Sponsors (4)
The bill strengthens Capitol security by authorizing counter‑UAS actions and requiring testing and FAA oversight, but does so at the expense of meaningful privacy, public‑safety, and due‑process risks and with potential for mission creep.
Federal law-enforcement at the U.S. Capitol (Capitol Police, staff, and visitors) can stop or disable threatening drones, reducing airborne threats to people and critical Capitol facilities.
Requires FAA coordination and reporting to Congress about safety impacts of counter‑UAS operations, improving oversight and transparency to help limit risks to civilian aviation and inform policy.
Allows controlled testing, training, and evaluation of counter‑UAS equipment before operational use, improving operational effectiveness and safety for responders who will use the systems.
Operators and bystanders face increased Fourth Amendment privacy risks because the bill authorizes interception of communications without prior consent.
Broad discretion for a Board to deem a 'credible threat' risks mission creep and expanded use of counter‑UAS authorities, creating civil liberties and oversight concerns for the public and local governments.
Disrupting, seizing, or using force to disable or destroy UAS can cause damage to private property or injury to people, creating public-safety and liability risks in urban areas.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Gives the Capitol Police Board authority to use counter-drone measures — including intercepting signals, disabling, seizing, or destroying UAS — with FAA coordination and privacy limits.
Introduced May 13, 2025 by Eli Crane · Last progress May 13, 2025
Grants the United States Capitol Police Board explicit authority to detect, identify, monitor, track, intercept communications of, warn, disrupt, disable, seize, take control of, and, if reasonable, damage or destroy unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that pose a Board-defined "credible threat" to Capitol facilities or assets. It allows testing and training with counter-UAS equipment, makes seized UAS subject to forfeiture, requires coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA when aviation safety or airspace use could be affected, and sets privacy-protective limits on collection and retention of intercepted data (generally capped at 180 days with limited law-enforcement exceptions).