Requires the Secretary of State, with the Secretary of Defense, to produce an updated global map and a one-year report identifying international and domestic ports the U.S. considers strategically important and any efforts by the People’s Republic of China (or PRC-linked entities) to build, buy, or control those ports. The unclassified map and report (with optional classified annexes) must list ports, assess vulnerabilities and PRC activities (including logistics systems like LOGINK), recommend authorities and actions to protect U.S. interests, and identify possible funding sources.
Develop an updated, global mapping of foreign and domestic ports identified to be of importance to the United States because of a capability to provide military, diplomatic, economic, or resource exploration superiority, with the Secretary of State acting in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.
Identify any efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or other PRC entities to build, buy, or otherwise control, directly or indirectly, ports identified in the mapping.
Submit the mapping developed pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees; the submission must be in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a study of strategic ports.
The study shall examine why such ports are of interest to the United States.
Primary federal actors (Department of State and Department of Defense) must allocate staff time, intelligence and analytic resources, and interagency coordination capacity to produce the map and report. Congress will gain new unclassified and potentially classified information to inform oversight, policy, and funding decisions. Port authorities, commercial terminal operators, shipping companies, logistics providers, and foreign port investors may be indirectly affected because the study could prompt future policy actions (investment reviews, export controls, foreign-aid conditions, or diplomatic engagement) targeting port ownership, operations, or logistics systems linked to PRC actors. U.S. allies and partner governments that host or operate strategic ports could see increased U.S. engagement or requests for information. The law itself does not impose requirements on state or local governments or on private port operators, but subsequent policy or funding actions based on the report (e.g., sanctions, screening, or investment restrictions) could directly affect those entities. Finally, PRC state-owned enterprises and PRC-linked commercial actors are the central foreign focus of the study and could face heightened scrutiny after the report is delivered.
Updated 1 day ago
Last progress December 18, 2025 (1 month ago)
On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote.
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Updated 2 days ago
Last progress February 27, 2025 (10 months ago)
Last progress May 22, 2025 (8 months ago)
Introduced on February 27, 2025 by Bill Huizenga
