Sponsors (3)
The bill aims to strengthen telecom supply-chain security and give U.S. policymakers clearer visibility and tools to accelerate removal of risky equipment—at the cost of potential diplomatic friction, substantial taxpayer-funded replacement/support expenses, administrative strain, and some market and regulatory uncertainty.
All Americans who use telecommunications (consumers, businesses, and taxpayers) benefit from reduced risk of foreign surveillance and disruptions because the bill pushes allied countries and partners toward 'trusted' telecom equipment and away from high-risk vendors.
Federal and state policymakers, plus oversight bodies, gain timely, country-by-country visibility into use of untrusted 5G equipment and carriers' rip-and-replace plans, enabling prioritized national-security and export policy decisions.
U.S. firms and partner-country projects stand to get earlier technical and financing support (via USTDA and diplomatic leverage), improving the chances U.S. companies participate in trusted telecom buildouts abroad.
U.S. taxpayers and federal budgets face potentially large costs because replacing insecure equipment at embassies and supporting partner-country transitions could require significant funding and divert resources from other priorities.
Naming specific foreign firms and publicly pressuring partners may produce diplomatic friction with China and affected countries, complicating trade and broader foreign-policy relationships.
Carriers and operators publicly identified as using untrusted vendors (or named in reports) could suffer market and reputational harm, threatening jobs and commercial opportunities even when they have remediation plans.
Based on analysis of 6 sections of legislative text.
Directs State to report on untrusted telecom equipment in allied 5G networks and U.S. embassies, and to select and support trusted infrastructure projects abroad.
Requires the State Department to identify and report on the presence of “untrusted” foreign telecommunications equipment and services in allied and partner countries’ 5G networks and in U.S. embassies, and to promote and support foreign telecom infrastructure projects that use trusted vendors. Directs specific reports (180 days after enactment and follow-ups) describing which carriers and networks use untrusted equipment, embassy implementation of existing prohibitions, servicing of embassy devices, and plans for replacement; also tasks the State Department and USTDA with choosing and advancing trusted infrastructure projects abroad.
Introduced June 27, 2025 by Jared Moskowitz · Last progress June 27, 2025