## Quick facts
- **Record:** Senate Floor
- **Section type:** Amendments
- **Chamber:** Senate
- **Date:** June 23, 2026
- **Congress:** 119th Congress
- **Why this source matters:** This section came from the Senate floor portion of the record.
## Linked context
- **People mentioned:** [Sheehy, Tim](/members/S001232)
- **Committees:** [Committee on Foreign Relations](/committees/ssfr00), [Committee on Foreign Affairs](/committees/hsfa00)
## Readable version of the official text
SA 5909. Mr. SHEEHY \(for himself and Mrs. Shaheen\) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal
year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the
following:
SEC. \_\_. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT ON
INTERNATIONAL BIODEFENSE, BIOSECURITY, AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY MATTERS.
\(a\) In General.—The Secretary of State shall advance
United States foreign policy goals to improve cooperation in
the field of international biodefense, biosecurity, and
biotechnology matters with United States allies and partners,
including by carrying out the activities described in this
section.
\(b\) Policy Development.—The Secretary of State, acting
through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security if the Secretary so delegates, in
coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs
and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization \(NATO\), shall pursue
enhanced biodefense cooperation within NATO, including by—
\(1\) advocating for the prioritization of policy development
within NATO relating to biodefense, including in the areas of
biotechnology, biosurveillance, and countermeasures in the
field of biological threats;
\(2\) identifying and evaluating opportunities to strengthen
NATO planning, policies, and activities relating to
biodefense and biotechnology;
\(3\) pursuing potential revisions or amendments to the NATO
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence
Policy to further enhance biodefense efforts in NATO;
\(4\) coordinating with NATO member states to prioritize and
implement measures described in the NATO Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Policy;
\(5\) strengthening NATO interoperability and allied forces
capabilities in resilience, detection, attribution, emergency
response, and recovery in the event of a weaponized
biological attack;
\(6\) evaluating opportunities for expanded NATO capabilities
to research, develop, and deploy biotechnology for
international security purposes; and
\(7\) promoting adherence by NATO member states to the
highest standards of safety and security in biological
research.
\(c\) Cooperation With United States Allies and Partners.—
The Secretary of State, acting through the Under Secretary
for Arms Control and International Security if the Secretary
so delegates, in coordination with the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, shall pursue international biotechnology,
biosecurity, and biodefense cooperation with United States
allies and partners, including—
\(1\) exploring potential areas of cooperation with countries
that are major non-NATO allies in biotechnology, biosecurity,
and biodefense matters;
\(2\) coordinating with allied and partner countries,
including NATO countries, on formulation of export control
policies in the field of biotechnology, including items that
may be identified as dual-use items that would pose a
substantial risk to national security if used for military
end-uses, such as items that could enable the development of
bioweapons;
\(3\) promoting adherence by United States allies and
partners to the highest standards of safety and security in
biological research; and
\(4\) collaborating on efforts to enforce the Biological
Weapons Convention.
\(d\) Strategies.—
\(1\) NATO biodefense strategy.—The Secretary of State,
acting through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security if the Secretary so delegates, in
coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
shall develop a strategy, to be known as the “NATO
Biodefense Strategy”, which shall include—
\(A\) an assessment of current cooperation between the United
States and NATO member states in biotechnology,
biosurveillance, biological threat countermeasures, and other
biodefense capabilities;
\(B\) an identification of strategic planning and deployment
gaps in NATO relating to biotechnology and biodefense;
\(C\) recommendations to address gaps identified under
subparagraph \(B\), including through coordination with NATO
member states, capability development, and coordination
mechanisms; and
\(D\) an assessment of current Department of State
cooperation with other United States Government agencies in
biodefense, biotechnology, biosecurity, biosurveillance, and
biological threat countermeasures.
\(2\) International biotechnology, biosecurity, and
biodefense cooperation strategy.—The Secretary of State,
acting through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security if the Secretary so delegates, in
coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
shall develop a strategy, to be known as the “International
Biotechnology, Biosecurity, and Biodefense Cooperation
Strategy”, which shall include—
\(A\) proposals for commitments or agreements under which the
United States and United States allies and partners,
including countries that are major non-NATO allies, may
expand cooperation on international security matters relating
to biotechnology, biosecurity, and biodefense;
\(B\) an assessment of the feasibility and effectiveness of
coordinating export control efforts, in addition to existing
export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and
the Australia Group, related to biotechnology items that may
pose national security risks if used for military end uses;
and
\(C\) an overview of nonproliferation, anti-terrorism,
demining, and related \(NADR\) programs and funds for the
purposes of enhancing capabilities and capacities to address
international biosecurity threats and recommendations for the
use of Department of State programs and funds, including NADR
programs and funds, to expand cooperation outlined in
subparagraph \(A\) and increase the effectiveness of export
control efforts identified in subparagraph \(B\).
\(3\) Limitation.—The strategies developed under paragraphs
\(1\) and \(2\) shall be limited to addressing threats posed by
biological agents and toxins as such terms are defined in
section 178 of title 18, United States Code.
\(e\) Report.—
\(1\) In general.—Not later than 270 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting
through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security if the Secretary so delegates, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
that contains the strategies required by subsection \(d\).
\(2\) Form.—The report required by this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex if submitted separately from the unclassified portion.
\(f\) Congressional Briefing.—Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary
for Arms Control and International Security shall provide a
briefing to the appropriate congressional committees in
response to significant developments relating to—
\(1\) the contents of the report required by subsection \(e\);
and
\(2\) other material developments in biotechnology and
biosecurity globally that may affect United States national
security interests.
\(g\) Definitions.—In this section—
\(1\) the term “appropriate congressional committees”
means—
\(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
\(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of the
Representatives.
\(2\) the term “biodefense” means actions to counter
biological threats, reduce risks, and prepare for, respond
to, and recover from biological incidents;
\(3\) the term “biological threat” means entities involved
with, or a situation involving, a biological hazard that can
potentially cause a biological incident;
\(4\) the term “Biological Weapons Convention” means the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on
their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972, and entered into force March 26, 1975.
\(5\) the term “biosecurity” means policies, practices, and
controls that reduce the risk of loss, theft, misuse,
diversion of, or intentional unauthorized release of
biological materials;
\(6\) the term “biosurveillance” means the process of
gathering, integrating, interpreting, and communicating
essential information and indications related to all-hazard
threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, plant,
and environmental health to achieve early detection and
provide early warning and contribute to overall situational
awareness of the health aspects of a biological incident to
support and enhance decision-making at all levels;
\(7\) the term “biotechnology” means the use of biological
processes, organisms, or systems for manufacturing, research,
or medical purposes, including genetic engineering, synthetic
biology, and bioinformatics; and
\(8\) the term “countries that are major non-NATO allies”
means countries designated pursuant to section 517 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2321k\).
## Official source
- [Download the official section PDF](https://api.govinfo.gov/packages/CREC-2026-06-23/granules/CREC-2026-06-23-pt1-PgS3066/pdf)