting with me here today as well as to 
our partners in the National Security Agency and other 
organizations. With the support of Congress, the National 
Reconnaissance Office will continue to invest in capabilities 
that are helping to solve some of the toughest intelligence 
challenges of our time.
    Employing advanced technologies makes it harder for our 
adversaries to hide, giving the United States decision 
advantage. Using different orbits and proliferating our systems 
allow us to track more objects more reliably. Diversifying 
systems in space and on the ground increases resilience. 
Employing AI techniques and advanced data systems allows us to 
provide more information, faster to users, especially 
intelligence analysts, policymakers, and warfighters, allowing 
them to make critical decisions with the best information.
    Developing leading-edge research in areas like photonics, 
quantum sensing, advanced materials, and Artificial 
Intelligence/Machine Learning prepare us for the future. All of 
these advanced capabilities, as well as those in development, 
allow us to support current challenges like the crisis in 
Ukraine and support the interdiction of narcotics trafficking 
as well as preparing for the future.
    The National Reconnaissance Office 's talented workforce is 
delivering these capabilities, but we can't do it alone. We are 
continuing to build partnerships across the government, 
academia, industry, and with allied nations that allow us to 
label--allow us to enable us to leverage innovative 
technologies.
    Working with intelligence community partners, our world-
class constellations and ground architectures will fuse data 
collections. For example, working with Defense Intelligence 
Agency, we accredited tools and capabilities to enable data 
fusion, improving intelligence outcomes. We have a close and 
productive relationship with National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the United States Space Force to support 
coordinated investment in space.
    Through an increasing number of commercial partnerships, we 
are leveraging commercial satellite buses, launch services and 
data, from electro-optical to radar and radio frequency, as 
well as other phenomenologies. We are fusing commercial data 
streams with national data streams and making them more readily 
available to our customers.
    In conclusion, the National Reconnaissance Office's 
continued success in maintaining our competitive advantage and 
keeping America safe depends on our continued ability to 
innovate, our investments in our workforce and our 
partnerships, and on Congress' continued support for the 
Nation. Our responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars is best 
illustrated by our 16th consecutive clean financial statement 
audit.
    On behalf of the entire National Reconnaissance Office 
workforce, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 
today. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering 
your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Scolise can be found in the 
Appendix on page 45.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Doctor.
    Admiral Whitworth, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL FRANK D. WHITWORTH, DIRECTOR, 
            NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Admiral Whitworth. Good afternoon. Distinguished members of 
the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you with my 
teammates.
    The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's, or NGA's 
mission is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and 
geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict 
features and geographically referenced activities on or about 
the earth and in space. The geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT 
for short, we produce provides warfighters, policymakers, 
intelligence professionals, and first responders the 
information they require to develop and carry out national 
security objectives that defend the homeland, secure United 
States interests abroad, and protect Americans serving in 
harm's way.
    Space-based systems play a critical role in supporting the 
United States National Security Strategy and are a primary 
source for the data National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
gathers to develop and produce geospatial intelligence. Our 
global competitors also share an appreciation for the space 
domain and value the advantage that space-based platforms offer 
to further their own objectives. Indeed, China's and Russia's 
space activities have become increasingly concerning, as both 
have developed and fielded counter-space capabilities, 
including progressively more capable, multisensor systems 
designed to hold United States space-based systems at risk.
    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's motto, ``Know the 
World, Show the Way... from Seabed to Space,'' reflects our 
responsibility to understand and distinguish these developments 
in a dynamic, changing world, not only in space, but across all 
domains. We achieve this with a team that is spread across more 
than 200 sites, including more than 20 countries around the 
world, embedded at most warfighting headquarters, many 
government agencies, numerous service intelligence centers, and 
at every combatant command and intelligence agency.
    Gathering the data and imagery necessary to characterize 
the activities and operations of our adversaries from the Earth 
to space is not a simple task. The key to that effort is 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's informed collection 
orchestration process. This process, developed with centuries 
of collective expertise, is how National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency professionals and mission partners 
choreograph an increasingly complex and capable constellation 
of space-based geospatial-intelligence assets.
    In the past year, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
took a giant leap to improve this process, establishing the 
Joint Mission Management Center, JMMC, with the United States 
Space Force, joining warfighters and intelligence professionals 
under National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's roof to 
decrease the gap between collection requests and delivery. A 
Joint Mission Management Center is central to ensuring our 
warfighters and intelligence professionals receive the imagery 
analysis they need and deserve.
    The expanding opportunities for space-based geospatial-
intelligence collection, including national technical means and 
commercial sources, are generating a day-to-day luge that will, 
if we harness it, allow us to support the demands and needs of 
warfighters in the future. Through programs like National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Maven, we are collaborating 
with warfighting headquarters around the world to continue 
providing the right geospatial-intelligence data when and where 
it is needed.
    Finally, I would like to highlight National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency's responsibility for guaranteeing the 
accuracy of Global Positioning System and maintaining the World 
Geodetic System 1984, or WGS 84, at reference frame, the 
backbone for all geolocation. These efforts are central to 
improving Global Positioning System geolocation accuracy for 
warfighters and government civil agencies alike, guaranteeing 
assured precision, navigation, timing, and targeting.
    In closing, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency relies 
greatly upon data obtained from space. As our Nation sharpens 
its focus in the domain, we embrace our partners at U.S. Space 
Force, United States Space Command, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office, ensuring that we maximize the potential 
of geospatial-intelligence to help understand adversary space 
and counter-space threats. Thank you, and I look forward to 
answering your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Admiral Whitworth can be found 
in the Appendix on page 53.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Admiral.
    General Purdy, you are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN PURDY, ACTING ASSISTANT 
     SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITION AND 
     INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

    General Purdy. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me to testify today. As military deputy, I first want 
to thank you for the National Defense Authorization Act 
authority to serve as the acting Service Acquisition Executive. 
It has allowed me to give direction, sign off acquisition 
plans, and actually make substantive change, and I really do 
thank you for that.
    I tell our acquisition community that it is our job to 
deliver integrated capability for the warfighter, and we have 
had multiple successes over this past several months. Back in 
August, we launched two Enhanced Polar System - 
Recapitalization payloads that ride-shared on Norway's 
satellites. These provided calm in the northern polar region, 
and this international partnership allowed the United States 
Government to save $900 million.
    Over the year, our newer operations test and training 
infrastructure--our test and training System Program Office 
organization has been able to deliver multiple trainers and 
multiple training injects into our war games to satisfy 
operational desires.
    In January, the Unified Data Library provided critical 
support to the Presidential Inauguration, supporting counter-
small Unmanned Aircraft Systems operations, ingesting over 1.4 
million data tracks.
    In April, we had a big month. We launched our first 
National Security Space Launch Phase 3 mission. It was for the 
National Reconnaissance Office. It was only 6 months after the 
award. Later in April, Space Force operationally accepted the 
weather system follow-on that helped us close six of 12 gaps. 
And then finally, we operationally accepted the S2E2 system, 
which is a mobile ground system that supports Overhead 
Persistent Infrared.
    But, in addition to delivering capability, it is also our 
job to figure out ways to go faster. Over the last 2 years, the 
Space Force has increased our other transaction authorities by 
470 percent. It increased our software pathways by 350 percent. 
An example from last year, the Resilient-Global Positioning 
System, we went from request for proposal to award in 71 days, 
mimicking the Space Development Agency's type of timelines. And 
speaking of Space Development Agency, they continue to press 
forward with their speedy acquisition contract timelines as 
well as their launches coming up this summer.
    Additionally, we are big fans and use--work with SpaceWorks 
quite frequently on the strategic funding increases and 
tactical funding increases and space based infrared system. 
Over 1,000 contracts have been awarded through that mechanism, 
and excitingly, we have been able to leverage almost $1 billion 
of venture capital money. External funds have been able to be 
collaboratively used for Space Force missions.
    In addition to other collaboration with the Space Force, we 
are using Service Acquisition Executive authorities in addition 
to the Space Force requirements authorities and going after 
program requirements, figuring out ways that we can dial down 
requirements and get after the commercial--the speed of 
commercial delivery. Our next plan is to go after our 
operational acceptance and test timelines as well.
    Most importantly on the acquisition workforce--it was 
mentioned here a few times--we are working workforce career 
plans for both the program managers and the engineers, and we 
are thinking through how we can get after longer program 
managers timelines, both early in their career to get after the 
reps and sets needed to understand our business, and then later 
in their career when they are actually running as a program 
manager.
    And finally, my deepest thanks to the entire acquisition, 
engineering, financial, contracting, and legal communities. 
These communities work extremely long hours under stressful 
situations. They are constantly dealing with new companies and 
new ways of business, and they do tremendous. And so, my deep 
thanks to all their work.
    And, finally, I look forward to all your questions. Thank 
you very much.
    [The prepared statement of General Purdy can be found in 
the Appendix on page 60.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you all for your opening remarks. We 
will now turn to member questions. I will start by recognizing 
myself for 5 minutes.
    General Purdy, you touched on some of this in your opening 
remarks, but I mentioned your recent announcement about the 
Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program acquisition 
plan. Can you talk a little bit about how you approached that 
and specifically how you worked with the requirements 
community?
    General Purdy. Yes, sir. That is actually a pretty exciting 
accomplishment that we have been able to do.
    So that started from last year's efforts on the Resilient 
Global Positioning System program where we explored the 
commercial capability that was there, and we found that bus 
prices--satellite bus prices were less expensive in Medium 
Earth Orbit than we thought, and we found that there was more 
capability for payloads than we thought.
    So then, last year, we did an RFI--request for 
information--out to industry on the Geosynchronous Space 
Situational Awareness Program, and we got quite a wide variety 
of responses. We weren't able to proceed due to classification 
issues. So then I worked with United States Space Command and 
the Space Force requirements side and the leadership to 
understand what their trade-offs might be. They expressed a 
willingness to trade off requirements.
    So then I went back to the System Program Office, and the 
System Program Office listed out all of the different current 
activities and the speed that they could do with the current 
system, and then what the commercial side could do and, if we 
turned off certain requirements, how much faster they could go.
    That revealed interesting data, to include they could go--
they could shave off about a third of the time and over half 
the cost.
    So we packaged that up and worked with the Space Force 
requirements community. They agreed to that, signed off on that 
requirements drop, and then we were able to get it out to the 
System Program Office. So we are off working now with that 
program office to go start off a more commercial line.
    And when I say ``commercial'' in this particular aspect, 
just to clarify, this is accomplishing the same Geosynchronous 
Space Situational Awareness Program mission. Our operators will 
fly the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program 
system using the same ground systems and data they do now, but 
these would be using faster commercial build times, cheaper 
build times, and cheaper, less expensive parts in order to 
bring that together in a faster sense.
    Dr. DesJarlais. On the Resilient Global Positioning System, 
what requirement does it fill for the service? And I think you 
touched on it, but how has that acquisition process been 
different?
    General Purdy. Sure. So, on our Global Positioning System, 
the Resilient Global Positioning System--so the requirement we 
are going after there is something that our Space Warfighting 
Analysis Center analytical arm in the Space Force and the 
Defense Science Board both flagged, and that is a resiliency 
need for the Global Positioning System enterprise.
    It is one of our most proliferated in the current sense, 
but yet, it will soon be one of our least proliferated. And it 
is vulnerable. Given the fact that the Global Positioning 
System constellation is relatively small a number, it is 
reachable by direct-ascent tech Anti-Satellite weapon, and 
supports such an important military and commercial mission.
    And so, the initial thinking was we used National Defense 
Authorization Act-granted Quick Start authority to start up the 
Resilient-Global Positioning System program, and we are looking 
to add more resiliency and more numbers. And that is the basic 
intent.
    The acquisition plan was, essentially, we went out to 
industry. We actually didn't think that we were going to get 
much, to be honest with you, and it was a surprise to us and a 
major learning portion for us--learning event last year. The 
satellite prices had--they were low in Low-Earth-Orbit already, 
but they had--they were lowering in Middle-Earth-Orbit. And so 
that convinced us that we should proceed with it.
    The results have actually been more surprising and 
encouraging than we thought. The buses actually bring a higher 
power level than our current program of record does, which 
allows us to punch through jamming in a better sense. And so, 
we can achieve better results, we think, over time, going after 
these commercial buses. So that has actually caused me to think 
for our main-line Global Positioning system--we are actually 
looking at that for alternative ways to get after that like our 
Global Positioning System.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
    Dr. Scolese, I have got about a minute here, but can you 
talk a little bit about the role that the Space Force guardians 
play in the work of the National Reconnaissance Office and what 
do you see is the value both the National Reconnaissance Office 
and Space Force get out of that arrangement.
    Dr. Scolese. Certainly. Yeah. They play a very vital role 
in it. As you know, about a third of our workforce is military, 
and the largest component of that military force are the 
guardians. And they serve roles principally in engineering and 
acquisition for developing some of our, you know, most 
important systems, as you are well aware. Particularly, as I 
mentioned, the roughly 200 satellites we have launched over the 
last couple of years--they were largely done with guardians 
because we knew where the ultimate utilization of them is.
    At the same time, they also bring the wealth of knowledge 
of what the Space Force needs so that we can go off and work 
together. And I believe that working together, we help grow 
them and show them our acquisition philosophy, and they take 
that back to the Space Force as well, and we also gain from 
them their learning from Space Force. So they are a very vital 
part of our organization.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. My time has expired. I now 
recognize the ranking member for his questions.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    We have had a lot of discussions on this committee about 
how space is becoming not just strategically important, but 
tactically important to the warfighter.
    Vice Admiral Whitworth, in your opening statement, you 
emphasized the global presence of National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency personnel embedded with warfighters. How 
specifically are those personnel training or educating 
warfighters to better leverage commercial geospatial-
intelligence capabilities?
    Admiral Whitworth. Thank you, sir, for the question.
    So at every combatant command, JTF, joint task force, every 
service intel center, every service, we are going to have what 
we call an National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support team 
that makes--the essence of your question--they are calling how 
to ensure that they get as much geospatial-intelligence at a 
place where it can provide decision advantage for that 
commander.
    Your specific question is so important. When you think 
about the four parts of geospatial-intelligence, we have got 
national technical means, we have got the proliferated 
architecture of Department of Defense, we have got 
international contributions, and then there is commercial. 
Commercial is potentially so agile that it can fill gaps we may 
not otherwise have. It is also important to the mission and 
being able to express maybe to partners in a very immediate 
way, and in an unclassified way, the meaning of what is 
happening in the world without giving up something that is more 
exquisite than national technical means.
    Mr. Moulton. Should Congress consider expanding tactical, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking authorities to allow 
Department of Defense elements to procure commercial data 
directly, especially raw imagery, to better meet these time-
sensitive operational requirements?
    Admiral Whitworth. It is a valid point, sir, and I would 
just offer, we do have a responsibility at least at National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and I am sure that--and this is 
consistent with what I have received from oversight--to ensure 
that a taxpayer only pays once. So, as we establish that 
denominator, somebody has to actually know what is coming from 
National Technical Means of Verification, what is coming from 
the proliferated architecture, and then what is left that we 
still haven't bought to ensure we don't buy it twice.
    So I would just caution that we not create a situation 
where we find--
    Mr. Moulton. I understand the concern, but, I mean, it is 
2025. Like, this should be pretty easy to figure out with 
technology--
    Admiral Whitworth. That is right, sir.
    Mr. Moulton. --and we just need to do it.
    Admiral Whitworth. Yes, sir. And, with the advent of a 
system that we call ``Slim Jims,'' all of the combatant 
commands actually can use Slim Jims to see that denominator. 
That is right.
    Mr. Moulton. General Purdy, Dr. Scolese, do you have any 
comments on this question?
    General Purdy. So it is on the Space Force's side to figure 
out sort of that relationship and the ops background; so I am 
going to focus more on the acquisition side.
    I know on our Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance and 
Tracking Program piece, we have got relationships where we can 
go--take a quick turn task, we can feed the data with National 
Geospatial Agency, and there are pending memorandum of 
understanding that are heading in that direction.
    And I will defer to Dr. Scolese.
    Dr. Scolese. Yeah. And we work closely, obviously, with 
National Geospatial Agency as well as the Space Force to make 
sure data is available, but I would also add that we also work 
with National Security Agency because we also are collecting 
Radio Frequency data as well. So commercial plays a vital role, 
and, you know, we believe we are supporting all the 
organizations that need it.
    Mr. Moulton. General Purdy, in your opening remarks, you 
state the Space Force's decision to repurpose acquisition 
lieutenant billets to support the officer training course and 
operational tours combined with looming reductions in the 
civilian workforce--we have already seen 14 percent--and 
advisory and assistance contractor reductions--they all 
increase the risk to program execution. Can you provide me 
examples of where you are taking risk due to reduced personnel?
    General Purdy. So I don't have specific, like, examples and 
effects for you, I guess I would say. It is more the risks that 
have been sort of materialized. So a combination of factors.
    So the Officer Training Course creation. Obviously, we have 
moved out lieutenants and we have put them into Officer 
Training Course. By the way, as the acquisition side, we call 
that OpEx for everybody, and, generally speaking, we support 
that operational experience. That has created a gap. Our plan 
was to fill that with civilian hires. That has obviously run 
into a bit of a problem in addition to--as we take Program 
Managers and Financial Managers and Personnel reductions. [AR1]
    And so we haven't had a chance to fully absorb and 
understand the numbers yet. You gave a number in your opening 
talk. I haven't actually received all those yet from the 
different organizations. I know anecdotally, with speaking with 
Space Development Agency, with speaking with AFWERX and 
SpaceWorks, with speaking with Space Systems Command, there is, 
I would say, trouble brewing. We are worried about the numbers. 
We are worried that we can execute our program offices. The 
program offices always vary a little bit based on their 
intensity and size. So you can dial a little bit, but there is 
a limit to it.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, there is obviously bipartisan concern 
the committee--
    General Purdy. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you.
    The chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 
Wilson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Dr. Chairman DesJarlais, for your 
leadership, and, indeed, this is bipartisan as we work with 
Congressman Moulton and everyone here.
    And we are so grateful, again, for each of you being here 
today.
    And it is particularly important because, sadly, the world 
is in a conflict we did not choose, between dictators with rule 
of gun invading democracies with rule of law. It began on 
February 24, 2022, with war criminal Putin invading Ukraine, 
and then it proceeded with mass murder on October 7, 2023, when 
the Iranian puppets invaded Israel with the catastrophic 
consequences there.
    War criminal Putin and the Chinese Communist Party continue 
to expand and modernize their space capabilities, with war 
criminal Putin acknowledging that other countries' commercial 
infrastructure and outer space used for military purposes can 
and will become a legitimate target. The United States must 
maintain the ability to be ahead of our adversaries in space to 
make sure that we have peace through strength.
    With that in mind, Secretary Yaffe, you have been correctly 
explaining the rapid rise of the adversary counter-space 
capabilities, especially for war criminal Putin and the Chinese 
Communist Party. As you mentioned in your statement, quote, 
``The Department remains concerned that Russia is developing a 
new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-
satellite capability,'' end of quote.
    With these remarks, it is inherently destabilizing. What is 
the Department of Defense assessment of the Chinese Communist 
Party and war criminal Putin's ability to have intent of such 
capabilities?
    Ms. Yaffe. Thank you, sir. I am sorry. When you said, 
``intent of such capabilities,'' you raised the Russian one. 
Are you asking about the breadth of counter-space capabilities?
    Mr. Wilson. Yes. Yes.
    Ms. Yaffe. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I mean, 
our concern is that Russia and China are both pursuing a 
breadth of capabilities intended to hold our space assets at 
risk. Given that they know the advantages that we derive from 
those assets, they want to deny our ability to access those 
services probably through both reversible and irreversible 
means. We know that we need to protect these assets, protect 
both our critical space-based assets and the joint force 
against space-enabled threats from their space assets.
    Mr. Wilson. And what is the status of our ability to 
counteract that?
    Ms. Yaffe. Sir, it depends certainly on the threats that we 
are facing. But, from our perspective, we need to be arrayed 
against the breadth of threats that we face from both of them. 
Certainly, we do continue to spend a lot of time being 
concerned about the one Russian space system where they seem 
intent on putting a nuclear weapon in space, but we also need 
to be prepared for ground-to-space threats, on-orbit threats, 
et cetera.
    I mean, what we have said and we continue to say is we need 
to have a breadth of assets in all domains to protect our 
space-based assets and to protect our personnel. These may 
include both reversible and nonreversible, kinetic/non-kinetic 
options. But it is important that we are able to give the 
Secretary of Defense and President options if required and if 
we face these threats in action from our adversaries.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you so much for your insight.
    And Vice Admiral Whitworth, the capabilities of your agency 
or department to provide vital edge against our adversaries on 
ground and space domain. We are fortunate that our country is 
full of innovative companies in the private sector who are 
willing to work with the government to provide the capabilities 
for national security.
    How do you coordinate your efforts to acquire commercial 
space capabilities, or license commercial data, from other 
organizations within the Department of Defense and the 
intelligence community?
    Admiral Whitworth. Thank you, sir, for the question. And 
this goes to our emphasis on commercially available--especially 
for us--for policy analytics. We certainly look for the best 
analytics we can get for geospatial-intelligence, and we have 
many things available to us: Commercial solutions offerings, 
they are very speedy. Bailment agreements are a way that we can 
see--try it on for size and see if it works for both size. 
Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quanitys, of course, is the 
tradition.
    We are always looking for the best and brightest, and this 
is evidenced by Luno A and B, which is upwards--that has an 
Request For Proposal of upwards of $500 million, and we have 
got now task orders for that in the maritime domain.
    Mr. Wilson. That is really encouraging. And, again, with 
the commercial capabilities, what is--or are they ahead of 
government capabilities? How do you assess their capability?
    Admiral Whitworth. I think the importance here is we are 
insatiable in coverage. And so I don't think I am in a position 
to say one is better than the other, but coverage is the name 
of the game here. And so we are a bit insatiable. I have said 
it in the past. We kind of want it all.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and I yield back. Thank 
you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the gentleman.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Whitesides, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Whitesides. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me start by recognizing my friend Dr. Chris Scolese. We 
have known each other for over 15 years, and his service to the 
country across a wide range of government agencies is 
exemplary. You know, thank you for your service, Chris.
    So, to jump into it, General Purdy, I just wanted to add 
my, I guess, voice to concerns that we provide a promising 
career advancement pathway for our space acquisitions 
workforce. I know you are deep in the midst of that, but I 
think what you are hearing from all of us on the Armed Services 
Committee is that that is clearly something that we are 
concerned about, and I just wanted to add my voice to that.
    To Admiral Whitworth and Dr. Scolese, in terms of the 
commercial remote sensing budgets, we have heard reports that 
the fiscal year 2026 budget request will include cuts to 
National Reconnaissance Office and Space Force commercial 
remote sensing funding. This is concerning, obviously, partly 
because there is so much going on in space and there is such a 
great demand for this data, but it also seems to go against 
stated administration priorities, and we also want to make sure 
that we are maintaining a sort of wide base of suppliers.
    Can either of you sort of speak to the reality of that? We 
see things in the news. Is it real, and how are you working to 
free up legacy requirements and budget to kind of keep pushing 
the ball forward on these things to enable traditional systems 
to focus more heavily on the things that only the United States 
Government can do?
    Dr. Scolese. You said it right. We want to focus the 
government effort on only those things that we can do. So we 
very much value the commercial capabilities and intend to keep 
on using those. It is largely based on demand, of course, but 
commercial is absolutely critical to what we are doing. And I 
would add it is not just the commercial imagery. It is also 
commercial Radio Frequency and also newer phenomenologies as we 
are working with that industry to go off and help advance 
those.
    But even further, it has helped enable our proliferated 
architecture. As General Purdy mentioned earlier, we are 
finding that commercial buses are not only available, but they 
are also capable of doing a lot of what our missions require, 
and they are available at a much lower cost than going off and 
developing a brand-new bus. And you will see those in our 
proliferated architecture that we are deploying today, and you 
will also see it as we are going forward and we are advancing 
the same thing in our signals-intelligence architectures.
    Mr. Whitesides. Thank you.
    Admiral Whitworth, would you like to add anything to that?
    Admiral Whitworth. At this time, I don't think so, because 
it is not our purview to actually enter a contract on pixels 
for commercial. So I would defer to Chris on that one.
    Mr. Whitesides. Okay. Sounds good.
    Major General Purdy, with all of the sort of uncertainty 
coming out of Space Development Agency over the last several 
months, can you give us a status update on their efforts to 
provide missile warning/missile tracking capabilities as part 
of the broader Space Force missile warning/missile track 
architecture?
    General Purdy. Sure. Space Development Agency has continued 
to forge ahead with their Tranche 1 activity. They continue to 
finalize testing on their Tranche 0, which was a test activity. 
So that has continued to work through their testing of the comm 
and the missile warning test. On the Tranche 1, that is coming 
in finally. They should start their launches this summer--
toward the tail end of this summer, and they will launch about 
one mission, or a set of missions a month. So about one a 
month.
    Missile warning kicks in, I think, a little bit later this 
fall. And so, they will finish that out through the beginning 
of next year. Once those are in orbit, the plan is actually 
pretty nice. So they are the Low-Earth-Orbit missile warning 
architecture. There is another office doing the Medium-Earth-
Orbit architecture, and then there are other offices existing 
in the future that are doing architecture out in Geostationary-
Earth-Orbit. All that data is flowing into the same system. 
There are multiple pathways for all the Overhead Persistent 
Infrared systems, and the Low-Earth-Orbit data from Space 
Development Agency is flowing into those same exact systems.
    Mr. Whitesides. Okay. Thank you for that.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I thank the gentleman.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 
Crank, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate our witnesses being here. Thank you all for 
your service to our country.
    If you have heard me speak for any length of time at this 
subcommittee before, you know I am already excited about the 
potential for Golden Dome to protect the homeland and deter our 
adversaries. And, while I am sure we are going to spend several 
years here on this committee debating which fancy and expensive 
systems to buy, Congress and Department of Defense need to 
ensure that we are doing it in a smart way. Just like how you 
need to buy a propane tank to go with your gas grill, we need 
to ensure we aren't just funding systems but also the support 
infrastructure needed for success.
    General Purdy, I want to focus on two exciting programs 
essential to homeland defense: orbital warfare spacecraft and 
space-based interceptors. Can you tell me how, in addition to 
procuring these critical weapon systems, the Space Force is 
also thinking about all the other things that are needed to 
successfully field and employ these items? I am thinking of the 
personnel, the training, the testing capabilities, and 
especially the command and control and control architectures.
    The Satellite Control Network is rapidly aging, and already 
near max capacity for day-to-day operations; and the new phased 
array systems are still in development. How is the deployment 
of these new phased array systems going, and how are you 
continuing to add requirements for additional capacity in the 
Satellite Control Network as the systems that will use it 
continue to proliferate? General Purdy.
    General Purdy. Sir, thank you for the question. That is a 
particular strong focus of basically what we would call end-to-
end capability. Too long in the past, we would deliver one--
say, a satellite or whatnot, and we would not be considering 
this whole--the whole rest of the architecture. So we have kind 
of established a policy of fully mission capable, fully end to 
end. So there are multiple ways that we are getting after that 
activity.
    So for one, we actually have a Program Executive Officer 
stood up to get after test and training architecture; so I will 
set that one side. I have a whole integration team that reports 
to me as the Service Acquisition Executive. Their job is to get 
after the end-to-end integration pieces, and specifically, to 
be tracking all the programs and making sure that we have the 
capacity that we are building and for tests and training 
architecture, Satellite Control Network architecture, et 
cetera. So I have got that process going.
    Specifically on Satellite Control Network--because you 
mentioned that one a few times--we have our existing Satellite 
Control Network architecture, as you mentioned. The next 
generation is the Sensor Complement and Radar Active 
Electronically Scanned Array radar system that we are 
developing that allows to hit multiple contacts at the same 
time. That is going reasonably well. It is a complicated build. 
And so, it is, frankly, too slow for my taste and too slow for 
the need, but it is going reasonably well. And so they are 
aiming for the next--for the first system, there is a demo this 
year, and then there is a--I think it is the next year or year-
plus is when that first one is coming out.
    As a back-up plan, what we have got going on is what is 
called JAM, the Joint Antenna Marketplace. This one is pretty 
exciting because this is going to do two things for us: It is 
going after full ops commercial. There is a lot of commercial 
capacity out there to do Satellite Control Network activity. We 
have practiced that with Space Development Agency. We have 
practiced that with Space Rapid Capabilities Office. Both of 
them have used commercial, cloud-based Satellite Control 
Network and actually even worldwide as well. And so Joint 
Antenna Marketplace is going to get after--that is going to 
open up hundreds of additional capacity and ability to go get 
hundreds of additional targets.
    In addition, that is going to do what is called 
orchestration to help us figure out, machine to machine, which 
systems we are going to go. Are we going to use existing 
Satellite Control Network? Are we going to use Sensor 
Complement and Radar? Are we going to use this Joint Antenna 
Marketplace? So all of those elements are pieces of the 
architecture that we are putting together slowly, and I am 
tying it together and tracking it at my level with our 
integration function. Think of it as, like, a space systems 
chief engineer.
    Mr. Crank. Okay. You talked about--and I don't have enough 
time here, but I am going to throw this out there and maybe if 
we get a second round we will come back to it--but you talked 
about the Unified Data Library, of course, a cloud-based data 
repository designed to consolidate commercial and United States 
Government space situational awareness data. It is intended to 
be the single source for accessing and managing all data in 
support of Space Force operational systems.
    To what extent is Space Force using it, and which Space 
Force operational systems are connected to it?
    General Purdy. Yeah. Many, if not all. So multiple Deltas 
at Space Operation Center are using it for their positional 
tracking in addition to, say, interference kind of activity. 
The National Space Defense Center, which is the ops floor doing 
the space floor, is tracking it with their C2 system. United 
States Space Command at the combatant commander uses it for 
their official common operating picture. Joint Commercial 
Operations, the main ops hub that is plugging in all the 
combatant commanders, is also using it and tracking it, and we 
actually track that worldwide in worldwide ops centers.
    Mr. Crank. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yes. Thank you.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 
Bell, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member.
    Dr. Scolese, I want to echo the sentiments of my colleagues 
and thank you for your service, as well as Admiral Whitworth, 
General Purdy, and also Ms. Yaffe. Your depth of knowledge and 
space policy and strategy is impressive and appreciated and 
very much needed at this time.
    I am proud to represent St. Louis, home to the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's West Campus, or NGA St. Louis, 
a cornerstone of our Nation's defense and a testament to St. 
Louis' growing sector and leadership in geospatial 
intelligence. St. Louis is rapidly solidifying its position as 
America's center for geospatial intelligence and hub of 
innovation.
    With the soon-to-be-open, brand-new, state-of-the-art 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency West, or National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency St. Louis facility, my district 
is not only supporting the mission of National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, but it is becoming indispensable to it. 
This investment reinforces the agency's capabilities and 
anchors St. Louis as a crucial component for our country's 
national security.
    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 's presence in St. 
Louis isn't just a point of pride. It is a clear recognition of 
our region's critical contributions to intelligence, 
innovation, and homeland defense and security. St. Louis is not 
just participating in our national security efforts, we are 
helping lead them.
    With that, Admiral Whitworth, and Ms. Yaffe, I would like 
you to chime in as well, if you don't mind. Can you provide an 
update on the progress and status of the new facility and your 
vision for the local academic and community partnerships that 
might be fostered and developed through this new opportunity?
    Admiral Whitworth. Thank you, Mr. Bell. It is good to see 
you again. You got to see the real National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency when you participated in our 845 ops and 
intel update. That wasn't a stunt. That was the real National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
    And so this is a very, very important question. We are very 
pleased to report that we are on glide slope for an opening on 
the 26th of September. We are in the fine-tuning right now of 
that facility on the northern portion of St. Louis. That 
involves mainly just Information Technology. And we know where 
everyone is going to sit. We have been giving tours to our 
workforce. They are getting excited. It is ready to go.
    On your question vis-a-vis the ecosystem, also extremely 
important. That is vibrant right now and one of the best 
examples of the combination of business, academia, civil 
government, Federal Government, and intelligence all banding 
together to ensure that this is a success. I think it will be a 
polestar for other communities as far as the relationship, 
especially between local business, local government, Federal 
Government, and academia with something like the Taylor 
Geospatial Institute, which is at full tilt.
    Ms. Yaffe. Thank you. I am not sure if I can add much to 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency facility, but, I 
mean, I would just say we have to continue to foster the space 
expertise and ecosystem within the government and with the 
industrial base because the sector is only growing and we are 
going to need to leverage all the talent out there. Thank you.
    Mr. Bell. Thank you. A few weeks ago, General Guillot 
testified before this committee that National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency is an extremely important partner in United 
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense 
Command day-to-day operations and that every advanced mission 
we do includes National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
capabilities.
    As the Nation develops the Golden Dome for America and as 
adversaries continue to modernize and enhance their 
capabilities, what is National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
's role in this mission of defending the homeland against 
missile threats, and how do you see geospatial intelligence 
contributing to Golden Dome efforts?
    Admiral Whitworth. Thank you very much for this question. 
It is a multidimensional answer. I will give it very quickly.
    I would offer that our advancements in target development--
the target development section of Artificial Intelligence-
enabled mission command. Some of the things that we have been 
able to foster through National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
Maven/Maven Smart System, I think, may be applicable here. And 
then, of course, we have expertise and a really important 
bridging between Title 10 and Title 50 on some of the sensors 
that detect heat.
    Mr. Bell. And then, quickly, in your statement for the 
record, you mentioned that National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency leads a community-wide process to coordinate commercial 
geospatial intelligence purchases across the government, 
maximizing the ability to share commercial imagery and 
analytics and preventing redundant acquisitions.
    Admiral, how does National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
work with consumers of commercial imagery and analytics, 
including the combatant commands, as well as National 
Reconnaissance Office and Space Force?
    Admiral Whitworth. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bell. In 3 seconds.
    Dr. DesJarlais. If you would, just submit that for the 
record. We are going to be running up against votes. We have 
got one more round of questions, and then we are going to move 
to the classified--
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 79.]
    Mr. Bell. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. --session so that we can get you out of 
here before we go vote.
    So the chair now recognizes Mr. Hamadeh from Arizona for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Space is the next frontier of warfare, and it is easy to 
overlook because we can't see it. But, back home in Arizona in 
Flagstaff, there is a small naval observatory that plays a huge 
role. That little station helps tell us exactly where we are in 
the galaxy. It aids in setting the official time for the entire 
Department of Defense and the country.
    Global Positioning System, internet communications, every 
part of our daily life depends on commercial and military space 
assets. Our enemies know this, and that is why China and Russia 
say that our satellites are fair game. They are preparing to 
knock us back decades without ever hitting American soil or our 
servicemembers. Now, that is why this mission of our Space 
Force is so crucial. We have no choice but to build America's 
technical edge, resilience, deterrence, and counter-strike 
abilities in this space domain.
    Now, my first question is for Ms. Yaffe. I am going to 
piggyback off what Congressman Wilson was talking about with 
Russia's latest Space Race and what we talked about last time 
in the bigger committee last week.
    What equivalent wild card option do we have that keeps the 
Russians and Chinese up at night in terms of offensive 
capabilities? I know we focus a lot on defensive.
    Ms. Yaffe. Thank you, sir, for the question. I mean, 
certainly, we are not looking for an equivalent capability to 
what Russia might be pursuing. It would be a violation of the 
Outer Space Treaty and would be devastating to Low Earth Orbit 
and to our interests.
    With that said, we are trying to be absolutely clear to 
Russia and China and anyone else that wishes to do us harm that 
we have an imperative to protect our freedom of access to space 
and our freedom to operate in space, and we are going to need a 
breadth of capabilities to do that.
    You know, we are trying to normalize space as an 
operational domain, which normally means we largely focus on 
doing things more normally within the Department, having war 
games that consider space, ensure military plans do, et cetera, 
but there are some differences with the space domain. So we may 
not talk about our capabilities in the same way. We think there 
are other ways to message to our adversaries what we intend to 
achieve, but we want to be absolutely critical we are going to 
protect and defend our critical space-based assets and our 
joint force from space-enabled threats with the breadth of 
capabilities and to ensure the President and Secretary of 
Defense have options.
    Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. And I know you mentioned earlier in 
your testimony about burden-sharing with our allies as well. 
How do our allies see this Space Race? Do they see the same 
threat as we do?
    Ms. Yaffe. Thank you, sir. We think that cooperation with 
allies and partners remains essential, and certainly space 
offers advantages for burden-sharing. We have a few ways to go 
about it. Part of it is ensuring that we do see the threat in 
the same way.
    We have been pursuing for a number of years something that 
is called the Combined Space Operations Initiative, or CSPO. It 
has grown recently from seven to 10 countries of our most 
capable space-faring partners. Part of that is ensuring that we 
see the threats in the same way. Part of it is thinking about 
how we approach the domain to operate most effectively and to 
our advantage. We explore different operational concepts and we 
explore appropriate behaviors because, unlike in every other 
domain, we don't have norms of behavior.
    We also engage bilaterally with some of our most capable 
space-faring partners because we do believe there are different 
ways that they can take up the burden to ensure that we can all 
approach the domain and protect our freedom to access and 
operate in the domain.
    Mr. Hamadeh. Are we looking at expanding it beyond the 10 
partners already?
    Ms. Yaffe. It is certainly under consideration. It is not 
calendar-based. It is conditions-based. We want to expand when 
there are partners that can bring something to the table, and 
that is what we did most recently with Japan, Italy, and 
Norway. If we assess that there are other partners that can 
similarly contribute to both the threat picture and operational 
concepts and capabilities and norms, I think that there would 
be consideration among those 10 partners to expand.
    Mr. Hamadeh. Very good. Thank you, Ms. Yaffe.
    Ms. Yaffe. Thank you.
    Mr. Hamadeh. My next question is to General Purdy. Seems 
like there has been a lot of progress with the acquisition 
reform, especially with the 6 months NRO contract that you were 
mentioning earlier.
    I know acquisition reform is going to be a huge focus of 
this year's defense bill, and we can't keep pace with China if 
we don't have the space industrial base.
    But if you had the power to make a single change to our 
space acquisitions, what would that be?
    General Purdy. So there are a host of--in the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Commission, in other 
commissions that have listed out a whole host of activities, if 
I had to pick one, I think flexibility of funds, particularly 
in Continuing Resolution environments. We really find ourselves 
up in a barrel when we can't actually get our funds, you know, 
until later in the year.
    And so ability to do Below-threshold reprogramming above-
threshold reprograming thresholds at a higher level, ability to 
do quick starts, ability to get moving in that progress while 
we are waiting for the big bill, I think is probably one of the 
most number one things I would poke at.
    Mr. Hamadeh. Flexibility seems to be a unifying issue.
    General Purdy. Yes.
    Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. That concludes the open portion 
of the hearing. We will now move to the closed setting.
    [Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]   
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 14, 2025
   
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 14, 2025

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    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              May 14, 2025

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BELL

    Admiral Whitworth. For commercial geospatial analytics, NGA 
practices a ``buy once, share many'' concept that both 
discourages uncoordinated purchases and encourages the 
procurement of commercial data and analytics with broad U.S. 
Government rights to that information.
    To implement this approach, NGA leads regular interagency 
forums, which include the U.S. Space Force, combatant commands, 
NRO, and other consumers across the National System for GEOINT, 
to prioritize community needs for commercial solutions. This 
ensures resources are used effectively while providing the 
transparency necessary to prevent redundant acquisitions by the 
U.S. Government.
    Commercial imagery is managed via an interagency process. 
NRO is responsible for funding, acquisition, and execution of 
contracts for commercial imagery. NGA is responsible for 
coordinating and tasking requests for imagery from the IC and 
DoD. We also make this imagery available to partners across the 
U.S. government, including the IC, DoD, and civilian agencies 
through our Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery (G-EGD) service, 
which is available on the World Wide Web as well as on SECRET 
networks.  [See page 21.]     
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 14, 2025

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

    Mr. Wilson. Major General Purdy, Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is 
critical to the Space Force's mission. I believe our ability to have 
situational awareness in space will be as important as it currently is 
on the ground for our armed forces.
    What is DOD's assessment of its current ability to maintain Space 
Domain Awareness-that is, analyze space related activity and 
characterize intent required to predict potential adversary activity?
    How are you taking commercial capabilities for Space Domain 
Awareness into account?
    General Purdy. It is important that we understand the role Space 
Domain Awareness (SDA) plays in supporting both space and joint 
operations. Our current SDA architecture is robust and we are investing 
in both our ground and space-based layers as well as across multiple 
phenomenologies (e.g., radar and optical). We are not only investing in 
new capabilities like the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability and 
upgrading our legacy Ground-based Electro Optical Deep Space 
Surveillance System, but we are also modernizing our legacy missile 
defense radars, such as the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack and 
Characterization system and Upgraded Early Warning Radar systems, which 
perform critical SDA functions as part of their mission. Investing in 
current and future SDA systems across multiple domains and 
phenomenologies ensures the U.S. Space Force provides timely 
characterization and warning of all friendly and adversarial actions in 
space.
    Furthermore, commercial capabilities are critical to our space 
architecture. Commercial capabilities are adding to - not replacing - 
the existing baseline architecture as a cost-effective way maintain 
pace with the rapid growth of on-orbit and rapid pace of technological 
innovation. Our priorities, and ultimately the mix of government-owned 
and commercial capabilities that contribute to our overall space domain 
awareness, will continue to be based on our warfighting priorities.
    Mr. Wilson. Given the accelerating pace of conflict and the need 
for resilient, scalable capabilities, how does the Space Force assess 
when commercial solutions can meet mission needs faster and more 
affordably than government-build alternatives?
    General Purdy. The diversity and complexity of the threats we face 
are accelerating, but so is the technical innovation in the private 
sector, which has long surpassed innovation in government. We are 
constantly reassessing our requirements and commercial capability, 
using SpaceWERX SBIR Phase 1 and Phase 2 contracts to explore the 
usefulness of new technologies and the viability of new companies to 
evaluate when to incorporate commercial into a program of record. As an 
example, we recently did this with the Geosynchronous Space Situational 
Awareness Program (GSSAP) follow-on program (RG-XX) where we have 
established requirement tradeoffs for faster delivery. It is a prime 
example of how opening the requirement trade space provides commercial 
competitors the opportunity to compete which, in-turn, allows the U.S. 
Space Force to deliver a capability at scale, at a reduced cost, and on 
a faster timeline. We are also reducing classification requirements to 
leverage commercial product lines and industry investment as well as 
continue to update security postures to increase the number of viable 
entrants.
    Mr. Wilson. We have heard that the budget request includes 
significant cuts to commercial space solutions. Does the Department 
still view commercial solutions as key to its future space 
architecture, or are these potential cuts indicative of a return to 
traditional acquisition models?
    Ms. Yaffe. The Department views commercial space solutions as key 
to our future space architecture. Secretary Hegseth has said that we 
should determine where we can more aggressively embrace commercial 
providers and where to build on the success of commercial launch and 
commercial satellite communications and harness the potential within 
commercial providers to expand into new mission areas, where 
appropriate.
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Scolese, as commercial remote sensing has 
dramatically improved in both capability and capacity how has the NRO 
current and future architecture changed to reflect that commercial is 
now capable of accomplishing some of the mission previously reserved 
only for NTM?
    Dr. Scolese. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is building 
the largest and most capable, diverse, and resilient overhead 
constellation in its history and commercial capabilities play a key 
role. Using multiple industry providers, NRO's Electro-Optical 
Commercial Layer (EOCL) contracts have increased commercial capacity 
and improved revisit rates, which has allowed NRO to tailor the 
development of its systems and capabilities to address the most 
challenging and sensitive missions.
    Commercial and national systems complement one another and allow us 
to satisfy a larger and broader set of requirements from across the 
user community, from the Department of Defense to the Intelligence 
Community to federal civil missions. Commercial systems are 
increasingly capable of delivering varying resolutions, coverages, and 
phenomenologies, i.e., radar, radio frequency (RF), hyperspectral 
imaging (HSI), etc. The increase in capability of commercial systems 
allows us to satisfy foundational use needs, thereby preserving our 
national systems for the most sensitive and complex national security 
missions.
    However, aside from one commercial EO provider, all of these U.S. 
commercial remote sensing capabilities are fairly nascent. While they 
may be able to meet one part of a requirement such as quality of the 
product, they are unable to meet other requirements of the product set 
by the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, especially 
timeliness. NRO continues to assess and consider utilization of 
commercial capabilities during each major iteration of its government 
owned systems and continues to award numerous study contracts on this 
topic to see where commercial capabilities can be utilized.
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Scolese, have you seen the requirements coming 
from the functional managers (NGA/NSA) change appreciable to reflect 
the capability and capacity that commercial remote sensing provides to 
both the DoD and IC? If so, how? If not, have you asked the functional 
managers why not?
    Dr. Scolese. Yes we have, in particular for commercial radar and 
radio frequency capabilities. As these commercial remote sensing 
capabilities have proven to have mission value, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) and National Security Agency (NSA) have 
increased taskings in order to meet emerging requirements from the user 
community.
    For example, as commercial radar capabilities improved and added 
additional capacity, and through Ukraine Supplemental Funding, NGA was 
able to utilize NRO's Strategic Commercial Enhancement contracts to 
increase the use of commercial radar in the Ukraine Area of Interest - 
valuable data for USEUCOM and Ukraine.
    In 2022, NRO's commercial radar providers delivered just over 3,000 
images In 2023, they delivered more than 11,000 images, almost four 
times as many as the year prior In 2024, they delivered more than 
22,000 images, double the year prior, and Through May 25 of this year, 
they have already delivered more than 12,000 images
    There has also been a marked increase in the use of commercial RF 
data, which is procured under the end user's authorities, through NRO's 
contract vehicles, and with NRO's and NSA's approval. NRO and NSA have 
a Standard Operating Procedure for Commercial RF orders that ensure all 
parties remain compliant with all statutes, executive orders, and 
regulations.
    Last May, the only commercial RF provider delivering data was 
HawkEye 360, and they were predominately supporting the Ukraine AOI. 
Demand for commercial RF increased and HE360 began supporting more 
missions. In September, Spire Global began delivering data and 
supporting missions, and this April, Umbra began providing data 
collected passively on radio frequency interference events. The user 
base has also increased over the last year from USAFRICOM and USEUCOM 
to include USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM, USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, Army, Coast 
Guard, Marines, Navy, Space Force and many others.
    In May 2024, NRO's commercial radio frequency providers conducted 
an average of 56 collections a week and delivered an average of 2,840 
coarse RF geolocations. In May 2025, they conducted an average of 342 
collections a week and delivered an average of 139,140 coarse RF 
geolocations.
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Scolese, NRO has a long and proud history of 
building and operating the NTM constellations, the process of procuring 
commercially collected data is undoubtable a cultural shift. How has 
the strategic and philosophical approach of the NRO changed to reflect 
Congressional guidance to prioritize commercial data sources?
    Dr. Scolese. The NRO fully leverages commercial capabilities-
including launch services, cloud data services, products and tools, and 
commercial imagery and data-enabling the NRO to compliment the services 
and capabilities we acquire from industry partners and only build the 
government capabilities and systems needed.
    In 2018, the responsibility for commercial imagery and data 
acquisition for the U.S. Department of Defense, Intelligence Community 
and Federal Civil Agencies transitioned from the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency to the NRO. At that time, there was one contract 
for operational electro-optical (EO) imagery.
    By the following year, NRO had awarded commercial imagery purchase 
contracts to BlackSky, HySpecIQ, Maxar, and Planet and two more 
integration contracts - one to HawkEye 360 for commercial radio 
frequency (RF) data and one to Capella Space for commercial radar.
    Those contracts represented an important milestone in the NRO's 
strategy of embracing both existing and emerging commercial remote 
sensing capabilities to create an integrated overhead architecture 
consisting of both national and commercial capabilities.
    In 2022, NRO awarded the Electro-Optical Commercial Layer 
acquisition, also known as EOCL. EOCL is the largest commercial imagery 
contract awarded by the IC to three providers - BlackSky, Maxar, and 
Planet.
    Using multiple industry providers, these EOCL contracts have 
increased commercial capacity, improved revisit rates, and enabled 
NRO's Overhead Systems to focus collection against the most challenging 
and sensitive missions. NRO continues to explore new entrants to this 
remote sensing market including hyperspectral and other phenomenologies 
through our Strategic Commercial Enhancements (SCE) investments 
enabling the user community to access and assess commercial data 
utility to meet requirements.
    Currently, NRO's Commercial Systems Program Office (CSPO) has a 
total of 15 commercial data provider contracts and 12 of those are SCE 
contracts: ? 3 Commercial Radar Providers (Capella, ICEYE U.S., & 
Umbra) 3 Commercial RF Providers (HawkEye 360, Spire & Umbra) 2 
Commercial Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI) Providers (Orbital Sidekick & 
Planet) And 4 Commercial EO providers (Albedo, Hydrosat, Muon Space, & 
Turion Space)
    CSPO's next SCE acquisition will be a multi-phenomenology 
Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) - an alternate acquisition approach 
to the Broad Agency Announcements used previously - to deliver new 
phenomenologies, emerging capabilities, and evolving commercial 
technologies at the speed of mission and industry. This CSO will be to 
explore multi-phenomenologies-EO, HSI, radar, radio frequency, and 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR).
    With a rolling proposal window of 5 years and no set times for 
responses from Industry, NRO views this CSO as an excellent opportunity 
to reach a greater number of providers in the commercial market place - 
to include new and emerging providers and capabilities. NRO plans to 
release the final Request for Proposal (RFP) in Summer 2025.
    One of the biggest paradigm shifts for the NRO was working across 
unclassified networks and communication channels. Because many NRO 
commercial providers don't have clearances, SCIFs, etc. we recognized 
and had to adjust many of our processes and risk postures to better 
engage uncleared industry partners.
    In working with these commercial imagery and data providers, NRO 
has helped these companies enhance their security infrastructure and 
ability to more effectively interact with the national security 
community by developing contract and security mechanisms to facilitate 
more agile, open, and user-friendly engagement and operations with 
these providers. As a result, these commercial providers have a better 
understanding of how their services and products can better meet 
national security requirements and where they can build future 
capabilities that can meet our current and future needs.
    Mr. Moulton. VADM Whitworth, during your testimony you repeatedly 
referred to commercial as a "gap-filler". This does not algin with 
Congressional intent, as outlined in multiple NDAAs. As commercial 
capability has dramatically improved over the last 5 years, what 
process does NGA use to determine if commercial can take over specific 
collections from NTM? How often does this evaluation take place?
    Admiral Whitworth. When I said commercial imagery is so agile that 
it can fill gaps, I intended to convey that commercial capabilities are 
critical elements of a GEOINT architecture which also includes National 
Technical Means (NTM) and the DOD proliferated architecture. They are a 
first choice for many missions and provide us with the agility to task 
them for rapidly emerging situations and for some missions where NTM 
would not be appropriate.
    For instance, commercial imagery satisfies more than 98 percent of 
the imagery collection requirements for NGA's statutory Foundation and 
Safety of Navigation production. We also rely upon commercial imagery 
to meet many intelligence collection requirements, as well as to 
provide unclassified, shareable imagery for Humanitarian and Disaster 
Relief missions.
    Regarding the ability for commercial to take over specific 
collections from NTM, NGA's collection orchestration process is built 
to meet DOD, IC, and other user needs for imagery as quickly as 
possible by assigning collection requirements to any system that is 
capable of meeting those needs, regardless of whether it is an NTM, 
commercial, or DOD system. This is more effective than assigning 
specific collections to either commercial platforms or NTM systems 
because doing so would result in delays for many users while they await 
a specific system to become available.
    As commercial capabilities improve, the collection orchestration 
process takes into account their ability to satisfy more challenging 
collection requirements and tasks them when they are the most effective 
means of meeting user collection needs.
    Mr. Moulton. We continue to hear and see a clear cultural 
resistance within NGA to treating commercial providers as true mission 
partners, which has negative operational effects. What are you doing to 
break that mindset and change the culture?
    Admiral Whitworth. I would appreciate the opportunity to meet to 
learn more about what you are hearing and seeing that suggest cultural 
resistance at NGA to embracing commercial providers as mission 
partners.
    I have heard similar assertions in the past, but I do not believe 
there to be a cultural bias against commercial providers at NGA. NGA is 
a leader in applying commercial imagery, commercial data, and 
commercial analytic capabilities to support military operations and 
humanitarian and disaster relief efforts around the world. Each and 
every day, we leverage a complex and diverse constellation of US 
national, commercial and foreign sensors to meet prioritized 
requirements. To ensure that we maintain the highest level of focus on 
commercial GEOINT capabilities, I elevated the agency's Commercial 
Operations Group to serve as my direct report in 2024.
    Mr. Moulton. How are analysts being trained to prioritize 
commercial data when it meets the requirement, rather than defaulting 
to NTM out of habit or preference? What accountability measures have 
you put in place to ensure analysts do so in practice?
    Admiral Whitworth. NGA collection strategy analysts undergo a 
formal training and certification process which includes instruction on 
commercial GEOINT systems and the incorporation of commercial imagery 
in collection plans. To further prevent defaulting to NTM out of habit 
or preference, NGA's primary tasking tool, the GEOINT Information 
Management Services (GIMS), defaults to sensoragnostic tasking 
submissions that include commercial capabilities.
    The primary accountability measure for our civilian workforce is 
the performance review process. Performance reviews of collection 
strategy analysts, which include quarterly feedback sessions, evaluate 
their ability to satisfy customer requirements with available GEOINT 
sources, including commercial sources of GEOINT, at the lowest 
classification level.
    Finally, NGA continually educates intelligence analysts on emerging 
national and commercial GEOINT capabilities. This includes a robust 
commercial imagery outreach program with Combatant Commands, Service 
Intelligence Centers, and external agencies that provides analysts 
technical training on emerging commercial imaging capabilities, 
analytics, services, and data.
    Mr. Moulton. How many dynamic collection opportunities have we 
missed because NTM is unavailable due to routine, standing requirements 
that commercial could easily satisfy? What data does NGA have to assess 
that tradeoff? How often is that analysis reviewed at the senior level?
    Admiral Whitworth. No dynamic collection opportunities are missed 
for that reason. In fact, dynamic collection requirements are always 
prioritized to ensure they are not outcompeted by standing collection 
requirements. They will be satisfied by the first collection 
opportunity available with a system capable of meeting the requirement, 
whether that system is commercial or National Technical Means.
    NGA recently provided the committee with a congressionally directed 
report on the satisfaction of collection requirements which contains 
additional data at the classified level to further address your 
question. NGA continually monitors collection orchestration activities, 
including the balance of collection across NTM and commercial systems. 
I review this report daily at NGA's operational standup meeting.
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Mr. Carbajal. Gen. Purdy, as someone who has worked across systems 
engineering, research and development, and program management of major 
defense acquisition programs, you surely understand the tension between 
rigorous mission assurance requirements and the need for speed and 
innovation. As you well know, mission assurance is non-negotiable in 
national security space programs. The stakes are high and every launch, 
every satellite, every system must function flawlessly to support 
critical missions such as missile warning, ISR, communications, and 
space domain awareness. Many in the defense and intelligence 
communities have raised concerns that overly rigid requirements are 
creating barriers for new entrants, limiting access to commercial 
innovation, and slowing down our ability to field capabilities at the 
speed of relevance. However, we appreciate that you've introduced 
tiered mission assurance into Lane 1 of the National Security Space 
Launch Program, and think this could be replicated across other launch 
contract mechanisms like SRP-4 and OSP-4. Gen. Purdy, how do you plan 
to balance the need for maintaining mission assurance while ensuring 
that the Space Force is agile enough to take full advantage of 
commercial space capabilities? Are there specific reforms or 
initiatives you believe could help streamline the mission assurance 
process, reduce bureaucracy, and accelerate capability fielding while 
still maintaining the high standards required for national security 
space programs?
    Gen Purdy, what is the Space Force's long term plan for TacSRT? 
Will it be submitted as a Program of Record? (If no, why not?)
    General Purdy. Historically, the risk tolerance for National 
Security Space Launch (NSSL) was low, driven by a strong focus on 
government oversight to ensure mission success based on lack of a 
robust commercial launch market and a string of catastrophic launch 
failures in the late 1990s. However, the commercial industry is 
experiencing unprecedented growth because of lower launch costs, driven 
by significant advancements and increased competition in the commercial 
rocket market. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) has modernized our 
acquisition strategies and mission assurance (MA) processes to take 
advantage of commercial innovation in the launch industry.
    The USSF's Assured Access to Space (AATS) enterprise uses multiple 
acquisition strategies and contracts to address the varying degrees of 
risk tolerance across missions and take advantage of emerging 
commercial innovations and launch providers. NSSL Phase 3's dual-lane 
approach provides the flexibility to adjust risk posture based on 
specific mission needs, balancing the effective use of resources and 
leveraging launch industry innovation. Lane 2 follows the traditional 
NSSL model serving "no fail" missions, with low-risk tolerance 
processes and rigorous MA. Lane 1 embraces the growing commercial 
market, with annual on-ramping, no requirement for formal NSSL 
certification, and tiered MA to match the payload's risk tolerance. The 
Lane 1 contract uses a four-tier MA approach to provide a spectrum of 
government oversight and scrutiny, enabling flexibility to throttle MA 
based on payload risk posture. Tier 0 is the most risk-tolerant option, 
leveraging commercial processes and FAA licensing without additional 
government MA; NSSL awarded nine Tier 0 missions in October 2024.
    The Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP) complements the NSSL 
program and provides access to small launch companies to launch small, 
experimental, and/or prototype payloads. RSLP also provides tiered MA 
commensurate to the customer's risk posture/tolerance and launch 
vehicle maturity on their OSP-4 (orbital launch) and SRP-4 (suborbital 
launch) contracts. In fact, the tiered MA concept was first implemented 
on the RSLP contract vehicles. The success of the tiered MA framework 
on OSP-4 and SRP-4 informed the NSSL Phase 3 acquisition strategy.
    AATS continues to modernize and refine tailored MA based on higher 
launch cadence, reusable flight hardware, data automation, and other 
tools to ensure effective and efficient use of government resources and 
significantly increase the speed of launch. Space launch, while 
becoming more commonplace, remains an extremely complex endeavor. We 
are evaluating the initial success of the Lane 1 approach, new entrant 
maturity, and the trade between speed and risk in the context of 
emerging threats and then applying any lessons learned to new or 
modified acquisition strategies and MA approaches to increase 
responsiveness and accelerate capability fielding.
    The recent signing of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency - 
U.S. Space Force Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on May 21, 2025, is a 
key enabler, formalizing interagency collaboration and data sharing to 
enhance support to the warfighter. This MOA will be used to determine 
the long-term plan for TacSRT.
    Mr. Carbajal. Dr. Scolese, given the emphasis on leveraging 
commercial innovations, what steps have you taken in recent budget 
cycles to move funding from traditional, government-owned platforms to 
commercial alternatives? Specifically, can you outline any recent 
reallocation of resources towards commercial capabilities, and away 
from legacy systems? How do these shifts align with the IC's overall 
modernization strategy?
    Dr. Scolese. The NRO continuously monitors the commercial market 
for expanding opportunities to participate in National Security 
collection. As industry demonstrates capability to meet government 
requirements, we roll them into the baseline to allow national systems 
to focus on the more challenging problems of requiring unique 
capabilities, exquisite collection, sensitive operations, or time 
critical tasking.
    From a commercial remote sensing perspective, NRO's Electro-Optical 
Commercial Layer (EOCL) program was specifically designed to identify 
imagery requirements being performed by NRO overhead Systems that could 
be met with commercial remote sensing capabilities.
    In 2022, NRO awarded the Electro-Optical Commercial Layer 
acquisition, also known as EOCL. EOCL is the largest commercial imagery 
contract awarded by the IC to three providers - BlackSky, Maxar, and 
Planet.
    Using multiple industry providers, these EOCL contracts have 
increased commercial capacity, improved revisit rates, and enabled 
NRO's Overhead Systems to focus collection against the most challenging 
and sensitive missions.
    Mr. Carbajal. VADM Whitworth, the last several supplemental 
appropriations bills for both Ukraine and Israel have included 
significant funding for commercial capabilities for combatant commands. 
If you are meeting the needs of the Department, why have we seen 
consistent requests for commercial space solutions from commanders for 
needs that are not being met? How does the NGA view its role in helping 
U.S. commercial remote sensing companies scale and succeed-not just as 
vendors, but as critical components of national defense infrastructure?
    Admiral Whitworth. NGA maximizes the existing GEOINT collection 
architecture to ensure the highest priority combatant command 
requirements are met. Although multiple studies over the past year have 
found our tasking processes are effective, we simply do not have enough 
GEOINT collection capacity available to meet every requirement. Planned 
growth in GEOINT collection over the next few years will help improve 
our ability to meet requests, as can commercially-provided GEOINT 
analytic data and services. NGA recently provided the committee with a 
copy of our study on satisfaction of collection requirements that 
contains additional data at the classified level that further addresses 
your question.
    NGA's role in helping commercial remote sensing companies scale and 
succeed is centered on our mission as a Combat Support Agency with deep 
GEOINT expertise. NGA leverages all usable commercial imagery purchased 
by NRO, and routinely communicates with commercial vendors about 
mission needs.
    NGA also leverages our expertise by offering companies and NRO 
valuable insight into mission-user needs that will improve the value of 
their capabilities to the government and other users.
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Mr. Bacon. The space-based Ground Moving Target Indicator mission 
is intended to replace and expand the mission of the JSTARs for the 
warfighter. Why does the NGA believe that the tasking for this system 
should reside with your agency, instead of by the service? When will a 
decision on the final tasking authority be made?
    General Purdy. The tasking authority for the Ground Moving Target 
Indicator program resides within the Combatant Commands. We will 
continue to collaborate with the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, including leveraging their expertise and investments.
    Mr. Bacon. Recently, you issued warnings at the SSIB conference in 
New Mexico to both the government and industry. You warned the 
government to think deeply about requirements, cost, time, and money. 
You further urged the government to have the wisdom to take risks and 
move things out to the commercial sector when it makes sense. You told 
industry to review what it's doing and what it's offering to the 
government, and figure out how it plugs in instead of just wholesale 
replacing whatever the government has in its inventory.
    Focusing on the industry aspect, the Space Force's approach today 
appears to be one of exploit, build, and buy. Shouldn't the sequence be 
exploit, build, further develop (with government funding), and then 
buy?
    Why is space so different from programs like KC-130 and F-47? If 
the DoD likes what a company is developing with its own or investor 
funds, it should consider buying it. DoD funds, adapted for commercial 
purposes, allow DoD to purchase the exquisite.
    General Purdy. At the SSIB conference, I emphasized that outpacing 
accelerating threats requires a cultural shift in how government and 
industry think, communicate, and build together. The U.S. Space Force 
prioritizes an "exploit, buy, build" sequence, with building as a last 
resort. This means first seeking to exploit existing assets in new 
ways, then buying commercially available data or capabilities if they 
adequately meet mission needs, and then only building unique government 
solutions when necessary. This approach informs how we define and 
validate requirements, incentivizing smart trade-offs and avoiding 
"gold plating." Industry must focus on operationally relevant, cost-
effective, and integrable solutions that can augment existing 
capabilities. This demands greater transparency and partnership, with 
government open to calculated risks and commercial solutions, and 
industry proactively shaping realistic, interoperable, and mission-
driven offerings. Success hinges not on perfection, but on quickly and 
affordably building the right system in partnership, leveraging 
commercial options whenever possible.
    The U.S. Space Force is prioritizing commercial-first solutions in 
many mission areas and programs, including Space Domain Awareness and 
Tactically Responsive Space, while the Commercial Space Office expands 
commercial integration into areas like Space-Based Environmental 
Monitoring. Acquisition programs are directed to identify where 
commercial offerings can meet requirements, with Acquisition Decision 
Memoranda promoting alternatives to traditional programs, which insert 
in competition and speed while acknowledging that there are certain 
"no-fail" missions that will likely remain government-led to mitigate 
national security risks. The U.S. Space Force aims to maintain its 
strategic advantage by leveraging commercial innovation and adjust its 
budget priorities, acquisition strategies, and culture to welcome 
commercial capabilities, ultimately buying speed, resilience, and 
strategic surprise to maintain space superiority.
    Mr. Bacon. The 557th Weather Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in 
Nebraska plays a critical role in supporting DoD's global operations 
with timely and accurate weather forecasting. However, the Department 
continues to rely on aging, retired NOAA satellites, with no defined 
acquisition path for replacement capabilities, either commercial or 
organic to the DoD. Given that most of this weather data originates 
from space-based platforms, what is the Department's strategy to ensure 
continuity and modernization of this capability, to include commercial 
capabilities?
    General Purdy. Following direction from Congress in FY2020, the 
U.S. Space Force (USSF) developed a weather strategy that shifted from 
using legacy satellites to proliferated architectures while continuing 
a holistic approach of non-materiel solutions and partnerships, which 
remains on track. Today, the USSF is focused on first leveraging our 
partners' data, then transitioning towards a commercial Data-as-a-
Service model for delivering capabilities faster and more efficiently, 
and finally pursuing a USSF materiel-provided solution only as 
necessary to fill critical warfighter capability needs.
    Additionally, the USSF is ensuring continuity and modernization of 
environmental monitoring capabilities through an ongoing and iterative 
collaborative process across the USSF, Air Force, Navy, NOAA, NASA, and 
other key organizations. The USSF will continue to modernize weather 
satellites and provide accurate weather forecasting with this 
integrated strategy in place.
    Mr. Bacon. The space-based Ground Moving Target Indicator mission 
is intended to replace and expand the mission of the JSTARs for the 
warfighter. Why does the NGA believe that the tasking for this system 
should reside with your agency, instead of by the service? When will a 
decision on the final tasking authority be made?
    Admiral Whitworth. NGA does not believe that we should be solely 
responsible for tasking of the Ground Moving Target Indicator mission.
    However, the evolution to a GMTI constellation with global access 
will produce the greatest capability if we enhance coordination across 
combatant commands and agencies while integrating overhead collection 
management activities.
    That is why we joined with U.S. Space Force, DIA, and other 
agencies and departments to establish the Joint Mission Management 
Center (JMMC). This center will bring together collection management 
tools and centuries of informed collection orchestration expertise to 
support the final tasking authority for space based-GMTI in their 
efforts to maximize their ability to meet combatant command 
requirements.
    NGA defers to USD(I&S) regarding when a decision will be made on 
the final tasking authority for space-based GMTI.
    Mr. Bacon. NGA, in partnership with CDAO, is successfully fielding 
commercia capabilities including the Maven Smart System to rapidly and 
effectively meet the Combatant Commands' GEOINT and targeting 
requirements. EUCOM and INDOPACOM are using it to access a common 
operating picture. However, there are still large gaps in who has it 
and on what networks. What is the plan to continue scaling it to ensure 
all warfighters at every Combatant Command have this joint warfighting 
software?
    Admiral Whitworth. As CDAO is responsible for procuring Maven Smart 
System (MSS) licenses for the combatant commands, their subordinate 
components and major sub unified commands, I defer to them to address 
your question about scaling MSS to more warfighters around the world.
    Mr. Bacon. I am pleased to hear that the administration is 
acknowledging what many members of this committee have known for years: 
that space is a warfighting domain. Our adversaries have made it so, 
and the US must act to protect its interests in space. How does the 
department plan to change policy to ensure that our adversaries are 
deterred, and more importantly, that our space forces are able to 
defeat these threats if required? In particular, how will policies 
change to enable the on-orbit testing required to validate that these 
systems work and demonstrate their effectiveness to our adversaries? 
How will policies change to enable the required training so that our 
operators have the opportunities they need to master their weapon 
systems?
    Ms. Yaffe. The Department is committed to protecting U.S. interests 
in space. To advance deterrence, we are working to assure the ability 
to accomplish critical national security missions that rely on space 
services. We are also implementing a balanced, combat credible force 
structure that includes capabilities for offensive and defensive space 
control missions to ensure that the Nation has options to deliver 
desired effects that protect and advance our priority policy 
objectives. On testing and training, we continue to work with the 
Military Departments and Services and our operators to make sure the 
Department's policies enable them to conduct their missions. As part of 
our effort to normalize space operations within the Department, we 
believe it is important that our Guardians can test and train to 
advance capabilities, concepts of operation, and readiness, just like 
every other service in every other domain. We are working hard to 
continue to standardize processes to enable necessary forward progress 
while ensuring that we work to preserve and advance our operational 
advantages. These efforts are complemented by implementation of the 
Department's space classification guidance, issued in December 2023, 
through which we seek to improve information sharing within the DoD to 
the benefit of trainers, planners, and operators.
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MESSMER
    Mr. Messmer. How does the Space Development Agency's (SDA) 
Transport Layer uniquely enable joint force operations and Joint All-
Domain Command and Control (JADC2)?
    General Purdy. The Space Development Agency (SDA) Transport Layer 
would enhance joint operations and JADC2 by providing extended, low-
latency communication and acting as a provisioner of space-based Link-
16, which is vital for interoperability across the Services. 
Furthermore, it offers essential data backhaul capabilities for the SDA 
Tracking Layer and Global Navigation Satellite System interference 
detection, addressing key challenges related to connectivity, 
persistence, and resilience. The ability to meet the U.S. Space Force's 
(USSF) "fight tonight" requirements is paramount during this period.
    Mr. Messmer. Can you ensure that Space Development Agency's (SDA) 
Tranche 2 Transport Layer will be protected within the Department's 
2026 budget and how are you going to ensure we don't put billions of 
dollars already invested by government and industry at risk?
    General Purdy. The U.S. Space Force recognizes that the 
capabilities being developed by the Space Development Agency's (SDA) 
Transport Layer are currently required to support SDA's Tracking Layer. 
To meet Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) requirements, a 
resilient and persistent space-based data transport layer is critical, 
and the capabilities delivered in Tranche 2 will support near-term 
needs. We are committed to being responsive to changing warfighter 
demand signals, budget realities, analytical conclusions, and 
government acquisition rules as we acquire the capabilities that 
provide the best value to the Joint Force.
    Mr. Messmer. My district includes NSWC Crane who has been one of 
the Department of Defense's (DoD) innovators in the use of Other 
Transactional Authority (OTA's) with their S2MARTS consortium OT. Does 
your organization have a similar OT in its arsenal and how do they 
intend to expand their use of OT's consistent with President Trump's 
Executive Order of April 9, 2025, regarding acquisition reform within 
the department?
    General Purdy. OTs are an important part of our contracting arsenal 
that we are increasingly using across the space portfolio to add speed 
to acquisitions and rapidly put capabilities in the hands of our 
warfighters. The new authorities granted by Congress, which allow the 
Senior Procurement Executives to approve larger awards, is extremely 
advantageous for moving faster, which is especially important given the 
size and complexity of space efforts. Currently, we are using a number 
of consortium OT contracts managed by various Services to increase the 
speed of acquisitions, including the Space Enterprise Consortium OT 
managed by Space Systems Command, which streamlines collaboration with 
non-traditional organizations such as commercial space startups and 
small businesses by using OTAs to rapidly develop prototypes. 
Additionally, we challenge our Program Managers to utilize the right 
mix of incentives, contract vehicles, and risk posture to deliver 
warfighting capability with speed and discipline.
    Mr. Messmer. What benchmarks should Congress look for to assess 
whether commercial-first geospatial acquisition and procurement 
solutions are being prioritized in execution by your organization?
    Dr. Scolese. NRO's Commercial Enhancements (SCE) program is the 
first of its kind in the national security community to explore and 
leverage new entrants and emerging capabilities in the commercial 
remote sensing market. The SCE program offers the DoD and IC user 
community an excellent opportunity to access and assess new entrant 
commercial imagery and data providers to see if their products meet 
requirements, and if yes, can on-ramp and accelerate vendors to provide 
products.
    Currently, NRO's Commercial Systems Program Office (CSPO) has a 
total of 12 SCE commercial data provider contracts: ? 3 Commercial 
Radar Providers (Capella, ICEYE U.S., & Umbra) ? 3 Commercial Radio 
Frequency (RF) Providers (HawkEye 360, Spire & Umbra) ? 2 Commercial 
Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI) Providers (Orbital Sidekick & Planet) ? And 
4 Commercial Electro-Optical (EO) providers (Albedo, Hydrosat, Muon 
Space, & Turion Space)
    NRO's next SCE acquisition will be a multi-phenomenology Commercial 
Solutions Opening (CSO) - an alternate acquisition approach to the 
Broad Agency Announcements used previously - to deliver new 
phenomenologies, emerging capabilities, and evolving commercial 
technologies at the speed of mission and industry. This CSO will be to 
explore multi-phenomenologies: EO, HSI, radar, radio frequency, and 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR).
    With a rolling proposal window of 5 years and no set times for 
responses from Industry, NRO views this as an excellent opportunity to 
reach a greater number of providers in the commercial market place - to 
include new and emerging providers and capabilities. NRO hopes to have 
the final Request for Proposal out this summer and look forward to 
seeing what industry has to offer. And how we can leverage those 
capabilities for our national security mission.
    Mr. Messmer. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has 
conducted significant geospatial intelligence collection in the CENTCOM 
Area of Responsibility (AOR) over the past two years to assist Israel. 
How have you seen Iran's missile defense capabilities impacted by 
Israeli airstrikes, and since the latter months of 2024, how have you 
seen Iranian bases adapt or rebuild?
    Admiral Whitworth. A classified response to this question for 
record has been provided to the subcommittee via secure means.
    Mr. Messmer. What benchmarks should Congress look for to assess 
whether commercial-first geospatial acquisition and procurement 
solutions are being prioritized in execution by your organization?
    Admiral Whitworth. NGA prioritizes commercial-first acquisition and 
procurement solutions when they meet requirements and demand. With 
regard to commercial imagery, this is an interagency process. NRO is 
responsible for funding, acquisition, and execution of contracts for 
commercial imagery. NGA is responsible for coordinating and tasking 
requests for imagery from the IC and DoD. We maximize the use of the 
commercial imagery procured by NRO that meets stated requirements - at 
the same time, we will not use imagery that fails to meet resolution, 
geolocation, or other quality standards. NGA and NRO work with 
commercial imagery providers on engineering enhancements that will 
improve their ability to deliver capabilities that meet US government 
needs.
    When it comes to commercial GEOINT analytics, it is best to assess 
trends in our purchases to assess whether we are evaluating newly 
available commercial capabilities and then investing in those that meet 
IC and DOD needs. Since 2020, NGA has seen significant improvements in 
commercial analytic capabilities as well as growing community demand 
for those capabilities. Accordingly, NGA has invested in an 
increasingly diverse and capable set of commercial capabilities since 
that time, and we have established contracting mechanisms to continue 
to do so. In 2024 and 2025, we awarded the Luno A and B contracts for 
commercial services - valued at up to $490 million.
    Mr. Messmer. How is the Department of Defense working to build 
cyber resilience into satellite command and control systems as threats 
continue to evolve, particularly as they relate to the serial networks 
within these Satellite Control Networks (SCN)?
    Ms. Yaffe. The Department recognizes that space systems, as with 
any networked capability, must harden attack surfaces to reduce 
exploitable vectors for attack on all segments of the space systems - 
ground, link, communications, user, and on-orbit. Appropriate 
cryptography, secure supply chains, a risk management framework that is 
threat-informed, and intent to design a system that is resilient to 
both current and future cyber threats is necessary to adapt to the 
dynamic cyber threat environment. The Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Space Policy works closely with the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy to address the 
convergence of the space, cyber, and electronic warfare domains.
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRANK
    Mr. Crank. In its recently released Space Warfighting: A Framework 
for Planners, the USSF notes that ``The concept of movement and 
maneuver in the space domain includes rapid and sustained maneuver; 
moving satellites into different Earth orbits; changing a spacecraft's 
location between lunar and geostationary orbits; changing trajectory 
within cislunar space; (...) and dispersing space capabilities and 
services across space architectures and other domains, while being able 
to focus military effects when and where needed.'' Maj. Gen. Purdy and 
Ms. Yaffe: Given the importance of In-Space Mobility and Logistics 
especially as China demonstrates mobility in space, what is the policy 
impact and what are the plans to invest in and acquire commercial 
capabilities for in-orbit logistics and maneuver?
    General Purdy. The U.S. Space Force (USSF), using the Department of 
Defense Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the USSF Commercial 
Space Strategy as guidance, has funded several commercial 
demonstrations to explore solutions for sustained space maneuver that 
will launch within the next couple of years and allow the USSF to learn 
about the maturity of the technology and the industrial base, assess 
military utility, and inform future concepts of operation, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, Service-level requirements, and objective 
force design.
    Enhanced Maneuver (Refueling) Demonstration 1: In 2023, USSF 
awarded a contract to develop a refueling shuttle that, coupled with 
Defense Innovation Unit's Orbit Fab propellant depot and Tetra-5 
satellites, will demonstrate a scalable commercial refueling 
architecture. These satellites are planned for launch in 2026.
    Enhanced Maneuver (Refueling) Demonstration 2: The ROOSTER-5 
satellite will host multiple commercial refueling payloads to refuel 
satellites. ROOSTER-5 is planned for launch in 2027.
    Augmented Maneuver Service: In 2024, USSF awarded a contract to 
develop on-orbit operations of ``GRIM'' (Geostationary Repositioning, 
Inspection, and Mobility) as part of SpaceWERX's strategic finance or 
STRATFI program. The GRIM satellite is capable of orbital transfer, 
disposal, and station keeping, which is an important step towards 
sustained space maneuver for satellites that do not have a refueling 
port. GRIM also provides resiliency by extending the life of satellites 
that experienced an anomaly or need to extend beyond their design life 
to close operational gaps, as well as demonstrate sustainable space 
behavior through disposal. This satellite is planned for launch in 
2026.
    Mr. Crank. Gen Purdy, many in the defense and intelligence 
communities have raised concerns that overly rigid requirements are 
creating barriers for new entrants, limiting access to commercial 
innovation, and slowing down our ability to field capabilities at the 
speed of relevance. However, I appreciate that you've introduced tiered 
mission assurance into Lane 1 of the National Security Space Launch 
Program, and think this could be replicated across other launch 
contract mechanisms like SRP-4 and OSP-4.
    Gen. Purdy, how do you plan to balance the need for maintaining 
mission assurance while ensuring that the Space Force is agile enough 
to take full advantage of commercial space capabilities? Are there 
specific reforms or initiatives you believe could help streamline the 
mission assurance process, reduce bureaucracy, and accelerate 
capability fielding while still maintaining the high standards required 
for national security space programs?
    General Purdy. Historically, the risk tolerance for National 
Security Space Launch (NSSL) was low, driven by a strong focus on 
government oversight to ensure mission success based on lack of a 
robust commercial launch market and a string of catastrophic launch 
failures in the late 1990s. However, the commercial industry is 
experiencing unprecedented growth because of lower launch costs, driven 
by significant advancements and increased competition in the commercial 
rocket market. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) has modernized our 
acquisition strategies and mission assurance (MA) processes to take 
advantage of commercial innovation in the launch industry.
    The USSF's Assured Access to Space (AATS) enterprise uses multiple 
acquisition strategies and contracts to address the varying degrees of 
risk tolerance across missions and take advantage of emerging 
commercial innovations and launch providers. NSSL Phase 3's dual-lane 
approach provides the flexibility to adjust risk posture based on 
specific mission needs, balancing the effective use of resources and 
leveraging launch industry innovation. Lane 2 follows the traditional 
NSSL model serving "no fail" missions, with low-risk tolerance 
processes and rigorous MA. Lane 1 embraces the growing commercial 
market, with annual on-ramping, no requirement for formal NSSL 
certification, and tiered MA to match the payload's risk tolerance. The 
Lane 1 contract uses a four-tier MA approach to provide a spectrum of 
government oversight and scrutiny, enabling flexibility to throttle MA 
based on payload risk posture. Tier 0 is the most risk-tolerant option, 
leveraging commercial processes and FAA licensing without additional 
government MA; NSSL awarded nine Tier 0 missions in October 2024.
    The Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP) complements the NSSL 
program and provides access to small launch companies to launch small, 
experimental, and/or prototype payloads.
    RSLP also provides tiered MA commensurate to the customer's risk 
posture/tolerance and launch vehicle maturity on their OSP-4 (orbital 
launch) and SRP-4 (suborbital launch) contracts. In fact, the tiered MA 
concept was first implemented on the RSLP contract vehicles. The 
success of the tiered MA framework on OSP-4 and SRP-4 informed the NSSL 
Phase 3 acquisition strategy.
    AATS continues to modernize and refine tailored MA based on higher 
launch cadence, reusable flight hardware, data automation, and other 
tools to ensure effective and efficient use of government resources and 
significantly increase the speed of launch. Space launch, while 
becoming more commonplace, remains an extremely complex endeavor. We 
are evaluating the initial success of the Lane 1 approach, new entrant 
maturity, and the trade between speed and risk in the context of 
emerging threats and then applying any lessons learned to new or 
modified acquisition strategies and MA approaches to increase 
responsiveness and accelerate capability fielding.
    Mr. Crank. Orbital Diversity has been identified as an effective 
holistic strategy to reduce vulnerabilities in our national space 
systems. For our exquisite ISR systems, are you exploring whether VLEO 
effectively applies this principle to maximize the continuity of 
collection in potential future conflicts? As you develop future 
architectures, is VLEO being considered as an avenue to proliferate for 
resiliency without compromising capability?
    Dr. Scolese. NRO recognizes the importance of orbital diversity as 
a key strategy for reducing vulnerabilities in our national space 
systems. While we currently implement orbital diversity across our 
constellation, Very Low Earth Orbit (VLEO) is not under active 
consideration at this time. However, as we continue to evolve our 
architectures and explore new technologies, we will evaluate VLEO's 
potential benefits for resilience and collection continuity in future 
conflicts. Our focus remains on developing diverse, resilient 
architectures that can maintain critical ISR capabilities across a 
range of scenarios.
    Mr. Crank. In its recently released Space Warfighting: A Framework 
for Planners, the USSF notes that ``The concept of movement and 
maneuver in the space domain includes rapid and sustained maneuver; 
moving satellites into different Earth orbits; changing a spacecraft's 
location between lunar and geostationary orbits; changing trajectory 
within cislunar space; (...) and dispersing space capabilities and 
services across space architectures and other domains, while being able 
to focus military effects when and where needed.'' Maj. Gen. Purdy and 
Ms. Yaffe: Given the importance of In-Space Mobility and Logistics 
especially as China demonstrates mobility in space, what is the policy 
impact and what are the plans to invest in and acquire commercial 
capabilities for in-orbit logistics and maneuver?
    Ms. Yaffe. There are no DoD policy barriers to pursuing in-space 
mobility and logistics capabilities and services. The DoD Commercial 
Space Integration Strategy (CSIS) states the Department will seek to 
integrate commercial solutions for all mission areas where solutions 
can enhance resilience and add capability without imposing unacceptable 
risk, while also maintaining U.S. government responsibility for certain 
critical national security functions. Space Access, Mobility, and 
Logistics (SAML) was identified as a ``commercial primary mission 
area'' in the CSIS, or one in which a preponderance of functions within 
this mission area could be performed by the commercial sector, while a 
limited number of functions must be performed by the government.
    The Department has funded several commercial demonstrations to 
explore solutions for sustained space maneuver that will fly in the 
next couple of years. These missions will allow the Department to learn 
about the maturity of the technology and the industrial base, assess 
military utility, and inform future Service requirements and force 
design.

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