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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions members such as Adam Schiff.
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June 23, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6013. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction,
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place in subtitle G of title X, insert
the following:
SEC. . COLLABORATION ON ADVERSARIAL THREATS AND AI
SECURITY RISKS.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) Antitrust laws; non-federal entity.—The terms
“antitrust laws” and “non-Federal entity” have the
meanings given those terms, respectively, in section 102 of
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C.
1501).
(2) Artificial intelligence.—The term “artificial
intelligence” has the meaning given that term in section
238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note).
(3) Assistance.—The term “assistance” includes the
provision of software, hardware, data, personnel, and other
resources.
(4) Covered artificial intelligence security purpose.—The
term “covered artificial intelligence security purpose”
means the purpose of protecting against, identifying,
evaluating, testing, analyzing, preventing, investigating, or
mitigating a covered artificial intelligence security risk.
(5) Covered artificial intelligence security risk.—The
term “covered artificial intelligence security risk” means
the potential for artificial intelligence, including during
development, training, testing, evaluation, deployment, use,
or release, to do 1 or more of the following:
(A) Substantially facilitate the development or deployment
of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
offensive cyber weapon.
(B) Cause a disruption to, degradation of, impairment of,
or loss of operational control over critical infrastructure
that is reasonably likely to result in a significant impact
on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination thereof.
(C) Substantially reduce the ability of a developer,
deployer, owner, operator, user, evaluator, auditor, Federal
department or agency, or other governmental authority to
oversee, evaluate, monitor, control, contain, restrict access
to, disable, or terminate such artificial intelligence, if
the applicable person or governmental authority has authority
or responsibility to do so, including through unauthorized,
deceptive, evasive, or malicious activity involving such
artificial intelligence.
(D) Autonomously improve, or substantially facilitate the
autonomous improvement of the capabilities of artificial
intelligence in a manner that creates a reasonable risk of a
consequence described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(E) Be stolen, weaponized, trained, developed, or deployed
by a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f)(2) of
title 10, United States Code) or an entity owned, controlled,
or directed by a covered nation in a manner that poses a
significant threat to the national security, including
through covert, clandestine, undisclosed, or otherwise
concealed development activities that attempt to evade
detection or verification.
(F) Be vulnerable to unauthorized access that—
(i) creates a substantial risk of a consequence described
in subparagraphs (A) through (D); or
(ii) is for the benefit of, at the direction of, or under
the control of—
(I) a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f)(2) of
title 10, United States Code); or
(II) an entity owned, controlled, or directed by a covered
nation.
(6) Exclusive purpose.—The term “exclusive purpose”,
with respect to the provision of information or assistance,
means for the purpose of, with not more than an insubstantial
part of the information or assistance being for other
purposes.
(7) Unauthorized access.—The term “unauthorized access”
with respect to artificial intelligence—
(A) means unauthorized access or use of artificial
intelligence; and
(B) includes—
(i) extraction or copying of model weights, parameters, or
other nonpublic model information;
(ii) systematic querying or automated extraction designed
to distill, replicate, or reconstruct model capabilities; and
(iii) compromise affecting the integrity, reliability, or
security of artificial intelligence, including through
malicious code, a backdoor, manipulated data, or compromise
of an artificial intelligence model, training dataset, or
artificial intelligence component.
(b) Antitrust Exemption.—
(1) In general.—It shall not be considered a violation of
any provision of the antitrust laws for—
(A) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange
information or assistance relating to a covered artificial
intelligence security risk in good faith for the exclusive
purpose of a covered artificial intelligence security
purpose; or
(B) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange
information or assistance for the exclusive purpose of
coordinating strategies to reduce covered artificial
intelligence security risks via delaying or otherwise
limiting the release, deployment, use, development, training,
testing, or evaluation of artificial intelligence, provided
that the non-Federal entities submit prior written notice of
the proposed coordinated delay or limitation to the Attorney
General and the Federal Trade Commission, detailing the
specific covered artificial intelligence security risk and
the scope of the proposed restriction.
(2) Limitation.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a non-
Federal entity receiving information or assistance unless the
non-Federal entity uses such information or assistance for a
covered artificial intelligence security purpose and has
implemented reasonable internal controls to limit the extent
to which such information or assistance can be used for other
purposes.
(3) Affirmative defense.—In any action or proceeding
brought under the antitrust laws, the exemption provided
under paragraph (1) shall constitute an affirmative defense,
and any non-Federal entity claiming the exemption shall bear
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the entity's actions were taken in good faith and for the
exclusive purpose described in paragraph (1).
(4) Rule of construction.—Paragraph (1)(A) shall not be
construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between
competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a
market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost
information.
(5) Exemption from disclosure.—Any information submitted
to the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission
pursuant to paragraph (1)(B), including any written notice
submitted under that subsection and any information derived
from such submission that would reveal the substance of such
submission, shall be—
(A) used solely for the purpose of subsection (c);
(B) deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code;
and
(C) withheld, without discretion, from the public under
section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code.
(c) Injunctive Relief.—
(1) In general.—The Attorney General or the Federal Trade
Commission may seek, in a court of competent jurisdiction, an
injunction against the initiation or continuation of the
provision or exchange of information or assistance by non-
Federal entities described in section 3 that violates the
antitrust laws if the Attorney General or the Federal Trade
Commission determines that the non-Federal entities are not
acting in good faith or are otherwise unreasonably engaging
in anticompetitive acts.
(2) Rules of construction.—Nothing in this section shall
be construed to—
(A) create any immunity or exemption from the antitrust
laws if the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission
determines that the non-Federal entities are not acting in
good faith or are otherwise unreasonably engaging in
anticompetitive acts; or
(B) to limit any private right of action for any violation
of the antitrust laws that is not exempt under subsection
(b).