Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act

Summary

Requires the State Department to identify and report on use of “untrusted” telecommunications equipment and services in allied and partner countries’ networks and within U.S. embassies, directs diplomatic support for selected trusted telecom infrastructure projects abroad, and directs limited early-stage project support by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. It also states Congress’s non‑binding view that certain China-based vendors pose risks and adopts definitions for “covered,” “untrusted,” and “trusted” equipment by reference to existing law.

• Directs the State Department to report on presence of untrusted telecom equipment in allied/partner 5G networks and detail carrier use, network location (core vs periphery), and rip‑and‑replace plans.
• Requires an embassy assessment report on compliance with the Section 889 procurement prohibition, waivers granted, device servicing risks, and communications‑security actions.
• Calls for State to select and support trusted telecommunications infrastructure projects abroad and for USTDA to provide early‑stage support for those projects.
• Adopts existing statutory definitions for covered and untrusted equipment and defines trusted equipment as anything not covered by those definitions.
• Expresses Congress’s non‑binding view that certain PRC‑headquartered vendors (e.g., Huawei, ZTE) pose security risks and that trusted equipment should be promoted globally.
• Sets reporting deadlines: initial reports within 180 days of enactment and annual follow-ups on foreign networks for two years.
• Does not itself appropriate new funds or ban vendors; it focuses on reporting, diplomatic support, and coordination among agencies.
• Specifies consultation roles for the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and allows for classified annexes where appropriate.