Text of Senate Amendment 5968

Quick facts

Record: Senate Floor
Section type: Amendments
Chamber: Senate
Date: June 23, 2026
Congress: 119th Congress
Why this source matters: This section came from the Senate floor portion of the record.

Linked context

People mentioned: Schiff, Adam B.
Committees: Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on the Judiciary

Readable version of the official text

SA 5968. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XVI, insert the

following:

Subtitle Human Authority in Lethal Operations

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Human Authority in

Lethal Operations Act of 2026” or the “HALO Act of 2026”.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) Appropriate committees of congress.—The term

“appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on

Armed Services, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the

Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the

Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on the

Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(2) Artificial intelligence.—The term “artificial

intelligence” has the meaning given such term in section

5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act

of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401).

(3) Autonomous weapon system.—

(A) In general.—The term “autonomous weapon system”

means a weapon system that, once activated, can identify,

select, or engage targets without further intervention by or

communication with a human operator.

(B) Includes.—The term defined in subparagraph (A)

includes weapon systems that have human-operated supervision

with the ability to override complete operation of the

system, but can select and engage targets without further

human operator input, recalibration, or communication after

activation.

(4) Covered artificial intelligence capability.—The term

“covered artificial intelligence capability” means an

artificial intelligence designed, tested, developed,

procured, deployed, or used by, on behalf of, or shared with

the Department.

(5) Designated commander.—The term “designated

commander” means the highest ranking commissioned officer

within the chain of command who exercises operational or

administrative command authority over an autonomous or semi-

autonomous weapons system.

(6) Department.—The term “Department” means Department

of Defense.

(7) Ethical principles for artificial intelligence.—The

term “Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence” means

the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence adopted by

the Department on February 24, 2020, as in effect on January

1, 2025.

(8) Military departments.—The term “military

departments” has the meaning given such term in section

101(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(9) Responsible artificial intelligence strategy and

implementation pathway.—The term “Responsible Artificial

Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway” means the

Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and

Implementation Pathway dated June 2022 and prepared by the

Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence

Working Council in accordance with the memorandum issued by

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks on May 26, 2021,

Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the

Department of Defense, as in effect on January 1, 2025.

(10) Secretary.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary

of Defense.

(11) Semi-autonomous weapon system.—

(A) In general.—The term “semi-autonomous weapon system”

means a weapon system that, once activated, is intended to

only engage individual targets or specific target groups that

have been previously selected by a human operator.

(B) Included.—The term defined in subparagraph (A)

includes weapon systems that autonomously conduct engagement-

related functions, including the following:

(i) Acquiring, tracking, and identifying potential targets.

(ii) Cuing potential targets to human operators.

(iii) Prioritizing selected targets.

(iv) Providing input on timing of when to fire.

(v) Providing terminal guidance on how to narrowly

categorize selected targets, only if human operator control

is retained for the purpose of selecting individual targets

and specific target groups for engagement.

(12) Specific target group.—

(A) In general.—The term “specific target group” means a

discrete group of potential targets, such as a particular

flight of enemy aircraft, a particular formation of enemy

tanks, or a particular flotilla of enemy vessels.

(B) Excluded.—The term defined in subparagraph (A) does

not include a general class of targets or a specific type of

target, such as a particular model of tank or aircraft.

(13) Unintended engagement.—The term “unintended

engagement” means the use of force outcomes resulting in

damage to persons or objects that human operators did not

intend to be the targets of United States

military operations, including levels of collateral damage

beyond those consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict and

relevant laws of the United States and international laws,

applicable rules of engagement, and commander's intent.

SEC. 3. DESIGN AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTONOMOUS AND

SEMI-AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.

(a) General Requirement.—

(1) In general.—The Secretary shall, acting through each

of the Secretaries of the military departments, ensure that

whenever the Department designs, tests, develops, procures,

deploys, or uses a system described in paragraph (2), the

system meets the requirements of this section.

(2) Systems.—A system described in this paragraph is an

autonomous weapon system or semi-autonomous weapon system

that uses artificial intelligence to create, generate,

prioritize, recommend, or engage targets or courses of action

in support of use of force decisions.

(b) Human Responsibility Over Use of Force.—

(1) Accountable individuals.—For each system described in

subsection (a)(2)—

(A) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment

of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate rules for clear

chain of command and command hierarchy for military

operations involving a system described in subsection (a)(2)

to mirror the chain of command and command hierarchy for

military operations that do not involve such systems;

(B) the Secretary shall ensure that a designated commander

is identified as accountable under applicable military and

international laws for each engagement or class of

engagements involving a system described in subsection

(a)(2), regardless of the degree to which artificial

intelligence contributed to the identification, development,

recommendation, selection, or engagement of the target; and

(B) shall exercise ultimate discretion, judgment, and control

over the use of force.

(2) System requirements.—Each system described in

subsection (a)(2) shall incorporate the following:

(A) A system design that incorporates capabilities and

interfaces that require the designated commander to exercise

ultimate discretion, judgment and control in the envisioned

development, planning, deployment, and use processes for the

weapon system, including constraints on each such system's

authorized actions, targets, and geographic, temporal, and

contextual scope, which the system may not expand or modify

without explicit human authorization.

(B) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces,

doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and human operator

training must require commanders and human operators to use

the system with deference to their discretion regarding care,

and to analyze the output, in accordance with the Law of

Armed Conflict and relevant laws of the United States and

international laws, applicable treaties, weapon system safety

rules, and rules of engagement that are applicable or

reasonably expected to be applicable.

target selection data, decision logic, and human operator

actions, including the individual designated under subsection

(b)(1)(B), sufficiently detailed to enable post-engagement

review of compliance.

(D) The design, testing, development, procurement,

deployment, legal analysis and review, and use of artificial

intelligence capabilities in autonomous and semi-autonomous

weapon systems shall be consistent with, but not limited to,

the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the

Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and

Implementation Pathway.

(3) Availability to the public.—The Secretary shall ensure

that—

(A) the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and

the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and

Implementation Pathway are available to the public; and

(B) any revision to the Ethical Principles for Artificial

Intelligence or the Responsible Artificial Intelligence

Strategy and Implementation Pathway adopted by the Secretary

is made available to the public before the date that is 30

days before the date on which the revision goes into effect.

(1) In general.—Each system described in subsection (a)(2)

shall be designed—

(A) to complete engagements within a designated timeframe

and designated geographic area and against a designated set

of potential targets, as well as other relevant constraints,

consistent with commander and human operator intentions;

(B) to require independent review and analysis of a

designated commander before using force against previously

unauthorized targets, materially expanding target sets or

geographic scope, taking actions contravening applicable law,

rules of engagement, other relevant laws of the United States

and international laws, or taking actions likely to result in

unintended engagement; and

parameters described in paragraph (1), to terminate the

engagement until additional human operator and commander

evaluation is completed.

(2) Evaluation criteria.—The evaluation criteria used

under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall consist of

assessment of deficiencies and recommendations for changes to

be compliant with subparagraph (A) of such paragraph before

restarting preparation for engagement.

(d) Transparency, Auditability, and Explainability.—

Consistent with the potential consequences of an unintended

engagement or unauthorized interference with the operation of

a system described in subsection (a)(2), the physical

hardware and software of such system shall be designed with—

(1) technologies and data sources that are available to,

auditable by, and explainable to the greatest extent possible

by relevant personnel of the Department with the necessary

clearance level; and

(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and

cybersecurity in accordance with Department instructions and

military standards governing cybersecurity and system safety.

(e) Activation, Termination, and Human Operator

Interface.—Each system described in subsection (a)(2) shall

be designed so that—

(1) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily

understandable to trained human operators, including by

clearly disaggregating which actions human operators need to

perform and which actions the weapon system will perform;

(2) clear procedures exist for trained human operators to

activate, terminate, and disable all weapon system functions;

(3) the system provides timely feedback on system status,

including regarding the quality and sufficiency of the data

inputs relied upon, to human operators in real time or near-

real time; and

(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and

doctrine are available, reviewed on a quarterly basis, by

weapon system human operators and designated commanders to

understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of

the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions.

(f) Degraded Communications Safeguard.—Any autonomous or

semi-autonomous weapon system that is, or is part of, an

unmanned platform shall be designed such that, in the event

of degraded or lost communications, the system does not

autonomously select and engage individual targets, specific

target groups, or general classes or specific types of

targets that have not been previously selected by an

authorized human operator.

(g) Continuous Monitoring.—The Secretary shall, in

coordination with the Director of Operational Test and

Evaluation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and

Engineering, and the appropriate Secretary of a military

department or Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and

Low-Intensity Conflict, establish and maintain procedures for

continuous monitoring of each system, to the greatest extent

possible, described in subsection (a)(2) to identify and

address circumstances in which changes to the system design

or operational environment require additional testing and

evaluation or legal review to provide sufficient confidence

that the system will continue—

(1) to function as intended;

(2) to avoid unintended engagements;

(3) to resist interference by unauthorized parties; and

(4) to remain compliant with relevant laws of the United

States, the Law of Armed Conflict, and international laws.

(h) Robust Artificial Intelligence Design.—For any system

described in subsection (a) that incorporates artificial

intelligence capabilities, such system shall be designed to

utilize robust artificial intelligence, in accordance with

the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and

Implementation Pathway so that the system is resilient in

real-world settings and against adversarial attacks and

spoofing.

SEC. 4. ADVANCED REVIEW AND APPROVAL AUTHORITY.

(a) General Requirement for Advanced Review.—With the

exception of systems described in subsection (e), the

Secretary shall ensure that each system described in section

3(a)(2) is approved in accordance with this section before

formal development and before fielding.

(b) Pre-development Review.—Before a decision to enter

formal development of a system described in subsection (a),

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly

verify that—

(1) the weapon system design incorporates the necessary

capabilities to allow a designated commander to exercise

ultimate discretion, judgment, and control over the use of

force in the envisioned planning, deployment, and use

processes for the weapon;

(2) the system is designed to complete engagements within a

designated timeframe and designated geographic area and

against a designated set of potential targets, as well as

other applicable parameters, consistent with designated

commander intentions, and if unable to do so, to terminate

use until additional human operator and commander evaluation

is completed before continuing the engagement;

(3) the combination of the system's design and concept of

use, including its target selection and engagement logic,

accounts for risks of armed conflict, including to civilians,

civilian populations, civilian objects, and other protected

entities, consistent with commander and human operator intent

and obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict,

or other relevant laws of the United States and international

laws;

(4) the system design, including system safety, anti-tamper

mechanisms, and cybersecurity, addresses and minimizes the

probability and consequences of failures;

(5) plans are in place for verification and validation and

test and evaluation to establish system reliability,

effectiveness, predictability of effects, and accuracy under

realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions,

interference, or unintended consequences;

(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence

capabilities, plans are in place to ensure consistency with

the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the

Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and

Implementation Pathway; and

(7) a thorough legal analysis, review, and risk assessment

of a system described in subsection (a) has been completed in

coordination with the General Counsel of the Department and

other relevant Department General Counsels and in accordance

with applicable directives governing the Defense Acquisition

System, the Department of Defense Law of War Program, the Law

of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United

States and international laws.

described in subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense

for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition

and Sustainment, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff shall jointly verify that—

(1) system capabilities, human-machine interfaces,

doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training have

been demonstrated to allow a designated commander to exercise

ultimate discretion, control, and judgment over the use of

force and to use systems whose outcomes are sufficiently

accurate with thorough legal analysis in accordance with the

law of war, Law of Armed Conflict, applicable treaties,

weapon system safety rules, and rules of engagement

reasonably expected to be applicable;

(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber

survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity

capabilities have been implemented to minimize the

probability and consequences of failures, including

unpredictable outcomes, and a monitoring protocol is in place

to identify and address changes in operational environment,

data inputs, and use that could contribute to such failures;

(3) verification and validation and test and evaluation

have—

(A) assessed system performance, capability, reliability,

risk margins, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic

conditions, including possible adversary actions,

interference, or unintended consequences; and

(B) have demonstrated that the system can be revised as

needed with sufficient rapidity to enable timely correction

of any unintended system behaviors that may be observed or

discovered during future system operations;

(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and

doctrine are available, quarterly reviewed, and used by

system operators and commanders to understand the

functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system in

real world conditions;

(5) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily

understandable to trained human operators, provide

transparent feedback on system status, provide secure logging

to enable traceability, and provide clear procedures for

trained human operators to activate and terminate system

functions;

(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence

capabilities, the deployment and use of such capabilities in

the weapon system will be consistent with the Ethical

Principles for Artificial Intelligence, the Responsible

Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway,

the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the

United States and international laws; and

(7) a legal review of the compliance of the weapon system

with the Defense Acquisition System, the Department of

Defense Law of War Program, the Law of Armed Conflict, and

other relevant laws of the United States and international

laws has been completed in coordination with the General

Counsel of the Department.

(d) Re-review of Modified Systems.—A system described in

subsection (a) that is a variant of an existing weapon system

previously approved through the review process under this

section shall not be covered by previous approval if changes

to the system algorithms, intended mission set, intended

operational environments, intended target sets, or expected

adversarial countermeasures materially differ from those

applicable to the previously approved weapon system. Such

systems shall require a new analysis, review, and risk

assessment before formal development and again before

fielding.

(e) Systems Not Requiring Advanced Review.—

(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the

advance review described in this section is not required for

weapon systems intended to be used in the following manners:

(A) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or

non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force without capability

to function as an autonomous weapon system.

(B) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems

used to select and engage materiel targets for local defense

to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks

for—

(i) static defense of installations with personnel,

including networked defense where the autonomous weapon

system is not co-located with the installation; or

(ii) onboard or networked defense of platforms with onboard

personnel.

used to select and engage materiel targets for purpose of

protecting remotely piloted or autonomous vehicles and

vessels.

(D) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal,

non-kinetic force against materiel targets.

(2) Exception.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a weapon

system intended to be used in the manner described in

subparagraph (B) of such paragraph in a case in which the

engagement zone for the system encompasses densely populated

areas or essential civilian infrastructure. In such a case,

the weapon system shall undergo the advanced review described

in this section to certify that the system can effectively

distinguish between military targets and non-combatants or

civilian objects in high-clutter environments.

SEC. 5. ROLE OF THE CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

(a) Monitoring and Evaluation.—The Chief Digital and

Artificial Intelligence Officer shall monitor and evaluate

artificial intelligence capabilities in, and cybersecurity

for, autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, and shall

advise the Secretary on such matters.

(b) Testable Requirements.—The Chief Digital and

Artificial Intelligence Officer shall, in collaboration with

the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—

(1) formulate concrete, testable requirements for

implementing the Ethical Principles for Artificial

Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial Intelligence

Strategy and Implementation Pathway;

(2) establish policy and issue guidance on definitions of

requirements and testability for artificial intelligence-

enabled systems to implement and demonstrate adherence to the

Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the

Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and

Implementation Pathway; and

(3) issue guidance on test and evaluation practices for

artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous or semi-

autonomous weapon systems, which shall include an adversarial

assessment (known as “red-team assessment”) that evaluates

weapon system vulnerability to adversarial manipulation under

operationally realistic conditions.

Artificial Intelligence Officer shall coordinate with the

Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and

the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation on developing

and using common tools and infrastructure for test and

evaluation and verification and validation of artificial

intelligence capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous

weapon systems, including assurance benchmarks for

reliability, robustness, security, and human-machine team

performance.

SEC. 6. TESTING AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) General Requirement.—The Secretary shall ensure that,

regardless of the acquisition pathway or testing and

evaluation oversight status for a weapon system, each system

described in section 3(a)(2) undergoes—

(1) rigorous hardware and software verification and

validation; and

(2) realistic system developmental and operational test and

evaluation, including analysis of unanticipated emergent

behavior.

(b) Specific Considerations.—Testing and evaluation of a

system under subsection (a)(2) may include testing on how

human operators respond to ensure they are provided with

enough time to exercise judgment and can reject or challenge

suggestions or recommendations.

system under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Verification that the system functions as anticipated

in realistic operational environments against adaptive

adversaries, including with realistic civilian presence,

activities, actions, and reactions, and are sufficiently

robust to minimize failures.

(2) For a system incorporating artificial intelligence

capabilities, rigorous developmental and operational test and

evaluation to verify and validate that the artificial

intelligence is robust according to design requirements.

(3) Testing to confirm that autonomy algorithms in systems

incorporating artificial intelligence capabilities can be

rapidly reprogrammed on new input data.

(d) Post-fielding Testing.—The Secretary shall ensure

that, after initial operational test and evaluation of a

system under subsection (a), as directed by the Director of

Operational Test and Evaluation—

(1) system data is collected and any further changes to the

system undergo appropriate verification and validation and

test and evaluation to ensure that critical safety features

have not been degraded;

(2) system software is tested using best-available

Department means and methods to validate that critical safety

features have not been degraded, and automated testing tools,

such as modeling and simulation, are used whenever feasible;

(3) any new or revised operating states or other relevant

changes in the system are identified and undergoes

appropriate and tailored additional test and evaluation to

characterize the system behavior in that new operating state;

and

(4) changes to the state transition matrix are evaluated to

determine whether they require whole system follow-on

operational test and evaluation.

(e) Iterative Cyber Testing.—The Secretary shall ensure

that hardware and software verification and validation of a

system under subsection (a) includes quarterly cyber test and

evaluation to verify that the system is resilient and

survivable in contested cyberspace.

(f) Role of the Director of Operational Test and

Evaluation.—Under this section, the Director of Operational

Test and Evaluation shall—

(1) oversee development of realistic operational test, risk

assessments, and evaluation standards for autonomous and

semi-autonomous weapon systems, including requirements for

data collection and standards for test and evaluation of any

changes to the system following initial operational test and

evaluation;

(2) evaluate whether autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon

systems under the Director's oversight have met standards

after being tested for rigorous verification, validation, and

evaluation in realistic operational conditions, including

potential adversary action, to ensure that the system is

robust to minimize failures;

(3) establish standards for data collection post-fielding

and monitoring and assessment by programs;

(4) establish and maintain a centralized repository for

reporting, collecting, and analyzing operational incidents,

weapon system failures, and unintended weapon system

behaviors;

(5) review and approve operational and live fire test plans

for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems; and

(6) coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for

Research and Engineering and the appropriate Secretary of a

military department or Assistant Secretary for Low-Intensity

Conflict to provide for monitoring to identify and address

when changes to the system design or operational environment

require additional testing and evaluation to ensure that the

system is robust to minimize failures such as unintended

engagements with civilians and civilian infrastructure,

densely populated areas, and resist interference by

unauthorized parties.

SEC. 7. PROHIBITED USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) General Prohibition.—No covered artificial

intelligence capability may be used in any manner that

violates the Constitution of the United States, Federal law,

the Law of Armed Conflict, or international treaty or other

legal obligation of the United States, or in any manner that

poses an unacceptable level of risk to the safety of an

individual or the civil liberty of an individual.

(b) Specific Prohibitions.—

(1) In general.—No covered artificial intelligence

capability may be used with the intent, purpose, or outcome

of—

(A) profiling, targeting, tracking, monitoring, inferring,

or concluding based on the data points of activity of any

individual based solely on the exercise of rights protected

under the Constitution or Federal law, including freedom of

expression, association, and assembly;

(B) detecting, measuring, or inferring the emotional state

of any individual from data acquired about such individual,

including the support of the health of consenting personnel

of the Federal Government;

ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, immigration status,

disability status, gender identity, or political identity;

(D) tracking, monitoring, or inferring the past, real-time,

or anticipated future location of any individual in the

United States, including using data acquired from commercial,

data brokers, data aggregators, or other third-party sources,

unless such acquisition and use is authorized pursuant to an

individualized judicial order, warrant, or otherwise required

by the Constitution or Federal law;

(E) aggregating or analyzing internal data or data acquired

from commercial, data brokers, data aggregators, or other

third-party sources, including but not limited to location

data, financial transaction data, communications metadata, or

biometric data, to accomplish any purpose prohibited under

paragraphs (1) through (4);

(F) removing a human from the chain of decisionmaking for

actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the

President, including initiating or terminating nuclear

weapons employment; or

(G) obtaining, receiving, or otherwise accessing, for a fee

or other consideration, any personal data of a United States

person from a data broker or other third-party source,

including any other governmental entity (including State,

local, or Federal entities) if such data was obtained by that

entity in a manner that would violate this subsection if

performed by the Department.

(2) Personal data.—For purposes of paragraph (1)(G), the

term “personal data”—

(A) means data, derived data, or any unique identifier that

is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an individual or

to an electronic device that is linked to, or is reasonably

linkable to, one or more individuals in a household;

(B) includes anonymized data that, if combined with other

data, can be linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an

individual or to an electronic device that identifies, is

linked to, or is reasonably linkable to one or more

individuals in a household; and

through Federal, State, or local government records or

through widely distributed media; and

apply to all activities of the Department, including

operational planning, logistics, intelligence analysis, and

operational support to any other agencies or military

personnel, regardless of status of deployment. In any case in

which the Department shares systems, data, or analytical

products derived from a covered artificial intelligence

capability or protected data (as described in subsection

(b)(7)) with another department or agency of the Federal

Government, the receiving department or agency shall be

subject to the same prohibitions and requirements as the

Department with respect to the use, querying, or further

dissemination of such systems, data, or products. The

Secretary shall ensure that such department or agency is

notified of, and in compliance with, the restrictions under

this section.

(d) Joint Operations.—The prohibitions of this section

shall apply to any Departmental participation in joint task

forces, fusion centers, or interagency working groups,

regardless of which agency serves as the lead or providing

entity.

SEC. 8. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.

(a) Protections.—The Secretary shall update such

whistleblower protections as the Secretary considers

appropriate to clarify procedures for artificial intelligence

systems, which shall ensure that all personnel who develop,

assess, deploy, operate, or use artificial intelligence as a

component of a National Security System (as defined in

section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code) or otherwise

for military or intelligence purposes can report concerns

about artificial intelligence, including concerns about

improperly harming civil liberties, privacy, safety, or

compliance with the requirements of this Act, to relevant

oversight officials.

(b) Compliance With Existing Law.—Updates to whistleblower

protections under subsection (a) shall be compliant with—

(1) section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, and its

implementation guidance under Department of Defense Directive

7050.06 (relating to military whistleblower protection);

(2) section 2302 of title 5, United States Code;

(3) title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of

Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-126; 128 Stat. 1414) and the

amendments made by such title; and

(4) section 4701 of title 10, United States Code.

(1) In general.—The Secretary shall ensure that adequate

and special procedures exist to receive, investigate, respond

to, and redress complaints anonymously, when appropriate, and

that reports may be made confidentially so that personnel may

raise concerns without fear of reprisal for any disclosures

related to artificial intelligence.

(2) Exception.—Confidentiality under paragraph (1) shall

not extend to significant misconduct, including violations of

law or government ethics, or when otherwise precluded by law.

(d) Investigation and Corrective Action.—The Secretary

shall ensure that adequate and special procedures exist for

reporting incidents of artificial intelligence misuse,

investigations of reported incidents, and processes for

taking corrective actions.

SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Semiannual Report on Artificial Intelligence Use

Cases.—Not later than six months after the date of the

enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the

Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of

Congress a report containing the following:

(1) A description of exemplary use cases of artificial

intelligence within the Department during the preceding year,

identifying best practices, failure modes, and risk

mitigation strategies employed.

(2) After-action reports on significant operational use of

covered artificial intelligence capabilities during the

preceding year, including—

(A) an assessment of system performance and effectiveness

of human oversight;

(B) any identified risks or failure modes;

including incidents resulting in civilian casualties or

injuries, damage to civilian objects or protected

infrastructure, or other unintended effects inconsistent with

the Law of Armed Conflict; and

(D) recommendations for improvements to human oversight,

system safeguards, and the mitigation of future civilian

harm.

(3) A description of training provided to human operators

of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems and other

artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act,

including documentation on employment procedures and

responsible retirement of systems.

(b) Annual Report on Infrastructure and Barriers.—Not

later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this

Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to

the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying—

(1) any significant barriers to the responsible development

and deployment of artificial intelligence within the

Department;

(2) gaps in infrastructure required to support

traceability, auditability, risk analysis, and forensics for

artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act; and

(3) recommended hardware, software, or other infrastructure

needs necessary to fulfill the requirements of this Act.

Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of

this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall

submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report

identifying—

(1) each fielded system for which compliance under this Act

cannot be certified, with a description of the specific

requirement or requirements with which the system does not

comply;

(2) the operational or national security legal

justification, if any, for the continued fielding of each

such non-compliant system; and

(3) a remediation plan and timeline for bringing each such

system into compliance or, if compliance is not practicable,

a plan for the responsible retirement or modification of the

system.

SEC. __10. EXCEPTIONS.

(a) Cyberspace Capabilities.—The requirements of sections

3, 4, 5, and 7 shall not apply to autonomous or

semi-autonomous cyberspace capabilities.

(b) Unarmed Platforms.—The requirements of sections 3,

4, 5, and 7 shall not apply to unarmed platforms,

whether remotely operated or operated by onboard personnel,

and whether autonomous or semi-autonomous.

time available between threat detection and required

intercept is insufficient to allow for individual human

authorization of each engagement and provided that such

operations do not have death or serious bodily harm to any

person as a reasonably foreseeable consequence, the

requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 7 shall not

apply to—

(1) systems employed exclusively for the defense against

incoming munitions, rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles; or

(2) unmanned aircraft systems.

(d) Other Excluded Systems.—The requirements of sections

3, 4, 5, and 7 shall not apply to—

(1) unguided munitions;

(2) munitions manually guided by the human operator, such

as laser- or wire-guided munitions;

(3) mines;

(4) unexploded explosive ordnance; or

(5) autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not

weapon systems.

(e) Identification Systems.—The requirements of sections

3, 4, 5, and 7 shall not apply to a system

described in section 3(a)(2) with the sole purpose and

outcome of identifying potential targets without further

intervention by or communication with a human operator.

SEC. __11. EFFECTIVE DATE; REVIEW OF SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN

USE.

(a) In General.—This subtitle shall take effect on the

date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this

Act.

(b) Review of Systems Currently in Use.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the

effective date set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary

shall conduct a review of all systems described in section

3(a)(2) that are in use by the Department as of such

effective date.

(2) Attestation.—Upon completion of the review required

under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the

appropriate committees of Congress a written attestation

identifying, for each reviewed system, whether the system is

compliant with the requirements of sections 3, 4, 5,

and 7.

(3) Noncompliant systems.—For any system that the

Secretary cannot attest is in compliance with sections 3,

4, 5, and 7, the Secretary shall immediately cease

all use of such system and, concurrent with the attestation

required under paragraph (2), submit to appropriate

committees of Congress a remediation plan that includes—

(A) a description of the specific requirement or

requirements with which the system does not comply;

(B) an operational or national security justification, if

any, for continued use of the system pending remediation; and

if compliance is not practicable, for the responsible

retirement or modification of the system.

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