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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Committee on Foreign Relations, members such as John Thune.
Issued
June 22, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 5894. Mr. THUNE (for Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Rosen)) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. Thune to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, add the following:
Subtitle F—Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act
SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the “Critical Undersea
Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act”.
SEC. 1282. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the
security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan
Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in
and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the
severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and
other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
(2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea
infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that
could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication
capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the
Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics.
Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would
significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate
both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown
in military, economic, and social functions.
(3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical
undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing
number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in
sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct
threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical
undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy
aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil
communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a
blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification
with the PRC.
(5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly
the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption
to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other
nations, including—
(A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC
severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet
access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who
had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide
limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was
able to complete repairs;
(B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported
damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a
“suspicious vessel” registered as the Shunxin-39 and the
Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern
while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged;
(C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the
Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after
suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and
(D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the
Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after
an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain
later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and
that he “might have broken the cable”.
(6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage
to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the
Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting
PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in
several incidents. Those incidents highlight the
vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as
the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators
accountable.
(7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure
constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and
undermine international security while falling short of
direct military confrontation.
(8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to
bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic
Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad
Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at
enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in
the Indo-Pacific.
(9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by
purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global
information and communications technology supply chain. Any
restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security
would have a direct impact on the world's economy.
(10) To counter the threats described in this section and
safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the
United States and its allies to take decisive action to
bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea
infrastructure and foster international cooperation to
protect those critical assets.
SEC. 1283. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Critical undersea infrastructure.—The term “critical
undersea infrastructure” means—
(A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable,
pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within
the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea
electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
equipment related to the support of offshore energy
production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil,
or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure,
as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or
(B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including
subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on,
beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit
communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic
signals, as well as associated landing stations and
facilities.
(2) Sabotage.—The term “sabotage” means actions, or
preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to
cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to
critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of
data transmitted via subsea telecommunications
infrastructure.
SEC. 1284. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE
INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.—Not later than 360 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the
Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an
initiative to be known as the “Taiwan Critical Undersea
Infrastructure Initiative” (in this section referred to as
the “Initiative”).
(b) Priority.—The Initiative shall prioritize the
protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure
near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC.
(c) Key Focus Areas.—
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.—In
carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and
deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring
systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential
sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as
appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's
critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence
networks.
(2) Rapid response protocols.—In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall—
(A) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid
response protocols for damaged critical undersea
infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and
(B) work with allies and partners of the United States to
help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical
capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea
infrastructure and minimize downtime.
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.—In carrying out
the Initiative—
(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan
and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain
awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect
and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical
undersea infrastructure; and
(B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint
patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait
and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats
and prevent sabotage.
(4) International frameworks for protection.—
(A) In general.—In carrying out the Initiative, the
Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative
frameworks with regional and global partners to protect
undersea cable networks near Taiwan.
(B) Elements.—The frameworks established under
subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the
United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing
platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to
enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.—In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and
support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure
near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial
depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce
vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage.
SEC. 1285. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.
(a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.—The
President shall work with like-minded international partners
to implement strategies that directly counter the Government
of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage
activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by
increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to
international norms regarding the protection of critical
undersea infrastructure.
(b) Raising Awareness.—The President shall work with like-
minded international partners to raise global awareness of
the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea
infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts,
information sharing, and participation in international
forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of
critical undersea infrastructure.
SEC. 1286. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL
UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.
(a) In General.—The President, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect
to any foreign person that the President determines, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible
for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage,
against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of
Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including—
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
which knowingly—
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support,
security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act
of sabotage; and
(2) any foreign person that knowingly—
(A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described
in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to
support such a vessel or entity;
(D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for
technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or
retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose
of evading sanctions;
(E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging
services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading
sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior
leader of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report Required.—Not later than 15 days after imposing
sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection
(a), the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that includes a detailed
justification for the imposition of the sanctions.
(c) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.—The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a foreign person described in
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property
are in the United States, come within the United States, or
are or come within the possession or control of a United
States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.—
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien described in
subsection (a) shall be—
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into
the United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.—
(i) In general.—The visa or other entry documentation of
an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked,
regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause (i)
shall—
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the possession of the alien.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.—
(1) Implementation.—The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.—A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth
in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.—
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters
agreement and law enforcement activities.—Sanctions under
this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or
parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or
paroling the alien is necessary—
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United
States, or other applicable international obligations of the
United States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement
activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.—
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.—
(A) In general.—A requirement to block and prohibit all
transactions in all property and interests in property under
this section
shall not include the authority or requirement to impose
sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.—In this paragraph, the term “good”
means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,
supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test
equipment, and excluding technical data.
(f) National Security Interests Waiver.—The President may
waive the application of sanctions under this section if,
before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees—
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
waiver is in the national security interests of the United
States; and
(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.
(g) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.—The terms
“admission”, “admitted”, “alien”, and “lawfully
admitted for permanent residence” have the meanings given
those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term
“appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(4) United states person.—The term “United States
person” means—
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including
any foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 1287. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the
President shall submit to Congress a report detailing—
(1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to
critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and
(2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.
SEC. 1288. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT
CRISIS.
(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United
States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan,
including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC)
to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive
interagency contingency planning that addresses the
catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national
security of the United States.
(b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a
Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group—
(A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and
(B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the United States
intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as
may be appropriate.
(2) Functions.—The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
shall—
(A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare
for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or
quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island,
military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and
hybrid threats;
(B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains,
financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security
posture of the United States and allies and partners of the
United States that would be affected by a crisis involving
Taiwan;
(C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate
diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security
responses across the Group;
(D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources,
and decision-making processes to execute such contingency
plans;
(E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or
coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions;
(F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the
United States, as appropriate; and
(G) regularly test and refine contingency plans.
(3) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the
establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years,
the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to
Congress a classified report that includes—
(A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and
planning activities conducted by the Group;
(B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States
and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a
crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of
capability gaps and resource requirements;
(C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes,
or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and
(D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons
learned by the Group.