Text of Senate Amendment 5935

Quick facts

Record: Senate Floor
Section type: Amendments
Chamber: Senate
Date: June 23, 2026
Congress: 119th Congress
Why this source matters: This section came from the Senate floor portion of the record.

Linked context

People mentioned: Barrasso, John
Committees: Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations

Readable version of the official text

SA 5935. Mr. BARRASSO (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the

following:

Subtitle __ Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026

SEC. __1. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Strategic Subsea Cables

Act of 2026”.

SEC. __2. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) Agency.—The term “agency” has the meaning given the

term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.

(2) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term

“appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on

Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(3) Appropriate federal agencies.—The term “appropriate

Federal agencies” means the following:

(A) The Department of Commerce.

(B) The Department of Defense.

(D) The Department of State.

(E) The Federal Communications Commission.

(F) The Department of the Treasury.

(G) The Department of Justice.

(H) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the

President.

(4) Critical undersea infrastructure.—The term “critical

undersea infrastructure” refers to both subsea

communications infrastructure and subsea energy

infrastructure.

(5) Interagency committee.—The term “interagency

committee” means the entity established under section

__1(b).

(6) Non-federal entity.—The term “non-Federal entity”

means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual,

organization, or business involved in the operation,

maintenance, repair, or construction of critical undersea

infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure

owners.

(7) Sabotage.—The term “sabotage” means actions, or

preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to

cause defective production, operation, or damage to critical

undersea infrastructure, including the confidentiality,

availability, and integrity of data transmitted via subsea

communications infrastructure.

(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.—The term “subsea energy

infrastructure” means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other

equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,

including—

(A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea

electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or

equipment related to the support of offshore energy

production installations;

(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between

land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and

(9) Subsea communications infrastructure.—The term

“subsea communications infrastructure” has the same meaning

as “submarine cable system”, as defined in section

1.70001(h) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and any

subsequent update to such meaning.

PART I—INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA

INFRASTRUCTURE

SEC. __1. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a

growing threat to United States and allied security and

economic prosperity.

(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea

infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including—

(A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea

communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian

mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of

SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on

Earth;

(B) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4

trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas

pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish

island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;

communications infrastructure connecting the main island of

Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;

(D) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-

Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the

Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea

communications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and

Finland and Estonia;

(E) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-

to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cables and the

Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the

central Baltic Sea;

(F) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-

to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable

and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of

Finland;

(G) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-

Pacific Express subsea communications cable connecting Taiwan

to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan;

(H) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea

communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan

with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;

(I) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea

communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea

linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and

(J) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable

connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the

Fitburg.

(3) In February 2024, NATO Defense Ministers established

the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to coordinate

information and threat intelligence sharing among private and

public sector actors to protect critical undersea

infrastructure.

(4) In January 2025, following critical undersea

infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea in December 2024,

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Baltic

Sentry to strengthen the protection of critical undersea

infrastructure.

(5) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an

EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development

and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for

Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub

in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated

surveillance approach.

(6) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN)

published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair

of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to

“build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable

network” and “to facilitate the expeditious deployment,

repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine

cables, between ASEAN Member States”.

(7) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United

States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its

commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and

Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for

digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea

cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and

encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners.

Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote

resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure

across the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. __2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital

strategic and economic links

between the United States and its partners and allies;

(2) according to NATO, “undersea cables carry an estimated

$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the

world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported

by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are

transmitted via undersea cables”;

(3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,

there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected

sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea

infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East

Asia;

(4) the United States Government has an important role to

play in advancing United States interests in international

bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea

infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and

redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these

goals;

(5) the United States Government should play a more active

role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for

the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the

Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the

Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU

Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure,

allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint

Expeditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including the

Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and

international organizations such as the International Cable

Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United

States national security and economic interests;

(6) the United States should lead efforts to promote the

deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure

networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen

preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies

and partners through enhanced information sharing and

coordination; and

(7) while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other

associated private sector stakeholders carry significant

responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the

United States Government and allied foreign governments need

to play a greater role.

SEC. __3. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT WITH

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD

UNITED STATES INTERESTS.

(a) In General.—The Secretary of State, in coordination

with the interagency committee, as appropriate, shall seek to

increase United States Government engagement with relevant

international bodies to advance United States national

security and economic interests as it relates to critical

undersea infrastructure.

(b) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the

enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,

the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the

appropriate congressional committees that includes the

following:

(1) A description of how increased United States Government

engagement with relevant international bodies, including in

coordination with the United States domestic subsea cable

industry, could support United States national security

objectives as it relates to the protection of critical

undersea infrastructure.

(2) A description of key objectives for promoting and

protecting United States national security interests within

relevant international bodies.

(3) A description of how the People's Republic of China

entities leverage their engagement with relevant

international bodies to further their strategic interests.

(4) A description of how encouraging other countries and

regional bodies to engage with relevant international bodies

can better ensure coordinated, consistent global subsea

communications infrastructure policies.

(5) A description of international bodies relevant for

critical undersea infrastructure where the United States

should increase its diplomatic engagement.

SEC. __4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL

UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.

(a) In General.—The President, in coordination with the

Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall

impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect

to any foreign person that the President determines, on or

after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible

for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against

critical undersea infrastructure, including—

(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of

which knowingly—

(A) commits acts of sabotage; or

(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support,

security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act

of sabotage; and

(2) any foreign person that the President determines

knowingly—

(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity

described in paragraph (1);

(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or

reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;

support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);

(D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for

technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or

retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph

(1) for the purpose of evading sanctions;

(E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging

services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the

purpose of evading sanctions; or

(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior

leadership of such a vessel or entity.

(b) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this

subsection are the following:

(1) Blocking of property.—The President may exercise all

of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary

to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and

interests in property of a foreign person described in

subsection (a), if such property and interests in property

are in the United States, come within the United States, or

are or come within the possession or control of a United

States person.

(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.—

(A) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien described in

subsection (a) shall be—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to

enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into

the United States or to receive any other benefit under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) Current visas revoked.—

(i) In general.—The visa or other entry documentation of

an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked,

regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is

or was issued.

(ii) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause (i)

shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry

documentation that is in the possession of the alien.

(1) Implementation.—The President may exercise all

authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702

and 1704) to carry out this section.

(2) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in subsections

(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to any

person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to

violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this

section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this

section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a

person that commits an unlawful act described in section

206(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).

(d) Exceptions.—

(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters

agreement and law enforcement activities.—Sanctions under

this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or

parole of an alien to the United States if admitting or

paroling the alien is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the

Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,

signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force

November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United

States, or other applicable international obligations of the

United States; or

(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement

activity in the United States.

(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.—

Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity

subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any

authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.—

(A) In general.—A requirement to block and prohibit all

transactions in all property and interests in property under

this section shall not include the authority or requirement

to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(B) Good defined.—In this paragraph, the term “good”

means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,

supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test

equipment, and excluding technical data.

(4) Exception for humanitarian assistance.—Sanctions under

this section shall not apply to—

(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the

provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,

medical devices, or humanitarian assistance, or for

humanitarian purposes; or

(B) transactions that are necessary for or related to the

activities described in subparagraph (A).

(5) Exception for safety of vessels and crew.—Sanctions

under this section shall not apply with respect to a person

providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to

sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended

for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the

protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the

maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other

significant damage.

(e) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Admission; admitted; alien.—The terms “admission”,

“admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those

terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) Agricultural commodity.—The term “agricultural

commodity” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of

the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(3) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means an

individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(4) Medicine.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given

the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,

and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(5) Medical device.—The term “medical device” has the

meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(6) United states person.—The term “United States

person” means—

(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted

for permanent residence to the United States;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States

or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including

any foreign branch of such an entity; or

(f) National Security Interests Waiver.—The President may

waive the application of sanctions under this section if,

before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the

appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the

waiver is in the national security interests of the United

States; and

(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.

SEC. __5. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),

in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,

shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional

committees that includes the following:

(1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting

period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and

maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China

(PRC) and the Russian Federation.

(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and

activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research

(GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,

including—

(A) a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in

deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed

warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and

development of new weapons systems;

(B) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly civilian

research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure

surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage;

of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as

well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and

(D) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific

vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime

Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers,

and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-

use operations and probing of critical undersea

infrastructure.

(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and

activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of

the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including—

(A) a description of GRU operations and capabilities

related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance,

monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure

and maritime logistics;

(B) a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant

and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing

and merchant vessel names and International Maritime

Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers

believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage

activities; and

of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as

well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.

(4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and

activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast

Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN

Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including

unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels

related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical

undersea infrastructure, including—

(A) a description of recent capability developments related

to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea

infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral

purposes; and

(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly civilian

fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or

surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including

in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the

Western Hemisphere.

(5) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian

Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of

critical undersea infrastructure, including—

(A) any current or planned operational coordination against

United States or allied and partner nation targets;

(B) any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation

of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage,

or seabed warfare capabilities;

critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or

seabed warfare; and

(D) any coordination in procurement of advanced

technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure,

surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention

of sanctions against the Russian Federation.

(6) A list of instances during the previous calendar year

in which the United States, or allies and partners of the

United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels,

either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia,

around critical undersea infrastructure, including—

(A) any official United States Government response to

counter the anomalous behavior; and

(B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and

partners.

(7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities

are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United

States-invested cables.

(b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.—The initial report

required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between

January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this

Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall

cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.

(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a

classified annex.

SEC. __6. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA

INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State,

the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant

Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on

Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the

appropriate congressional committees a report that includes

the assessment of the intelligence community, including

dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and,

if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of

reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:

(1) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea

communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian

mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.

(2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four

trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas

pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish

island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including—

(A) an assessment of the activities of Russian military

vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities,

at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading

up to the incident;

(B) a description of any Russian civilian or military

vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the

aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned

vehicles that gained access to the blast sites;

group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the

rental boat “Andromeda” in the weather and sea conditions

present at the time;

(D) an assessment of whether the Russian Federation's

documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or

other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations

on land targets is applicable to a maritime context;

(E) an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to

honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian

entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas

deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;

(F) an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord

Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western

financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator;

(G) a description of the law enforcement investigations by

regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and

their outcomes;

(H) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented

in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the

months leading up to or immediately after the incident,

including those with undersea surveillance or warfare

capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites

either before or after the incident in question; and

(I) any information on potential attribution received from

allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or

intelligence channels.

(3) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea

communications infrastructure connecting the main island of

Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.

(4) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-

Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to

subsea communications infrastructure connecting Estonia and

Sweden and Finland and Estonia.

(5) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-

to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cable and the

Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the

central Baltic Sea.

(6) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-

to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable

and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of

Finland.

(7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-

Pacific Express subsea communications infrastructure

connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of

Korea, and Japan.

(8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea

communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan

with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.

(9) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea

communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea

connecting Liepaja and Sventoji.

(10) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa

cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel

called the Fitburg.

(b) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be

submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified

annex.

SEC. __7. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE

SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as international critical undersea infrastructure

expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper

installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of

international subsea cables that have the potential to

undermine United States and foreign partner national security

interests;

(2) the United States is uniquely positioned to provide

technical, material, and other forms of support to

international partners to enhance the resilience of

international critical undersea infrastructure;

(3) the United States Government should enhance its

diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help

foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and

effectively install, maintain, repair, and protect

international critical undersea infrastructure; and

(4) given the importance of critical undersea

infrastructure to United States and allied energy security

and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing

capabilities designed to target United States and allied

subsea energy infrastructure.

(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.—The Secretary

of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources

towards—

(1) engaging with foreign countries, in coordination with

other relevant Federal agencies, to improve security and

reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance,

and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and

(2) working with allies and partners to improve response

times to address critical undersea infrastructure sabotage,

including, as appropriate, by improving the coordination of

cable repair vessel deployments.

enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5

years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other

relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate

congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by

the United States Government in the prior calendar year to

work with international allies and partners to strengthen the

security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring,

maintenance, repair, and protection of critical undersea

infrastructure, including—

(1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that create

barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain,

repair, and protect critical undersea infrastructure; and

(2) progress made in the previous calendar year as a result

of United States engagement with allies and partners.

PART II—DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE

SEC. __1. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED

EXPERTISE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall assign not

fewer than four full-time equivalent individuals, of which

not fewer than two individuals shall be assigned to the

Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea

communications infrastructure, in order to support the

Department of State's interagency engagement on matters

related to critical undersea infrastructure, including—

(1) critical undersea infrastructure protection and

resilience;

(2) coordination with United States allies and partners;

and

(3) United States engagement in international bodies that

cover critical undersea infrastructure.

(b) Assignment.—The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital

Policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in

meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection

(a).

the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of

State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of

Representatives.

(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea

Infrastructure Sabotage.—Not later than 90 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State

shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a

report on how the United States Government plans to

prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant

international bodies to spur increased information sharing

between allied and partner governments and relevant private

sector companies regarding threats to, and the sabotage of,

critical undersea infrastructure.

PART III—SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION,

CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

SEC. __1. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF

SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) According to a December 2024 United States Federal

Government white paper, “There currently exists no forum in

which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry can

effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify

and address shared challenges.”.

(2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for

the protection of subsea communications infrastructure,

damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and

emergency response are overseen by various government actors

through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal

departments and agencies.

(3) In order for the subsea cable industry to align with

United States economic and security interests and help

industry prepare security risk mitigation measures, the

United States Government must provide the industry a clearer

concept of operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain

and infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security

measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and

definitive cost analysis.

(b) Establishment.—Not later than one year after the date

of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish

an interagency committee (referred to in this subtitle as the

“interagency committee”) comprised of the heads of the

appropriate Federal agencies, or their designees, to lead

United States Government efforts to—

(1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea

communications infrastructure;

(2) effectively collaborate with non-Federal entities,

including relevant members of the subsea cable industry, to

identify and address shared challenges to subsea

communications infrastructure security and resilience;

(3) coordinate United States Government policies to improve

subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience;

and

(4) address other matters related to subsea communications

infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the

President.

interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United

States Federal Government's operational authorities for

subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience.

The overview shall include an interagency concept of

operations for partnering with non-Federal entities,

including subsea communications infrastructure owners and

operators, to secure and repair subsea communications

infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis scenarios; and

(d) Analysis of Subsea Communications Infrastructure

Sabotage.—

(1) In general.—The President shall direct the heads of

the appropriate Federal agencies to develop strategies to

coordinate closely within the interagency process and with

subsea communications infrastructure industry stakeholders to

review sabotage and other threats to subsea communications

infrastructure, including by leveraging analysis from

industry-wide data, to—

(A) identify trends;

(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases of subsea

communications infrastructure sabotage;

communications infrastructure construction;

(D) identify Federal Government functions and private

sector engagement methods to support the security of subsea

communications infrastructure; and

(E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage

to subsea communications infrastructure.

(2) Strategy elements.—The strategies required under

paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) resourcing requirements;

(B) coordination with United States allies and partners and

relevant subsea communications infrastructure industry

stakeholders; and

for subsea communications infrastructure sabotage.

(e) Report.—Not later than 30 days after establishing the

required interagency committee under subsection (b), the

President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the

following elements:

(1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the

interagency committee and United States Federal agencies

overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).

(2) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will

advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).

SEC. __2. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON

SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Public-private Sector Information Sharing.—Consistent

with the necessary protections of classified information, the

sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and

civil liberties, all appropriate Federal agencies shall, with

the approval of the interagency committee and in direct

coordination with the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence, including, as appropriate, with intelligence

sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the

installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea

communications infrastructure, issue procedures to establish

and promote—

(1) the timely sharing of classified information regarding

subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, any

indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to

subsea

communications infrastructure held by members of the

interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess

the necessary security clearances;

(2) the timely sharing between the interagency committee

and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea

communications infrastructure sabotage, information relating

to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized uses

under this subtitle, in the possession of the interagency

committee that may be declassified and shared at an

unclassified level;

(3) the timely sharing by the interagency committee to non-

Federal entities, and the voluntary, cooperative sharing by

non-Federal entities to the interagency committee, of

unclassified, including controlled unclassified, information

regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage,

indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to

subsea communications infrastructure;

(4) the timely sharing by the interagency committee to non-

Federal entities, and the voluntary cooperative sharing by

non-Federal entities to the interagency committee, when and

if appropriate, of information relating to indications of

potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage or

authorized uses under this title, held by the interagency

committee or non-Federal entities about subsea communications

infrastructure sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any

potential adverse effects from such sabotage; and

(5) the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and

performance metrics.

(b) Development of Procedures.—The procedures developed in

accordance with this section shall—

(1) ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the

capacity to identify and inform subsea communications

infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea

communications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the

appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities

consistent with the protection of classified information;

(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes,

roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency

committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing,

including subsea communications infrastructure-specific

information sharing and analysis entities; and

(3) require members of the interagency committee and other

appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea

communications infrastructure sabotage indicators or

defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls

to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of

such information.

Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the

interagency committee, shall—

(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment

of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under

subsection (b); and

(2) not later than one year after submitting such

procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to

Congress a report on the implementation and execution of

information sharing with private sector actors in the

previous year pursuant to subsection (a).

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