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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE POSTURE HEARING

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE POSTURE HEARING

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC, Thursday, May 15, 2025.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ronny Jackson [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RONNY JACKSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Dr. JACKSON. Good afternoon. I ask unanimous consent that the chair may declare a recess at any time. Without objection so ordered.

Today you will hear from our witnesses let me start by saying really quickly here just to kind of set the room here a little bit. We are having kind of sparse attendance today just so everyone knows. There are a couple of factors in play.

We have a couple factors in play here. One is that votes are cancelled tomorrow so folks are preparing to get out of town right now. And number two is that we have some other hearings going on with all the reconciliation stuff, including several of our members are on the Veterans Affairs Committee, and they have a full committee right now hearing with the Secretary. So we will have members that come and go. And I just want to make sure everybody kind of knew what was going on. But we have myself and the ranking member, so I think we will be good to go.

Okay. Today we will hear from our witnesses on the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, or DIE, and how the DIE is postured for Fiscal Year 2026 and beyond.

The Department of Defense is focused on strategic competition, particularly countering the People's Republic of China and ensuring our Armed Forces have the tools, capabilities, and the training needed to succeed in any environment.

But we know the strategic competition is only one of the many challenges our forces are called to address. We must also ensure that we are supporting all the geographic combatant commands to counter whatever threats may arise.

Intelligence enables leaders to make informed decisions, especially in an increasing complex world, thereby enhancing their lethality, survivability, and capability to provide for our nation's defense. Ensuring we have a Defense Intelligence Enterprise that is capable, robust, and synchronized is critical to all of us.

This is a challenging task at hand and one we look forward to working with the Department on to make sure that we are accomplishing this.

Understanding each of your roles in these efforts will help us ensure your organizations have the capabilities needed and the resources required to accomplish your individual missions.

We look forward to hearing from you about Defense Intelligence Enterprise, the priorities, the strengths, the challenges, and the ongoing synchronization efforts within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

I would like to welcome today's witnesses from across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, Mr. Dustin Gard-Weiss, performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. Welcome, sir. Lieutenant General William Hartman, Acting Commander, United States Cyber Command, performing the duties of the director of the National Security Agency, and chief, Central Security Service and welcome, General. And lastly, but not least, Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

In the interest of time, I ask that the witnesses will keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less so that we have sufficient time for questions and answers.

I would also like to point out that we have an open session and a classified session. What we will do here is as soon as we are done asking questions, which would, based on the limited number of members that we have here, could go quickly, we will go immediately to the classified session and get that started.

If we go a full hour, then we will break because we have votes scheduled at 4 o'clock and then we will come back for the classified section in the classified area after votes.

With that, let me thank our witnesses again for appearing today. And now I recognize Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jackson can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JASON CROW, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Mr. CROW. Thank you, Dr. Jackson, and thank you to our witnesses for their testimony today, for coming in and answering our questions as well.

You know, the focus of this committee, which is a very bipartisan committee, is on the products and deliverables to the folks down range. As a former special operator, and there are many who sit on this committee, this is a mission that we take personally that cuts to the men and women who we know, we serve with, and we obviously have a deep obligation to serve. And those of you who are in uniform I know share that mission deeply. You have committed your lives to that.

We also know the global security environment is increasingly volatile, and we can't overstate the need for an agile, capable and synchronized Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Malign actors like China and Russia are adapting their strategies continuously learn-

ing from lessons in Ukraine and fragile places around the world in conflicts that continue to rear up day-to-day and week-by-week.

That's why the focus of this committee again is making sure that we cut through partisanship. That we focus on the deliverables. And that's why I am also increasingly concerned by some of the proposals and actions of this administration.

Some reports of politicizing personnel cuts, of slashing very critical positions, of potentially manipulating intelligence if it doesn't fit a specific narrative, I want to try to get to the bottom of that. We are not going to do that in this hearing because a lot of that is sensitive stuff. We will take that up under closed session.

But just to let people know, these are important questions that have to be answered because the men and women who are not here, who we have an obligation to serve, obviously deserve the best materials and the best products.

I am also very concerned by some of the proposed cuts of up to 8 percent in some of your agencies. You know, I am for government reform. I am a government reformer. And there are always efficiencies. There is always fat to be found. There is always ways of doing something better.

But, you know, I've been doing this for a while. And, you know, I know that your agencies are some of the leanest and meanest and most efficient within the government. And across the board, an arbitrary cut of 8 percent goes into muscle and bone and not just fat.

And the result of that could be an America that is substantially less safe in operators and military around the world that don't get the products and deliverables that you all are charged with delivering for them.

So those are some of the questions. Those are the things on my mind. Again, we want to be productive. We want to make sure that we keep the men and women in uniform foremost on our mind and just make sure that we work together in a bipartisan way, which is what we always do. That doesn't mean we don't have tough disagreements sometimes. We are no stranger to that here. But, again, with the ultimate mission in mind. And with that, I yield back.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Crow. I appreciate that. And I share Mr. Crow's concerns as well about some of the budget cuts and some of the personnel reductions.

You know, we both understand how important what you do is to the safety, security of our troops and our national security. And we want to make that we can do everything that we can to make sure that those aren't impacting your mission.

With that, we will now hear from our witnesses.

And Mr. Gard-Weiss, we will hear from you and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. DUSTIN J. GARD-WEISS, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Thank you, Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege to appear before you, along with my colleagues, to testify on the current posture of the Defense Intelligence and Security En-

terprise to confront the array of global threats and challenges facing the United States and our allies and partners.

The intelligence and security experts across the Department of Defense work tirelessly to collect, analyze, and address current and future threats in support of the President's priority to achieve peace through strength.

These experts comprise the enterprise that provides intelligence informed insights and options to the Secretary of Defense in support of the Secretary's priorities of restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and re-establishing deterrence.

To that end, the Military Intelligence Program, or MIP, reflects the America First Defense policy agenda and strategic priorities of the President and Secretary of Defense and is developed in close coordination with the director of National Intelligence.

I am joined today by General Joe Hartman, performing the duties of the director of the National Security Agency, and Lieutenant General Jack Kruse, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

They each will offer their perspectives on how the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is aligned to support our warfighters and speak to the threats that our enterprise must address.

Once it is released in the coming weeks, Congress will see how the Fiscal Year 2026 Military Intelligence Program budget request reflects focused investment in capabilities and initiatives to position the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to support the Secretary's three priority lines of effort as outlined in his guidance on the development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy.

Defend the Homeland by providing intelligence support to seal our borders against illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking, advance America's interests in the Western Hemisphere, and enable the Golden Dome, President Trump's next-generation missile shield.

Deter China in the Indo-Pacific through a new generation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities matched to the threat in support of combat-credible military forces in the Western Pacific.

Support increased burden-sharing with allies and partners to maximize return on investment while ensuring America's interests always come first.

The Military Intelligence Programs will emphasize rebuilding our military intelligence capabilities by reviving our defense industrial base, reforming acquisition processes, including a greater focus on better informing Department of Defense investments with intelligence and rapidly fielding emerging technologies.

It prioritizes investments in American workers and technology while maintaining strategic partnerships with key allies. The Military Intelligence Program will develop and retain critical intelligence capabilities domestically, focusing on American interests to maintain our position as the strongest and most lethal force in the world.

I will also note that the Military Intelligence Program will reflect the Secretary's emphasis on strategic discipline and fiscal responsibility, including optimizing and aligning our workforce, and his commitment to passing a financial audit. These and other priorities

reflect the Enterprise's continuing focus on providing decision advantage against near-peer competitors.

In summary, the Military Intelligence Program will support the Department's ability to execute its programs needed to address these global challenges. And your support is critical to achieving the President's vision of peace through strength and ensuring that our intelligence capabilities remain second to none.

I thank the subcommittee for its leadership and support. And I look forward to answering your questions here and in our closed section.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gard-Weiss can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you. I appreciate that.

And General Hartman, you are now recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM J. HARTMAN, ACTING COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND; PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

General HARTMAN. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to be here today representing the men and women of the National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today with my Department of Defense Intelligence Enterprise colleagues.

At the National Security Agency, our workforce supports our policymakers by providing unique, timely, and exquisite insights for the nation's top priorities. As a combat support agency, we provide critical support to our warfighters in countering a multitude of threats facing the nation today and in the future.

The men and women of both Cyber Command and National Security Agency are the key to our mission success and serve as our competitive advantage across all of our mission sets.

China remains our pacing threat. Countering their efforts to challenge the United States as well as their aggression in the Indo-Pacific is a top priority.

United States Cyber Command and National Security Agency are focused on using the full scope of our authorities and the full spectrum capability to counter China's aggression.

We remain ready and postured to contest China's malicious activities across the globe in lockstep with our allies and our United States government and industry partners.

United States Cyber Command and National Security Agency remain focused on achieving mission success across the spectrum of the President's priorities relayed to us in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance.

In developing our Fiscal Year 2026 budget request, in partnership with the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Agency has focused on administration priorities, including defending the homeland, modernizing our capabilities, as well as on our core function of code-making and code-breaking.

As examples, both organizations have taken comprehensive and concrete actions in support of homeland defense, including improving our support to United States Government disruption activities

with cartels operating in Mexico and along thesouthern border and in the development of Golden Dome for America.

Our nation is confronted with an increasingly complex and dynamic threat landscape in the cyber domain. However, I want to assure you today that United States Cyber Command and National Security Agency are at the forefront of this challenge, armed with unparalleled capabilities and insights that place us at an advantage against our most formidable adversaries.

Our dedicated professionals are actively defending the nation, including the Defense Industrial Base, from sophisticated nation-state actors and cyber-attacks. We are not merely reacting to intrusions. We are proactively identifying and analyzing the tools and tradecraft our adversaries are sharing. We share these critical discoveries publicly and with our partners to empower a collective defense that strengthens our nation.

I know this Committee is highly supportive of our missions and our people. And I am thankful for the opportunity to testify in front of you today.

[The prepared statement of General Hartman can be found in the Appendix on page 34.]

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, General. I appreciate that.

And General Kruse, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY A. KRUSE, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General KRUSE. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the worldwide threats to our nation and our posture to address these increasingly complex challenges.

Defense Intelligence Agency is dedicated to providing not only the warfighter, the acquisition community, and the senior administration officials with timely and accurate intelligence, but also to the Congress to assist in your role in countering threats to the United States.

The men and women of Defense Intelligence Agency in 140 nations around the global are focused every day on delivering intelligence that strengthens defense of the United States homeland, enhances warfighter lethality, supports effective and efficient acquisition and countermeasure development, counters foreign intelligence entities attempting to steal United States information or penetrate our networks and supply chains, and increases mission sharing and interoperability with trusted United States allies and partners.

Our efforts are more timely and more important than ever. The current threat landscape is changing more rapidly than at any time in my 35 years in uniform. Our adversaries are deepening cooperation with each other across multiple domains and developing and proliferating advanced technologies which generate novel methods to threaten our interests.

Starting in the United States homeland, we face a twofold threat. First, along our southern borders, transnational criminal organizations, drug traffickers, and terrorist groups are attempting to circumvent host nation laws and evade United States law enforce-

ment, including by exploiting migration flows toconduct activities aimed at harming United States citizens.

Our longstanding cooperation with United States law enforcement agencies has enabled Defense Intelligence Agency to respond quickly. And Defense Intelligence Agency has surged analytic, collection, scientific, and technical capabilities to support United States Northern Command, United States Southern Command, the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Second, our adversaries are pursuing technological advances to improve their ability to directly threaten the United States homeland with military capabilities, including expanding the scale and sophistication of their conventional and nuclear-capable missile systems.

China and Russia are building a diverse array of delivery systems to exploit gaps in current United States ballistic missile defenses. They are developing hypersonic glide vehicles as well as Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems, which are Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, that enter a low altitude orbit before reentering to strike targets.

The Defense Intelligence Agency is currently providing the authoritative intelligence assessments to assist the department in designing and deploying the necessary defenses to support the Golden Dome for America initiative. And, during the future operational phase, Defense Intelligence Agency will provide collection, sensor networks, data fusion, and operational support to detect and counter strategic missile threats to the homeland.

Our priority threat, as described in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, is China. The Chinese Communist Party is rapidly developing military capabilities across all warfare domains, air, land, sea, space, and cyber. And all of these are designed to seize Taiwan by force while preventing intervention by the United States or other third parties.

Along its periphery, China is executing multi-domain pressure campaigns against the Philippines, Taiwan, and others that resist its territorial claims.

In response, our China Mission Group stood up in 2022 to synchronize Defense Intelligence Agency and enterprise analysis, collection, and intelligence operations against the global China threat. And since then, numerous intelligence disciplines have increased collection by at least 30 percent against China. And we have brought new collection and exploitation capabilities online.

Defense Intelligence Agency has also increased analytic production by double digits. And through our Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System, or MARS, and the Common Intelligence Picture efforts, we are delivering next-generation foundational military intelligence to the warfighter and soon will deliver real-time, authoritative, force tracking data layers to enable all-domain, Artificial Intelligence-enabled battlespace awareness, warning, and sensor-to-shooter capabilities.

Additionally, China's advancements in Artificial Intelligence, biotechnology, quantum sciences, and microelectronics are heightening the threat environment and positioning Beijing to dominate a

range of advanced and emerging technologies that are foundational to military innovation.

Beijing is working to integrate Artificial Intelligence into a variety of military capabilities, including uncrewed systems, decision support systems, Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, and influence operations. And to meet this challenge, Defense Intelligence Agency is redesigning its collection strategies and enhancing Measurement and Signature Intelligence, Human Intelligence, and open source capabilities, ensuring that we stay ahead of emerging threats and technological advancements.

Regarding other threat actors, Russia remains a significant, aggressive, and enduring threat to the United States and its neighbors.

Moscow has remained steadfast in its demands for Ukrainian neutrality, authority over the size of Ukraine's armed forces, and is a further partitioning of the Ukrainian state.

Russia will continue its military strategy of attrition, focused on degrading Ukraine's ability and will to resist, while facing its own significant losses of equipment and personnel.

With this threat environment in mind, I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide our insights and our perspectives during our discussions today.

It is an honor to join my colleagues, Mr. Gard-Weiss and Lieutenant General Hartman, before this subcommittee. I am truly privileged to lead the Defense Intelligence Agency and represent its talented and dedicated workforce, who serve with distinction and in harm's way all across the globe.

We are grateful for your support, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kruse can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. And we will begin questions, and I will start by recognizing myself.

Mr. Gard-Weiss, I was just going to ask you a real quick question here. I will just read this real quick because some in our audience may not fully appreciate this. But the U.S. intelligence community is statutorily comprised of 18 organizations, 9 of which are elements of the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Army Intelligence, U.S. Naval Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise, and U.S. Space Force Intelligence. That is a big piece of the pie.

I would like to ask you, and I won't say, are you getting everything that you need because the question to that answer is usually no. But do you think that your piece of the pie, of the Department of Defense budget, is sufficient to do what you are being asked to do today?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Chairman, thank you for the question. I am incredibly proud of the work that our enterprise does today in support of the Department of Defense, our warfighters, our commanders, the Secretary, and the President.

The threat environment that we are facing is increasingly complex. You mentioned in your opening statement that we are facing China, the pacing threat, while we are responding to events around the world.

Right now what I can tell you is that we are postured and aligned to support the priorities of the Secretary. And I look forward to having a conversation with you once we are able to discuss the details of the Fiscal Year 2026 budget about the areas where we are taking risk and how and where we are aligning those resources to ensure that we are taking less risk in priority areas.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I will do everything I can, and I know the other members of this committee as well, to make sure you have everything you need because our warfighters obviously can't do their jobs without the support that you provide.

For General Kruse and General Hartman, I just want to ask you a real quick question. I think you both touched on this or mentioned this in passing. I know, General Kruse, you did with regards to China in your opening statement. But with regards to—you know, and this is partly why I asked this question as well because we understand that the big focus in the military for the last few years has been to pivot and to break our competition away from counterterrorism so on and so forth. But we also understand, and General Kruse and I recently talked about this, that the counterterrorism mission did not go away. It is still there. Support still has to be provided.

But then you have other things that are also, you know, really gaining—I am sure taking lots and lots of your time as they become more and more a part of your day-to-day expectations and, you know, what you are going to have to deal with regards in particular to artificial intelligence, machine-learning, and now open source intelligence.

Can you tell me, are we keeping up with that? And in what ways are you approaching that so that we don't get behind the Chinese on this?

And what is your biggest hurdle here? I mean, what are you not getting or what is your biggest concern regarding what I just mentioned in the day-to-day conduct of your mission? I will start with either one.

General Hartman, do you want to start?

General HARTMAN. Chairman, thanks for the question. From our standpoint, we continue to be laser-focused on China. And our plan to meet that threat is really dependent on technology like artificial intelligence.

We know the Chinese force is larger than us. And the way that we scale to meet that challenge is by leveraging the talent of our workforce and the technology that we have access to, particularly our relationship with private industry, which in the United States, we still have a strategic advantage as it relates to technology like artificial intelligence. And I believe that we will continue to remain so.

Dr. JACKSON. Okay. Before we go to General Kruse, I was just going to ask you real quick, so do you think—are you having any issues with recruiting people? I know that is always an issue. But

are you getting good people that understand these issues, that want to come into the organization, versus going off into the private sector?

And are there any authorities that you don't have? I mean, it is going to cost more money obviously. We understand that. But are there any authorities that you need from Congress that you don't have to stay on top of this and outpace the Chinese on this?

General HARTMAN. Chairman, we continue to get extraordinarily qualified young people from the Services and from the civilian community that are experts in artificial intelligence and high performance computing and machine learning.

We certainly need the resources to provide them the technology that they need to work the problem. We have got a great plan for that. I think we will be able to talk about that plan more when the budget comes out.

But right now I believe that we are very well-positioned. We have a roadmap thanks to our work with Congress. We have stood up an artificial intelligence task force. We have executed over a dozen pilots. And I do believe we are positioned well.

From an authority standpoint, there are really no authorities that we don't have right now in order to execute this plan.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, sir. General Kruse, do you have anything to add on that?

General KRUSE. Just very briefly, I will just echo what General Hartman said. The workforce at Defense Intelligence Agency, we prioritized in the most recent series of personnel reductions and workforce optimization, the retention of our younger, probationary, and recently recruited personnel because of the skills that they bring. And I think that will pay dividends for us in the long run.

To your earlier question about where are we balancing and how are we taking risk? What I would offer is as the Department writ large and as a nation writ large focuses on the priorities that are articulated appropriately by the administration, there is a need for a minimum capability to reside in the low priority theaters against counterterrorism. And I think that is the intelligence community's responsibility to be able to continue to collect at a certain level, to be able to give policymakers the opportunity to address those threats should they arise.

And so for me, it is—the challenge that we have is how do you balance the remaining capability on the lower priority systems while we move out extraordinarily aggressively? And I think when you see the 2026 budget come forward, you will see Defense Intelligence Agency and the administration reaching heavily into the current priorities. And we look forward to additional conversation about how those will balance in closed session.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, General. I will have some more questions I will ask you in the classified session. And I am going to yield back now and recognize Ranking Member Crow for as much time as he would like.

Mr. CROW. Thank you, Chairman. I wanted to start by visiting this 8 percent cut issue. And again, I am in favor of efficiencies and trying to find them where we can find them. And there are places where we could find savings for the American taxpayer.

But this 8 percent cut, and I understand that some of your entities, you are able to define that just by expediting retirements, you know, kind of natural attrition within your organization. But I would love both of you, General Hartman and General Kruse, to very briefly talk about what the impact is going to be as you currently understand it. I know you are still working through it.

I will start with you, General Hartman.

General HARTMAN. Ranking Member, thanks. You know, each year at the National Security Agency, we lose approximately 7 percent of our workforce through natural attrition. The difference in the 8 percent this year is it will be executed over a much shorter period of time, really about a 90 day period. And so that will be impactful.

That being said, all of the personnel that are leaving the agency have done so on a voluntary basis. They have generally been retirement eligible. And they have taken advantage of one of these programs that allow them a bit more advantageous circumstances to leave.

We are a large agency. We have a tremendously skilled workforce. And I do believe that we will have senior leaders that will move into the position and continue to execute the very important mission that we have to defend the nation at the National Security Agency.

Mr. CROW. General Kruse?

General KRUSE. I think I would relay similarly every year we have 4 to 6 percent attrition across the agency. So we will do an accelerated, you know, version of that this year.

Our targets were, as you saw from the Secretary, 5 to 8 percent. We will certainly achieve those percentages. But I have faith that the younger generation will step into those leadership positions.

To answer very specifically what is the impact, for those more senior people that are leaving, what I am losing very clearly are senior leadership. I am losing expertise. And I am losing combat experience. But I go back to there are people that are mid-grade that are going to step into these roles that also have combat experience from our 20 years of Counter Terrorism and will pick up the flag and run with the baton as quickly as possible.

In a closed session, I am happy to tell you where we are taking more risk than others. There will be impact, but I think great Americans are going to step into these roles.

Mr. CROW. And I have no doubt of that. I mean, I have no doubt that these younger talented folks will step up and do their best. You know, I think about my military time, and you all have experienced this a lot more than me. There is this process called the relief in place. When we were in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I was being replaced by a unit, it's called a RIP. And you know this. You RIP out the other unit.

And it is essential that those units overlap. And they have to overlap because the unit that had been there that knew the locals, that knew the threats, that had learned all the lessons from the sector, all of that knowledge had to be transferred to the new unit. And if it didn't, if you didn't have that overlap, that knowledge was lost. And the new unit had to learn the lessons the hard way, sometimes with blood.

So when you talk about expedited losses and retirements and accelerated timelines, to me it seems like we are losing that overlap that is essential, and there is going to be costs to it. General Hartman?

General HARTMAN. Ranking member, thanks for those points. It will be more challenging, all right? And because of that—but we do know who is going to lead the organization. And for the most part, we know who is going to replace them.

And it is my job as the person performing the duties of the National Security Agency to have a plan and to execute a plan that ensures we can continue to provide this fundamentally important mission for the nation.

And I am going to do that. And it will be difficult, but that is what they pay leaders for.

Mr. CROW. And you are a Ranger—

General HARTMAN. I am a Ranger.

Mr. CROW. —like me.

General HARTMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. CROW. So you have been given a mission, and there is no doubt in my mind you will execute it to the best of your ability. But now it is incumbent on us in Washington to make sure that the mission you have been given is actually smart and makes sense. General Kruse?

General KRUSE. One additional thing the Defense Intelligence Agency has in its arsenal is in addition to the headquarters and all the centers that are directly reporting to me, I also man the J2s out of each of the combatant commands as well as the Joint Staff J2. And that allows me when I have holes in expertise in very specific areas to move personnel.

So for example, some of the key leadership positions, they are showing up on the joint staff. We are bringing in personnel from United States Indo-Pacific Command to fill these roles to try and achieve exactly what you are talking about. How do you do a RIP, a replacement in place, when you are not actually in place?

And so we are working through the lessons learned that we have done and as we have led our units in previous ways. What is the modern version of that using modern technology?

Mr. CROW. Well, you all have a very hard task ahead of you. And I am not going to wish you luck because luck doesn't do it. We are going to work hard to make sure that we resist policies that don't make sense and that would put America in danger and that we support you in that mission.

Thank you. I yield back.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Crow. And Mr. Cisneros from California, you are recognized for five minutes.

Mr. CISNEROS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

Lieutenant General Hartman, you stated just a few minutes ago, right, you continue to get top talented individuals that come in, but it does take all of these individuals to kind of get trained up and built up to speed.

And General Nakasone used to always state that, you know, I get these individuals. They are there with me for like two to four years, and it is time for them to transfer, right at the time where they actually start to get good at what they are doing.

I would like to see how we can change that. I don't know if you feel the same way. I am going to assume maybe you do, right, that, you know, you get these individuals built up and they get good at what they are doing and then it is time for them to leave and transfer to something else.

But how can we kind of work with you to kind of get it where maybe we can kind of get out of this mold, which is we do it this way because it is the way the military has always done it. You are in a duty station two to three years, and it is time for you to transfer. But we are losing a lot of that knowledge and kind of shortening up and building that expertise before somebody goes on and moves to something else.

But I would like to hear from you how maybe we can kind of fix that and get to them—instead of getting them to the point where they actually become good, keeping them there and allowing them to build their skills instead of transferring them.

General HARTMAN. Congressman, thanks for the question. I 100 percent concur with your analysis. We have over the last couple of years made significant progress working with the services in order to do really three things.

One is to extend the tour length for an individual after they become fully mission qualified. And that's really important because at that point we can employ an individual, you know, to their greatest capability in order to work the mission. So that is the first piece.

The second is a number of services for key work roles have supported multiple tours in either the National Security Agency or United States Cyber Command.

And then the third piece that we are really working is to ensure synergy between assignment policies at the National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command for the same work role. And so allow a servicemember to move between the agency and the command in a way that best utilizes their training and experience for the good of the nation.

I think we are making good progress. And we have got a plan to continue to do so moving forward.

Mr. CISNEROS. And General Kruse, I am sure the same thing happens in the Intelligence Agency, so I would love to hear your response, too.

General KRUSE. Certainly. The workforce that Defense Intelligence Agency enjoys actually gives us a little bit of a buffer here. Seventy percent of my workforce is civilian and about half of those are former military. So I have this fantastic mix of civilian, former military, and active duty military.

We have worked over the last couple years to start to extend our civilian tours as we rotate around the globe, and several of the services are looking at doing the same thing. So that becomes really important for us.

And then for new mission areas where I have low density, just small numbers, for example in the cyber realm, where we man the Cyber Command G2, but we are also building up some additional capability at Congress' direction, my intent is to have those career paths actually be from service cyber into National Security Agency into Cyber Command into us so we can keep people in the same mission space regardless of tour length.

Mr. CISNEROS. All right. Well, anything we can do to support that legislation-wise or anything, please let us know. We are happy to support that fully.

Lieutenant General Kruse, another question for you. We know during the Trump, the first President Trump Administration, he was at times kind of very cautious about some of the intelligence that he received from our staff and even had a tendency to maybe believe it from somewhere else. And we can either take this here or maybe take it in the next room.

But, you know, how can you work with the administration to ensure that what you are giving them is going to be heard and that it is going to be kind of taken in as for what it is and that this is actually good intelligence that you are presenting them?

General KRUSE. I think you just hit on both sides of the coin. I think we owe a candid intelligence assessments, non-political, the best we can do, the most authoritative regardless of source and then provide that. And it is building a trust relationship from all of our stakeholders.

We have done this for warfighters for many, many years. I have worked with Special Operations Forces. There is a really dynamic feedback loop. You are either good and you are trusted or you are not.

And the same thing is actually okay with the administration. Our goal is to provide the most accurate intelligence that we can and build a trust relationship over time. And that is my intent to do so.

Mr. CISNEROS. All right. Thank you both for your answers. Thank you all for being here. And I yield back.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Cisneros. And I now recognize Mr. Scott from Georgia for five minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, gentlemen for being here. And we all know that our prior president ignored the advice from his military commanders with regard to Afghanistan and other key areas. Fortunately, we have a President now that is willing to secure the border.

And so my question gets to you, Mr. Gard-Weiss. With the President's direction to leverage defense capabilities to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants and fentanyl and other illegal drugs that are killing American citizens across our borders, how is the Defense Intelligence Enterprise providing support to that mission?Mr. Gard-Weiss. Congressman, thank you for the question. I am incredibly pleased with how the Department has shifted and aligned rapidly to support the President's priorities along the border, and that includes the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

We have surged defense intelligence analysts to support both Northern Command as well as Homeland Security CBP in particular, Customs and Border Protection, in the sectors along the border.

We have increased the use of, and actually for the first time, leveraged airborne collection platforms, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms, to enable these missions. And we have increased the priority in both of the agencies to my left and right, increasing both the collection and production in support of the priority, not just with regards to migration, but also with re-

gards to fentanyl and the counter drug or drugs coming from our southern border.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I think it is important that we do anything and everything we can to protect the American citizens from the flow of illegal drugs in this country. A lot of Americans die from fentanyl, and we all know people who have died from it. We had two young people in my area die from it just a couple of weeks ago. And I hope we continue to increase the pressure in the intelligence hearing to stop it.

I want to talk with you about integrating space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance with what we do. The Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Tracking Program provides commercial space-based intelligence to the warfighter. How is the Department of Defense integrating commercial space-based capabilities in its intelligence architecture?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, we absolutely are. We are leveraging commercial space-based capabilities across a range of missions, whether it be for warfighting or for intelligence analytic purposes, both Space Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, and others.

I will also say that we are increasing the application of that. We have seen that play both in terms of commercial, electro-optical with pictures and radar, both in terms of augmenting and complementing our national systems and our government systems, that we have increased the use of that for sharing broader use.

And frankly in some areas, they are just uniquely positioned to support from a Department of Defense standpoint, that includes foundation requirements to support National Geospatial Intelligence Agency for mapping and a variety of other purposes.

So, Congressman, we absolutely are focused on a space-based commercial capabilities and how they can apply to the Department.

Mr. SCOTT. I have one other question, and I want to preface it with this. I know China is the priority right now. But it is not the only mission that I expect we will have. And one of my primary concerns is that as we draw down systems that will work in non-near-peer engagements that we are drawing them down faster than we are putting up systems that will work in the near-peer engagements. So my question for you is did the Department of Defense divest from kind of the traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms and more towards space-based sensors? I mean, how are we making sure that our combatant commanders don't lose their abilities right now that they need today in favor of future missions?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, I believe that relative to China, we are going to increasingly need to increasingly rely on space. But also to your point, we need a range of capabilities to give our combatant commanders options in their theaters. And we are attempting to balance just that.

I believe that there will continue to be a requirement for airborne platforms. But we need to balance that with our investment in space. And I look forward to having a conversation with you and the committee once we are able to discuss our Fiscal Year 2026 budget proposal.Mr. Scott. Thank you. Generals, I have several

other questions. I will wait until we are behind closed doors for that. Chairman, I yield.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Ms. Jacobs from California, you are now recognized for five minutes.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here. So first, the 2025 interim national defense strategic guidance refocuses our intelligence posture towards strategic competition.

How is the Defense Intelligence Enterprise aligning with that new guidance while also ensuring its assessments of major adversaries like China remain objective and free from confirmation bias? Maybe General Kruse, you could start.

General KRUSE. So the interim national security guidance that we are all now transitioning to and implementing takes us down a pathway. I don't know that it changes necessarily who the threats are, but it reframes a little bit about where the focus is and where we need to put a variety of our efforts.

So this somewhat ties back to Congressman Scott's question in my view on the balancing piece. One of the things that the Defense Intelligence Agency in particular owns is a lot of other intelligence disciplines.

So for example, on the airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance layers, we pull that and reduce that in other theaters, Africa, for example. It does become the human-intelligence, the overt, the clandestine human-intelligence, the technical collection, a variety of the other pieces, that if we can stitch together along with commercial and open source data, we start to fill in the blanks to go down that path.

What that does is get back, I think to your question, about how do you avoid confirmation bias? It is making sure that you are willing to go in and check all of the other all source issues. For me, every problem now has to be an all source and both an exquisite intelligence and an open source question to get to the best possible answers.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you. And Mr. Gard-Weiss, same question to you.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. I echo General Kruse's comments with regards to the pacing threat of China and strategic competition.

I think that the alignment to focus on, as we discussed, southern border, other priorities, I have every confidence in our enterprise to ensure that the providing intelligence that is free from bias in support of any decisions that may be made by our warfighters and our leadership in the executive branch.

Ms. JACOBS. Okay. Great. Thank you. And then I want to talk about Syria. And obviously I know we will have to do more of that in closed session. But I actually agree with the Trump Administration lifting certain sanctions to ease Syria's humanitarian crisis.

How do you make sure that you all are getting the most dynamic picture or the most accurate picture in this very dynamic situation of what's happening? If you can, anything you can say in open about sort of how you currently assess the conditions in Syria following this policy change and what possibilities, if any, you have seen since the political opening. Maybe Mr. Gard-Weiss, I will start with you.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman Jacobs, if I might, may I refer to General Kruse initially given this is in his analytical expertise.

General KRUSE. So I would offer there is probably two parts to this. One is how are we making sure we understand what is going on?

When the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization took over the Syrian government, I would offer that is really the substantive change. It is not the policy change. It is now what do we do in response to that?

And we need a good partner that is going to allow us to put pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and Syria and other organizations. And so the policy change is about allowing the ability to be able to do that.

As far as the ability to collect in there if we have a smaller footprint or based on the changes we have seen over time, what I would offer is we are relying heavily on allies and partners. We are going back to some of the activities, some of the human sources, a variety of the things that we did during 20 years of counterterrorism and being able to go back and try and leverage some of those accesses in intelligence themes.Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And to the extent you can talk about it in open session, can you talk about sort of what the threat from extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria currently is?

General KRUSE. I would offer that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is getting stronger globally every day in small areas. It is probably the most competent at external operations planning and is increasing out of Syria in particular or ISI-K, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - Khorasan, as being the most likely to present a threat to Western governments. I think beyond that, I would offer Al Qaeda in particular is more of a regional threat against United States forces in particular areas. And I would offer probably a richer conversation in closed session.

Ms. JACOBS. I will look forward to that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Ms. Jacobs. And Mr. Keating from Massachusetts, you are now recognized for five minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it has been a privilege that I have had being in this committee because gaining a new window insight over the servicemen and women that serve our country.

Mr. Gard-Weiss, in the first few sentences of your testimony, you said it goes to restore warrior ethos. So I would like to ask General Hartman, General Kruse, have we lost our warrior ethos? I haven't seen it. A simple yes or no would be sufficient. Is this lost, our warriors' ethos is lost on our servicemen and women? A simple yes or no will work.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, our force continues to be laser-focused on the threats before us.

Mr. KEATING. General Kruse?

General KRUSE. I am very proud of the warrior ethos that my organization displays every day around the globe.

Mr. KEATING. So, Mr. Gard-Weiss, could you do me a favor and define what you think warrior ethos is? What did we lose here? What was lost? I didn't think it was missing.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, from my perspective, it is about ensuring that we are foresighted on the needs of our warfighter. And that in my mind in a simplistic for our Defense Intelligence Security Enterprise is ensuring that that is consistent with the Secretary's priorities for the department.

Mr. KEATING. So the Secretary defines warrior ethos?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. The Secretary has set strategic priorities for the Department of Defense. My obligation in this seat is to ensure that our Defense Intelligence Enterprise—

Mr. KEATING. No. One of your first sentences is that we have got to restore warrior ethos. I didn't know it was lost. Where is it? What is it?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, I think my statement was referring to the fact that our postured to support the Secretary's priorities, one of which is being to restore warrior ethos.

Mr. KEATING. What is that? It was one of your first statements.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. I look forward to—

Mr. KEATING. What does it mean to you? What does it mean to the Secretary, I guess, that is what it is all about? If it was so important that it was in the beginning and so important that we lost it, you have to tell us what is gone before we can find it again. I mean, you said it has to be restored. Please just enlighten me.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, my obligation is to ensure that our enterprise is postured to support—

Mr. KEATING. I know that you said that. What is warrior ethos you keep talking about? The Secretary keeps talking—I am hearing it all the time. It is lost somewhere. We have to find it. Where is it and what is it?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, I refer back to my statement, which is to ensure that our enterprise—

Mr. KEATING. I was referring back to your statement, too, sir. The first thing was warrior ethos. Look, I am going to move on to another issue that concerns me. It was in all the opening statements, really. And you know, we are facing an 8 percent mandatory personnel cut. And so we have got some hard decisions in front of us.

And you all mentioned about the Golden Dome. So Mr. Gard-Weiss, can you tell me the cost of the Gold Dome, the Golden Dome? I know there is an Iron Dome in Israel. And I have an idea of what that costs. And Israel is very small, land area and United States is expansive. So what is the cost of the Golden Dome?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, I am not aware of what that cost is for Golden Dome. I can tell you that we are postured from a Defense Intelligence Enterprise to provide the intelligence and options in support of homeland defense.

May I also just reference back to your comment regarding 8 percent reduction. I think we have discussed that previously. I would be glad to have a conversation with you about that as well.

I will also just say in that regard that we have presented the risk to the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary for their consideration. We are still waiting for the final budget to proceed. And so to say that it was exactly 8 percent, we will determine what that looks like as we bring the budget forward.

Mr. KEATING. General Kruse, you mentioned one of the greatest advantage you have personnel-wise are the young people on probationary status that you have and the knowledge that they are accruing and what they learned. Can you just comment on the value of those people on probationary status?

General KRUSE. I had approximately 875 people on probationary status. And according to the executive orders and all the guidance that we received, we removed them from service if they had performance issues. And so there are a handful that we asked to depart government service.

I was able to retain then a vast majority of those 875. And these were people that we have intentionally recruited. They have got Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics skills. They have got cyber skills. They have got language skills. They have got really, a passion for service and a patriotism that they want to join the U.S. government and a Department of Defense organization. And I look forward to seeing a part of our—

Mr. KEATING. I just want to thank you for referencing that because these are important parts of our entire federal workforce, not just in the military. And thank you for highlighting that. I yield back.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Keating. Mr. Mills from Florida, you are now recognized for five minutes.

Mr. MILLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first help out some of my colleagues what warrior ethos is. Warrior ethos is prioritizing the warfighter so that they can guarantee they have everything they need to do their job based on meritocracy, not based on diversity, equity, inclusion.

To go to another one of my colleagues who had made a comment that President Trump and the first administration didn't listen to the intelligence that was provided, I would argue that the former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness also didn't listen, which is why we have such a recruitment deficit. So we may want to talk about some of these things in a closed session at any time.

I would like to get to the panel now that we have debunked some of the nonsense on this committee.

How is Artificial Intelligence going to contribute to our ability to thwart a lot of the cyber and a lot of the economic resource and supply chain warfare that China is engaged in? Lieutenant General Kruse?

General KRUSE. So I will leave a little bit of the cyber piece for General Hartman because that is more of his bailiwick. But I would offer Artificial Intelligence is the only way we are going to be able to sift through the large volumes of data that shows what adversary actors, foreign intelligence enterprise agencies and foreign industry and research activity, and what they are trying to deliver and what that technology is trying to deliver.

Artificial Intelligence is critical to help us synthesize that data. And then tip and cue sort of the experts that we have, the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics population that we have, to start to distill where is China taking their activities and then how do we get ahead of that either through supply chain work, through cybersecurity, and a variety of other areas.

The key for me on Artificial Intelligence though is you have got to deploy it. You have got to trust it. And you have got to be able to do independent verification and validation of the outcomes of the Artificial Intelligence, facts that you can trust and its support data.

Mr. MILLS. And General Hartman, if you could just kind of enlighten me on—

General HARTMAN. Congressman, thanks for your question. The force that we face in China is significantly larger than ours, but our workforce is more talented. And our ability to arm that talented that workforce with artificial intelligence is the way we get to scale as it relates to the China problem.

We use it every day. We use it in all of our operations. And I would look forward to in a closed session to be able to cover that in more detail with you.

Mr. MILLS. Thank you so much. You know, obviously the United States Indo-Pacific Command fight is one that we are eyeballing heavily with a potential unification of Taiwan, knowing that that would impact 92 percent of semiconductor and microchip capabilities. Also why it is so important to eliminate the double taxation on Taiwan and be able to do more onshoring, which is truly what the America First agenda is about, is American innovation, American workers, American solutions.

But I am not convinced necessarily based on coastal defense plans, based on seventh fleet capabilities, based on a hub and spoke strategy that China is really willing to go all in on this strategy. I think economically it doesn't necessarily make for a sound strategy. They have too much to lose, I think, from an economic perspective, knowing their economy is far worse off than our own.

I think that—one of my big issues that I face is not understanding how the director of defense trade controls is holding $9 billion, however, of Taiwanese money for defense stuff that has not ever been exported.

Is there any reason that you can think of of why these types of goods and defense materials would be held as opposed to just getting them there to be more of that porcupine, that spiky sense, to prevent China from even thinking it is a plausible three-month strategy?

And I will let you, Mr. Gard-Weiss, if you would like to—just anyone to hit on it. But like you are 100 percent on the warrior ethos stuff. Regardless of what our colleague might have said, that is exactly what the Secretary of Defense is doing right now. And that is exactly what we are getting back to is the old days of be all you can be, which is what it was during my days in the Army.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, thank you. I am not familiar with that issue, so if I can take that for the record, we would be glad to get back to you—

Mr. MILLS. Please.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. —with a response.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

Mr. MILLS. And I would love to see the Pentagon put pressure on the State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to get those DSP-5 approvals and make sure we can export the necessary goods because this wasn't even American. This isn't Foreign

Military Sales or Foreign Military Financing money. This is $9 billion that came from Taiwan to buy goods, like Harpoon and other things, in an effort to try and guarantee a more robust coastal defense plan. And so I would love to see what that looks like.

With that, I think a lot of my other questions are going to be more for the classified section. But I really appreciate your time and keep the warrior ethos running. With that, I yield back.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Mills. And against my better judgment, Mr. Van Orden, you are recognized for five minutes.

Mr. VAN ORDEN. Thank you, I think, Mr. Chairman. I would remind my colleague that we lost Afghanistan and Iraq. And so when we are looking for lessons learned, you know, and how we should structure our forces and do Replacement in Places and everything, we probably should look somewhere else because we lost those wars. And we fought in them. And I don't want to do that anymore.

And so when we look at how we gather intelligence and disseminate it, I think we need to look at it a little differently because we missed the collapse of Vietnam, the fall of the Soviet Union, 9/11, Afghanistan being run over by the Taliban in five minutes, we missed all of that, with over the decades trillions of dollars we invested in the national intelligence architecture, right?

So I am saying we should take a knee and think about how we are doing stuff and apply some non-linear thinking to this problem.

As far as my other colleague, who seemed to have stepped out, if he goes to www.nsw.navy.mil and types in SEAL ethos, he will see a document that me and 62 other SEALs wrote in 2005. And it describes in ad nauseum exactly what the word ethos is.

And you are spot on, dude. Listen, Pete Hegseth is a warrior, warrior. And we need warriors to lead warriors. Enough of this pantywaist stuff going on. Forget about it.

The goal of the Department of Defense needs to be intimidating our adversaries to the point where they don't attack us. But if they decide to, we utterly destroy them and grind them into dust so we prevent other adversaries from attacking us or our allies. Other than that, the Department of Defense should be doing nothing.

So I have a question for you, sir. I am the longest serving enlisted member of the military to ever get elected to Congress, and I was also—did human intelligence at a very high level.

So are there any authorities that you cats are missing that we can grant you congressionally to make sure that you can do your job to protect us?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, thank you—

Mr. VAN ORDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. —for your statement and for the question. I think we can provide some additional details in the closed session.

Mr. VAN ORDEN. Okay. But suffice it to say for this setting, yes, there are some additional authorities that would enable us to ensure that we are able to operate in an increasingly challenging environment, particularly in one of ubiquitous technical surveillance and others—

Mr. VAN ORDEN. Roger that.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. —to enable us to be able to do what we can to operate and succeed in that environment and decrease risk to those individuals who are in harm's way.

Mr. VAN ORDEN. Okay. Check it a notch up. Now here is the one thing we need to talk about. When the Patriot Act came out, I was all for it. I wanted to find everybody that harmed my country and kill them, right? But the problem was, mission creep took place with the Patriot Act when we started spying on American citizens. And everyone knows this to be true.

So how are we going to make sure with additional authorities that you guys don't allow mission creep to take place when we start, you know, spying on American citizens again? What type of oversight things do you have internally and what do you need from Congress to make sure that we are watching the people that are watching people?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, as to the additional authorities I was referring to, they do not fall into that realm of collecting on Americans. But in terms of the Patriot Act—

Mr. VAN ORDEN. It should not. Listen, dude. I know everything this sort of stuff about who can do what legally and all that. I am asking, you know, how do we make sure that there is oversight in place so that it doesn't happen again because it did happen? Let's learn from the past. That is all I am asking.

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Congressman, I agree. We absolutely are learning from the past, have implemented stringent compliance regime. I will let General Hartman speak to how his agency ensures compliance with intel oversight and U.S. person concerns in 12333 and the liken.

General HARTMAN. Congressman, thanks for the question. And I will tell you that the day after I was put in the position of performing the duties of the director of the National Security Agency, that the first thing I spent most of my day on was compliance, right?

I believe we have learned lessons from the past, and we have a rigorous compliance network that ensures we are accessing legally collected information against foreign adversaries operating outside of the United States in that we are doing everything humanly possible to protect the rights of the American citizens.

Mr. VAN ORDEN. General, that is exactly the right answer. So thank you. And again, if we need to do something, you know, restructure something for oversight, just tell us, and we will do it. We want to eliminate the enemy but not at the cost of sacrificing Americans' constitutional rights. So thank you for that.

General HARTMAN. Thanks, Congressman.

Mr. VAN ORDEN. I yield back.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Van Orden. And this is perfect timing. We are about to have to go to the floor to vote. Before we leave, I would like to ask Mr. Crow, do you have any closing remarks you would like to make?

Mr. CROW. I don't, Chairman. I think we can move it along to closed session. Thank you.

Dr. JACKSON. Absolutely. Thank you. And I just want to thank you, the witnesses, once again for your time today. Thank you to the gentlemen here in uniform and everyone else here in the room that is in uniform for your service and your sacrifice. We deeply appreciate it.

We will be adjourning. We will reconvene in Rayburn 2337 immediately after votes on the floor. And with that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MAY 15, 2025

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 15, 2025

Opening Statement
Chairman Ronny Jackson
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations – Hearing
"Defense Intelligence Enterprise Posture Hearing"
May 15, 2025 – 3:00pm – 2118 RHOB

Good afternoon.

The Subcommittee will come to order.

"I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to declare a recess at any time."

"Without objection, so ordered."

Today, we will hear from our witnesses on the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, or DIE, and how the DIE is postured for Fiscal Year 2026 and beyond.

The Department of Defense is focused on strategic competition, particularly countering the People's Republic of China and ensuring our Armed Forces have the tools, capabilities, and training needed to succeed in any environment. But we know strategic competition is only one of the many challenges our forces are called to address. We must also ensure that we are supporting all the Geographic Combatant Commands to counter whatever threats may arise.

Intelligence enables leaders to make informed decisions, especially in an increasingly complex world, thereby enhancing their lethality, survivability, and capacity to provide for our nation's defense. Ensuring we have a Defense Intelligence Enterprise that is capable, robust, and synchronized is critical.

This is a challenging task at hand and one we look forward to working with the Department on. Understanding each of your roles in these efforts will help us ensure that your organizations have the capabilities needed and the resources required to accomplish your mission.

We look forward to hearing from you about the DIE's priorities and the strengths, challenges, and ongoing synchronization efforts within the DIE.

I would like to welcome today's witnesses from across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise:

- **Mr. Dustin Gard-Weiss**, Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security;

- **Lieutenant General William Hartman**, Acting Commander, U.S. Cyber Command; Performing the Duties of Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service; and

- **Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse**, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

In the interest of time, I ask the witnesses to keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less so that we have sufficient time for Questions-and-Answers.

With that, let me thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. I now recognize Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks.

Remarks as prepared for Mr. Dustin Gard-Weiss,
Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security at the
House Armed Service Committee Hearing
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations
May 15, 2025

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you along with my colleagues to testify on the current posture of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to confront the array of global threats and challenges facing the United States and our allies and partners.

The intelligence and security experts across the Department of Defense work tirelessly to collect, analyze, and address current and future threats in support of the President's priority to achieve Peace through Strength. These experts comprise the Enterprise that provides intelligence-informed insights and options to the Secretary of Defense in support of the Secretary's priorities of Restoring the Warrior Ethos, Rebuilding the Military, and Reestablishing Deterrence. To that end, the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) reflects the America First defense policy agenda and strategic priorities of the President and Secretary of Defense and is developed in close coordination with the Director of National Intelligence.

I am joined today by LTG William Hartman, Performing the Duties of the Director of the National Security Agency, and Lt Gen Jeffrey Kruse, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. They each will offer their perspectives on how the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise is aligned to support our warfighters and speak to the threats that our Enterprise must address.

Once it is released in the coming weeks, Congress will see how the Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) MIP budget request reflects focused investment in capabilities and initiatives to position the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to support the Secretary's three priority lines of effort as outlined in his guidance on the development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy:

- **Defend the Homeland** by providing intelligence support to seal our borders against illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking, advance America's interests in the

Western Hemisphere, and enable the Golden Dome, President Trump's next-generation missile shield.

- **Deter China in the Indo-Pacific** through a new generation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities matched to the threat in support of combat-credible military forces in the Western Pacific.

- **Support increased burden-sharing** with allies and partners to maximize return on investment while ensuring America's interests always come first.

The MIP will emphasize rebuilding our military intelligence capabilities by reviving our defense industrial base, reforming acquisition processes including a greater focus on better informing DoD investments with intelligence, and rapidly fielding emerging technologies. It prioritizes investments in American workers and technology while maintaining strategic partnerships with key allies. The MIP will develop and retain critical intelligence capabilities domestically, focusing on American interests to maintain our position as the strongest and most lethal force in the world. I will also note that the MIP will reflect the Secretary's emphasis on strategic discipline and fiscal responsibility – including optimizing and aligning our workforce - and his commitment to passing a financial audit. These and other priorities reflect the Enterprise's continuing focus on providing decision advantage against near-peer competitors.

In summary, the MIP will support the Department's ability to execute its programs needed to address these global challenges. Your support is critical to achieving the President's vision of peace through strength and ensuring our intelligence capabilities remain second to none. I thank the Subcommittee for its leadership and support, and I look forward to answering your questions here, and in our closed session.

BIOGRAPHY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

DUSTIN J. GARD-WEISS
Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

Mr. Gard-Weiss is performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)). Mr. Gard-Weiss assumed the position of the Executive Director in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security (OUSD(I&S)) on February 27, 2023. In this role, Mr. Gard-Weiss supports the USD(I&S) and DUSD(I&S) in exercising authorities related to intelligence, counterintelligence, and security for the Department of Defense. The Executive Director is the OUSD(I&S) senior career official and is focused on the alignment, integration, advocacy, and oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise.

Prior to joining the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gard-Weiss was the Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DDNI) for Policy and Capabilities (P&C) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where he worked to ensure the Intelligence Community (IC) was postured for the threats and challenges of an uncertain future through strategy, policy, and capabilities development. At the ODNI, he also served as the Associate Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Enterprise Capacity helping lead the organization responsible for IC resources, workforce, systems, technology, acquisitions, and infrastructure.

Mr. Gard-Weiss previously served as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Associate Director for Enterprise, responsible for leading and managing U.S. and international Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT) community partnerships, executing the GEOINT Functional Manager authorities, and chairing the U.S. GEOINT Committee of Record. He has worked on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations at increasing levels of leadership and responsibility, including as the Acting Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence and as Assistant Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence / Assistant Head of the Naval Intelligence Activity, delivering comprehensive intelligence to Navy leadership, representing the Navy as a member of the IC, and managing and overseeing the Navy's intelligence activities. He also served at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Interagency Task Force - Combating Terrorism as the Deputy Counter Terrorism (CT) Mission Manager, helping lead the Department of Defense's CT Intelligence Enterprise. Mr. Gard-Weiss began his career as an intern at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) managing the Navy's foreign intelligence relationships.

Mr. Gard-Weiss earned a BA in International Relations from Brown University and an MBA from Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM HARTMAN

ACTING COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND

PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

BEFORE THE 119TH CONGRESS

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

MAY 15, 2025

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to be with you representing the men and women of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today with my Department of Defense Intelligence Enterprise colleagues.

At the National Security Agency, our workforce supports our policymakers by providing unique, timely and exquisite insights for the nation's top priorities. As a combat support agency, we provide critical support to our warfighters in countering a multitude of threats facing the nation today, and in the future. The men and women of both U.S. Cyber Command and NSA are the key to our mission success and serve as our competitive advantage across all of our mission sets.

China remains our pacing threat. Countering their efforts to challenge the U.S. as well as their aggression in the Indo-Pacific is a top priority. U.S. Cyber Command and NSA are focused on using the full scope of our authorities and the full spectrum of our capabilities to counter China's aggression. We remain ready and postured to contest China's malicious activities across the globe in lockstep with our allies and our U.S. government and private industry partners.

U.S. Cyber Command and NSA remain focused on achieving mission success across the spectrum of the President's priorities relayed to us by Secretary Hegseth's Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance. In developing our FY26 budget request, in partnership with the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, NSA has focused on Administration priorities including defending the homeland and modernizing our capabilities, as well as on our core functions of code-making and code-breaking. As examples, both organizations have taken comprehensive and concrete actions in support of homeland defense, including improving our support to U.S. Government disruption activities with cartels operating in Mexico along the Southern Border and in the development of the Golden Dome for America.

Our nation is confronted with an increasingly complex and dynamic threat landscape in the cyber domain. However, I want to assure you today that U.S. Cyber Command and NSA are at the forefront of this challenge, armed with unparalleled capabilities and insights that place us at an advantage against our most formidable adversaries.

Our dedicated professionals are actively defending the nation, including the Defense Industrial Base from sophisticated nation-state actors and malicious cyber-attacks. We are not merely reacting to intrusions; we are proactively identifying and analyzing the tools and tradecraft of our adversaries and sharing these critical discoveries publicly and with our partners to empower a collective defense that strengthens our nation's cybersecurity posture.

I know this Committee is highly supportive of our missions and our people and I am thankful for the opportunity to testify in front of you today.

LTG William J. Hartman, USA

Acting Commander, U.S. Cyber Command; Performing Duties of Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service



Lieutenant General William J. Hartman assumed his role as Acting Commander, U.S. Cyber Command; Performing the Duties of Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service effective April 3, 2025.

He previously served as the Commander, Cyber National Mission Force. A native of Mobile, Alabama, LTG Hartman is a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of South Alabama, where he received his commission through the Reserve Officer's Training Corps as an Infantry Officer.

LTG Hartman served in multiple positions as an Infantry, Military Intelligence, and Cyberspace Operations Officer, with assignments in the United States, Italy, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey.

LTG Hartman has commanded a company, battalion, brigade, and Special Mission Unit, and served as the senior intelligence officer at the battalion and regimental level for the 75th Ranger Regiment, and multiple tours as a SOCOM Joint Task Force S2.

LTG Hartman is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Air Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Military Science, Senior Service College Fellowship with the CIA, and the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. He holds degrees from the University of South Alabama, Air University, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

LTG Hartman's awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf clusters, the Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf clusters, the Joint Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, and the Army Achievement Medal with oak leaf clusters. He is qualified to wear the Ranger Tab, Master Parachutist Badge, the Combat Infantry Badge, and the Combat Action Badge. LTG Hartman was designated as a Distinguished Member of the 75th Ranger Regiment in 2007.

LTG Hartman and his wife are the proud parents of two children.

Lieutenant General Jeff Kruse
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

2025 Defense Intelligence Enterprise Posture Hearing |
Opening Remarks for the 119th Congress | U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations

15 May 2025

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee—thank you for this opportunity to present the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the worldwide threats to our nation, and our posture to address these increasingly complex challenges.

DIA is dedicated to providing not only the warfighter, the acquisition community, and Senior Administration officials with timely and accurate intelligence, but also to the Congress to assist in your role in countering threats to the United States.

The men and women of DIA in 140 nations around the global are focused every day on delivering intelligence that: strengthens defense of the U.S. Homeland, enhances warfighter lethality, supports effective and efficient acquisition and countermeasure development, counters foreign intelligence entities attempting to steal U.S. information or penetrate our networks and supply chains, and increases mission sharing and interoperability with trusted U.S. allies and partners.

Our efforts are more timely and more important than ever. The current threat landscape is changing more rapidly than at any time in my 35 years in uniform. Our adversaries are deepening cooperation with each other across multiple domains, and developing and proliferating advanced technologies which generate novel methods to threaten our interests.

Starting in the U.S. Homeland, we face a twofold threat. First, along our borders, transnational criminal organizations, drug traffickers, and terrorist groups are attempting to circumvent host nation laws and evade U.S. law enforcement—including by exploiting migration flows— to conduct activities aimed at harming U.S. citizens. Our longstanding cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies has enabled DIA to respond quickly. DIA has surged analytic, collection, scientific, and technical capabilities to support USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI.

Second, our adversaries are pursuing technological advances to improve their ability to directly threaten the U.S. Homeland with military capabilities, including expanding the scale and sophistication of their conventional and nuclear-capable missile systems. China and Russia are building a diverse array of delivery systems to exploit gaps in current U.S. ballistic missile defenses. They are developing hypersonic glide vehicles as well as Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems, which are ICBMs that enter a low-altitude orbit before reentering to strike targets. DIA is currently providing the authoritative intelligence assessments to assist the Department in designing and deploying the necessary defenses to support the Golden Dome for America initiative. And, during the future operational phase, DIA will provide collection, sensor networks, data fusion, and operational support to detect and counter strategic missile threats to the Homeland.

Our priority threat—as described in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance—is China. The Chinese Communist Party is rapidly developing military capabilities across all warfare domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyber—designed to seize Taiwan by force while preventing intervention by the United States or other third parties. Along its periphery, China is executing multidomain pressure campaigns against the Philippines, Taiwan, and others that resist its territorial claims.

In response, our China Mission Group stood up in 2022 to synchronize DIA and enterprise analysis, collection, and intelligence operations against a global China threat. Since then, numerous intelligence disciplines have increased collection by at least 30% against China, and we have brought new collection and exploitation capabilities online. DIA also has increased analytic production by double digits, and through our Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System (MARS) and Common Intelligence Picture efforts we are delivering next-generation foundational military intelligence to the warfighter and soon will deliver real-time, authoritative force tracking data layers to enable all-domain, AI-enabled battlespace awareness, warning, and sensor-to-shooter capabilities.

Additionally, China's advancements in AI, biotechnology, quantum sciences, and microelectronics are heightening the threat environment and positioning Beijing to dominate a range of advanced and emerging technologies that are foundational to military innovation. Beijing is working to integrate AI into a variety of military capabilities, including uncrewed systems, decision support systems, ISR, cyber, and influence operations. To meet this challenge, DIA is redesigning its collection strategies and enhancing MASINT, HUMINT, and OSINT capabilities, ensuring that we stay ahead of emerging threats and technological advancements.

Regarding other threat actors, Russia remains a strategic threat to the United States and an aggressive threat to its neighbors. Moscow has remained steadfast in its demands for Ukrainian neutrality, authority over the size of Ukraine's armed forces, and a further partitioning of the Ukrainian state. Absent a negotiated peace deal or ceasefire, DIA assesses that Russia will continue its military strategy of attrition, focused on degrading Ukraine's ability and will to resist, even while facing its own significant losses of equipment and personnel.

North Korea has strengthened its relationship with Russia over the past year due to the conflict in Ukraine. Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with much-needed munitions and more than 10,000 troops in exchange for cash, weapons-manufacturing supplies, a mutual defense treaty, and the possibility of advanced military technology. North Korea probably seeks to use this combat experience to enhance its military capabilities.

Iran, though significantly weakened over the past 18 months, will continue to enable its consortium of terrorist and militant actors, known as the "Axis of Resistance." Iran's longstanding support to the Huthis has enabled the Huthis to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea, U.S. military assets, and civilian port and energy infrastructure across the region. We have surged network development and all-source analysis capabilities to support counter-Huthi operations, which have had a significant but temporary effect on Huthi capabilities.

To meet these needs across the globe, DIA has taken risk in other mission sets. Nonetheless, DIA continues to provide indications and warning on ISIS and al-Qa'ida threats to U.S. personnel, as both groups increasingly decentralize their plotting efforts against the West. ISIS will continue to try to conduct external attacks against Western targets, while al-Qa'ida will focus on localized plotting against U.S. interests abroad with the threat in Africa most acute.

With this threat environment in mind, I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide our insights and perspectives during our discussions today. It is an honor to join my colleagues, Mr. Gard-Weiss and Lieutenant General Hartman before the committee. I am truly privileged to lead the Defense Intelligence Agency and represent its talented and dedicated workforce who serve with distinction and in harm's way all across the globe. We are grateful for your support, and I look forward to your questions.

BIOGRAPHY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY A. KRUSE



Lt. Gen. Jeffrey A. Kruse is the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C. As the Director of DIA, Lt. Gen. Kruse serves as the Department of Defense's senior military intelligence official supporting the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, combatant commands and the Director of National Intelligence by providing intelligence, counterintelligence, enterprise management, acquisition support, secure communications and crisis support to policymakers and warfighters around the globe.

Prior to assuming his role at DIA, Lt. Gen. Kruse served as the Advisor for Military Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence and was awarded the National Intelligence Superior Service Medal. In this capacity—in partnership with executive leaders across DoD and the Intelligence Community—he oversaw and advocated for activities, capabilities and policies to drive enduring DoD-IC integration. Lt. Gen. Kruse also served as the Director for Defense Intelligence for Warfighter Support in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

Lt. Gen. Kruse has extensive operational and combat experience in multiple theaters around the globe. He served as the Director of Intelligence for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, deployed as the Director of Intelligence for Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve in the Middle East and served as the Senior Special Advisor to the Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Throughout his career, Lt. Gen. Kruse commanded Air Force and joint units at the squadron, group and wing levels. Other assignments included serving as Chief of Legislative Affairs for U.S. Strategic Command and as a programmer, panel chair, and head of the Air Force's "Engine Room," which develops the service's annual budget.

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant
December 16, 1990

First Lieutenant
December 16, 1992

Captain
December 16, 1994

Major
January 01, 2002

Lieutenant Colonel
May 01, 2005

Colonel
October 01, 2008

Brigadier General
June 08, 2015

Major General
July 24, 2018

Lieutenant General
August 16, 2020

EDUCATION

1990 Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio
1991 Distinguished Graduate, Intelligence Officer Training, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas
1996 Honor Graduate, Master of Science, Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C.
1997 Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2004 Master of Arts, National Security and Strategic Studies, with Highest Honors, College of Naval Command and Staff, U.S. Naval War College, Distinguished Graduate, Newport, R.I.
2008 Master of Science, National Security Strategy, National War College, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS OR CAREER CHRONOLOGY

1. April 1991–November 1991, Student, Intelligence Officer Training, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas
2. November 1991–December 1993, Chief of Intelligence, 682nd Air Support Operations Center, Shaw AFB, S.C.
3. January 1994–July 1994, Deputy Chief, Training and Tactics, 609th Air Intelligence Squadron, Shaw AFB, S.C.
4. July 1994–August 1995, Chief, Intelligence Section, 78th Fighter Squadron, Shaw AFB, S.C.
5. September 1995–September 1996, Student, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C.
6. September 1996–September 1997, Instructor and Course Supervisor, Intelligence Applications Officer Course, Goodfellow AFB, Texas
7. September 1997–June 1998, Executive Officer, 17th Training Wing, Goodfellow AFB, Texas
8. June 1998–July 2000, Commander, 314th Training Squadron, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
9. August 2000–January 2002, Chief, Strategic and Theater Targeting Sections, then Chief, Hard and Deeply Buried Targets Branch, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
10. January 2002–July 2003, Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief and Chief, Legislative Affairs, USSTRATCOM, Offutt AFB, Neb.

11. August 2003–June 2004, Student, College of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
12. July 2004–April 2005, Chief, Intelligence Force Management Branch, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
13. May 2005–June 2006, Commander, Pacific Air Forces Air Intelligence Squadron, Hickam AFB, Hawaii
14. June 2006–June 2007, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Seventh Air Force, and Deputy Commander, 607th Air Intelligence Group, Osan Air Base, South Korea
15. July 2007–June 2008, Student, National War College, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
16. July 2008–February 2010, Chief, Information Superiority Division, then Chief, C2 and Cyber Superiority Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Arlington, Va.
17. March 2010–June 2010, Chief, Program Integration Division ("Engine Room"), Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Arlington, Va.
18. July 2010–July 2012, Commander, 361st Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
19. July 2012–June 2014, Commander, 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va.
20. June 2014–May 2015, Senior Special Assistant to the Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mons, Belgium
21. June 2015–June 2016, Director of Intelligence, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Southwest Asia
22. July 2016–July 2019, Director for Intelligence, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii
23. July 2019–August 2020, Director of Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence & Security), the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
24. August 2020–February 2024, Director's Advisor for Military Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, McLean, Va.
25. February 2024–present, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, JB Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
1. August 2000–July 2003, Chief, Strategic and Theater Targeting and Chief, Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, then Special Assistant to the CINC and Chief, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., as a captain and major
2. June 2014–May 2015, Senior Special Assistant to the Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mons, Belgium, as a colonel
3. June 2015–June 2016, Director of Intelligence, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), Southwest Asia, as a brigadier general
4. July 2016–July 2019, Director for Intelligence, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii, as a brigadier general and major general
5. July 2019–August 2020, Director of Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence & Security), the Pentagon, Arlington, Va., as a major general
6. August 2020–February 2024, Director's Advisor for Military Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, McLean, Va., as a lieutenant general
7. February 2024–present, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency JB Anacostia-Bolling, as a lieutenant general

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
National Intelligence Superior Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Army Commendation Medal
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award with four oak leaf clusters
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with three oak leaf clusters
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star
Inherent Resolve Campaign Medal with two bronze stars
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Korean Defense Service Medal
Nuclear Deterrence Operations Service Medal
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship (Pistol)
Kuwait Liberation Medal - Government of Kuwait

(Current as of March 2024)

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MAY 15, 2025

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLS

Mr. GARD-WEISS. The Department of Defense (DoD) is working rapidly to enhance the defense capabilities of allies and partners so they can effectively contribute to the collective defense of the Asia-Pacific. Taiwan is a top priority for the Administration, and DoD is using every tool at our disposal, including security assistance and security cooperation authorities such as Presidential Drawdown Authority and the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative, to support Taiwan's self-defense requirements to deter and deny an attack by China in the Western Pacific region. Furthermore, DoD has reviewed its processes and issued guidance to the foreign military sales enterprise to accelerate arms sales to Taiwan to the greatest extent possible. These efforts are essential to re-establishing deterrence and enhancing our collective defense. At the same time, Taiwan must continue to do much more for itself. This starts by increasing its defense spending to a floor of five percent and investing in asymmetric capabilities. [See page 20.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MAY 15, 2025

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY

Mr. KELLY. The University of Mississippi has taken a national leadership role in advancing narrative intelligence (NARINT) through the creation of the National Center for Narrative Intelligence, working with the DoD to analyze and counter malign narratives. Narrative intelligence-the ability to understand, shape, and respond to stories and messaging that influence perception and behavior - is a vital part of information warfare. In light of Russia's use of AI to fuel disinformation, deepfakes, and influence operations, what are your agencies doing to cultivate and integrate NARINT to build national resilience and counter foreign information threats across domains?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. I am not aware of any direct collaboration between specific DoD intelligence components and the National Center for Narrative Intelligence Initiative, nor the explicit application of emerging narrative intelligence concepts. However, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) well understands the concept and engages in related work critical to national security.

DIE analysts routinely assess adversarial perceptions of the United States, our allies, and our partners. This includes analyzing how adversarial beliefs and understanding are shaped by our statements, operations, and activities. The DIE strives to discern and report on changes in these perceptions, enabling us to better anticipate and counter potential threats.

Furthermore, the Intelligence Community dedicates significant resources to differentiating between genuine adversarial actions and statements versus those intended for deception or intimidation. This analysis is crucial for accurate threat assessment and effective strategic decision-making.

Finally, the DIE recognizes the dual-edged nature of artificial intelligence (AI). AI provides valuable tools for our own intelligence analysis and enhances our understanding of adversarial narratives. Simultaneously, we acknowledge the potential for adversaries to leverage AI to create and disseminate disinformation, posing a significant threat to our collective interests. The DIE is actively monitoring and adapting to this evolving landscape.

Mr. KELLY. The University of Mississippi has taken a national leadership role in advancing narrative intelligence (NARINT) through the creation of the National Center for Narrative Intelligence, working with the DoD to analyze and counter malign narratives. Narrative intelligence-the ability to understand, shape, and respond to stories and messaging that influence perception and behavior - is a vital part of information warfare. In light of Russia's use of AI to fuel disinformation, deepfakes, and influence operations, what are your agencies doing to cultivate and integrate NARINT to build national resilience and counter foreign information threats across domains?

General KRUSE. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HAMADEH

Mr. HAMADEH. Mr. Gard-Weiss, The threats we face across continents and domains are unprecedented and growing. Is the Defense Intelligence Enterprise doing enough to integrate reservists and guardsmen as a surge force, or specialist pipeline?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) actively integrates Reserve and National Guard service members, leveraging dedicated programs like the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program with its 28 geographically dispersed Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers. The DIE does so to directly support intelligence training, readiness, and operational requirements of the warfighter.

Mr. HAMADEH. Mr. Gard-Weiss, the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment says that cartels and terror groups are adapting their smuggling methods and routes in response to the heavier U.S. presence on the border. Specifically, how are the cartels and terrorists preparing to counter our new border security? Do our troops on the border have the intelligence resources to stay ahead of them?

Mr. GARD-WEISS. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), often called cartels, function like diversified corporations with various business units. Faced with increased U.S. border security, cartels are diversifying their revenue streams by focusing on drug markets outside the United States while increasing criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and fuel theft within their own territories. To circumvent heightened security, these cartels employ a range of surveillance techniques, including covert observation posts, remote cameras, drones, and monitoring of U.S. airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. Cartels also use advanced cellular telecommunications infrastructure and exploit the vastness of the Pacific Ocean to dynamically shift smuggling routes from land to sea.

Furthermore, TCOs and DTOs employ substitution tactics - replacing regulated fentanyl precursor chemicals with unregulated alternatives to avoid customs inspections. They also use camouflage and obfuscation, such as hiding drugs in legitimate corporate shipments, or exploiting U.S. citizens as unwitting or willing accomplices. Underground tunneling likewise remains a persistent method to bypass sensors.

Despite these challenges, U.S. armed forces are committed to adapting and using intelligence, technology, and tactics to protect U.S. territorial integrity against unlawful mass migration, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and other criminal activities. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise has prioritized this mission pursuant to the President's Executive Orders on securing the southern border and has sourced numerous U.S. Northern Command requests for augmented intelligence support.

Mr. HAMADEH. Gen. Hartman, the Biden-Harris Administration's open border disaster made our country and communities less safe, especially border states like Arizona. In addition to the gangs we are all seeing, are you uncovering more entrenched cartel, foreign intelligence, and terror networks that flourished under Biden, and which must be dismantled? As Director of the National Security Agency and head of CYBERCOM, how do you balance the need to identify these foreign threats inside America, with protecting the Constitutional rights of American citizens?

General HARTMAN. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.]

Mr. HAMADEH. Gen. Hartman, information and psychological warfare is growing in prominence. How are we protecting our open-source analyst networks and AI models from adversarial data poisoning, or synthetic, fake news media manipulation?

General HARTMAN. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.]

Mr. HAMADEH. General Kruse, the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment says that Mexican cartels executed 1600 IED attacks against Mexican security forces in 2024. That's up from just three in 2020 to 2021. A Texas rancher was killed by one in February while driving on his property that straddles the border. Some didn't want to designate these cartels as terror organizations. In other hearings, we talk about shifting our focus from counter insurgency and IEDs, to near-peer nations and drones. But President Trump offered U.S. forces to help Mexico stop these cartels. General, who taught these cartels how to build IEDs, and how advanced are they? What emerging threats do you foresee that could pull America into a counterinsurgency conflict south of the border?

General KRUSE. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.]

Mr. HAMADEH. General Kruse, Syria is in a transition period, from the Assad regime and the Syrian Civil War, to one where President Sharaa is trying to unite the country. Is ISIS filling some of the vacuum in Syria? How can we leverage President Trump's decision to lift sanctions to prevent an ISIS resurgence, and limit more extremist factions from emerging in Syria's new government? How do you see the future of our mission in Syria?

General KRUSE. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.]

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