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Insert a new paragraph requiring the Board of Governors to provide 120 days' advance notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis to specified congressional committees before proposing or finalizing a "major covered rule," and define "major covered rule" (includes $10 billion / 10-year threshold and alignment with recommendations from specified non-governmental international organizations).
Add a subsection (c) that prohibits the Comptroller of the Currency from proposing or finalizing a major covered rule unless the Comptroller provides 120 days' advance notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis to specified congressional committees, and defines "major covered rule" (same $10 billion / 10-year threshold and alignment condition).
Insert a new subsection (g) requiring the FDIC Board of Directors to provide 120 days' advance notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis to specified congressional committees before proposing or finalizing a major covered rule, and defining "major covered rule" (including the $10 billion / 10-year threshold and alignment condition).
Add a new subsection (g) requiring the NCUA Board to provide 120 days' advance notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis to specified congressional committees before proposing or finalizing a major covered rule, and define "major covered rule" (same $10 billion / 10-year threshold and alignment condition).
Add a new subsection (d) requiring the FHFA Director to provide 120 days' advance notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis to specified congressional committees before proposing or finalizing a major covered rule, and define "major covered rule" (same $10 billion / 10-year threshold and alignment condition).
Stops federal financial regulators from issuing ‘major’ rules that adopt recommendations from nongovernmental international organizations unless they give Congress at least 120 days’ advance notice and a detailed economic analysis of costs and effects. It also prohibits certain federal banking regulators from meeting or engaging with listed international organizations on climate-related financial risk during a calendar year unless the regulator first files a report to two Congressional committees describing prior participation and the organization’s funding sources. The bill is primarily about adding pre-rulemaking economic review and congressional notice for large rules tied to international NGO recommendations, and adding a paperwork-and-reporting barrier before regulators can engage with specific international bodies on climate risk work. That increases congressional visibility and agency burdens, and may slow or limit adoption of international financial standards and climate-related coordination.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may not propose or finalize a major covered rule unless, at least 120 days before issuing the proposed or final rule, it provides the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis including projections of economic costs, sectoral effects, and effects on availability of credit, gross domestic product, and employment.
The Comptroller of the Currency may not propose or finalize a major covered rule unless, at least 120 days before issuing the proposed or final rule, the Comptroller provides the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis including projections of economic costs, sectoral effects, and effects on availability of credit, gross domestic product, and employment.
The Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may not propose or finalize a major covered rule unless, at least 120 days before issuing the proposed or final rule, the Board provides the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis including projections of economic costs, sectoral effects, and effects on availability of credit, gross domestic product, and employment.
The National Credit Union Administration Board may not propose or finalize a major covered rule unless, at least 120 days before issuing the proposed or final rule, the Board provides the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis including projections of economic costs, sectoral effects, and effects on availability of credit, gross domestic product, and employment.
The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency may not propose or finalize a major covered rule unless, at least 120 days before issuing the proposed or final rule, the Director provides the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with notice, testimony, and a detailed economic analysis including projections of economic costs, sectoral effects, and effects on availability of credit, gross domestic product, and employment.
Who is affected and how:
Federal financial regulators and listed federal banking agencies: They must prepare and deliver advance notices, testimony, and detailed 10-year economic projections for any high-cost rule aligned with nongovernmental international organization recommendations. They also must prepare annual participation and funding-source reports before engaging on climate-related work with certain international bodies. This will increase their analytic, legal, and administrative workload and could delay rulemaking and international engagement.
Banks and other financial firms: Could face slower or reduced adoption of international standards in U.S. regulation, producing uncertainty about future compliance expectations. Firms may also face indirect costs from slower harmonization with international practices.
International nongovernmental standard-setters and climate-focused bodies: May see reduced U.S. regulator participation or influence if agencies decline to engage because of reporting burdens or timing constraints.
Markets, consumers, and the economy: Potential short-term uncertainty if rules are delayed; long-term effects depend on whether the requirement reduces the adoption of internationally harmonized standards (which could raise compliance costs or fragment rules) or prevents economically burdensome regulation by forcing more rigorous cost analysis.
Congress: Gains earlier, detailed visibility into the projected economic impacts of large, internationally-aligned rules and into regulators’ interactions with listed international organizations.
Benefits and trade-offs:
Benefits include greater transparency, explicit economic cost estimates for very large rules, and more congressional oversight of international standard adoption.
Trade-offs include slower regulatory action, higher agency compliance costs, possible retreat from international cooperation (especially on climate risk), and risk that required projections produce adversarial delay rather than substantive improvements in rule design.
Legal and operational risks:
Agencies may face legal challenge or inter-branch tension over what counts as “intended to align” with an international NGO recommendation.
The threshold and reporting requirements could be used to block or slow regulations addressing systemic risks, including climate-related financial risks, if agencies or Congress choose to enforce the procedural barriers strictly.
Expand sections to see detailed analysis
Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Introduced May 13, 2025 by Barry D. Loudermilk · Last progress May 13, 2025
Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Introduced in House