Sponsors (3)
The bill trades stronger, more transparent U.S. efforts to identify and reduce reliance on risky foreign telecom equipment—and to accelerate trusted alternatives abroad—against diplomatic friction, reputational harms, administrative burdens, and potentially significant taxpayer costs and definitional gaps that could leave security holes.
All Americans: the bill pushes allied governments and operators toward 'trusted' telecom equipment abroad, lowering the risk of foreign surveillance, espionage, or disruption to international communications.
Federal and state policymakers and oversight bodies: regular country-by-country and embassy reporting gives timely, actionable information to prioritize remediation, funding, and diplomatic attention to insecure networks and embassy equipment.
Carriers, equipment makers, and regulators: disclosed operator plans for rip-and-replace, Open RAN/6G integration, and use of untrusted vendors help industry and regulators plan supply-chain transitions and prioritize where U.S. support or financing is needed.
Taxpayers and governments: replacing insecure equipment at embassies and supporting allied projects could require substantial funds, increasing budgetary pressure or diverting resources from other priorities.
U.S. diplomatic interests and international cooperation: publicly naming specific foreign firms and identifying carriers using untrusted equipment risks diplomatic friction with China and could complicate partnerships with allied governments and operators.
Carriers, operators, and some foreign firms: public identification of vendors or carriers may cause reputational and commercial harm—even when nonbinding or when remediation plans exist—which can disrupt markets and investment.
Based on analysis of 6 sections of legislative text.
Mandates State Department reports on untrusted telecom gear in allied 5G networks and U.S. embassies, defines trusted/untrusted using existing law, and directs diplomatic support for trusted infrastructure projects.
Official title: To establish certain reporting and other requirements relating to telecommunications equipment and services produced or provided by certain entities, and for other purposes.
Introduced June 27, 2025 by Jared Moskowitz · Last progress June 27, 2025
Requires the State Department (with Commerce consultation) to report on the presence of "untrusted" telecommunications equipment and services (as defined by existing law) in 5G networks of U.S. allies and partners with collective defense agreements and in U.S. embassies, and to support selected trusted telecommunications infrastructure projects diplomatically and via the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. It adopts the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act definitions for covered/untrusted equipment, narrows the definition of "trusted" to the complement of that covered category, and mandates timelines and content for multiple unclassified reports (with optional classified annexes). Creates new recurring reporting duties, requires assessments of implementation of an existing federal prohibition on certain vendors in embassy equipment, directs political/diplomatic support for selected projects abroad, and calls for early-stage project assistance from USTDA where appropriate.