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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Committee on Foreign Affairs, members such as William Francis Hagerty.
Issued
June 24, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6069. Mr. HAGERTY (for himself and Mr. Kim) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of division A, add the following:
TITLE XVII—BLOCKING LARGE-SCALE ADVERSARIAL DISTILLATION EFFORTS ACT
OF 2026
SEC. 1701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as “Blocking Large-scale
Adversarial Distillation Efforts Act of 2026” or “BLADE
Act”.
SEC. 1702. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) artificial intelligence models owned by United States
private sector entities are essential for advancing economic
and national security interests of the United States;
(2) many of the most advanced artificial intelligence
models owned by United States entities are “closed-source
models” whose unique technical characteristics are not
openly shared or published;
(3) the unauthorized acquisition of model capabilities,
such as model weights, model architectures, and other
technical characteristics of closed-source artificial
intelligence models, by persons of concern through model
extraction attacks represents a threat to the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States,
as well as the intellectual property rights and economic
competitiveness of United States entities;
(4) the United States Government, in cooperation with
private owners of closed-source artificial intelligence
models, should take steps to identify, punish, and deter
model extraction attacks on the protected capabilities of
closed-source artificial intelligence models by persons of
concern;
(5) model extraction attacks against United States closed-
source artificial intelligence models allow foreign
adversaries a short cut to acquiring advanced artificial
intelligence capabilities; and
(6) authorized model training practices that adhere to the
terms of service or are otherwise consistent with contractual
terms set by the owners of closed-source artificial
intelligence models are a legitimate research method that
play an important role in artificial intelligence research
and are fundamentally distinct from model extraction attacks
addressed by this title.
SEC. 1703. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term
“appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate.
(2) Closed-source artificial intelligence model.—The term
“closed-source artificial intelligence model” means any
artificial intelligence model with the following
characteristics:
(A) Proprietary key technical information, such as
underlying model weights, that are necessary to reproduce and
independently recreate the model and that are not willingly
shared with third parties or otherwise made publicly
available by the owner of the model.
(B) Access and use governed by terms of service or
contractual agreements that are established by the owner of
the model.
(C) Access that is provided via an application program
interface or another consumer-facing, owner-controlled
interface without enabling third parties to obtain, modify,
or host the closed-source artificial intelligence model on
their own data servers or other technology unless
specifically authorized by the owner of the model.
(3) Country of concern.—The term “country of concern”
means—
(A) the People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong
and Macau Special Administrative Regions;
(B) the Russian Federation; and
(C) any other foreign country—
(i) listed in Country Group D:5 in Supplement No. 1 to part
740 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, as published on
January 1, 2026, that is designated by the Secretary of
Commerce as a country of concern for purposes of this section
and for which notice of such designation has been published
in the Federal Register; and
(ii) identified by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to an
assessment required by subsection (a) or (e) of section 1704.
(4) Person of concern.—The term “person of concern”
means any foreign person that—
(A) is located or headquartered in, or the ultimate parent
company of which is headquartered in, a country of concern;
(B) is operating under the direction or control of any
entity located or headquartered in, or the ultimate parent
company of which is headquartered in, a country of concern;
or
(C) is conducting or attempting to conduct a model
extraction attack against closed-source artificial
intelligence models owned by United States persons and
outside of authorized model training practices.
(5) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means a
person that is not a United States person.
(6) Fraudulent account network provider.—
(A) In general.—The term “fraudulent account network
provider” means any foreign person that knowingly and
intentionally creates, obtains, maintains, sells, brokers, or
otherwise provides access to an account that allows a person
of concern to access a closed-source artificial intelligence
model that the entity would otherwise be prohibited from
accessing as a result of location restrictions in the terms
of service or a contractual agreement created by the owner of
the model.
(B) Exception.—For purposes of subparagraph (A), an entity
that creates or transmits location information to enable
persons within countries of concern to access the internet
for purposes of freedom of expression is not, on the basis of
that activity alone, a fraudulent account network provider.
(7) Model extraction attack.—
(A) In general.—The term “model extraction attack” means
the unauthorized extracting of the capabilities of a closed-
source artificial intelligence model to replicate, develop,
train, or improve another artificial intelligence model, if
such extraction—
(i) circumvents technical, contractual, or other access
controls, identity verification requirements, or geographic
access restrictions implemented by the owner of the model;
(ii) is conducted through fraudulent, misrepresented, or
unauthorized credentials; or
(iii) violates the terms, conditions, or restrictions
governing access to or use of the model, as established by
the owner, that specifically prohibit the use of model
outputs or interactions to replicate, develop, train, or
improve another artificial intelligence model.
(B) Inference of purpose.—For purposes of subparagraph
(A), the purpose of extraction may be inferred from the
totality of circumstances, including—
(i) the volume, structure, pattern, coordination, or timing
of the extraction activity;
(ii) the concentration of extractions on specific model
capabilities;
(iii) the use of multiple accounts in a coordinated manner;
or
(iv) the correlation of extraction activity within the
development timeline of another artificial intelligence
model.
(C) Exclusion.—For purposes of subparagraph (A), model
training activities conducted in compliance with the terms,
conditions, and restrictions governing access to and use of a
closed-source artificial intelligence model, or otherwise
conducted within a permitted exception or the express
authorization of the owner of the model, are not model
extraction attacks.
(8) Operating committee for export policy.—The term
“Operating Committee for Export Policy” means the Operating
Committee for Export Policy referred to in section 1763(c) of
the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4822(c)).
(9) Owner.—The term “owner” means, with respect to a
closed-source artificial intelligence model, the person
that—
(A) holds intellectual property rights (including trade
secret, copyright, patent, or other proprietary rights),
contractual rights, or a combination thereof, sufficient to
authorize or restrict third-party access to, use of,
extraction from, or reproduction of the model, or any
version, instance, or deployment the model, whether such
rights were obtained through development, acquisition,
assignment, license, or otherwise; and
(B) is a United States person.
(10) Person.—The term “person” means individual or
entity.
(11) United states person.—The term “United States
person” means—
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person located in the United States.
SEC. 1704. ASSESSMENT OF MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND
FRAUDULENT ACCOUNT NETWORK PROVIDERS.
(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in
coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of
the Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall complete an
assessment to determine—
(1) which, if any, persons of concern have conducted or are
currently conducting model extraction attacks against closed-
source artificial intelligence models owned by United States
persons; and
(2) which, if any, persons of concern are fraudulent
account network providers.
(b) Matters To Be Included.—The assessment required by
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A determination of which persons of concern—
(A) have either previously or are currently engaging in
model extraction attacks; or
(B) are fraudulent account network providers.
(2) A determination of the countries, if any—
(A) from which model extraction attacks have originated;
and
(B) in which fraudulent account network providers exist.
(3) An identification of which, if any, agencies or
instrumentalities of governments of countries of concern have
provided or are providing material assistance to entities
identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
(4) An analysis of the methods employed by persons of
concern identified pursuant to paragraph (1), including—
(A) the role of fraudulent account network providers in
model extraction attacks, including, to the extent possible,
the physical location of offices and data centers of such
providers; and
(B) a determination, to the extent possible, of the number
of attempted model extraction attacks that occurred during
the 2 calendar years preceding the date on which the
Secretary of Commerce begins the assessment required by
subsection (a).
(5) An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of
various detection approaches that can be used to determine
whether a model extraction attack has occurred or is
occurring.
(6) An assessment of the economic and national security
consequences of successful model extraction attacks by
persons of concern that occurred during the 2 calendar years
preceding the date on which the Secretary of Commerce begins
the assessment required by subsection (a).
(7) Steps detailing how the United States Government is
assisting owners of closed-source artificial intelligence
models that have been the target or victim of model
extraction attacks in detecting model extraction attacks,
deterring future model extraction attacks, and punishing
persons of concern that engage in model extraction attacks or
are fraudulent account network providers.
(8) A diplomatic strategy to leverage allies and partners
of the United States in detecting and preventing model
extraction attacks by persons of concern.
(c) Public Consultation.—
(1) In general.—In conducting the assessment required by
subsection (a), the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination
with the head of each agency that is a member of the
Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall consult with
owners of closed-source artificial intelligence models that
have been the targets or victims of model extraction attacks,
academic experts, industry fora, and other appropriate
entities—
(A) to identify patterns of behavior and methods of
attackers to better inform efforts of the United States
Government and the private sector to detect model extraction
attacks;
(B) to develop best practices for defending against model
extraction attacks; and
(C) to develop best practices for identifying activities of
fraudulent account network providers that facilitate model
extraction attacks.
(2) Voluntary participation.—The participation of owners
of closed-source artificial intelligence models described in
paragraph (1) in consultations under that paragraph shall be
voluntary.
(d) Report.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 210 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in
coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of
the Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that
contains the findings of the assessment required by
subsection (a).
(2) Updates.—Not later than one year after submitting the
report required by paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for
3 years, the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an update to the report
listing any additional persons of concern identified pursuant
to subsection (a).
(3) Form.—The report required by paragraph (1), and each
update required by paragraph (2), shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(e) Routine Assessment.—The Secretary of Commerce, in
coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of
the Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall routinely
assess for—
(1) model extraction attacks directed against owners of
closed-source artificial intelligence models that occur after
the date of completion of the assessment required by
subsection (a);
(2) fraudulent account network providers that facilitate
model extraction attacks after that date; and
(3) any material changes related to other matters specified
in subsection (b).
(f) Industry Coordination.—The Secretary of Commerce, in
coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of
the Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall establish an
information-sharing mechanism that allows owners of closed-
source artificial intelligence models to voluntarily,
quickly, and confidentially share information about model
extraction attacks and fraudulent account network providers
with the Department of Commerce.
(g) AI Model Extraction Attackers List.—
(1) In general.—The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination
with the head of each agency that is a member of the
Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall—
(A) maintain a list, to be known as the “AI Model
Extraction Attackers List”, that displays information about
specific persons of concern identified pursuant to an
assessment required by subsection (a) or (e) as having
conducted or directed model extraction attacks in the past
year; and
(B) publish the list on a publicly available website of the
Department of Commerce.
(2) Protection of confidential information.—The Secretary
of Commerce may not, in publishing the list required by
paragraph (1) on a publicly available website of the
Department of Commerce, disclose confidential information
provided by the owner of a closed-source artificial
intelligence model without the express permission of the
owner.
(h) Public Guidance.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 210 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in
coordination with the head of each agency that is a member of
the Operating Committee for Export Policy, shall publish a
report comprising of best practices to detect, prevent, and
respond to model extraction attacks.
(2) Public access.—The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be publicly available.
(3) Protection of confidential information.—In making the
report required by paragraph (1) publicly available, the
Secretary may not disclose confidential information provided
by the owner of a closed-source artificial intelligence model
without the express permission of the owner.
SEC. 1705. DETERRING MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND FRAUDULENT
ACCOUNT NETWORK PROVIDERS.
(a) Consideration of Addition to Entity List.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 210 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Commerce
for Industry and Security, in coordination with the head of
each agency that is a member of the End-User Review
Committee, shall make a determination, by majority vote of
the Committee, with respect to whether each entity described
in paragraph (2) should be added to the Entity List
maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security and set
forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations, or any successor regulations.
(2) Entities described.—An entity described in this
paragraph is—
(A) an entity that is a person of concern identified, under
subsection (a) or (e) of section 1704, as having conducted
model extraction attacks or having facilitated such attacks
via fraudulent account networks; or
(B) a subsidiary of such an entity (to be determined by
ownership of 50 percent or more in the aggregate, directly or
indirectly).
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.—
(1) In general.—The President, may, pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property
and interests in property of each person of concern
identified under subsections (a) and (e) of section 1704 if
such property and interests in property are in the United
States, come within the United States, or are or come within
the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Exceptions.—
(A) Exception relating to the provision of humanitarian
assistance.—Sanctions under paragraph (1) may not be imposed
with respect to transactions or the facilitation of
transactions for—
(i) the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,
or medical devices;
(ii) the provision of humanitarian assistance; or
(iii) transporting goods or services that are necessary to
carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance.
(B) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and
national security activities.—Sanctions under this
subsection shall not apply to any authorized intelligence,
law enforcement, or national security activities of the
United States.
(3) Penalties.—A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
subsection or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.