[Senate Hearing 119-8]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                          S. Hrg. 119-8

                              OPEN HEARING:
                    NOMINATION OF JOHN L. RATCLIFFE
                     TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
                          INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            JANUARY 15, 2025

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
      
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]      


        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
                                __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
58-615                      WASHINGTON : 2025                  
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
       
                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

           (Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.)

                     TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman
                MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            JON OSSOFF, Georgia
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  MARK KELLY, Arizona
MARCO RUBIO, Florida
                  JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
                CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio
                  JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                              ----------                              

                       Ryan Tully, Staff Director
                  William Wu, Minority Staff Director
                     Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                            JANUARY 15, 2025
                           OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                   Page
Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas...........................     1
Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia.......................     4

                                WITNESS

The Honorable John Ashcroft, Former United States Attorney 
  General........................................................     6
The Honorable John L. Ratcliffe, Nominee to be Director of the 
  Central Intelligence Agency....................................     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    13

                         SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............    42
Additional Pre-Hearing Questions.................................    66
Post-Hearing Questions...........................................   121

 
 OPEN HEARING: ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN L. RATCLIFFE, TO BE DIRECTOR, 
                      CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

                      WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15, 2025

                                       U.S. Senate,
                          Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Room 
SD-G50, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Cotton, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cotton (presiding), Warner, Collins, 
Cornyn, Moran, Lankford, Rounds, Young, Rubio, Heinrich, King, 
Bennet, Gillibrand, Ossoff, Kelly.

                          PROCEEDINGS

    Chairman Cotton. This hearing will come to order.
    We are holding this hearing before President-Elect Trump's 
Inauguration, therefore, we have not yet received Mr. 
Ratcliffe's nomination to be Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
    Procedurally, the Senate must receive a nomination before 
we can vote on and report it out of committee; and therefore we 
are having this hearing in expectation that the nomination will 
follow on Monday.
    When formally nominated by the President after his 
inauguration, the Committee will convene a business meeting to 
vote on the nomination and report it to the full Senate.
    As an initial matter, Committee rule 5.4 states that no 
confirmation hearing shall be held sooner than seven calendar 
days after receipt of the nominee's background questionnaire, 
financial disclosure statement, and responses to additional 
prehearing questions unless the time limit is waived by a 
majority vote of the Committee.
    While the Committee received Mr. Ratcliffe's background 
questionnaire and responses to additional prehearing questions 
more than seven days in advance, the committee received a 
financial disclosure statement on January 14th. I therefore ask 
Members for unanimous consent to proceed with the hearing.
    Hearing no objection, we have consent to proceed.
    I want to remind all those in attendance that while they 
are welcome to observe today's hearing, I will not allow 
disruptions by the audience.
    Audience members may not verbally or physically distract 
from the hearing, including by shouting, standing, raising 
signs, or making gestures that block the view of other members 
of the audience. Those who do so will be immediately removed 
from the room.
    Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the 
Committee to begin consideration of Mr. Ratcliffe's 
qualifications and to allow for our Members' thoughtful 
deliberation. To date, Mr. Ratcliffe has provided substantive 
written responses to more than 170 questions presented by the 
committee. Today, of course, Members will be able to ask 
additional questions and hear from Mr. Ratcliffe in both this 
open session and in closed sessions.

   OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COTTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            ARKANSAS

    Chairman Cotton. I want to welcome everyone to this hearing 
on President Trump's nomination of Mr. Ratcliffe to be our next 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, welcome back to the Intelligence Committee. 
I also want to welcome your wife Michele and thank her and your 
daughters for the sacrifices they have made across a lifetime 
of public service.
    Former Attorney General John Ashcroft is also back before 
the Senate. Mr. Attorney General, I am sure your being here 
makes you nostalgic for your own confirmation process a few 
years back. (Laughter.)
    John, welcome. We look forward to your remarks.
    I want to acknowledge also my predecessor, Vice Chairman 
Warner. Senator Warner and I have worked together collegially 
over the years even when we have disagreed strongly. I expect 
this spirit of comity to continue and not just between the Vice 
Chairman and me, but across our committee.
    I also want to thank Senator Rubio for his service on the 
Committee. He remains a member of the Committee, but he is 
otherwise detained this morning at his own confirmation 
hearing. He has been a trusted colleague and respected leader 
on the Committee for years. We will miss him, but we also look 
forward to his distinguished service as our next Secretary of 
State.
    I want to extend my special thanks to our Committee senior 
staff on both sides as well. They put in yeoman's work over the 
holidays to be sure we could promptly move forward Mr. 
Ratcliffe's nomination.
    I want to begin with a few observations from my decade of 
service on the Intelligence Committee. The men and women of the 
intelligence community (IC) perform vital work to protect our 
Nation. They often serve in dangerous and squalid conditions. 
Their successes are seldom celebrated and even known. Unlike 
our troops, no one buys them beers in the airport. Sometimes 
their families don't even know what they do. So let me say to 
them today, on behalf of this Committee and a grateful nation: 
We respect you, we appreciate you, and we thank you.
    But we also need more from you. In these dangerous times, 
our intelligence agencies haven't anticipated major events or 
detected impending attacks. In just the last few weeks, the 
members of this Committee and, I presume, the President, had no 
forewarning of the New Orleans terrorist attack or the collapse 
of the Assad tyranny in Syria. The same goes for Hamas's 
October 7th atrocity against Israel in 2023.
    I could give other examples, but suffice it to say, we are 
too often in the dark. While this goes for the entire 
intelligence community, the problem is especially acute at the 
CIA which remains after all the ``central'' intelligence 
agency. The CIA needs to get back to its roots, but must 
overcome several challenges to do so.
    First, the CIA has neglected its core mission--collecting 
clandestine foreign intelligence. Put more simply, stealing 
secrets. Intelligence collection is the main effort. Every 
other job is a supporting effort. If you don't collect 
intelligence by, say, handling spies or hacking computers, you 
should ask yourself how you support those who do or how you 
harness and use what they produce.
    I have seen way too many reports over the years with 
phrases like ``according to,'' ``based on,'' ``judging by,'' 
followed only by diplomatic accounts and press reports. In 
other words, not intelligence. And it has gotten worse over the 
last four years. Those sources are not unimportant, but without 
clandestine intelligence, we might as well get briefed by the 
State Department or a think tank or just read the newspaper.
    Second, the CIA has become too bureaucratic. Now I realize 
that Allen Dulles probably had the same complaint just five 
years after the CIA was created. But this has also gotten worse 
in recent years, in no small part thanks to former Director 
Brennan's so-called ``modernization.'' Lines of authority have 
grown blurry. Talkers have replaced doers and managers with no 
field experience have taken over operational roles, and more. 
Much like our military, the tooth-to-tail ratio at the CIA is 
badly out of balance.
    Third, the CIA's analysis and priorities have been 
politicized. Intelligence analysis all too often has aligned, 
curiously, with the Biden administration's policy preferences: 
The Afghan army is strong and cohesive. Ukraine's army will 
collapse within days of Russia's invasion. Israel can't 
possibly destroy Hamas or Hezbollah. Iran's air defenses are 
mighty and fearsome. Time and again, the CIA has produced 
inaccurate analysis that conveniently justifies President 
Biden's actions or as often his inaction.
    Likewise, the CIA's misplaced priorities have yielded too 
many reports on matters like the prospects for gay rights 
legislation in Africa or climate change. These topics may have 
their place in government, but it is not at the CIA.
    And I certainly hope to never again see another video 
statement or social media post from the CIA about diversity or 
equity or inclusion. If you wonder why our intelligence 
Agencies struggle to collect intelligence, consider this fact: 
The CIA offered to pay diversity consultants three times as 
much as a new case officer. I am sorry, but if you feel like 
you need a diversity consultant or an affinity group or your 
pronouns in an email, maybe the CIA isn't for you. This job 
isn't about your identity or your feelings. It is about our 
Nation's security.
    Fourth, the CIA dabbles too much in questions of political 
judgment, even as it neglects its core mission of intelligence 
collection. Some of the blame, to be fair, lies with us. I hear 
questions from this Committee about some nation's will to fight 
or if we do this, that, or the other thing, what will Vladimir 
Putin or Xi Jinping do in response. These aren't really 
intelligence questions but rather matters of statesmanship and 
political judgment or prudence--the statesman's supreme virtue. 
I would observe that Lincoln and Churchill didn't have our 
vast, modern intelligence apparatus, but they were pretty good 
wartime leaders because they were great statesmen.
    It is the CIA's responsibility to provide us and the 
President with timely, relevant secrets; for example, that 
Russia has mobilized multiple divisions on Ukraine's border at 
Christmastime and sent perishable fresh blood supplies to the 
front. It is our job to use that information to discern the 
inherent logic of events, not to defer passively to the 
intelligence community's judgment that it is a convenient 
conclusion that Putin hadn't yet decided to invade just days 
before the obviously impending invasion.
    Fifth, the CIA needs to become bolder and more innovative 
in covert action. I have seen successful covert action 
programs. I have seen debacles. The latter are usually caused 
by ill-advised constraints by political leaders or when a 
President used covert action as a substitute for policy and not 
a supplement for policy. I will have to save more for our 
closed session, of course, but let's for now say the timid 
indecision that has characterized the Biden administration's 
overt actions extends to its covert actions.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, you have a big job ahead of you. The Nation 
needs a strong, capable, and aggressive CIA. I believe the men 
and women you will lead want to serve in just that kind of 
Agency. They joined the CIA after all, not a church choir or a 
therapy session on a college campus. They and the Nation are 
counting on you to deliver badly needed reforms and on this 
Committee to ensure you do.
    I will now recognize the vice chairman for his opening 
remarks.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            VIRGINIA

    Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Chairman, first of all, 
congratulations on becoming Chair of what I think is the most 
important Committee in the Senate. And I look forward to 
working with you in the kind of traditions that we have 
maintained in the now close to 15 years that I have been on the 
Committee. So congratulations, Tom.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Congratulations 
on being nominated to be Director of the CIA. It was a pleasure 
to meet your wife. And I think you brought a great introducer 
in the former Attorney General Ashcroft. Pleasure to see you, 
sir.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with 
you last month and hear your views. You previously served on 
the House Intelligence Committee and obviously as Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI), so you obviously have an 
appreciation for the work done by our intelligence community 
generally and more specifically, the CIA. If confirmed, I 
believe you will be the first person who actually has served as 
both as DNI and head of the CIA.
    Echoing a little bit of what Chairman Cotton said, the 
Agency you have been nominated to is facing an unprecedented 
number of challenges which I believe as well requires a great 
deal of leadership. These challenges ranging from the conflicts 
in Ukraine and Gaza, competition with China especially with 
respect to artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced 
technologies, the persistent threat of international terrorist 
organizations, and a constant theme of cyber threats from 
nation-states and their actors attacking our critical 
infrastructure to, candidly, just run-of-the-mill criminal 
ransomware actors.
    Adding to all this has been a focus of mine and I know so 
many of us on the committee, that the revolutions in technology 
from AI to synthetic bio to advances in energy require, I 
believe, fundamental changes in how we operate.
    In effect, it is the very fabric of warfare in many ways 
that is changing. I believe very strongly that national 
security is no longer determined by simply who has the most 
powerful ships and tanks, but who also will lead in this 
technology competition from semiconductors to drones to 
synthetic bio.
    I believe--and we have made some progress on this, but I 
still think we have a long way to go--that the IC must continue 
to adapt to these challenges. In particular, it must be better 
organized to collect on the development and use of advanced 
technology by our adversaries, because they pose a dramatic 
threat to United States leadership. The truth is, if we are not 
staying ahead of that, their ability for these foreign nation-
states to use technology to get us in a stranglehold could be a 
huge, huge challenge.
    During such times it is also vital that we are able to 
recruit and retain the best possible talent for the IC. That 
starts with ensuring the workforce feels respected and valued. 
I am very concerned that the President-elect has continued to 
engage in undeserved attacks on the professional women and men 
of our intelligence agencies. These comments I do think affect 
the morale of these men and women who, as Senator Cotton said, 
they don't get the recognition or get their beer bought for 
them. They have to toil in anonymity. But they have, I believe 
consistently, regardless of which party is in power been 
willing to defend our Nation.
    Unsurprisingly, particularly public comments from our 
leaders have a negative effect on the recruitment and retention 
of the talent of these critical men and women of the IC.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, today is your opportunity to reassure the 
men and women of the CIA that they not fear reprisal for being 
willing to speak truth to power. The most critical role of the 
IC is speaking truth to power. I need your commitment that you 
will not fire or force out CIA employees because of their 
perceived political views and that you will not ask these 
employees to place loyalty to a political figure above loyalty 
to country. And I need to hear your plan on how you will 
reassure the CIA workforce on these issues.
    Also on the personnel front, I am concerned that we 
continue to hear from CIA officers who have been victims of 
sexual assault at work as well as those suffering from the 
lasting effects of anomalous health incidents (AHI). I would 
like to hear your plan for ensuring that those who come forward 
about being hurt in the line of duty are taken seriously and 
provided the care and the attention they deserve.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, if confirmed, you will be sitting at a 
critical intersection between intelligence and policymaking. 
Your job will be to give the President the best professional 
judgment of America's intelligence experts at the CIA, even 
when that judgment might be inconvenient or uncomfortable. I 
need your public assurance that you will always seek to provide 
unbiased, unvarnished, and timely intelligence assessments to 
the President, to the Cabinet, to his advisers, and to those of 
us in Congress.
    I need your assurance that this intelligence will represent 
the best judgments of the CIA, again, regardless of political 
implications or views.
    And though we should not need to say it out loud, I will 
also need your assurance that you will work to appropriately 
protect our intelligence community's sources and methods.
    Thank you again for your service so far. Thank you for 
providing what I know will be good testimony today, and I look 
forward to working with you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
    Former Attorney General John Ashcroft kindly offered to 
introduce his former colleague when Congressman Ratcliffe was 
nominated to be the Director of National Intelligence in 2020, 
but COVID forced him to do so only by letter.
    Fortunately, we have another chance to hear from him today. 
So I am pleased to recognize Attorney General Ashcroft for his 
introduction.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ASHCROFT

    Mr. Ashcroft. Good morning, Chairman Cotton and Vice 
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    Members of the Committee: I want to thank you for your 
serious consideration and attention to the constitutional 
responsibility of confirming high ranking executive branch 
officials, and it is an honor for me to participate with you by 
my appearance here today.
    Testifying and sharing my profound support for the 
nomination of the Honorable John Ratcliffe as the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency is something for which I am 
deeply grateful. Good national security decisions proceed from 
the combination of valid intelligence, information, and 
considered judgment. Integrity is an indispensable imperative 
for intelligence--the best friend of national security. 
National security is the singular--unfortunately, is the 
singular portfolio most allergic to the infection and 
devaluation that results from inaccuracy and distortion. For 
high-quality decisionmaking, sound intelligence must never be 
diluted or contaminated by personal bias or political 
predisposition.
    John Ratcliffe's record of upholding the Constitution and 
enforcing the law, including his farsighted work in the 
intelligence field recommends him supremely to serve America as 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have known 
and worked with John for almost decades. I know of no person--
no person of a higher commitment to integrity. I have seen him 
speak the unvarnished truth to those he works with and those he 
works for, whether senior government officials or corporate 
CEOs.
    As a Member of the Congress, Ratcliffe's career stands as 
an outstanding record of public service. He is consistently 
well prepared, tough, but he is a tough and fair interrogator, 
fundamentally focused on the Constitution, never involving 
himself in personal attacks.
    John has served on the House Intelligence, Judiciary, 
Ethics, and Homeland Security Committees and as chairman of the 
House Homeland Security Committee's Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee.
    In the Department of Justice, John served as a Federal 
prosecutor, first as an assistant U.S. Attorney and chief of 
anti-terrorism and national security for the Eastern District 
of Texas; then as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Texas, where he pursued more than 30 national security and 
terrorism related matters. After his service as U.S. Attorney, 
I had the privilege of working with John in the Ashcroft, 
Sutton and Ratcliffe law firm where he focused on government 
and internal investigations, homeland security, and foreign 
corrupt practices law.
    In professional moments, both public and private, I have 
seen John's thoughtful, decisive, yet humble leadership. He is 
a careful and willing listener, skilled at proceeding and 
processing with different voices in complex situations. He is 
comfortable in being held to account, and he will require those 
in the Agency to be similarly accountable.
    Over the past 15 years, he served in crucial roles as both 
a developer and consumer of intelligence. John therefore brings 
to the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency a relevant reservoir of experience as well as sound 
judgment on an array of issues related to national security. He 
understands that the intelligence community exists to secure 
the liberties and freedoms of Americans--liberties and freedoms 
that he holds in highest regard.
    As a prosecutor, John dealt with national security and 
terrorism-related matters. This ranged from domestic and 
international terrorism to drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
and the transnational criminal organizations that threaten us 
in ways that we have previously not been accustomed to.
    During recent decades of our Nation's most elevated concern 
regarding terrorism, John developed excellent relationships 
with the international intelligence sources in order to aid 
America. That experience will serve him well in fostering 
appropriate cooperation with the intelligence agencies of our 
allies.
    Under John's leadership as Chairman of the House Homeland 
Security Committee's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Protection Subcommittee, he forged policies and statutes which 
will strengthen and do strengthen our Nation's intelligence 
gathering capacity.
    He is thoroughly conversant with a wide variety of national 
security topics with a focus on emerging and expanding 
cybersecurity threats. This includes investigating foreign 
cybersecurity interference, reviewing the Department of 
Homeland Security's efforts to secure government networks, 
evaluating the cyber threat intelligence integration center, 
the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the continuous diagnostics and 
litigation program together with the interagency coordination 
on cybersecurity.
    John enlisted bipartisan support to build a national cyber 
intelligence infrastructure to protect our country. President 
Obama signed a significant cybersecurity bill that John co-
authored: The National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act 
which passed the House of Representatives with an overwhelming 
bipartisan vote.
    His record reflects a commitment to continued building a 
forward-looking intelligence community that is integrated and 
coordinated. His experience signals his possession of the 
skills necessary to lead the intelligence community in 
effectively addressing proliferating national security threats.
    John Ratcliffe is capable of and committed to delivering 
the most insightful, accurate intelligence and 
counterintelligence possible. He will supply decisionmakers 
with excellent information upon which they can base sound 
judgments safeguarding our national security.
    Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, thank you for what I 
consider to be a privilege of communicating to you my 
unreserved endorsement of John L. Ratcliffe for the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.
    I understand that Mr. Ashcroft will now step away?
    Mr. Ashcroft. I will join the citizens.
    Chairman Cotton. You are more than welcome to do so.
    Mr. Ashcroft. And observe from the high perch of 
citizenship the rest of the proceedings. And I pray God's 
blessing on this Committee. I am very, very pleased that the 
Committee is seriously considering the statement both of the 
vice chairman--we used to call that person the ranking member, 
but I think he is vice chairman now--and the chairman.
    I am grateful to you. Thank you for allowing me to be here.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, before we move to your opening statement, it 
is the custom of the Committee to ask a series of questions of 
all nominees. Nothing personal about you.
    So first off, do you solemnly swear that you will give this 
Committee your full and truthful testimony today and in the 
future?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I do.
    Chairman Cotton. Again, we have five standard questions. A 
simple ``yes'' will do. A ``no'' will require further 
explanation, if you needed help with the test.
    First, do you agree to appear before the Committee here and 
in other venues when invited?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Chairman Cotton. If confirmed, do you agree to send 
officials from your agency to appear before the Committee and 
designated staff when invited?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Chairman Cotton. Third, do you agree to provide documents 
and any other materials requested by the Committee in order for 
it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Chairman Cotton. Fourth, will you ensure that your office 
and your staff provide such material to the Committee when 
requested?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Chairman Cotton. Finally, do you agree to inform and fully 
brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this 
Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather 
than only the chairman and the vice chairman?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Chairman Cotton. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Ratcliffe. The floor is yours for your opening statement.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN L. RATCLIFFE

    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you very much, Chairman Cotton, Vice 
Chairman Warner, and distinguished Members of the Committee for 
the opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee 
for the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have 
enjoyed meeting with each of you individually, and I look 
forward to answering your questions today.
    Thank you to my friend and mentor former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft for being here today, and for his gracious and 
humbling remarks. Sir, I am forever grateful for your faith in 
me.
    Thank you to Director Burns and your excellent team at the 
CIA for your commitment to a smooth and professional 
transition.
    I would like to recognize my amazing family, my wonderful 
wife Michelle, our two daughters, Riley and Darby, my five 
brothers and sisters, and watching from above, my parents Bob 
and Kathie Ratcliffe. I simply have no words to adequately 
express my gratitude to all of you.
    Finally, thank you, President Trump, for the great honor of 
nominating me to lead the world's premier intelligence agency. 
I am grateful for the opportunity to serve under you once 
again, and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help you 
protect the American people and advance America's interests.
    Today, we face what may be the most challenging national 
security environment in our Nation's history. The Chinese 
Communist Party remains committed to dominating the world 
economically, militarily, and technologically. Transnational 
criminal organizations are flooding American communities with 
violence and deadly narcotics. The Russia-Ukraine war wages on, 
spreading devastation and increasing the risk of the United 
States being pulled into a conflict with a nuclear power. The 
Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies continue to export 
mayhem across the Middle East, and Iran is closer to nuclear 
breakout than ever before. North Korea remains a destabilizing 
force. Increasing coordination among America's rivals and 
adversaries threatens to compound the threats that they each 
pose to us individually. Numerous terrorist groups and other 
non-state actors, some of which have even crossed our southern 
border, still pose a persistent threat to our people and our 
homeland.
    These threats converge at a time of rapid technological 
change. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and 
quantum computing will define the future of national security, 
geopolitical power, and human civilization.
    Ubiquitous technical surveillance is presenting 
unprecedented challenges to one of the CIA's core missions, 
collecting human intelligence. In short, the challenges are 
great and increase the necessity of confirming a CIA Director 
who is prepared on day one to take them head on.
    For roughly a quarter of a century, I have devoted my 
professional life to U.S. national security. I served as the 
chief of antiterrorism and national security and then U.S. 
Attorney for of the Eastern District of Texas. As a 
Congressman, I was a Member of the House Intelligence, Homeland 
Security, and Judiciary Committees. As Director of National 
Intelligence, I had the privilege of working closely with 
President Trump and oversaw the 18 agencies of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, including the Agency I now have the 
honor of being nominated to lead.
    In each of these roles I served with fidelity to the 
Constitution and the strict adherence to the rule of law, and I 
have always prioritized American civil liberties, something I 
will continue to do, if confirmed to serve again.
    Each of these experiences has shaped me as a leader and 
national security professional. Together they have prepared me 
to steer the CIA through a tumultuous time in the world and 
toward a future in which the CIA's mission will be both more 
difficult and more indispensable than ever before.
    If confirmed, my leadership at CIA will focus on setting 
and communicating priorities and demanding relentless 
execution. Above all will be a strict adherence to the CIA's 
mission. We will collect intelligence, especially human 
intelligence, in every corner of the globe, no matter how dark 
or difficult. We will produce insightful, objective, all-source 
analysis, never allowing political or personal biases to cloud 
our judgment or infect our products. We will conduct covert 
action at the direction of the President, going places no one 
else can go and doing things no one else can do.
    To the brave CIA officers listening around the world, if 
all of this sounds like what you signed up for, then buckle up 
and get ready to make a difference. If it doesn't, then it is 
time to find a new line of work.
    We must be the ultimate meritocracy. I will 
unapologetically empower the most talented, hardest working, 
and most courageous risk takers and innovators to protect the 
American people and advance America's interests. And I will not 
tolerate anything or anyone that distracts from our mission.
    It would be inappropriate in an unclassified setting for me 
to discuss in detail some of my views on intelligence 
collection priorities, but I am happy to do so in the 
classified hearing that will follow this one.
    However, if confirmed, there are several organizational 
priorities that I plan to focus on that I would like to discuss 
here.
    The first is talent. As you are all no doubt aware, the CIA 
has a remarkably low turnover rate among its workforce. This 
shows the CIA's success in attracting mission-focused public 
servants who find deep meaning and value in the unique work 
they are privileged to do every day. But in some cases, it also 
suggests that complacency is tolerated. High performers hate 
nothing more than mediocrity and nothing poisons a high-
performance workplace culture than leaders who don't hold team 
members accountable when they don't meet expectations. The CIA 
must be a place that incentivizes and rewards meaningful 
contributions to our Nation's security and holds accountable 
low performers and bad actors who are not focused on our 
mission.
    It has been said that the CIA's World War II predecessor, 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), described its ideal 
recruit as ``a Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.'' This 
sentiment is the essence of what today's CIA must recapture, 
but we must find that fighting spirit in recruits whose 
talents, skill sets, and backgrounds are more varied than ever.
    I will also work to develop pathways for mid-career 
professionals with highly sought after skills to fill gaps in 
the Agency's workforce and for CIA officers to do rotations in 
the private sector that broaden their perspectives.
    I am committed to protecting and supporting CIA's 
workforce. We will fully investigate workforce health and 
wellness issues, including anomalous health incidents (AHI). 
Our officers must embrace a culture of toughness and resilience 
but we must also be clear that when they put themselves in 
harm's way we will make sure they are taken care of when they 
return home. We owe that to America's men and women in uniform, 
and we owe it to the silent warriors who risk their lives in 
the shadows as well.
    Altogether, these talent strategies will be particularly 
important in addressing another organizational priority that I 
will focus on--technology. At the CIA technology is both a tool 
and a target. As a tool, technology is baked into nearly every 
facet of the Agency, from the spy gadgets imagined and created 
by the Directorate of Science and Technology and used by the 
Directorate of Operations, and the cyber capabilities deployed 
by the Directorate of Digital Innovation to the Directorate of 
Support using new technology tools to support our workforce and 
the AI-powered large language models used by the Directorate of 
Analysis. But over the decades, as technological innovation has 
shifted more and more from the public sector to the private 
sector, the CIA has struggled to keep pace. As a target, 
technology is more important than ever, whether it is 
understanding our adversaries' capabilities in AI and quantum 
computing or their developments in hypersonics and emerging 
space technologies or their innovations in counterintelligence 
and surveillance, the recent creation of the Agency's 
Transnational and Technology Mission Center was an 
acknowledgment of that fact, but much more has to be done 
because our adversaries, and one in particular, that I will 
discuss now, understand that the Nation who wins the race of 
emerging technologies of today will dominate the world of 
tomorrow.
    Which brings me to the need for the CIA to continue in 
increasing intensity to focus on the threats posed by China and 
its ruling Chinese Communist Party.
    As DNI, I dramatically increased the intelligence 
community's resources devoted to China. I openly warned the 
American people that from my unique vantage point as an 
official who saw more intelligence than anyone else, I assessed 
that China was far and away our top national security threat.
    President Trump has been an incredible leader on this 
issue, and it is encouraging that a bipartisan consensus has 
emerged in recent years. The recent creation of the CIA's China 
Mission Center is an example of the good work that must 
continue.
    In closing, the Agency must provide the President and U.S. 
policymakers with the best possible intelligence to inform 
their decisionmaking in hopes of preserving peace and spreading 
prosperity. This is our once in a generation challenge. The 
intelligence is clear. Our response must be clear as well.
    I am honored for the opportunity to appear before you 
today, and I thank you for your consideration of my nomination 
to be Director of the CIA, and I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of the witness follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.
    Colleagues, I will remind you that we will move on to 
questions now for five minutes each in order of seniority at 
the gavel. When we conclude this open session will have a 30-
minute break and move directly into a closed session.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, the Director of the CIA has four 
responsibilities under the law: No. 1, collecting foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence; No. 2, correlating, 
evaluating, and disseminating that intelligence; No. 3, 
directing and coordinating all human intelligence collection 
outside the U.S., and No. 4, performing other intelligence 
functions as directed by the President.
    The way I count those four responsibilities, at least three 
of them are about collecting foreign intelligence. And I said 
in my opening statement that collecting foreign intelligence is 
the core mission of the CIA. Do you agree that it is the core 
mission of the CIA to aggressively and unapologetically collect 
foreign intelligence; which is to say, steal the secrets of our 
adversaries to protect this Nation?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I do, Senator. That is why in my opening I 
said we would go to every corner of the globe no matter how 
dark or difficult to do that. Look, I know this Committee knows 
as well that on this issue with regard to HUMINT, the 
collecting of human intelligence, we are not where we are 
supposed to be. And other agencies collect HUMINT, but CIA is 
the world's premier and must be the world's premier clandestine 
collector of human intelligence.
    Yes, there are challenges. We talked about some of those--
ubiquitous technical surveillance--but some of that, Senator, 
is an issue of making it a priority and focus and execution. 
You mentioned in your opening a former director once recently 
said that the CIA does not steal secrets, and I think that was 
demoralizing to the Directorate of Operations. So I am here to 
publicly say that if confirmed, that is exactly what the CIA is 
going to do.
    Good decisions are hostage to good information and good 
intelligence, and the better we do at collecting human 
intelligence, the better decisions you all can make, the better 
analytic judgments analysts can make, and the fewer 
intelligence lapses or failures that you highlighted, Mr. 
Chairman, will occur, if we embrace that as a priority.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you.
    With intelligence collection as the core mission of the 
CIA, then I presume you agree in my opening statement that the 
people who collect the intelligence are the main effort in the 
Agency, everyone else is a supporting effort--important jobs to 
be sure but a supporting effort; is that right?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Chairman Cotton. Do we need to increase the ratio of people 
in that main effort who are collecting intelligence to the 
people who are supporting and using it to harness its use?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. To the point of what the core mission is in 
increasing human intelligence one of the things if confirmed I 
will spend some time. I had an opportunity to go out to the 
Agency a few times as a nominee, but if confirmed, I do want to 
spend time looking at that, Senator, in terms of the ratios and 
how resources are being deployed, the structure in which those 
resources exist currently, and whether or not that needs to 
change to improve our performance.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Let's talk a little bit about 
analytic objectivity at the CIA. That starts with you. You have 
a partisan background. We all on this dais have partisan 
backgrounds. We have thrown partisan punches as much as the 
next guy has. It also is not without precedent. Republican 
politicians have taken over this job before--George H.W. Bush 
or Mike Pompeo; Democratic politicians like Leon Panetta have 
taken it over. I think for the record all three of them were 
pretty good at the job. Can you assure the committee, your 
workforce at the Agency and the American people that despite 
your partisan background and politics, you will set aside those 
partisan views and you will be someone who can be effectively 
lead the Agency delivering the intelligence and analysis that 
the President and the Congress depends on?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I can, Mr. Chairman.
    While I enjoyed my time in Congress, I enjoyed more my time 
as DNI and the opportunity to be apolitical, and look forward 
to, if being confirmed as CIA Director, to continuing to do 
that. It is absolutely essential that the CIA leader be 
apolitical.
    As you know that when you walk in the building at the CIA, 
inscribed on the wall is the quote ``and ye shall know the 
truth and the truth shall make you free.'' That is a reminder 
to CIA officers when they walk in about the truth. Collecting 
the truth, intelligence, critical information, so that American 
people can be free. Freedom and liberty are dependent on the 
CIA doing that job and doing it in an apolitical way. So I am 
very much committed to that, and look forward to that if 
confirmed.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you.
    Congress mandated by law the creation of the Office of the 
Ombudsman for Objectivity at the CIA. It requires the office to 
quote ``conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers 
and employees of the Agency.'' In your preparation for this 
hearing, have you had an opportunity to review the results of 
the most recent survey of that office?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I have had a chance to see a summary. I 
haven't seen in detail the results of the congressionally 
mandated survey. I do know, though, that looking at it, what I 
can tell you at the top line, the participation in the survey 
was not what it should be and it reflects that a significant 
percentage of the current CIA workforce does have concerns 
about the objectivity of the products that they are producing, 
and even cited that in specific instances to include the PDB, 
the President's daily brief, included some of those products 
that the workforce felt were not being objectively produced.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you. I am glad you saw and reached 
those conclusions. The office in that survey is a good way for 
the workforce to communicate to the leadership and to the 
Congress what is happening sometimes out of our sight, and I am 
hopeful that you will address that if confirmed.
    Vice Chairman.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
    And Mr. Ratcliffe, thank you for your opening comments. I 
appreciate your comments about technology. I appreciate your 
comments about independence in the workforce. I appreciate 
actually the Chairman asking this as well.
    I want to come back to a couple of these topics, because 
there is concern in the community. I hear it, you may have 
heard it. When we hear statements by incoming administration 
officials, and occasionally even from the President-elect 
himself, attacking the intelligence community and threatening 
to replace long-term career civil servants if they are somehow 
deemed as not sufficiently loyal. You have addressed this but I 
want to address it again right now.
    What assurances can you provide to this Committee and to 
the CIA workforce that you will resist efforts to fire or force 
out career CIA employees because of perceived political views 
or somehow their views of loyalty to the President?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I think the best example of that, Mr. Vice 
Chairman, is if you look at my record, and my record as DNI. 
That never took place. That is never something anyone has 
alleged and it is something that I would never do. So I would 
approach this position very much the same way and provide the 
same assurance.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Again, I think there has been--a lot 
has happened in the last four years since your prior service. 
There have been these comments.
    I would emphasize again, if you are asked to remove 
personnel, to get rid of individuals based on this political 
litmus test, I would ask that you keep the committee informed 
of those requests.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I certainly will.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Same thing--and again, I appreciate 
the Chairman raising this as well. The most important job for 
you, for the folks at the CIA, is speaking truth to power. And 
I want to again reiterate the question Senator Cotton raised. 
We want to make sure your analysis is objective. It is not 
politically influenced. We have got to make sure it is timely. 
This willingness to speak truth to power, even if it is 
uncomfortable. I would like you to speak to that again.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Vice Chairman Warner, I appreciated the 
opportunity for you and I to visit. As you recall, this issue 
came up, and I was grateful then and will take this opportunity 
to talk about what my record is in terms of speaking truth to 
power.
    If you recall, we talked about the fact that as a Member of 
Congress, I was the individual who was outside the Judiciary 
Committee in 2019 listening to the former FBI Director Jim 
Comey say that my line of questioning was political; that the 
idea that intelligence authorities at the FISA Court being 
abused couldn't possibly happen--was a bunch of nonsense. But I 
had reviewed those applications and I knew that I was speaking 
truth to power, and the inspector general and the subsequent 
FBI Director later confirmed that under oath.
    To that point, Director Wray this week in his exit 
interview said that China was the defining threat of our 
generation. I wrote that and said that four years ago as DNI, 
and when I did I was accused of being political. But I wasn't. 
I was speaking truth to power. I wasn't outsizing the threat 
from China.
    In 2020, when a chairman of an intelligence committee 
misrepresented that a laptop owned by then-candidate Biden's 
son was somehow a Russian intelligence operation and 51 former 
intelligence officials used the imprimatur of IC authority to 
go along with that, I stood in the breach. I stood alone and 
told the American people the truth about that.
    So I think my record in terms of speaking truth to power 
and defending the intelligence community and its good work is 
very clear. And what I can assure you is, those types of 
instances if I am in that position as CIA Director and have to 
do that again, as uncomfortable as that can be to be accused, 
you know, the truth will ultimately defend itself, and I think 
that intelligence will as well.
    Vice Chairman Warner. And the truth will defend itself even 
if that truth is counter to the views of the current 
administration. At the end of the day it has to lead back to 
the truth.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Correct.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Time for one last question. As you 
well know, our intelligence community is the best in the world, 
but we also receive an enormous amount of benefit from our 
partners around the world. We have got to make sure, and 
obviously the President has the right to declassify 
information; but we have seen that willingness to declassify in 
advance of Putin's brutal attack on Ukraine used effectively 
but if we look at the declassification particularly if it is 
done below the Presidential level, making sure we consider the 
sources and methods of our allies, there is no requirement that 
intelligence is shared. It is based on a trust relationship.
    I'd like you to briefly speak to how we maintain that trust 
relationship with the very valuable information we receive from 
our allies and partners around the world.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, I agree completely. As DNI, I was able 
to experience what you just said. We do have the best 
intelligence enterprise in the world, but we have great 
partners around the world that we work with to do great things 
to improve not just our national security posture, but theirs. 
That is reliant upon mutual trust and respect for intelligence 
sharing between intelligence agencies.
    And as CIA Director, if confirmed, I will understand that 
improving our national security posture and protecting the 
American people will be absolutely dependent upon maintaining 
those relationships and maintaining that trust.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thanks. Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome. For the past nine years at least, anomalous health 
incidents also known as the Havana syndrome, have been a 
serious and persistent problem within the intelligence 
community. At first there was a robust effort to investigate 
the cause of these incidents and to support the possible 
victims. Along with other Senators on this Committee, I was one 
of the authors of the HAVANA Act to ensure that there was 
funding available for those who had been afflicted.
    However, more recently, support for both investigative 
analysis and for victims within the CIA have decreased. Then we 
have had some interesting developments. On December 5th, the 
House Committee on Intelligence released an unclassified report 
finding that there was an increasing likelihood that a foreign 
adversary was responsible for at least some of the reported AHI 
cases.
    Then on the 10th of January, the ODNI released an updated 
intelligence assessment of the AHIs that revealed that two 
intelligence agencies reported that they believed a foreign 
actor may have used some sort of novel weapon or prototype 
device to inflict AHI's on our personnel.
    This is very disturbing to me. It raises questions of 
whether dissenting voices were suppressed in earlier analyses. 
And my basic question to you is this: What actions, if 
confirmed, will you take to ensure that the CIA aggressively 
and objectively investigates the causes of the AHIs including 
examining whether or not a foreign adversary is responsible for 
harming the men and women who are serving our country?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator Collins, thank you for the question, 
and I want to start by saying that I enjoyed the chance to 
visit with you. And as you recall, we talked about this issue 
from my perspective four years ago when I was the Director of 
National Intelligence and you were as concerned then as you are 
now about this issue, along with Senator Rubio.
    I asked then-CIA Director Haspel to look into the issue 
four years ago. Having stepped away, I share your frustration 
that four years later we are very much in the same place in 
terms of trying to make an assessment and determination on the 
cause of this. I share your frustration in not being able to 
understand why. But, if confirmed, and have the opportunity to 
be briefed on all the assessments and intelligence, my pledge 
to you is that I will drill down and look carefully at that 
issue and work with you to see.
    I read the unclassified report, the House report and the 
unclassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment. 
I have not had access to the--my understanding--very lengthy 
classified report. But I look forward to drilling down on that 
because as I talked about in my opening, the workforce has been 
affected by this and it has affected their morale because of 
this and it is why I highlighted that.
    So the cause of it is one point, but the care of the CIA 
workforce that has been affected is another. But they are 
equally important to me. So my pledge is to look into it but to 
work with you to try and--obviously we need to know if we have 
an adversary that is using a weapon against our people, and I 
look forward to my ability to look at that intelligence for 
myself.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, and I look forward to working 
with you.
    I have very little time left. The Chairman mentioned that 
the intelligence community for which I have the greatest 
respect has had some significant misjudgments lately.
    For example, there was a misjudgment of how long the Afghan 
government would stand after the United States' hasty and ill-
advised withdrawal. The IC missed early assessments on 
Ukraine's willingness to fight, projecting incorrectly how 
quickly the Russians would be able to take Kyiv. They did not 
warn or predict the Hamas mass attack against Israel. The IC 
was surprised at South Korea's martial law declaration, nor did 
they predict the rapid collapse of the Syrian regime.
    My question to you--and I know the IC is not going to get 
it right every time. But when there is a pattern or even when 
there is a miss, what should the IC do to review why these 
major intelligence changes were not identified or predicted?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator.
    It is what I talked about I think in response to Chairman 
Cotton's question about this. The intelligence community is not 
always going to get it right. It hasn't always gotten it right. 
But we have had too many instances where you all as 
policymakers are finding out by watching news reports about 
some of these things that I think can be at least in some cases 
at least fairly characterized as intelligence failures or 
lapses.
    We talked about what can we do, what do we need to do. Part 
of it is a technical thing in terms of improving our 
collection, addressing ubiquitous technical surveillance. I 
know I haven't been fully briefed on this but I am impressed by 
some of the things for instance that the Directorate of Science 
and Technology is doing to help us solve for X with regard to 
operating as human sources in an environment of UTS.
    But I also think a bigger part of this that I am going to 
focus on, Senator, is to look at what is happening in terms of 
the focus and execution on core mission. Better--as I said, 
good decisions are hostage to good information and we all know 
that the human intelligence collection isn't where it needs to 
be. So, looking at the reasons why we have lost our focus there 
and some of those things are, you know, if you have a 
politically motivated bureaucratically imposed social justice 
agenda that takes up part of your attention, that can distract 
from the core mission of collecting human intelligence that 
matters and providing it to you in a timely way. My pledge to 
you is that I am as every bit as concerned, and I don't want 
those intelligence failures or lapses to happen on my watch, 
and I will do everything I can to ensure that it doesn't.
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe, for the thorough 
answer. I know that you would be thrilled to stay here all day 
long to answer our questions. But, colleagues, try to move it 
along. I know there are four or other five hearings going on. 
Some of you may have to get to those hearings. Let's try to 
move quickly and stick to the 5-minute limit. We will have a 
chance to question Mr. Ratcliffe in the closed hearing, and I'm 
sure he will be happy to answer your questions for the record 
as well.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. I am hoping that quantum computing might 
solve the problem of having to be three places at once here 
after these hearings.
    I first want to acknowledge a new Senator at the end of the 
dais, Senator Young, and welcome him to the committee. I am 
pleased he is joining us and I know he will make a great 
contribution.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you.
    Senator King. Welcome. It seems to me that you have an 
initial task that is a little unusual but also very important 
and that is to restore the confidence of the President-elect in 
the intelligence community. Before you could deliver the 
information that he needs to know, you need to get him to a 
place where he does have confidence in the judgments that are 
coming to him and he is notoriously skeptical of the 
intelligence community. Being skeptical is not necessarily a 
bad thing. But I hope that is one of the first things that you 
can work with him on is to make him receptive to the 
information and the truth that you will be providing as a 
result of your position.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, thank you, Senator.
    I think one of the reasons that I am having this 
opportunity for you all to consider me for confirmation is 
because President Trump knows and wants me to lead with 
integrity, wants me to carry out the duties of the CIA as 
director to follow the law and authorities as far as it will go 
and no further to protect America's national security.
    Senator King. I think that confidence he has in you is an 
important asset. I would suggest rebuilding his confidence in 
the community is an important task.
    Let me move forward. Everybody has talked about telling the 
truth to power. Dan Coats, one of your predecessors at DNI, put 
it most succinctly and persuasively. He said the mission of the 
intelligence community is to find the truth and tell the truth. 
I think that is a very good way to look at it. We haven't 
talked much here today about why that is so important.
    I recently reread David Halberstam's book ``The Best and 
the Brightest,'' a comprehensive history of Vietnam.
    It is heartbreaking about the intelligence failures and 
frankly, intelligence manipulation that led to a great deal of 
that tragedy. So that is why it is so important, because skewed 
intelligence can equal lives lost. And you have already 
committed and I won't make you say so again, but I think you 
understand how important this is.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I do.
    Senator King. Four years ago I asked you a series of yes 
and no questions and you answered them all correctly. I would 
like to run through them once more very briefly.
    Would you ever ask, encourage, or support an intelligence 
professional adjusting his or her assessment to avoid criticism 
from the White House or political appointees?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
    Senator King. Would you ever change or remove content in an 
intelligence assessment for political reasons or at the behest 
of political leadership?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
    Senator King. Would you consider an individual's personal 
political preferences to include loyalty to the President in 
making a decision to hire, fire, or promote an individual?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
    Senator King. And do you commit to exclusively consider 
professional qualifications and IC personnel decisions without 
consideration of partisan or political factors?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Senator King. If you were to receive credible evidence as 
Director of the CIA that an individual was undermining 
objectivity and furthering a political agenda in the 
intelligence community, would you remove or discipline that 
person?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Senator King. Will you or any of your staff impose a 
political litmus test for CIA employees?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. No.
    Senator King. Finally, if confirmed, will you reassure your 
workforce that loyalty tests are not allowed and not encouraged 
in the CIA?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I will.
    Senator King. Those were exactly the answers that you gave 
before. Thank you.
    One other brief question. I believe that you are the author 
of an important statute on cybersecurity. And I have done 
extensive work in that area myself. I believe that one of the 
great failings in national policy is a lack of the cyber 
deterrent strategy that our adversaries, particularly China, 
feel that they can attack our telecommunications system, our 
electrical system or whatever with impunity. Do you believe it 
would serve the national interest to develop a declaratory 
cyber deterrent strategy similar to the strategy that underlies 
the rest of our national defense posture?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I do, Senator, and I know we share a similar 
view on the threat from cyber. There is so much focus on the 
integrity--the sovereignty and integrity of our territorial 
borders, but as you well know, it is invasion through our 
digital borders from half a world away and a few seconds and a 
few key strokes that can cause----
    Senator King. And it is happening every day.
    Mr. Ratcliffe [continuing]. So much damage. The deterrent 
effect has to be that there are consequences to our adversaries 
when they do that.
    One of the things that I hope to do if confirmed as CIA 
Director is to work on the development of the types of tools 
that will be effective in allowing us to do those things. The 
deployment of those capabilities, of course, will be a policy 
decision for others to make. But I would like to make sure that 
we have all of the tools necessary to go on offense against our 
adversaries in the cyber means.
    Senator King. Thank you very much. I hope you will advocate 
in the councils of the national security apparatus of the 
administration. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe. I appreciate your 
testimony.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Lankford.
    Senator Lankford. John, Michele, thank you for being here. 
Thanks for your leadership. Thanks for your sacrifice, and what 
you have already done to serve the Nation. We really appreciate 
that.
    It is a tremendous sacrifice to serve in the intelligence 
community. As my wife has said to me a couple of times, we 
share everything about everything and talk about life together. 
But now there is a portion of my life I can't talk about with 
her, serving on the Intelligence Committee. You have had even 
more of that serving as DNI. So thanks for your sacrifice to 
serve.
    I have several questions I want to run through quickly on 
this. There are a group of folks in Oklahoma City. I can't name 
who they are because they are alive, but their lives were 
threatened on election day by an ISIS terrorist in Oklahoma 
City that was discovered initially by a 702.
    That 702 authority is important. There are people in my 
neighborhood that are alive today because of that 702 
authority. You have been outspoken on this. It has been much 
maligned in many ways, but it has been vital for intelligence 
collection around the world.
    What is your position on 702 authority?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator Lankford, for the 
sentiment and for the question. FISA and particularly Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is an 
indispensable national security tool. There is no other way to 
get around that. I say that not as a matter of opinion, but as 
an informed judgment in my role as Director of National 
Intelligence being the President's principal intelligence 
adviser, advising the President in the Oval Office and 
understanding that a significant percentage--sometimes more 
than half of the actionable foreign intelligence that we 
provide to the President as the policymaker to act as Commander 
in Chief comes from FISA-derived or 702-derived action.
    I will say I have supported FISA in that regard, but I 
also, as I outlined earlier, understand that it is an important 
indispensable tool but one that can be abused.
    Senator Lankford. Right.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. And that we must do everything we can to 
ensure it has the appropriate safeguards, because it can't come 
at the sacrifice of Americans' civil liberties. So I have 
supported those reforms and called out those abuses when they 
have taken place.
    Senator Lankford. I think the best way to do that is by 
actually enforcing. Those that have abused it, that they are 
actually called out and accountability is held for those 
individuals so everybody knows this is an indispensable tool. 
Don't abuse it. I think that becomes very clear. You have 
mentioned in your testimony, we cannot ignore CIA's critical 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in support of 
border security efforts. I think few Americans understand just 
south of our border is one of the most violent areas of the 
world. Today, there are murders, beheadings. There are aerial 
bombardments with one cartel fighting within itself fighting 
for leadership right now. It is an incredibly violent area just 
south of our border, not to mention the thousands of Americans 
that die with the narcotics they pump into the United States, 
and destabilize our economy and our families. That is a 
critical role for us in our national security. How do you 
perceive that?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, and it also ties in, Senator, to your 
question about the importance of FISA. So much of what the CIA 
has done and can do to support U.S. Government efforts to 
interrupt the drug trafficking rings and the places from which 
the precursor chemicals for those drugs come from, our 
disruptions are often as a result of FISA-derived information.
    But you highlight an important point. We talk about the 
threats from China and Russia and other adversaries overseas, 
but I think we all know and understand and acknowledge that the 
failures and the integrity of our border has turned my home 
State of Texas as not only a border State but every State into 
a border State. We have to make sure, and one of the things, if 
confirmed, that I want to talk about and pledge is the 
understanding that in addition to drug trafficking I made the 
point about terrorists coming across our border, that we not 
lose sight of counterterrorism as something that the CIA needs 
to be focused on as we talk so much about the threat from China 
and Russia and the great power competition.
    Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back 12 
seconds to you. How about that for a gift?
    Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Senator Bennet, please follow 
Senator Lankford's example.
    Senator Bennet. Thank you. I will take Senator Lankford's 
12 seconds. I'm just kidding.
    I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on taking on this 
role, and I want to thank the Vice Chairman for your leadership 
on this Committee. I hope that we will continue with the 
standard that you set for all of us in terms of politics.
    Congressman Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Thank 
you for your visit to the office.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. As well.
    Senator Bennet. I know you are a student of history and a 
student of this Committee, know that this Committee came out of 
the series of reforms that Congress put together to deal with a 
really dark chapter in American history. Senator King from 
Maine talked about bad intelligence during Vietnam. There were 
instances of the CIA engaging in assassination plots abroad. It 
is hard to imagine today that that is even true.
    That provoked bipartisan outrage, and the reason this 
Committee exists in part is not just to make the policy that 
you have been talking about and others this morning, but also 
to provide oversight on behalf of the American people and our 
colleagues who, as Senator Lankford was just saying, don't have 
access to the intelligence that the people on this Committee 
have.
    I would just ask you to talk a little bit about your views 
on what the purpose of that congressional oversight is and 
what, if you are confirmed to this position, what your 
responsibility to this Committee will be?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator Bennet. I enjoyed the 
chance to visit with you and talk about a number of issues. As 
you know from my background, I came from Congress. I was on an 
Oversight Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. So I think it gives me a unique perspective, I 
brought that over as DNI and if confirmed, as CIA Director. I 
have the perspective of both the executive branch and the 
legislative branch.
    I will confess that one of the things I was disappointed in 
was the fact that despite being on a congressional Oversight 
Committee over the intelligence communities, there was so much 
intelligence that I learned for the first time as DNI that I 
knew that no Member of Congress was aware of.
    And I think that that sort of speaks to my approach and 
understanding, that I take seriously the obligation that I will 
have if confirmed as CIA Director to keep this Committee fully 
and currently informed on intelligence issues.
    It is not that this Committee or any Intelligence Committee 
or any oversight committee in Congress needs to know 
everything, but you should at least know the topic exists.
    Senator Bennet. So let's talk about that a little bit, 
Congressman. When the President gets his Presidential daily 
brief every day. There is a very high standard for veracity for 
what is in that because he has to obviously make the most 
significant decisions that any human has to make about 
deploying our defense assets or the other things that a 
President does.
    We don't have anything like that in Congress. And a lot of 
the time we are often, as you said, finding ourselves fishing 
around in headlines and sort of less well-organized 
intelligence materials that we are provided, with no assurance 
that it is a complete picture of anything. So I wonder what 
your conclusion about that is and what the obligation of the 
CIA or any intelligence agency is with your leadership to be 
able to provide a fuller picture, the picture that you are 
talking about that a Member of Congress who is on this 
Committee should actually know rather than be guessing about?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, my perspective is you have highlighted 
all the things that sort of reveal that our national security 
posture is impacted in a negative way when we are not 
communicating well between the branches of government, and 
particularly on sensitive national security matters.
    I think a better informed Congress will allow for better 
national security decisions and keep the American people safe. 
I am open to a continuing dialogue about how--I won't stand on 
tradition. This is traditionally what the CIA does or shares. I 
am open to at the end of the day, we talk about the core 
mission of the CIA. It is to provide a decisive strategic 
advantage to you and to the President as policymakers. I don't 
view it as just informing the President. I view it as integral 
that I be informing you to provide that same strategic decisive 
advantage.
    Senator Bennet. I am out of time but I appreciate very much 
of the fulsomeness of your answer. I want to observe that it is 
really easy for politicians to accuse the intelligence agencies 
of politicization and actually it is important that we do that 
when it is an the appropriate thing to do. But this is the 
place where that oversight is supposed to be provided. These 
are the people that are supposed to fix that problem. And it 
can only be done if we have people with integrity that are 
working at the heads of these agencies that can help us fix the 
problems, not just complain about it. And I hope we will be 
able to work together to do that. Thank you Mr. Ratcliffe. I 
look forward to working with you.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ratcliffe, 
thank you for your service to our country already, and to 
Michele, thank you for the sacrifice which you also offer in 
allowing him to do this particular job in the future.
    I want to go back to the FISA Section 702 just a little 
bit. We are in an open session, and I think one of the 
opportunities that we have is to perhaps share with the 
American people with a little bit more clarity what 702 is 
really all about and what actually happens.
    Can you kind of describe in an approach that--OK. It is 
coming up for renewal again in April of next year. And between 
now and then we are going to have to convince the American 
people and other Members of Congress that we have made 
significant improvements in the protections, but also we have 
done our best to try to explain why this is such an important 
part of, as a tool, in our collection approach.
    Can you talk a little bit about the mechanics so that as 
those who listen to you today, they understand what FISA 702 
actually is and how it fits into the collection process?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Sure. Senator, thank you. I enjoyed the 
chance to visit with you. I know we, we are like-minded in 
terms of the importance of 702 as I talked with Senator 
Lankford and how I view it as an indispensable tool.
    It is one that I used as a prosecutor. General Ashcroft 
talked about national security and terrorism related 
investigations. I have used it as a practical matter there. 
Like you as a legislator have seen it. But then the unique 
perspective as DNI and if confirmed here, the importance of it 
in fulfilling the core mission.
    702 allows for foreign--collecting foreign intelligence on 
foreign persons, not on U.S. persons. The controversy, why some 
people think that FISA is, no pun intended, a four-letter word, 
that in the course of technical collection on foreign persons 
for foreign intelligence to make good decisions to keep our 
country safe, that sometimes U.S. persons are incidentally 
collected. In other words, they are having a conversation with 
a foreign person.
    Senator Rounds. Look, we eavesdrop, don't we?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Senator Rounds. We are not eavesdropping on Americans. We 
are eavesdropping on people that are not American citizens and 
we are doing it outside of our country.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. That's right.
    Senator Rounds. And in the middle of it, we have Americans 
that are sometimes caught up and maybe perhaps having a 
conversation with somebody outside the country.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. That's right.
    Senator Rounds. At that point there may have been something 
collected inadvertently. Can we use that?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. So there is, for instance, when the CIA 
collects intelligence, it is allowable to do a U.S. person 
query where you are looking for someone that might be 
communicating with some foreign person to do something bad to 
the United States.
    What you can't have is accessing that or making the query 
for political reasons or for some reason other than protecting 
our national security. We have to have the safeguards to make 
sure that those kinds of abuses can't take place and be 
misused. And my pledge to you is, if confirmed as CIA Director, 
that that won't happen.
    I will point out that I haven't been briefed on everything, 
but I am impressed with the CIA's compliance rate with regard 
to U.S. person queries is 99.6 percent, meaning they do a 
really good job of making sure that Americans who are swept up 
incidentally aren't having their civil liberties violated. Is 
it perfect? No. But----
    Senator Rounds. But there were reforms made based upon 
practices that were not appropriate several years ago.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. That's correct.
    Senator Rounds. As you are reporting it. But they have 
already been addressed.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. That's correct.
    Senator Rounds. So you would be supportive of the renewal 
of 702 and perhaps there are some additional considerations, 
but at this point it is critical we get it renewed?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. It is critical. It is indispensable, and for 
critics of it, no one has offered a replacement. If, for 
instance, half of the actionable foreign intelligence comes 
from FISA 702, what are we going to replace that with? And the 
critics haven't provided any alternative to that. And so----
    Senator Rounds. And look, and I agree and I thought it was 
important in this open setting that we there be a better 
understanding or a better clarification.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I mean.
    Senator Rounds. How critical it is and what it really is. 
It is basically looking at things overseas and not in the 
United States.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I think it is going to be an iterative 
ongoing discussion and needs to be as it comes up for 
reauthorization again, and it will be incumbent on me if 
confirmed both within the administration and outside stress the 
things that you and I are talking about and make sure that 
people understand, and to dispel false narratives about how 
FISA is being misused or can be misused.
    Senator Rounds. Correct. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Gillibrand.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 
Ratcliffe, for your service. Thank you for meeting with me. We 
had an excellent conversation about a number of our priorities 
on the committee, but mine specifically. Pandemic preparedness 
was one issue. AHIs which Senator Collins covered very 
effectively and sexual assault and harassment in the military. 
So I just want to address those so you can talk about them 
publicly.
    As we discussed, we need to do a much better job in 
detecting and preventing and knowing the intelligence to 
prepare for the next pandemic. We didn't have the type of 
collaboration we needed to prepare for COVID. We had 
disagreements about how COVID began and we never really got 
resolution on that, which is a concern for me. But this idea of 
a one-health proposal is creating essentially a fusion center 
for the CIA, the NSA, the DoD, the Department of Agriculture, 
and HHS, so that you are in real time working collaboratively 
to detect this information. Because agriculture and science, 
they often share data and information, and we know with regard 
to the Wuhan lab that they were publishing data and information 
about the tests they were doing. The scientific community had 
access to that. The CIA, on the other hand, was looking into 
other intelligence. They might have been able to get the 
details about illnesses quicker than anyone else. But none of 
these groups were talking so the data wasn't shared in a timely 
basis, so we didn't really have the information we could have 
had if the CIA was talking to the medical community, the 
scientific community, and the agricultural community, in terms 
of research. So I just want your commitment that you will work 
with me on this very important issue because the CIA can play 
such a meaningful role in protecting our Nation from such other 
threats such as a pandemic or any use of a biological weapon or 
any use of that kind of harm to the United States.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator Gillibrand, I really did enjoy the 
chance to visit and talk about these issues. I agree 
completely. I do pledge to work with you on that.
    You know, we go back to one of the worst incidents in our 
Nation's history, 9/11. It was a failure of communication. We 
had the intelligence. We just weren't sharing it with each 
other in a way that would prevent that. And you brought up 
COVID is the more recent example where maybe as many as 25 
million people died worldwide and at least a million Americans 
as a result of that. And one of the things--when I came in as 
DNI--to your point, was I was surprised at the lack of 
coordination between for instance the intelligence community 
and health agencies like the CDC and NIH and the ability to--
that channels were not open to share information like you are 
talking about. So many of these things can be if not prevented 
mitigated quickly if we are communicating and sharing 
intelligence better.
    I completely agree with the sentiment that you have 
expressed and look forward to working with you to make sure 
that we are doing those things if I am confirmed as CIA 
Director.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. And I just want to associate 
myself with the comments of Senator Collins with regard to 
AHIs. I think it is essential, as I mentioned in our hearing, 
that you collaborate with the Department of Defense, with their 
intelligence agencies, to understand what the nature of these 
effects are, what causes them, and what type of adversaries can 
be using technology in a way to actually harm our 
servicemembers.
    I really appreciate that you will commit to delving deep 
into this issue and really try to limit the siloing of 
information between the CIA and the DoD on this very topic.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I will. I look forward to it. The CIA is the 
premier intelligence agency in the world. And I am not saying 
that it should always be able to make an assessment about 
cause, but over time it is typically something we should expect 
and in some cases demand.
    For instance, COVID. You brought up that. That is one 
issue. But AHI is another one. I am curious and look forward to 
reading the classified version of the AHI in terms of the 
assessments that were made or the inability to make an 
assessment on causation, and if I am not satisfied, will 
continue to look at that.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. And my last question--
obviously, the scourge of sexual assault is problematic in 
every area of society. We want to make sure that the CIA is a 
safe place to work and that people who are being harassed or 
assaulted can come forward and demand justice. I just ask your 
commitment that you will work with this Committee to make sure 
all of our members of this community can work in a safe 
environment.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I will, Senator. I appreciate your 
leadership on this issue. I know it has been something you have 
highlighted. And as we talked about in our meeting, over the 
course of my career, I am grateful for what my record reflects 
in leadership positions I have had and organizations I have had 
in terms of not tolerating sexual assault and sexual abuse when 
I was U.S. Attorney, when I was DNI, when I was in Congress, 
all of those. And so I make that pledge to you gratefully.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to 
serve with you and other members of this Committee.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, had a nice visit with you in the office. You 
answered many of my questions. What I will ask you here today 
will be familiar to you and build on that meeting.
    Thank you again for your willingness to serve your country. 
You are prepared, I think, for this step, this position. You 
are qualified. I anticipate supporting your nomination. So we 
will begin with that.
    You spoke in your testimony to the growing role of emerging 
technology and to advances being made by our adversaries. If 
confirmed, how will you direct the agency to analyze and 
respond to foreign threats that undermine, often overlook 
critical areas of our security and economic well-being, such as 
the food and Ag sectors?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. So, thank you for the question. I did enjoy 
our visit, Senator Young, and enjoyed serving with you in the 
House of Representatives, and if confirmed, look forward to 
working with you from this perspective.
    I was talking with Senator Gillibrand about COVID-19, the 
origins of that and the things that the intelligence community 
needs to do to be better. Part of that is to your point in 
embracing emerging technologies and making sure that one of the 
things that the CIA does is adapt to the technology curve. For 
instance, when we talk about utilizing artificial intelligence 
and machine learning, there is so much data that's out there in 
this great technological age that we live in, that sometimes 
the intelligence community spends so much time sifting through 
the data that they can't find the signal for the noise. And one 
of the things that technology allows us to do is to find the 
signal in all of that noise. In other words, so that we can 
find the intelligence, spend more time using the intelligence, 
and less time looking for it. You brought up different issues 
where that can be valuable and where that can be helpful.
    One of the things that I know you are interested in and we 
have talked about was the biosecurity and the biointelligence 
issues and how the CIA needs to expand its authorities in that 
regard. And its relationships with scientists and researchers 
to be on the leading edge of information as it is coming out 
and develop early warnings to some of the problems that we are 
talking about in that space.
    Senator Young. I am encouraged that you are thinking 
critically about this topic, and it is clear to me you are. You 
should know as you are likely aware, but all others who are 
watching this should know, that there has been commissioned by 
Congress a National Security Commission on Emerging 
Biotechnology, and that commission is charged with looking at 
the national security implications of our current biotech 
leadership but also making recommendations to make sure that 
the United States can stay ahead of our adversaries, in 
particular China.
    So we will produce those recommendations in the spring 
timeframe. I am chairman of that commission currently. And some 
of those will implicate very directly our intelligence 
community. And so I would just ask that you, your staff, review 
that report when it is published and work with this Committee 
and others on some of its recommendations.
    Do you commit yourself, without having seen the report, but 
to be attentive to its recommendations and findings?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I absolutely do and I appreciate your 
leadership on that issue and as we talked about, and we will 
talk about more. I look forward to supporting and collaborating 
your efforts in that regard.
    Senator Young. Thank you. Time is winding down and I am the 
new guy, but one other quick question here. Would you like to 
volunteer any particular approaches that you might want to lead 
the agency in to delay or degrade the threats posed by foreign 
nations using emerging technologies like AI or biotech?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I think we can talk about some of those 
things in the classified session, Senator. I think that what I 
would say in this setting is that when it comes to technology, 
we have so much concern about what China and Russia and our 
adversaries, what they are doing and how we need to counter 
them. I have absolute confidence that we can and will. There is 
only one country in the world that can parallel park a 200-foot 
rocket booster. The Chinese can't do it. The Russians can't do 
it. We do it, and we do it in part because of the great 
collaboration we have and can have and need to deepen between 
the private sector where there is so much innovation and 
ingenuity in the space of emerging technologies, and I am 
committed as CIA Director if allowed, to expanding upon that.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Ossoff.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ratcliffe, 
congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your service 
to the country and congratulations to your family. I enjoyed 
our engagement a few weeks ago. It is a useful opportunity for 
me to learn more about your views and your plans for CIA.
    I want to begin with a matter that impacts Georgia.
    On election day 2024, there were a series of bomb threats 
issued against polling places in DeKalb County, Georgia, 
principally. Predominantly Black, predominantly democratically 
leaning precincts that disrupted election operations and the 
ability of folks to vote on the afternoon of election day. Our 
State election officials attributed those threats to Russian 
actors.
    What assurance can you give my constituents in Georgia that 
CIA will sustain collection to identify threats to voting 
rights and election administration in the United States?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I 
enjoyed our visit as well. I can give every assurance. As you 
know, the CIA doesn't have domestic authorities. When we talk 
about election security issues, the FBI and DHS are the 
agencies that provide that protection. Where the CIA plays a 
role is if we have bad actors who want to influence or impact 
our elections, as you have related in this case. I haven't seen 
that specific intelligence, but, for instance, if Russia--
Russian actors were behind those threats, those are the kinds 
of things that the CIA not only should do but must do and, 
frankly, do better in terms of collecting intelligence on how 
our adversaries intend, whether it is through physical means or 
through a cyber means of disrupting or influencing elections. 
And the CIA's role should be to identify those threats over 
there before they come over here.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you for that commitment to sustain 
that collection. I appreciate it.
    I want to give you the opportunity to provide some 
clarifying information about events that have attracted some 
scrutiny in September of 2020 when you sent a letter to the 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee that declassified 
certain intelligence about Russian analytic products that had 
been collected by the intelligence community and which pertain 
to events four years past, during the 2016 election and the 
controversy over alleged links between the Trump campaign and 
the Russian Government. And my purpose is not to interrogate or 
to relitigate that ancient history from 2016 but to understand 
why you chose to send that letter to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee declassifying intelligence on that day, September 29?
    You will no doubt recall that that was the same day as the 
Presidential debate, yes?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't recall that it was that date, but it 
may be.
    Senator Ossoff. You don't recall? Your testimony is that 
you are not aware that that letter was sent to the Judiciary 
Committee by you on the same day as the Presidential debate.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't recall that it was on that date, but 
I will take you at your word. The dates will reflect what they 
are. But to your question----
    Senator Ossoff. I want to drill down on that. Because my 
purpose is not to suggest some kind of political intent, but 
you made it very clear that avoiding politicization of the 
intelligence community's activities is a high priority for you; 
is that correct?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Correct.
    Senator Ossoff. It strikes me that in releasing politically 
sensitive intelligence that you'd think carefully about the 
timing of that; that you might consider that doing so on the 
day of a Presidential debate, when this was intelligence 
collected four years in the past, might reasonably draw the 
question of whether or not there was some political impetus. Is 
that reasonable?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. It is reasonable for you to ask that, and if 
I can, you asked me to clarify, if I can do that. You are 
correct, it was my decision, but it wasn't my process.
    To your point, that effort was actually the request of this 
Committee during my confirmation hearing as DNI, was to go back 
and look at the intelligence from 2016 and 2017 Intelligence 
Community Assessment. I also received separately a request from 
the Attorney General and from then special counsel to 
declassify certain intelligence relating to that in support of 
what would be a public report from the special counsel.
    I in addition to that received what I would call requests 
or what I would call demands from other Senate committees to 
include the Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland 
Security and Government Accountability--whatever the title of 
that committee is, for information related to that. That took 
place over a course of several months. And the process, just so 
you are clear, was an iterative, collaborative process that 
included the Attorney General, the CIA Director, the Director 
of the NSA, myself as DNI, and again, an iterative process that 
resulted in a highly redacted product to protect sources and 
methods, but yet to respond to these requests or demands to put 
that information out. So I take----
    Senator Ossoff. That is useful information and my time is 
running short, but we can discuss further in the closed session 
if we need to. I appreciate you and enjoyed our recent meeting.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank you for that.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ratcliffe, I think I have the 
distinction of having known you longer than anybody else on 
this Committee. I remember when you were----
    Mr. Ratcliffe. They call that misfortune.
    Senator Cornyn. [continuing]. When you were the mayor of 
Heath, Texas. How many people live in Heath, Texas?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Around 7,000.
    Senator Cornyn. You still live there with your wife?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I do. It is a great community.
    Senator Cornyn. It is.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I say hi to all the Heathans out there. 
(Laughter.)
    Senator Cornyn. Absolutely.
    So I have every confidence that you will do an outstanding 
job as the next Director of the CIA. And I say that advisedly, 
because as I said I have known you for a long time and watched 
your career from the private sector to U.S. Attorney, acting 
U.S. Attorney for a while, to Member of Congress. And I had the 
privilege of introducing you to the committee at your previous 
confirmation hearing as Director of National Intelligence. So I 
don't really have any doubt about your qualifications.
    I do want to talk about a couple of subjects, and one is, I 
know people have heard the discussion of FISA and Section 702, 
and I appreciate the clarity which you explain how essential 
this tool is. I think part of the problem we have had with 
reauthorization is that people don't trust the people actually 
implementing that tool, because they have seen the abuses by 
Members of the IC, including the FBI, particularly dating back 
during President Trump's administration. So they figure, well, 
everybody must misuse these tools.
    But I thought you had a great analogy when we discussed 
this on the phone. You said, well, you probably have a bunch of 
steak knives in your kitchen, and they can be used for useful 
and beneficial purpose but they can also be misused. And I 
think that was a pretty good analogy.
    But I want to ask you about one of the quote ``fixes'' that 
some people have suggested to the current state of the law, and 
that is to require a warrant to query lawfully collected FISA 
information. You have properly identified the fact that these 
are directed at people overseas--overseas--foreigners overseas 
not Americans. But you are a former U.S. Attorney and a pretty 
good lawyer, and you understand what probable cause requires. 
To be able to establish probable cause in front of a judge you 
need to have evidence. And if all you have is a FISA query of a 
foreign target that happens to mention an American citizen or a 
U.S. person, is there any way for you to go to court and 
establish the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in 
order to query that data?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, Senator, you know the answer to that 
better than I do because you are a better lawyer and were an 
Attorney General. But the answer is no, because the danger 
there is that you really don't have the information to obtain 
the warrant. And the process of obtaining the warrant, we are 
talking about national security issues where sometimes minutes 
matter and the ability to disrupt or interdict the bad actors 
or to act upon the intelligence that you can gain from that. So 
the process of even getting a warrant, the time that it takes, 
much less the fact that as you say you won't have a probable 
cause basis to get there.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, I think there is a lot of 
misunderstanding and misinformation about how FISA works. And, 
admittedly, I have to periodically go back and refresh my own 
memory because it does get to be fairly convoluted sometimes. 
But the fact of the matter is it is illegal to use this tool to 
spy on American citizens, and there are protocols in place to 
lessen the likelihood that that could ever possibly occur. But 
I think basically what has happened is there has been a lack of 
trust in the people who had access to those tools in the recent 
past, and I hope you will help restore that trust. I also think 
you are going to need to share your experience and wisdom with 
the nominees for FBI and Director of national security, because 
we have had these conversations as well, and I think there is 
some confusion about whether a warrant should be required or 
not.
    I think you are absolutely right, and that is I think is 
not the answer. Thank you.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Kelly.
    Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations on 
your new job. I look forward to working with you on this 
Committee. And Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations to your 
nomination for this position. And congratulations to your 
family as well.
    I want to follow up on what Senator Ossoff was referring 
to, the intelligence that was released prior to the 2020 
election. That intelligence was rejected. First of all it was 
before I was on the committee, but my understanding that it was 
rejected by Democrats and Republicans on this Committee as 
having no factual basis that put Russian disinformation into 
the public sphere.
    I just want to understand. So, in hindsight, knowing what 
you know now, and this is four years removed from that and we 
have had another election and, obviously, we have got 
challenges we face with Russian, Chinese, Iranian 
disinformation in our politics. So, in hindsight, are there any 
changes that you would make to the way you handled that 
information?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator, I appreciate the question. You 
know, I certainly--looking back, having the opportunity to 
change certain things might do that. I don't know in this case. 
For instance, Senator Ossoff raised the point that the 
declassification occurred on the day of a Presidential 
election. I don't recall that. Obviously, that is when it did.
    Senator Kelly. I think he said debate.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Debate, I am sorry. I wasn't aware of that. 
I certainly don't think I did everything perfectly in terms of 
making decisions about every issue that relates to--I am 
talking generally. But I talked about my record in terms of how 
I approach these things and how in terms of speaking truth to 
power which sometimes includes declassifying information. Most 
of the things that I have done, Senator, aged very well, and I 
think others will continue to.
    For instance, on COVID origins, I think that ultimately I 
believe there will be an assessment that is consistent with the 
position that I have taken.
    Senator Kelly. It is hard to get this stuff exactly right. 
I get that. This is complicated. In this case, you know, it did 
become rather political and I appreciate your willingness to 
look back.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. The other thing I want to say is, part of my 
answer to your question is classified, and I look forward in 
the classified session to talk to you about one of the things 
this Committee asked me to do that did influence my decision 
was to look at the 2018 Intelligence Community Assessment. And 
in not only looking at that, what I did--so to be clear. I 
requested a briefing from the CIA from some members of the team 
that were involved in that. And I am not sure that that 
information or that intelligence has been shared with this 
Committee. So I look forward----
    Senator Kelly. Let's follow up on that.
    I got a few more things to cover here and I got about maybe 
90 seconds left here.
    In your response to the committee, you indicated--this is a 
different topic.
    You agreed with the Trump administration's 2017 assessment 
that the Assad regime used chemical weapons, including in 
Douma, killing hundreds, injuring hundreds more. The U.S. 
intelligence community had a similar assessment that these 
weapons were used.
    If you are serving or when you are serving as the Director 
and the DNI asks you to explore evidence that Douma or other 
attacks were staged or that analysis indicating the use of 
chemical weapons is incorrect or there is some kind of similar 
situation, what would you do?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, look at the intelligence. So you are 
right, I did include that. That was based upon the intelligence 
that I was able to review during my time as DNI. And I think 
the intelligence was clear. I think the assessments were, I 
forget if they were with high confidence, but I believe that 
they were. What I haven't seen is any intelligence in the last 
four years that I wouldn't have access to. So I would look at 
that. But I would be surprised if there is intelligence that 
would change my initial assessment but I certainly go back and 
look at that.
    Senator Kelly. Could I just very briefly just have a few 
more seconds here? I just want to get your commitment to work 
with me, focusing on transnational criminal organizations on 
the other side of the border. It is a big problem. It affects 
my State in a big way.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. And my State.
    Senator Kelly. Yes.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I absolutely make that pledge in working 
with you to address that threat.
    Senator Kelly. Thank you.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Moran.
    Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciate our conversation in the office. 
I particularly appreciate the indication of your transparency 
with this Committee, your forthrightness, telling us the truth. 
It has been difficult from time to time to know what the true 
story is, and there is certainly--there are opinions about 
truth but we ought to be trying to find the truth.
    I want to ask you about statements that you have made. I 
agree with you that China is the greatest threat facing our 
country. I rate Russia as our second-greatest threat and 
believe it is the most acute threat today.
    Will you describe the scope of the threat as you see it, 
and the importance of countering the Kremlin?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. The question, the threat from Russia?
    Senator Moran. Threat from Russia. You indicate China is 
the first and greatest threat.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Absolutely. So Russia is very clearly an 
adversary of the United States. The threat, it courses a 
country with a very large nuclear stockpile. The thing that 
separates the threat from Russia from China in my mind and why 
I put them even though we include them in the great power 
competition is that the United States is the largest economy in 
the world. China is the second largest. Russia has an economy 
that is roughly the same size as my home State of Texas. So 
what it means is that the Russians have to decide where they 
are going to compete with the United States, and so they have 
chosen areas like hypersonics and other areas. But that comes 
with a cost. I think we saw some of the costs in terms of troop 
readiness as they engaged in their aggression against Ukraine. 
So, a dangerous lethal adversary who in many respects is, 
because of the limitations that I have talked about is focused 
on areas where there are great equalizers, and one of those is 
cybersecurity.
    Countries that can't compete with the United States in 
terms of kinetic firepower across the board can do so through 
cyber means. In other words--and we see that with Iran and 
North Korea and other countries who can't compete with us 
kinetically focus on cyber means to cause us harm. Russia 
certainly falls into that category as well in terms of where a 
lot of their focus is and my assessment of them in terms of the 
malign activities that they take across, against the U.S.
    Senator Moran. Certainly invasion of another country has 
significantly complicated the security of our allies and 
perhaps the United States. I would point out that you are the 
first Texan I have ever met that belittled the State of Texas. 
(Laughter.)
    In your answers to the committee's questionnaire you state 
regarding Russia that you ``believe.'' I am quoting you. You 
believe ``we cannot let our adversarial relationship boil over 
into unintended wars.'' And you go on to say ``I will advise 
the President when there are opportunities to work toward 
mutually beneficial outcomes with Russia.''
    You did not make a similar commitment for China, Iran, or 
North Korea. What is the difference?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I don't recall, like the context of the 
question why there would be a difference.
    For instance, I think what I was referring to there, 
Senator, was for all of the things that I talked about in terms 
of Russia as a threat and the things where they challenge us 
with malign activity, there are areas where we, for instance, 
countering terrorism. Some of the same threats that we face 
from terrorist groups are threats that they face. So there are 
occasions where information or intelligence can be shared or 
things can be done in our mutual--to the mutual benefit of our 
countries and those types of things.
    That would be true with China as well. You know. I think 
President Trump's approach from a policy standpoint is to not 
look for conflict with anyone, including our adversaries, but 
to provide a strong deterrent effect to their malign activities 
through America's strength--peace through strength.
    I think Iran may be different in the sense that it is a 
terrorist State, a terrorist regime, and has been designated by 
the Trump administration. So I would put that in a different 
category.
    Senator Moran. In addressing the importance of analytical 
objectivity and speaking truth to power, you state that as the 
DNI you represented the IC's analysis to policymakers 
faithfully, including dissenting views even when the full 
analytical picture was unpopular.
    Could you give me an example?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Sure. In connection with the 2020 
Presidential election, assessment was made as to whether China 
was trying to undermine President Trump's re-election efforts, 
and there was a split between the community.
    A majority opinion was that China was not doing that and 
wouldn't do that for a number of reasons. The minority opinion 
was that they were. I agreed with the minority opinion. But 
what I did was not try to substitute my judgment for the 
community. I wrote a dissent that would be public and people 
could see the reasons for that and in the process supported a 
whistleblower, one of our leading cyber officers, in support of 
that position.
    I will say that 15 months later, FBI Director Wray held a 
press conference talking about the exact things that I was 
saying China had engaged in that they were doing. And so the 
opinion that China would never engage in those kind of 
activities proved to be false, and I think that my dissent aged 
well.
    Senator Moran. Not only did you speak out against the 
majority but you turned out to be right.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Cotton. Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    On July 21, 2020, you sent a letter to this Committee 
stating that while you agreed to appear at the committee's Open 
Worldwide Threat hearing as DNI, as Director of National 
Intelligence, that you would not take any questions in open 
session. And you wrote that letter while committing twice in 
your confirmation hearing that you would appear and answer 
questions.
    Obviously, this position is one that requires congressional 
oversight. I don't think any of us up here would ever ask you 
to answer questions in a way that revealed anything that was 
classified or was more appropriate for closed session. I want 
to ask you why you thought that was appropriate, and today, can 
you commit that, if confirmed, you will appear at this 
Committee's annual Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats and take 
questions from the Committee itself?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Senator, thanks for the question. I think 
there was a slight mischaracterization.
    I didn't refuse. I made a proposal about how to handle the 
worldwide threats hearing. I did that for a number of reasons. 
First of all, I didn't at that time as DNI--which, as you know, 
the DNI speaks for the entire intelligence community.
    My proposal was actually a reflection of multiple leaders 
across the intelligence community who shared my opinion that 
other countries don't hold public hearings like that where we 
discuss sensitive national security information.
    The problem isn't in terms of you asking questions about 
classified material. The issue comes up in terms of being put 
on the spot to provide an answer where sometimes you might 
inadvertently provide information that is classified because 
you don't recall at what level or if it is classified at all. 
That is the danger, and that has happened.
    That explains how I approached that issue.
    What I would say is this. I am being considered for the CIA 
Director which is not the head of the intelligence community. I 
understand notwithstanding my opinion about how the worldwide 
threat assessment hearing should take place, that the 
committee--and I learned from that the committee disagreed and 
didn't want that proposal. So that would not be an issue if I 
am confirmed as CIA Director.
    Senator Heinrich. So you will come.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Senator Heinrich. And take appropriate questions.
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Senator Heinrich. Let me ask you and you answered Mr. 
Ratcliffe this question in writing but I think it is important 
for the American people and frankly for the world to hear your 
answer in an open hearing as well.
    Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2016 prohibited the use of any interrogation 
technique that was not authorized in the Army Field Manual. 
Will you abide by this law?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes.
    Senator Heinrich. In your answers to the committee 
questions you wrote that the CIA must, and this is a quote from 
you: ``The CIA must help rebuild public confidence in the 
intelligence community in the wake of prior abuses.'' End 
quote.
    You reference that on a number of different occasions in 
your answers. I, frankly, never have been one to shy away from 
criticizing either the IC or the CIA when I felt it was 
appropriate. But I think most of us up here can agree that on 
the whole that CIA's men and women produce the finest 
intelligence in the world with a great deal of objectivity and 
integrity, and if there is a lack of public confidence, it is 
because it has become too easy for some elected officials to 
throw around terms like the ``Deep State.''
    If you are confirmed, what precisely would you do to help 
rebuild public confidence in the agency, and where do you see 
that necessary and appropriate?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I 
think it is the things we have talked about already and some of 
it you may not have been present for, but in terms of leading 
by example if confirmed as a CIA Director. I went through a 
series of examples where I talked about speaking truth to power 
and the importance of that and setting the right example in 
connection with that. So I think that is essentially how I 
would go about it, is to lead by example.
    Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Cotton. I believe the vice chairman has a follow-
up question.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also 
quickly want to mention. I appreciate your answer to Senator 
Heinrich's question about appearance here. I think we do have a 
unique situation in America where we have public congressional 
oversight. I think it is critically important to help restore 
that trust, and I appreciate your commitment to appear and 
testify.
    This is a topic I am going to raise in closed, but I wanted 
to also at least get you on the record in the open session and 
I think you will concur. Senator Cotton pointed out a number of 
times, the Chairman pointed out when the IC didn't get it right 
in recent times. And I think--I am not sure we are ever going 
to get an all-seeing IC, but one particular area I have been 
concerned about is the ability for the IC to monitor technology 
advancement. I think historically that has not been the case. 
We have told our spies to go spy on the military or foreign 
governments, but we see repeatedly as we think about this 
technology competition, particularly with China. And I can cite 
chapter and verse from CIA getting it wrong about how slick it 
was going to be to move to lower level semiconductors or to 
move to smaller conductors or smaller semiconductors, area 
after area.
    I think Director Burns current administration we moved the 
enterprise some. I think we still have a lot more to do. But I 
did want you in this public setting to weigh in on how it is 
absolutely critical that the CIA is able to not only look at 
our adversaries in terms of government and military presence 
but clearly in this technology competition and how we have to 
up our game in terms of collection?
    Mr. Ratcliffe. I agree 100 percent completely. You talked 
about it, Senator, earlier in terms of military threats are one 
thing, but, as you know, I believe for instance, the NSA, we 
have the best code makers and code breakers in the world, but 
if China gets to quantum computing before we do, that causes a 
real problem. We have got to win the war, the race on 
technology to stay ahead of the technology curve. Part of that 
is, when we talk about technology as a tool and a target is, we 
have to disrupt. CIA has to play a really important role in 
disrupting our adversaries' technologies in terms of trying to 
get ahead of us.
    You mentioned semiconductors. We all know that the issue 
that relates to Taiwan and that 95 percent of advanced 
semiconductors are there and we are trying to address those 
supply chain issues. But we can do things and CIA must do 
things to disrupt how our adversaries are dealing with their 
supply chain issues in regard to that. That is just one 
example.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Cotton. For the information of Senators, we intend 
to hold a Committee vote on Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination as soon 
as possible, most likely on Monday afternoon; therefore, any 
Member who wishes to submit questions for the record after 
today's hearing, please do so by close of business tomorrow.
    Mr. Ratcliffe, I presume we can expect you to provide your 
replies even more promptly.
    Thank you all. The open session of this hearing is 
adjourned.
    We will reconvene in closed session in 30 minutes. That 
will be at 12:37 p.m. Thank you.
    (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:07 p.m.)
   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
   
                               [all]