Text of Senate Amendment 6373

Quick facts

Record: Senate Floor
Section type: Amendments
Chamber: Senate
Date: June 24, 2026
Congress: 119th Congress
Why this source matters: This section came from the Senate floor portion of the record.

Linked context

People mentioned: Cotton, Tom
Committees: Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations, Select Committee on Intelligence

Readable version of the official text

SA 6373. Mr. COTTON (for himself and Mr. Warner) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

DIVISION __—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.—This division may be cited as the

“Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027”.

(b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents for this

division is as follows:

DIVISION __—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations. Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account. Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by

law.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 301. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and

Assistant Directors of National Intelligence. Sec. 302. Repeal of National Intelligence Management Council. Sec. 303. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and

offices. Sec. 304. Transfer of National Intelligence University. Sec. 305. Limitation on domestic activities at the National

Counterterrorism Center. Sec. 306. Timely provision of security direction to intelligence

community whistleblowers. Sec. 307. No police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal

security functions for Director of National Intelligence.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency authority regarding

unmanned aircraft systems. Sec. 402. Modification relating to security personnel at certain

installations.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Sec. 501. Authority of National Security Agency to correlate, evaluate,

and disseminate certain intelligence. Sec. 502. Prohibition on availability of funds for relocation of Office

of Intelligence and Analysis to certain facilities. Sec. 503. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and

by the National Reconnaissance Office. Sec. 504. Modification of annual report on Federal Bureau of

Investigation case data. Sec. 505. Establishment of Office of Counterintelligence. Sec. 506. Role of National Security Agency in collection and analysis

of signals intelligence.

TITLE VI—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 601. Amendments to presidential appointments for intelligence

community positions. Sec. 602. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products. Sec. 603. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship

Program. Sec. 604. Countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national

intelligence priority. Sec. 605. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or

former intelligence community employees. Sec. 606. Modification of definitions in National Security Act of 1947

and scope of intelligence sharing responsibilities of

Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 607. Prohibition on intelligence community use of adversary

unmanned ground vehicles. Sec. 608. China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force. Sec. 609. Limitations relating to Chinese products and services. Sec. 610. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive

cyber operations conducted by nongovernmental entities. Sec. 611. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence

community. Sec. 612. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets. Sec. 613. Repeal of certain report and briefing requirements. Sec. 614. Intelligence community personnel travel, allowances, and

related expenses regulations. Sec. 615. Prohibition on sending and receiving objects using entities

owned or controlled by persons or governments of certain

countries. Sec. 616. Enhancing intelligence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

region. Sec. 617. Intelligence activities related to Ukraine. Sec. 618. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing with countries

of significant concern to the United States.
Sec. 619. United States-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.

TITLE VII—ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Sec. 701. Artificial intelligence exploitation guard and intelligence

sharing. Sec. 702. Director of National Intelligence review of intelligence

community use of artificial intelligence to support

targeting. Sec. 703. Improvements for artificial intelligence policies, standards,

and guidance for intelligence community. Sec. 704. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial

Intelligence Security Center. Sec. 705. Reports on novel uses of artificial intelligence technology. Sec. 706. Clear labeling of artificial intelligence outputs for

targeting workflows. Sec. 707. Research on use of artificial intelligence relating to

inadvertent escalation. Sec. 708. Research on interaction of adversarial artificial

intelligence systems with intelligence community systems. Sec. 709. Proliferation assessments regarding artificial intelligence

technology. Sec. 710. Review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities

under Vulnerabilities Equities Process. Sec. 711. Prohibition on certain artificial intelligence models on

intelligence community systems.

TITLE VIII—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 801. Modification to notification requirements for authorized and

ordered departures. Sec. 802. Identification of reallocable frequencies. Sec. 803. Intelligence support to the U.S. International Development

Finance Corporation. Sec. 804. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting Federal

Reserve information. Sec. 805. Offenses involving espionage. Sec. 806. Parental bereavement leave. Sec. 807. Definition of foreign instrumentality for purposes of

economic espionage prohibition.
Sec. 808. Protection of trade secrets.
Sec. 809. Technical amendments.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this division:

(1) Congressional intelligence committees.—The term

“congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning

given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) Intelligence community.—The term “intelligence

community” has the meaning given such term in such section.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal

year 2027 for the conduct of the intelligence and

intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts.—The amounts authorized to

be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the

intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those

specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations

prepared to accompany this division.

(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of

Authorizations.—

(1) Availability.—The classified Schedule of

Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made

available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,

the Committee on Appropriations of the House of

Representatives, and to the President.

(2) Distribution by the president.—Subject to paragraph

(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of

the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in

subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,

within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

(3) Limits on disclosure.—The President shall not publicly

disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any

portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.

3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized

to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management

Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal

year 2027 the sum of $568,000,000.

(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.—In

addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the

Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),

there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence

Community Management Account for fiscal year 2027 such

additional amounts as are specified in the classified

Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,

retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be

increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may

be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits

authorized by law.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central

Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund

$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2027.

TITLE III—MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

SEC. 301. APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE AND ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Redesignation of Principal Deputy Director of National

Intelligence as Deputy Director of National Intelligence.—

(1) In general.—Subsection (a) of section 103A of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “Principal”;

and

(B) by striking “Principal” each place it appears.

(2) Conforming amendments.—Subsection (c) of such section

is amended—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “Principal”;

and

(B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking “Principal”.

(3) Additional conforming amendment.—

(A) National security act of 1947.—Such Act is further

amended—

(i) in section 103(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)(2)), by

striking “Principal”;

(ii) in section 103I(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3034(b)(1)), by

striking “Principal”;

(iii) in section 106(a)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3041(a)(2)(A)), by

striking “Principal”; and

(iv) in section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 3053(b)), by striking

“Principal”.

(B) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard

intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019,

and 2020.—Section 6310 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew

Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years

2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3351b) is amended by striking

“Principal” each place it appears.

2022.—Section 1683(b)(3) of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(b)(3))

is amended by striking “Principal” both places it appears.

(b) Elimination of Deputy Directors of National

Intelligence and Establishment of Assistant Directors of

National Intelligence.—

(1) In general.—Section 103A(b) of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “Deputy” and

inserting “Assistant”;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking “may” and all that

follows through the period at the end and inserting the

following: “is an Assistant Director of National

Intelligence for Mission Integration and an Assistant

Director of National Intelligence for Policy and

Capabilities, who shall be appointed by the Director of

National Intelligence.”; and

“Assistant”.

(2) Conforming amendments.—The National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(A) in section 102A(l)(4)(F) (50 U.S.C. 3024(l)(4)(F)), as

redesignated by section 402(g)(1)(B), by striking “a

Deputy” and inserting “an Assistant”; and

(B) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by striking

paragraph (3).

Intelligence in Law.—Any reference in law to the Principal

Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall be treated as

a reference to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

(d) Clerical Amendments.—

(1) Section heading.—Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C.

3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking

“deputy directors of national intelligence” and inserting

“deputy director of national intelligence and assistant

directors of national intelligence”.

(2) Table of contents.—The table of contents for such Act,

in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by

striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the

following:

“Sec. 103A. Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant

Directors of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 302. REPEAL OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.

(a) In General.—Section 103M of the National Security Act

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3034d) is repealed.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of such Act

is amended by striking the item relating to section 103M.

SEC. 303. REPEAL OF VARIOUS POSITIONS, UNITS, CENTERS,

COUNCILS, AND OFFICES.

(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.—

(1) Repeal.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K

(50 U.S.C. 3034b).

(2) Conforming amendment.—Section 103G of such Act (50

U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).

(3) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such Act

in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by

striking the item relating to section 103K.

(b) Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.—

(1) Termination.—The Director of National Intelligence

shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and

wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community

Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).

(2) Repeal.—

(A) In general.—Title I of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking

section 103L (50 U.S.C. 3034c).

(B) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such

Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is

further amended by striking the item relating to section

103L.

(3) Effective date.—The amendments made by this subsection

shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date

of the enactment of this Act.

Advisory Council.—

(1) Repeal.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking

section 120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).

(2) Conforming amendment.—Section 331 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law

117-81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph

(2) and inserting the following:

“(2) The term `climate security' means the effects of

climate change on the following:

“(A) The national security of the United States, including

national security infrastructure.

“(B) Subnational, national, and regional political

stability.

“(C) The security of allies and partners of the United

States.

“(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including

unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism,

rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.”.

(3) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such

Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is

further amended by striking the item relating to section 120.

(d) Framework for Cross-Disciplinary Education and

Training.—

(1) Repeal.—Subtitle A of title X of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking

section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).

(2) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such

Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is

further amended by striking the item relating to section

(e) Joint Intelligence Community Council.—

(1) Termination.—The Joint Intelligence Community Council

is terminated.

(2) Conforming amendment.—Title I of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking

section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).

(3) Repeal of requirement to consult with joint

intelligence community council for national intelligence

program budget.—Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by

striking “, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of

the Joint Intelligence Community Council,”.

(4) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such Act

in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by

striking the item relating to section 101A.

SEC. 304. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.

(a) Transfer.—The Director of National Intelligence shall

transfer the functions of the National Intelligence

University to the National Defense University described in

section 2165 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) Repeal.—Title X of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking subtitle D

(50 U.S.C. 3227 et seq.).

(1) Title 10.—Section 2151(b) of title 10, United States

Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3).

(2) Title 17.—Section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States

Code, is amended—

(A) by striking subparagraph (M); and

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (M).

(3) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard

intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019,

and 2020.—The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019,

and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116-92) is amended by

striking section 5324 (50 U.S.C. 3334a).

(d) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents for the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is

amended, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, by

striking the items relating to subtitle D of title X.

SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES AT THE NATIONAL

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

(a) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.—Subsection (e)

of section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3056) is amended to read as follows:

“(e) Limitation on Domestic Activities.—The Center may,

consistent with applicable law, the direction of the

President, and the guidelines referred to in section 102A(b),

receive and retain intelligence pertaining to domestic

terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United

States Code) only as necessary to enable the Center to

collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining to

international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title

18, United States Code).”.

SEC. 306. TIMELY PROVISION OF SECURITY DIRECTION TO

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWERS.

(a) Intelligence Community Employees.—Section

103H(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting “,

unless the Director does not provide such direction not later

than 7 calendar days after the date on which the employee

furnishes the statement required by subclause (I)” after

“practices”.

(b) Central Intelligence Agency Employees.—Section

17(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of

1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by

inserting “, unless the Director does not provide such

direction not later than 7 calendar days after the date on

which the employee furnishes the statement required by

subclause (I)” after “practices”.

SEC. 307. NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OR

INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(z) No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or

Internal Security Functions.—The Director of National

Intelligence shall have no police, subpoena, or law

enforcement powers or internal security functions.”.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUTHORITY

REGARDING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

Section 15A(m) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of

1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515a(m)) is amended by striking “December

31, 2027” and inserting “the date set forth in section

210G(j)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.

124n(j)(1))”.

SEC. 402. MODIFICATION RELATING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AT

CERTAIN INSTALLATIONS.

Section 15(a)(1)(D) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act

of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)(D)) is amended by inserting

“or the National Reconnaissance Office” after “Office of

the Director of National Intelligence”.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO CORRELATE,

EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et

seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 23. AUTHORITY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE

CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.

“The Director of the National Security Agency may—

“(1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to

national security; and

“(2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and

executive branch customers as the Director considers

appropriate.”.

SEC. 502. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RELOCATION

OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS TO

CERTAIN FACILITIES.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this

division for fiscal year 2027 for the National Intelligence

Program (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), may be obligated or expended to

move or relocate the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of

the Department of Homeland Security to any facility other

than a facility owned by the Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 503. FUNDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED

WITH AND BY THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) In General.—Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10,

United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 421

the following:

“Sec. 421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities

conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office

“(a) Use of Appropriated Funds.—The Director of the

National Reconnaissance Office may use appropriated funds

available to the National Reconnaissance Office for

intelligence and communications purposes to pay for the

expenses of arrangements with foreign countries for

intelligence activities conducted with and by the National

Reconnaissance Office.

“(b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.—The

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds

other than appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of

arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence

activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance

Office, except that—

“(1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part,

by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a

purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds;

“(2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be

used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items

that are sold; and

“(3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be

used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit

of the United States.

“(c) Reports.—

“(1) Use of appropriated funds.—Any funds expended under

the authority of subsection (a) shall be reported, pursuant

to the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), to—

“(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee

on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the

Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

“(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the

Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense

of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of

Representatives.

“(2) Use of funds other than appropriated funds.—Funds

expended under the authority of subsection (b) shall be

reported to the committees described in paragraph (1)

pursuant to procedures jointly agreed upon by such committees

and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections at the

beginning of such subchapter is amended by inserting after

the item relating to section 421 the following:

“421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by

the National Reconnaissance Office.”.

SEC. 504. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION CASE DATA.

Section 512A(b)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3111a(b)(6)) is amended by striking “country

affiliation” and inserting “terrorist organization”.

SEC. 505. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) in paragraph (2), by striking “; and” and inserting a

semicolon;

(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

paragraph (3):

“(3) identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to

the Department of the Treasury; and”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c) Office of Counterintelligence.—There is established,

within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of

Counterintelligence, which shall be responsible for

implementing the policies and procedures across the bureaus

of the Department of the Treasury required to carry out the

counterintelligence responsibilities described in subsection

(a).”.

SEC. 506. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN COLLECTION AND

ANALYSIS OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et

seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 23. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

“The Director of the National Security Agency shall—

“(1) provide overall direction for and coordination of the

collection and analysis of signals intelligence by elements

of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such

collection and analysis; and

“(2) in coordination with other departments, agencies, and

elements of the United States Government that are authorized

to undertake such collection, ensure that—

“(A) the most effective use is made of resources; and

“(B) appropriate account is taken of the risks to the

United States and those involved in such collection.”.

TITLE VI—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 601. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FOR

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POSITIONS.

(a) Appointment of Deputy Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency.—Section 104B(a) of the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by

inserting “, by and with the advice and consent of the

Senate” after “President”.

(b) Appointment of Deputy Director of the National Security

Agency.—Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of

1959 (50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security

Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with

the advice and consent of the Senate.”.

Counterterrorism Center.—Section 119(b)(1) of the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by

striking “President, by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate” and inserting “Director of National

Intelligence”.

(d) Appointment of Director the National

Counterintelligence and Security Center.—Section 902(a) of

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50

U.S.C. 3382(a)) is amended by striking “President, by and

with the advice and consent of the Senate” and inserting

“Director of National Intelligence”.

(e) Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence.—Section 103C(a) of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3028(a)) is amended

by striking “by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate” and inserting “by the Director of

National Intelligence”.

(f) Appointment of General Counsel of the Central

Intelligence Agency.—Section 20(a) of the Central

Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is

amended by striking “by the President, by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate” and inserting “by the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency”.

SEC. 602. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

PRODUCTS.

(a) In General.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“SEC. 1115. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

PRODUCTS.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) All-source intelligence product.—The term `all-

source intelligence product'—

“(A) means any intelligence product published by an

element of the intelligence community using multiple types of

intelligence for purposes of providing an analytic assessment

or situational update; and

“(B) does not include a product containing purely law

enforcement information.

“(2) Assumption.—The term `assumption' means a

supposition used to frame or support an argument.

“(3) Judgment.—The term `judgment' means a conclusion

based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and

assumptions.

“(b) Establishment.—

“(1) In general.—The production of any all-source

intelligence product shall adhere to—

“(A) the analytic standards described in subsection (c);

and

“(B) any guidance or policy issued under paragraph (2).

“(2) Guidance and policy.—The Director of National

Intelligence or any other head of an

element of the intelligence community may issue guidance or

policy that expands upon the standards described in

subsection (c) as such head considers appropriate, except

that any such guidance or policy shall not contradict or

otherwise circumvent such standards.

“(c) Analytic Standards.—The standards described in this

subsection are the following:

“(1) Objectivity.—In producing any all-source

intelligence product, an analyst—

“(A) shall—

“(i) perform the analyst's functions with objectivity and

with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning;

“(ii) employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms

that reveal and mitigate bias;

“(iii) be alert to influence by existing analytic

positions or judgments; and

“(iv) consider alternative perspectives and contrary

information; and

“(B) shall not be unduly constrained by previous judgments

when new developments indicate a modification is necessary.

“(2) Independent of political consideration.—Any all-

source intelligence product shall not be—

“(A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a particular

audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or

“(B) influenced by the force of preference for a

particular policy.

“(3) Timely.—Any all-source intelligence product shall be

disseminated in time for the product to be actionable by

customers.

“(4) Based on all relevant information available.—Any

all-source intelligence product shall be informed by all

relevant information available.

“(5) Analytic tradecraft standards.—Any all-source

intelligence product shall adhere to the following analytic

tradecraft standards:

“(A) Sourcing.—Any all-source intelligence product

shall—

“(i) identify and properly describe the quality and

credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies

upon which judgments are based; and

“(ii) use source descriptors in accordance with sourcing

guidance prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.

“(B) Uncertainty.—Any all-source intelligence product

shall—

“(i) indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties

associated with major analytic judgments, specifically the

likelihood of occurrence of an event or development, and the

analyst's confidence in the basis for the judgment;

“(ii) note causes of uncertainty, including assumptions

and gaps, and explain how uncertainties affect analysis; and

“(iii) for expressions of likelihood or probability, use

one of the sets of terms defined in Intelligence Community

Directive 203.

“(C) Distinguishing.—Any all-source intelligence product

shall—

“(i) clearly distinguish statements that convey underlying

intelligence information used in analysis from statements

that convey assumptions or judgments;

“(ii) state an assumption explicitly when the assumption

serves as the linchpin of an argument or when the assumption

bridges key information gaps;

“(iii) explain the implications for judgments if

assumptions prove to be incorrect; and

“(iv) as appropriate, identify indicators that, if

detected, would alter judgments.

“(D) Incorporate analysis of alternatives.—Any all-source

intelligence product shall—

“(i) identify and assess plausible alternative hypotheses;

“(ii) in discussing alternatives, address factors such as

associated assumptions, likelihood, or implications related

to United States interests; and

“(iii) identify indicators that, if detected, would affect

the likelihood of identified alternatives.

“(E) Relevance.—Any all-source intelligence product shall

provide information and insight on United States national

security issues.

“(F) Argumentation.—Any all-source intelligence product

shall—

“(i) present a clear main analytic message up front;

“(ii) in the case of a product containing multiple

judgments, have a main analytic message that is drawn

collectively from those judgments; and

“(iii) be effectively supported by relevant intelligence

information and coherent reasoning.

“(G) Analytic line.—Any all-source intelligence product

shall—

“(i) state how its major judgments on a topic are

consistent with or represent a change from major judgments in

previously published analysis, or that it represent initial

coverage of a topic; and

“(ii) fully consider and bring to the attention of

customers significant differences in analytic judgment, such

as between two analytic elements of the intelligence

community.

“(H) Accuracy.—Any all-source intelligence product

shall—

“(i) apply expertise and logic to make the most accurate

judgments and assessments possible, based on the information

available and known information gaps; and

“(ii) express judgments as clearly and precisely as

possible, reducing ambiguity by addressing the likelihood,

timing, and nature of the outcome or development.

“(I) Visuals.—Any all-source intelligence product shall

incorporate effective visual information as appropriate. Any

content of any all-source intelligence product depicted

visually shall adhere to the analytic standards described in

this subsection.

“(d) Required Information.—

“(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), any

all-source intelligence product shall include a section

dedicated to explaining the tradecraft related to the

analytic tradecraft standards described in subparagraphs (A),

(B), (C), (D), and (G) of subsection (c)(5).

“(2) Exceptions.—The requirement of paragraph (1) shall

not apply to—

“(A) any all source-intelligence product less than 300

words; or

“(B) any all-source intelligence product produced for the

President's Daily Brief.

“(e) Tracking Adherence to Analytic Standards.—The

Director of National Intelligence and each other head of an

element of the intelligence community shall—

“(1) develop metrics for evaluating the performance of

their respective element in adhering to the analytic

standards described in subsection (c); and

“(2) use such metrics to evaluate individual performance,

develop analytic workforce training, and inform Congress on

matters related to analytic performance.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of such Act

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 1115. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence

products.”.

SEC. 603. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY

FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) In General.—Title X of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after

section 1002 the following:

“SEC. 1003. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY

FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

“(a) In General.—There is established a program (in this

section referred to as the `Program') under which selected

employees of the intelligence community may train at certain

nongovernmental entities as technology fellows.

“(b) Designation.—The program shall be known as the `Ben

Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program'.

“(c) Agreements.—

“(1) Nongovernmental entities.—Each head of an element of

the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) shall

seek to enter into agreements with nongovernmental entities

with experience in cutting-edge technology under which such

entities may host technology fellows under the Program.

“(2) Selected employees.—For each employee of an element

of the intelligence community selected for participation in

the Program in accordance with subsection (e), the head of

the element of the intelligence community that selected the

employee shall provide for a written agreement among that

element of the intelligence community, the nongovernmental

entity concerned, and the employee. The agreement shall—

“(A) require that the employee of the element of the

intelligence community, upon completion of the fellowship,

serve in that element, or elsewhere in the intelligence

community if approved by the head of the element that

selected the employee, for a period equal to twice the length

of the fellowship;

“(B) provide that if the employee of the element of the

intelligence community fails to carry out the agreement, the

employee shall be liable to the United States for payment of

all expenses of the fellowship, unless that failure was for

good and sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the

element that selected the employee; and

“(C) contain language ensuring that the employee of the

element of the intelligence community does not improperly use

information that the employee knows relates to an acquisition

or procurement of the element of the intelligence community

for the benefit or advantage of the nongovernmental entity.

“(3) Elements described.—The elements of the intelligence

community described in this paragraph are the following:

“(A) The Central Intelligence Agency.

“(B) The National Security Agency.

“(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

“(D) The National Reconnaissance Office.

“(E) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

“(d) Board.—

“(1) In general.—There is established a board for the

Program (in this section referred to as the `Board').

“(2) Membership.—The Board shall be composed of the

directors of science and technology, or equivalents, of the

elements of the intelligence community described in

subsection (c)(3).

“(3) Co-chairs.—The members of the Board shall serve as

co-chairs of the Board.

“(4) Selection criteria.—The Board shall establish

selection criteria for the participation of employees in the

Program.

“(e) Selection.—Each year, each head of an element of the

intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3) shall

select two employees of such element to participate in the

Program.

“(f) Term.—An employee selected for participation in the

Program may serve for one year as a technology fellow at a

nongovermental entity that has entered into an agreement

under subsection (c)(1) with

the head of the element of the intelligence community

concerned.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of such Act

is amended by inserting after the item relating to section

1002 the following:

“Sec. 1003. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship

Program.”.

SEC. 604. COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS AS A

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations,

such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated

investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and

impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from

Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's

Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that

these estimates are conservative and only includes losses

reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(2) According to the Consumer Federation of America,

Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year

to online scams.

(3) Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and

sanctions designations issued by the Department of the

Treasury have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious

cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign

governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia

groups whose activities present a threat to the economic and

national security of the United States.

(4) Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely

extensively on communications and financial services of

United States companies, enabling the organizations'

targeting of vulnerable Americans.

(5) Targeted efforts against the United States intelligence

community by foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations to

defraud or extort by using deepfakes, voice-cloning, or other

sophisticated technological advancements presents a

counterintelligence threat.

(b) Sense of Congress.—

(1) In general.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, and

foreign affiliates associated with those organizations,

constitute hostile foreign cyber actors and are valid targets

for intelligence operations under existing intelligence

authorities; and

(B) the Director of National Intelligence should treat

collection, analysis, and disruption toward hostile foreign

cyber actors as a national intelligence priority as part of

the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.

(2) Hostile foreign cyber actors.—The hostile foreign

cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a

minimum, the following:

(A) Prince Group.

(B) Huione Group.

(D) Jin Bei Group.

(E) Funnull Technology Inc.

(F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand Company

Limited.

(G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.

(H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC.

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director of National

Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a

report on hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam

centers.

(2) Contents.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall

include the following:

(A) An identification of the individuals and entities

operating as hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign

scam centers, that pose the most significant threat.

(B) An identification of the locations from which the

individuals and entities identified under subparagraph (A)

operate.

techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign

scam centers, commonly use, including reliance on any

products or services subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.

(D) A description of any relationships between the

individuals and entities that operate as hostile foreign

cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, and their

governments or countries of origin that could impede the

ability to counter threats from such centers.

(E) An identification of communications and financial

services providers subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States that provide enabling services to individuals and

entities identified under subparagraph (A).

(F) A description of any relationships that the individuals

and entities identified under subparagraph (A) have with

transnational organized crime groups.

(3) Form; public availability.—The report required by

paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but

may include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the

report shall be made available to the public.

SEC. 605. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING

CURRENT OR FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

EMPLOYEES.

(a) In General.—Title V of the National Security Act of

1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the

end the following:

“SEC. 519. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING

CURRENT OR FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

EMPLOYEES.

“(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.—In

this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress'

means the following:

“(1) The congressional intelligence committees.

“(2) The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.

“(3) The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of

Representatives.

“(b) Notice Requirement.—If an element of the

intelligence community makes a criminal referral to the

Department of Justice regarding a current or former employee

of any element of the intelligence community, the general

counsel of the element of the intelligence community that

made the referral shall notify the appropriate committees of

Congress of the referral on the date such referral is made

and provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a

summary of the referral.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is

amended by inserting after the item relating to section 518

the following:

“Sec. 519. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or

former intelligence community employees.”.

SEC. 606. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY

ACT OF 1947 AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING

RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Definitions.—Section 3 of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “includes” and

inserting “means”; and

(2) in paragraph (5)—

(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking

“refer to all” and inserting “means”;

(B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows:

“(B) involves foreign threats to the United States, its

people, property, or interests.”.

(b) Scope of Intelligence Sharing Responsibilities.—

Section 102A(f)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is

amended, in the first sentence, by inserting “, and other

Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate,”

after “community”.

SEC. 607. PROHIBITION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF

ADVERSARY UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Covered foreign country.—The term “covered foreign

country” means any of the following:

(A) The People's Republic of China.

(B) The Russian Federation.

(D) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(2) Covered foreign entity.—The term “covered foreign

entity” means an entity that is domiciled in a covered

foreign country, or subject to influence or control by the

government of a covered foreign country as determined by the

Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense,

and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.

(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system.—The term

“covered unmanned ground vehicle system”—

(A) means a mechanical device that—

(i) is capable of locomotion, navigation, or movement on

the ground; and

(ii) operates at a distance from one or more operators or

supervisors based on commands or in response to sensor data,

or through any combination thereof; and

(B) includes—

(i) remote surveillance vehicles, autonomous patrol

technologies, mobile robotics, and humanoid robots; and

(ii) the vehicle, its payload, and any external device used

to control the vehicle.

(b) Prohibition on Procurement of Covered Unmanned Ground

Vehicle Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.—

(1) In general.—Except as provided under paragraph (2),

the head of an element of the intelligence community may not

procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is

manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.

(2) Exemption.—The heads of elements of the intelligence

community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1)

if the procurement is required in the national interest of

the United States and—

(A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation,

training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare,

information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development

of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground

vehicle system technology;

(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism

or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or

Federal criminal or national security investigations,

including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare,

information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development

of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned

ground vehicle technology; or

or as modified after procurement but before operational use,

can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered

foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security

cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.

Vehicle Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.—

(1) Prohibition.—

(A) In general.—Beginning on the date that is one year

after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as

provided in paragraph (2), no element of the intelligence

community may operate a covered unmanned ground vehicle

system manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.

(B) Applicability to contracted services.—The prohibition

under subparagraph (A) applies to any covered unmanned ground

vehicle systems that are being used by any element of the

intelligence community through the method of contracting for

the services of covered unmanned ground vehicle systems.

(2) Exemption.—The heads of the elements of the

intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under

paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national

interest of the United States and—

(A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation,

training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare,

information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development

of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground

vehicle system technology;

(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism

or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or

Federal criminal or national security investigations,

including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare,

information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development

of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned

ground vehicle system technology; or

or as modified after procurement but before operational use,

can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered

foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security

cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.

SEC. 608. CHINA-TAIWAN STRATEGIC WARNING TASK FORCE.

(a) Establishment.—Not later than 60 days after the date

of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National

Intelligence and the Undersecretary of Defense for

Intelligence and Security shall establish a task force to be

known as the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force

(referred to in this section as the “Task Force”) to lead

the efforts of the intelligence community with respect to

providing indications and warning of any military aggression

by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan.

(b) Objectives.—The objectives of the Task Force are the

following:

(1) The synchronization of all intelligence community

efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning,

including the generation of indicators and development of

collection requirements related to such indicators.

(2) The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan

indications and warning and the development of analytic

methodologies for use across the intelligence community in

conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and

warning.

(3) The development and implementation of information

technology solutions to synchronize the access of the

intelligence community to information relating to indications

and warning.

following members (or their designees):

(1) The Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and

Security.

(3) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(5) The Director for Intelligence for the United States

Indo-Pacific Command.

(6) The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence

Agency.

(7) The Director of the National Security Agency.

(8) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for

Intelligence and Analysis.

(9) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and

Research.

(10) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence

community that the Director of National Intelligence and the

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

determine appropriate.

(d) Leadership; Organization; Meetings.—

(1) Co-chairs.—The Director of National Intelligence (or a

designee of the Director) and the Undersecretary of Defense

for Intelligence and Security (or a designee of the

Undersecretary) shall be co-chairs of the Task Force.

(2) Working groups.—The Task Force may create subordinate

working groups as determined by the co-chairs.

(3) Meeting frequency.—The Task Force shall meet regularly

but not less than quarterly.

(e) Staffing.—

(1) In general.—The Task Force may hire staff and create

joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task

Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.

(2) Agency liaison.—Each member listed in subsection (b)

shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency

concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such

liaison shall be responsible for coordinating the

participation and support of the agency concerned to the Task

Force.

(f) Initial Reports.—. Not later than 180 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall

submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the

congressional defense committees a report on the status of

the Task Force, including—

(1) a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community

with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning;

(2) a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a

common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by

the intelligence community against such indicators;

(3) a description of the resources provided by each Task

Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan

indications and warning, disaggregated by—

(A) dollars spent or planned to be spent during fiscal year

2027 ; and

(B) total full-time equivalent personnel; and

(4) recommendations to improve the collection and analysis

of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan

indications and warning.

(g) Sunset.—The provisions of this section shall terminate

on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment

of this Act.

SEC. 609. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CHINESE PRODUCTS AND

SERVICES.

(a) Prohibition on Use by Intelligence Community.—

(1) In general.—Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section

6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2026 (50 U.S.C. 3334m note; division F of Public Law 119-60)

is amended to read as follows:

“(1) Covered application.—The term `covered application'

means—

“(A) the DeepSeek application or any successor application

or service; or

“(B) any product or service from any entity of the

People's Republic of China that is included on—

“(i) the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry

and Security of the Department of Commerce;

“(ii) the list (sometimes known as the `Non-SDN Chinese

Military-Industrial Complex Companies List') maintained by

the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the

Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as amended by Executive

Order 14032 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to addressing the

threat from securities investments that finance certain

companies of the People's Republic of China), or any

successor order; or

“(iii) the list of Chinese military companies required

under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10

U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283) and maintained by the

Department of Defense.”.

(2) Conforming amendment.—The heading for such section is

amended by striking “deepseek” and inserting “products and

services from people's republic of china”.

(b) Limitation on Procurement by Intelligence Community.—

Section 414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2022 (28 U.S.C. 532 note; division X of Public Law 117-

103) is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by striking “by federal bureau

of investigation”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking

“Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” and

inserting “head of an element of the intelligence

community”;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking “Federal Bureau of

Investigation” and inserting “element”; and

of the Director)” and inserting “head”;

(3) in subsection (b), by striking “the Director (or a

designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a

recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director

shall” and inserting “the head of an element of the

intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to

subsection (a)(3), the head shall”;

(4) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as

follows:

“(2) People's republic of china product or service.—The

term `People's Republic of China product or service' means—

“(A) an information or communication technology product

manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and designed,

developed, or maintained by a firm that is domiciled in

China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or

“(B) an information or communication technology product or

service provided or manufactured by—

“(i) an entity that is fully or partially owned or

controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of

China; or

“(ii) an entity included on the list submitted by the

Director of National Intelligence under section 6706(c) of

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

(division F of Public Law 119-60; 139 Stat. 1648).”.

SEC. 610. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR

OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY

NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

(a) In General.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“SEC. 1115. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR

OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY

NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

“(a) In General.—An element of the intelligence community

may not provide intelligence or support for an offensive

cyber operation conducted by a nongovernmental entity, unless

such an entity—

“(1) is conducting the offensive cyber operation on behalf

of such element and is operating under the authorities and

supervision of such element; or

“(2) is otherwise authorized by the President of the

United States to conduct the offensive cyber operation.

“(b) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Nongovernmental entity.—The term `nongovernmental

entity' means any entity that is not an entity of the United

States Government.

“(2) Offensive cyber operation.—The term `offensive cyber

operation' means any activity carried out in cyberspace, or

any associated preparatory action, that affects an

information system, network, or any other computer

infrastructure that is not owned or lawfully operated by the

entity carrying out the activity or action.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of such Act

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 1115. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive

cyber operations conducted by nongovernmental

entities.”.

SEC. 611. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.—Title I of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end

the following:

“SEC. 124. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Biological data.—The term `biological data' means

multiomic information and other relevant information,

including associated descriptors, derived from the structure,

function, or process of a biological system, that is

measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis, including

information from humans, animals, plants, or microbes.

“(2) Biological intelligence.—The term `biological

intelligence' includes the information collected or

disseminated by the intelligence community concerning

biological threats through genomic surveillance,

immunological monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic

analysis, and other scientific methodologies.

“(3) Biological threat.—The term `biological threat'

includes any naturally occurring infectious disease,

engineered pathogen, toxin, or other biological agent that

poses a risk to human, animal, or plant health or to the

national security of the United States.

“(b) Determination; Dissemination.—The Director of

National Intelligence, in such coordination with the

Secretary of Defense as the Director considers appropriate,

shall, consistent with applicable Federal law and Executive

Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States

intelligence activities)—

“(1) determine which United States agencies would benefit

from receiving anonymized biological data and biological

intelligence in support of detection, characterization, and

attribution of foreign biological threats; and

“(2) disseminate such anonymized biological data and

biological intelligence to agencies identified under

paragraph (1).

“(c) Standards; Databases.—Not later than 1 year after

the date of the enactment of this section, the Director of

National Intelligence, in such coordination with the

Secretary of Defense as the Director considers appropriate,

shall—

“(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats

of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence

are, to the extent possible, consistent with standards used

by other United States agencies, including by—

“(A) providing for standardized data categorization and

tagging of biological data;

“(B) considering standardized scientific and laboratory

equipment and data collection methodologies; and

“(C) minimizing collection of any biological data that is

likely to contain biological or genomic information specific

to any United States person, including any derived data that

is specific to any United States person; and

“(2) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of

streamlined and unified accesses to databases of biological

intelligence collected by the intelligence community or the

Department of Defense.

“(d) Priority.—In carrying out subsections (b) and (c),

the Director of National Intelligence shall prioritize

supporting capabilities, including the development of

technical tools, that enable the early detection,

characterization, and attribution of naturally occurring,

novel, or engineered pathogens that could threaten the United

States.

“(e) Rule of Construction.—Unless otherwise authorized by

any other provision of law, nothing in this section shall be

construed to allow the sharing or dissemination of anonymized

biological data derived from law enforcement actions, or to

allow such law enforcement data to be maintained or shared

through databases covered in paragraph (c)(2), unless such

biological data solely relates to a biological threat as

defined by (a)(3).”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of such Act

is amended by inserting after the item relating to section

123 the following:

“Sec. 124. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence

community.”.

SEC. 612. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.

(a) In General.—Title III of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after

section 304 the following:

“SEC. 304A. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION

MARKETS.

“(a) In General.—Except as may be necessary to conduct

authorized intelligence activities, a covered individual may

not participate in a prediction market on any topic relating

to nonpublic information to which the covered individual has

access by virtue of being a covered individual, during—

“(1) the period during which the covered individual is

employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence

community; or

“(2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which

the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by

such an element.

“(b) Policy.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the

enactment of this section, the Director of National

Intelligence shall issue a policy implementing the

prohibition in subsection (a), including—

“(1) establishing appropriate penalties for violating the

prohibition; and

“(2) providing notice to all covered individuals.

“(c) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Covered individual.—The term `covered individual'

means an employee or contractor, or a former employee or

contractor, of an element of the intelligence community who

holds a security clearance.

“(2) Prediction market.—The term `prediction market'

means a platform, company, or service that allows agreements,

contracts, transactions, or swaps between users over the

outcome of non-financial future events, such as sports,

military actions, and elections.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents of such Act

is amended by inserting after the item relating to section

304 the following:

“Sec. 304A. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.”.

SEC. 613. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Oversight of Foreign Influence in Academia.—Section

5713 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019,

and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369b) is repealed.

(b) Report on Efforts to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and

Related Items.—Section 1261 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note;

Public Law 112-239) is amended by striking subsection (e).

Initiative of the People's Republic of China.—Section 7003

of the Energy Act of 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is amended by

striking subsection (d).

(d) Briefing on Protocols for Certain Intelligence

Community Employees and Dependents.—Section 605(g) of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50

U.S.C. 3334k(g)) is amended by striking paragraph (3).

(e) Periodic Report on Positions in the Intelligence

Community That Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified

Information, Networks, or Facilities.—Section 6610 of the

Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50

U.S.C. 3352e) is repealed.

(f) Review of Shared Information Technology Services for

Personnel Vetting.—Section 7701 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public

Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1100) is repealed.

(g) Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management

Task Force.—Section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and

Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3370) is amended

by striking subsection (e).

(h) Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil

Liberties, and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.—Section

620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2021 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.

(i) Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National

Security Systems; Report on Exemptions.—Section 6309(f) of

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (44

U.S.C. 3557 note; division F of Public Law 117-263) is

amended by striking paragraph (3).

(j) Report on Collaboration Between Intelligence Community

and Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial

Threats.—Section 6514(b) of the Intelligence Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3370b(b)) is amended by

striking paragraph (6).

(k) Timeliness Standard for Rendering Determinations of

Trust for Personnel Vetting; Reviews.—Section 7702(a) of the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50

U.S.C. 3352h(a)) is amended by striking paragraph (2).

(l) Briefings on Status of Intelligence Community

Innovation Unit.—Subsections (c) and (d) of section 7502 of

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024

(Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1082) are repealed.

(m) Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding

Analytic Standards.—Section 6312 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note;

Public Law 117-263) is amended—

(1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and

(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections

(n) Annual Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Public-

private Talent Exchanges.—Section 6506 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159;

138 Stat. 2497) is amended by striking subsection (e).

(o) Software Licensing.—Section 109 of the National

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(p) Review and Update of Position Designation Guidance.—

Section 7 of the SECRET Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-173; 132

Stat. 1294) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(q) Report on Independent Study on Economic Impact of

Military Invasion of Taiwan by People's Republic of China.—

Section 7407 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal

year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1075) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

SEC. 614. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL TRAVEL,

ALLOWANCES, AND RELATED EXPENSES REGULATIONS.

(a) Central Intelligence Agency.—Section 4 of the Central

Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3505) is amended by

adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c) Biennial Reviews and Reports.—Not later than

September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every 2

years thereafter, the Director shall—

“(1) review the regulations covered by this section; and

“(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review

under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence

committees the findings of the Director with respect to the

review, including identification of any changes to the

regulations or personnel coverage thereof that the Director

determines to be necessary for the performance of

intelligence functions.”.

(b) Office of Director of National Intelligence.—Section

102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is

amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(z) Biennial Reviews and Reports Regarding Intelligence

Community Personnel Travel, Allowances, and Related Expenses

Regulations.—Not later than September 30, 2027, and not less

frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, in order to

reflect the requirements of the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence not taken into account in the

formulation of Government-wide travel procedures covered by

this section, the Director shall—

“(1) review such requirements; and

“(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review

under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence

committees the findings of the Director with respect to the

review, including any regulations that the Director

determines to be necessary for the performance of

intelligence functions.”.

SEC. 615. PROHIBITION ON SENDING AND RECEIVING OBJECTS USING

ENTITIES OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OR

GOVERNMENTS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES.

(a) Definition of Covered Nation.—In this section, the

term “covered nation” has the meaning given such term in

section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.

(b) In General.—

(1) List required.—Not later than 90 days after the date

of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of

products, intellectual property, technology, and any other

objects that the Directors determine—

(A) affect the national security of the United States; and

(B) if acquired by a covered nation, would pose a threat to

the national security of the United States.

(2) Form.—The list required by paragraph (1) may be in

classified form.

element of the intelligence community may send or receive any

product, intellectual property, technology, or other object

as identified pursuant to subsection (b) within the United

States using an entity, including any shipping company, that

is owned or substantially controlled by a person or a

governmental entity domiciled in a covered nation.

(d) Waiver.—The head of an element of the intelligence

community—

(1) may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the

element on a case by case basis if the head determines that

in the particular case, sending or receiving any product,

intellectual property, technology, or other object by an

entity identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for

the national security of the United States; and

(2) not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall

notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.

(e) Notification.—Not later than 30 days after the head of

an element of the intelligence community issues a waiver

described in subsection (d), such head shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a written notice of the

waiver, which shall include—

(1) a justification for the waiver, including the product,

intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to

the waiver; and

(2) a description of the national security threat

mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity

that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c).

SEC. 616. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE INDO-

PACIFIC REGION.

(a) Definition of Intelligence Cooperation.—In this

section, the term “intelligence cooperation” means

activities authorized under the provisions of law

administered by the heads of the elements of the intelligence

community, including the collection, analysis, production,

and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.

(b) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United

States to consider intelligence cooperation with allies and

partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region a

priority national security investment that will help deter

aggression, reinforce regional stability, and reduce the risk

of miscalculation, all of which will advance the national

security and economic prosperity of the United States by

helping to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

(1) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence

shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of

elements of the intelligence community as the Director

considers relevant and the members of the Five Eyes

intelligence-sharing alliance, undertake efforts to bolster

and improve—

(A) the intelligence foundations of alliances between the

United States and Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the

Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand; and

(B) intelligence cooperation between the United States and

other regional partners, such as India and Vietnam.

(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation.—Efforts

undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts—

(A) to address the speed and complexity of potential

strategic and operational contingencies in the Indo-Pacific

region, including any scenarios involving adversarial efforts

to limit the freedom of navigation through critical maritime

chokepoints threaten supply chain security;

(B) relatedly, to ensure shared situational awareness

across the full spectrum of potential contingencies,

including military indications and warnings;

with the goal of providing decision advantage;

(D) to inform collective defense planning and response by

further integrating intelligence cooperation into joint and

combined operational planning activities, exercises, and

wargames focused on regional contingencies, including the Rim

of the Pacific;

(E) to encourage intelligence cooperation with Taiwan,

consistent with United States law and policy; and

(F) to promote multilateral intelligence sharing and

collaboration among allies and partners of the United States,

such as through the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea

trilateral mechanism and the United States-Japan-Philippines

trilateral mechanism.

SEC. 617. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE.

(a) Statement of Policy.—

(1) In general.—Section 3 of the Support for the

Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of

Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended—

(A) in paragraph (16), by striking “; and” and inserting

a semicolon;

(B) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at the end

and inserting “; and”; and

“(18) to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense

and deterrence capability, including through the provision of

intelligence support, as a means of advancing the national

security of the United States, regional stability, and the

protection of United States interests in Europe.”.

(2) Definition.—Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8901) is

amended—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs

(5) and (6), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) Credible defense and deterrence capability.—The term

`credible defense and deterrence capability' means the

ability to defend against and deter any credible conventional

military threat from the Russian Federation acting

unilaterally or in concert with partners, through the use of

conventional military means, possessed in sufficient

quantity, including weapons platforms and munitions, and

command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance capabilities.

“(4) Intelligence support.—The term `intelligence

support' means activities authorized under the provisions of

law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence

community, including the collection, analysis, production,

and dissemination of information, intelligence, and

imagery.”.

(b) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support Absent an

Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.—Until

Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely

enter into an armistice or comprehensive political settlement

of the conflict, the Director of National Intelligence, in

coordination with the Director

of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of any other

relevant element of the intelligence community, shall

continue to ensure the provision of intelligence support to

the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United

States policy goals in Ukraine.

(1) In general.—Intelligence support to Ukraine required

under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless

the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with

the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a

specific and identifiable national security concern.

(2) Notification.—Not later than 15 days after making the

decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise

materially downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the

Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the

heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall

submit to the congressional intelligence committees a

notification that includes—

(A) a detailed description of the reason for the pause,

termination, restriction, or material downgrade of

intelligence support;

(B) the expected duration of the pause, termination,

restriction, or material downgrade; and

of Ukraine to conduct effective military operations.

(3) Form.—A notification submitted under paragraph (2)

shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified

annex.

(d) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the

Event of Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.—

(1) In general.—If Ukraine and the Russian Federation

voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a

comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other

relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust

the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation

of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement

and, consistent with the national security interests of the

United States, support building and sustaining the capacity

of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian

attack against the territory of Ukraine.

(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence

support.—Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a

comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination

with the heads of the other relevant elements of the

intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security

Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report that includes—

(A) a description of the details of the armistice or the

comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in

Ukraine, including a description of the role of the

intelligence community in monitoring the adherence by the

parties to specific elements of the agreement;

(B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that Ukraine will

face under the terms of the agreement and potential measures

that the intelligence community or other parties could take

to help mitigate such vulnerabilities;

intelligence support the Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency has authorized in light of the changed situation on

the ground in Ukraine in order to help build and sustain the

capacity of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future

Russian attack against the territory of Ukraine;

(D) an assessment of the implications of the armistice or

comprehensive political settlement for the national security

interests of the United States in Europe, including the

capacity of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization to deter future aggression by the Russian

Federation; and

(E) a description and assessment of any cooperative

arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries, including

member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

that the intelligence community assesses would contribute to

deterring a future attack or act of aggression by the Russian

Federation aimed at occupying or seizing the territory of

Ukraine.

(3) Form.—The report required by paragraph (2) shall be

submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified

annex.

(4) Early warning.—The Director of National Intelligence,

in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements

of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and

member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate

and timely response with respect to any potential attack or

act of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(5) Notification.—

(A) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence

shall promptly notify each Member of the congressional

intelligence committees not later than 5 days after any

intelligence element provides Ukraine any intelligence

pursuant to paragraph (4).

(B) Contents.—A notification submitted pursuant to

subparagraph (A) shall include—

(i) a description of the specific threatened attack or act

of aggression shared with Ukraine;

(ii) the date on which the intelligence was provided to

Ukraine;

(iii) details of the channel through which the intelligence

was shared, including the names and titles of the relevant

intelligence community officers and Ukrainian government

officials;

(iv) the response of the Government of Ukraine upon

receiving the intelligence;

(v) an assessment produced by the Defense Intelligence

Agency, in coordination with other relevant elements of

intelligence community, as to what support Ukraine might

require in order to deter or repel the threatened attack or

act of aggression; and

(vi) a summary of subsequent actions that the Director of

National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, and other heads of relevant elements of

the intelligence community, directed be taken to support

Ukraine in defending against or otherwise responding to the

threatened attack or act of aggression.

subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may

include a classified annex.

(e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the

Event of an Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an

Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.—

(1) In general.—In the event of an armed attack by the

Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a

comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements

of the intelligence community, shall immediately resume the

provision of intelligence support to the Government of

Ukraine at a level the Directors deem necessary to support

military operations of the Government of Ukraine that are

intended, or reasonably expected, to help the Armed Forces of

Ukraine defend or liberate the territory of Ukraine and

prevent such territory of Ukraine from being occupied or

attacked by the Russian Federation.

(2) Notification.—

(A) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence

shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence

committees not later than 5 days after resuming intelligence

support pursuant to paragraph (1).

(B) Contents.—A notification submitted pursuant to

subparagraph (A) shall include—

(i) a description of the specific attack or act of

aggression against Ukraine;

(ii) a description of any intelligence support that Ukraine

requested from the United States;

(iii) an assessment of the support that Ukraine might

require in order to deter or repel the attack or act of

aggression;

(iv) a description of any intelligence support that the

Director has authorized to be provided to Ukraine; and

(v) a description of the response of the Government of

Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence support.

subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may

include a classified annex.

(3) Sunset.—

(A) In general.—The provision of intelligence support for

Ukraine under this subsection shall cease on the date that is

120 days after the date on which the Government of Ukraine

and the Government of the Russian Federation agree to

reinstate the armistice or comprehensive political settlement

that was violated or a new armistice or comprehensive

political settlement is entered into force.

(B) Recommencement.—Upon the cessation of the provision of

intelligence support under subparagraph (A), the Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the

heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence

community, shall resume the provision of intelligence support

to Ukraine pursuant to subsection (d).

(f) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.—The

terms “armistice” and “comprehensive political

settlement” mean a formal written agreement between the

Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian

Federation that has the effect of permanently ending the

armed conflict between both nations.

(2) Intelligence support.—The term “intelligence

support” means activities authorized under the provisions of

law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence

community, including the collection, analysis, production,

and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.

(3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.—

The term “specific and identifiable national security

concern” includes the following:

(A) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government

of Ukraine has been compromised by the Russian Federation or

another foreign adversary.

(B) Protection of sources and methods.

pause intelligence support.

(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government

of Ukraine receiving United States intelligence support

engaged in a pattern of human rights violations, atrocities,

or violations of the law of armed conflict.

(4) Territory of ukraine.—The term “territory of

Ukraine” means all territory internationally recognized to

be the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014,

including Crimea and the territory that the Russian

Federation claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.

SEC. 618. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH

COUNTRIES OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN TO THE UNITED

STATES.

Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50

U.S.C. 3024(j)) is amended—

(1) by striking “Under the direction” and inserting the

following:

“(1) In general.—Under the direction”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) Notification required.—

“(A) In general.—Not later than 48 hours after a decision

to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially

downgrade intelligence support or intelligence activities (as

defined in section 501(f)), including information,

intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under

Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to

United States intelligence activities), to the government of

a country of significant concern to the United States, the

Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a notification of such

decision.

“(B) Elements.—The notification required in subsection

(a) shall include—

“(i) a detailed description of the reason for the pause,

termination, restriction, or material downgrade of

intelligence support;

“(ii) a description of the change in intelligence sharing;

“(iii) the categories of information affected;

“(iv) the expected duration of the pause, termination,

restriction, or material downgrade; and

“(v) the anticipated impact of such decision on regional

security and the national security objectives of the United

States.

“(C) Country of significant concern to the united states

defined.—In this subsection, the term `country of

significant concern to the United States' means—

“(i) Israel;

“(ii) Ukraine;

“(iii) Taiwan; and

“(iv) any other country designated as such by the

President.”.

SEC. 619. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING

ENHANCEMENT.

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United

States—

(1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security

partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national

defense of the United States, regional stability, and the

protection of United States personnel and interests in the

Middle East;

(2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust

intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to

counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats,

state and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions

evasion, and other transnational security challenges that

threaten both Israel and the United States;

(3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the

Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors

that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional

partners;

(4) to ensure that security assistance and defense

cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its

qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law

and broader regional security considerations;

(5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional

security architectures that include Israel and willing

regional partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile

defense, maritime security, early warning systems, and

intelligence-sharing frameworks; and

(6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to

enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response

capabilities for United States military and diplomatic

personnel in the region.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Israel remains a critical United States security

partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a

strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational

effectiveness and technological superiority;

(2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the

United States and Israel has saved United States personnel

and property in the region and should remain a central pillar

of the bilateral security relationship;

(3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East—

including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber

operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare—requires

sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States

and Israel;

(4) the United States-Israel security partnership has

historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which

strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and

deterrent value; and

(5) expanding normalization and practical security

cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a

force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated

defense.

(1) In general.—Title XI of the National Security Act of

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end

the following:

“SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

“(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.—

“(1) In general.—The President, acting through the

Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the

Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and

the protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand

and enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of

Israel.

“(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.—Intelligence sharing

carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing

of information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism,

sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate

actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile

threats, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic

missiles, air and space domain awareness, and other aerial

threats relevant to the defense of Israel, United States

forces and interests in the region, and regional security

partners.

“(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.—

“(A) In general.—Intelligence sharing and related

security information exchanges with the Government of Israel

shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise materially

limited except on the basis of a specific and identifiable

national security concern determined by the President, such

as the protection of intelligence sources and methods,

counterintelligence risk, or another significant security

consideration.

“(B) Documentation requirement.—The President shall

document any determination to suspend, reduce, or otherwise

materially limit intelligence sharing or related security

information exchanges with the Government of Israel,

including a description of the national security rationale

supporting the change.

“(4) Congressional notification.—

“(A) In general.—Not later than 15 days after the date of

any decision to materially increase, suspend, reduce, or

otherwise alter intelligence sharing or related security

information exchanges with the Government of Israel, the

President shall notify the congressional intelligence

committees of such decision.

“(B) Elements.—Each notification required by subparagraph

(A) shall include the following:

“(i) A description of the change in intelligence sharing

or security information exchange.

“(ii) The categories of information affected.

“(iii) The national security objectives served by the

change.

“(iv) In the case of a suspension or reduction, the

specific national security concern supporting the change.

“(v) An assessment of the anticipated impact on regional

security, United States forces, and integrated air and

missile defense cooperation.

“(b) Intelligence Sharing and Analytic Cooperation With

Abraham Accords Countries.—

“(1) In general.—The President, acting through the

Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the

Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law

and security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence

sharing and analytic cooperation with countries that have

normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham

Accords (as defined in section 64(k) of the State Department

Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order

to strengthen regional security integration.

“(2) Priority areas.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the

President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate

intelligence and information relating to—

“(A) counterterrorism threats and networks, including

state and nonstate aggressors, and terror financing;

“(B) cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and defensive

best practices;

“(C) air and missile defense early warning and threat

tracking;

“(D) geospatial, overhead, and other imaging intelligence

relevant to shared security concerns; and

“(E) maritime security threats, including threats to

freedom of navigation, commercial shipping, sanctions

evasion, and regional maritime stability.

“(3) Safeguards.—

“(A) Adoption of guidelines.—The Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,

shall adopt guidelines for intelligence sharing and analytic

cooperation carried out under this subsection that ensure

appropriate safeguards—

“(i) to protect intelligence sources and methods; and

“(ii) to ensure that recipients maintain adequate security

protections consistent with United States requirements.

“(B) Restrictions on access.—If the Director of National

Intelligence determines that a recipient of intelligence

sharing or analytic cooperation carried out under this

subsection has any intelligence, defense, or technological

information sharing relationship with an adversarial nation,

the Director shall restrict all access of such recipient to

such intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.

“(c) Report Required.—

“(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date

of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for

5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate

congressional committees a report on the status of United

States intelligence sharing

with the Government Israel and, as appropriate, regional

partners.

“(2) Matters to be included.—Each report required by

paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with

the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the

following:

“(A) A description of the categories of intelligence and

security information shared by the United States Government

with the Government of Israel.

“(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly

integrating Israel into regional air and missile defense and

early warning architectures with partner countries, including

those that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to

the Abraham Accords.

“(C) A description of how such intelligence sharing has

contributed, if at all, to—

“(i) improved detection, tracking, warning, interception,

or deterrence of aerial threats, including missiles and

unmanned systems, for Israel, United States forces, or

regional partners; and

“(ii) the overall stability and coordination of security

in the region.

“(D) An assessment of progress in improving

interoperability among technology networks of the United

States, Israel, and partner countries.

“(E) A description of efforts to secure technology

networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized access.

“(F) An identification of any legal, policy, technical,

counterintelligence, or security barriers limiting deeper

intelligence integration, including risks to intelligence

sources and methods.

“(G) A summary of any significant increases or reductions

in intelligence sharing during the reporting period and the

national security rationale for such changes.

“(3) Form.—Each report required by paragraph (1) report

shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a

classified annex.

“(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In

this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional

committees' means—

“(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

“(B) to the extent Department of Defense information is

implicated, the congressional defense committees (as defined

in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).”.

(2) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such Act

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.”.

TITLE VII—ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND

INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Artificial intelligence model.—The term “artificial

intelligence model” means a capability or series of

capabilities combined that can, for a given set of

objectives, generate outputs such as predictions,

recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or

input.

(2) Center.—The term “Center” means the Artificial

Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency.

(3) Classified information.—The term “classified

information” has the meaning given such term in section 805

of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).

(4) Cleared industry personnel.—The term “cleared

industry personnel” means employees or representatives of a

covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and

have a demonstrated need to know.

(5) Congressional intelligence committees.—The term

“congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning

given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of

1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(6) Covered person.—The term “covered person” means a

non-Federal person who—

(A) is a United States citizen;

(B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial intelligence

models or critical enabling infrastructure; and

an element of the intelligence community or Department of

Defense.

(7) Director.—The term “Director” means the Director of

the National Security Agency.

(8) Intelligence.—The term “intelligence” has the

meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security

Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(9) Intelligence community.—The term “intelligence

community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of

the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(10) Security clearance.—The term “security clearance”

means an authorization to access classified information.

(11) Threat information.—The term “threat information”

means information on—

(A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use products

or research of covered persons or other entities or

individuals to generate synthetic media for foreign-directed

influence campaigns, develop and manage computer network

exploitation campaigns, design or develop weapons systems, or

enhance surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the

privacy or threaten the security of citizens of the United

States;

(B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries, including

indications of compromise to networks associated with covered

persons and other entities and individuals, or other

technical indicators, indicating a compromise to the

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial

intelligence system, or to the supply chain of an artificial

intelligence system, including training or test data,

frameworks or software libraries, training or inference

computing environments, or other components necessary for the

training, management, or maintenance of an artificial

intelligence system;

clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously access

the systems of covered persons for purposes of illicit

technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair economic

advantage, including through techniques to extract a model's

technical capabilities to replicate, develop, or improve a

foreign artificial intelligence model without authorization

by the covered person;

(D) activity of foreign entities of concern to sabotage or

otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial intelligence

systems or the supply chain of an artificial intelligence

system, including training or test data, frameworks or

software libraries, training or inference computing

environments, or other components necessary for the training,

management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence

system; and

(E) observations, emerging concerns, or other inputs from

vendors or researchers regarding relevant malicious or

clandestine activity of foreign entities of concern toward an

artificial intelligence system, its supply chain, or other

necessary components.

(b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of

Intelligence and Threat Information With Covered Persons.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through

the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the

feasibility and advisability of facilitating the secure

sharing with covered persons of intelligence and threat

information germane to the exploitation of access to United

States artificial intelligence systems and enabling

infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection,

intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.

(2) Participation.—The Director may not select covered

persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides

a competitive advantage or procurement preference to any

covered person, to the detriment of another covered person.

(3) Duration.—The Director shall carry out the pilot

program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3-

year period beginning on the date of the establishment of the

pilot program.

(1) Criteria.—The Director shall establish criteria

governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot

program required by subsection (b), which may include

criteria relating to the following:

(A) Relevance to national security.

(B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive

intelligence information.

(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling, use,

and nondisclosure requirements.

(E) The availability of cleared personnel of covered

persons or willingness of covered persons to increase the

number of cleared personnel.

(2) Nature of participation.—Participation in the pilot

program shall not be construed as a certification,

endorsement, or regulatory approval by the United States

Government of any artificial intelligence system or

commercial activity and the Director may not exclude a

covered person from participating on the basis of political

or ideological viewpoints of the covered person or its

employees.

(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.—

(1) Authorized modes.—Under the pilot program required by

subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center,

authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information

as described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through—

(A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the

intelligence community and a covered person;

(B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons, as

determined appropriate by the Director; or

operated or overseen by the Director.

(2) Limitation.—Any mechanism established under this

section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence

and threat information and shall not establish standards,

requirements, or best practices governing artificial

intelligence development or deployment.

(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.—

(1) Procedures required.—The Director shall, acting

through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or

downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared

under the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure

usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods.

(2) Examples of procedures.—The procedures developed under

paragraph (1) may include the following:

(A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries.

(B) The preparation of classified annexes where necessary.

intelligence.

(D) The appropriate use of cleared industry personnel.

(3) Handling requirements.—The Director shall, acting

through the Center, codify policies governing the handling,

storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the

pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and

compliance mechanisms.

(f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.—

(1) Permissible use.—Intelligence shared under the pilot

program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for

detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign

activity exploiting access to United States artificial

intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in

intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and

other malicious activities.

(2) Nondisclosure.—A covered person may not disclose to

any person who is not a covered person or an element of the

intelligence community any intelligence shared with the

covered person under the pilot program required by subsection

(b), except as expressly authorized by the Director acting

through the Center.

(g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.—In planning and

coordinating the pilot program required by subsection (b),

the Director shall, acting through the Center, consult with

the Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence.

(h) Evaluation and Reporting.—

(1) Evaluation.—The Director shall, acting through the

Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of

the pilot program established under subsection (b).

(2) Report.—

(A) In general.—Not later than 90 days before the date on

which the pilot program required by paragraph (1) of

subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph (2) of such

subsection, the Director shall, acting through the Center,

submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report

assessing—

(i) the effectiveness of intelligence sharing under the

pilot program;

(ii) the adequacy of safeguards for sources, methods, and

privacy;

(iii) the scope of participation; and

(iv) whether the program should be modified, extended, or

terminated.

(B) Form.—The report submitted pursuant to subparagraph

(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include

a classified annex.

(i) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be

construed—

(1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United

States persons not authorized by another provision of law;

(2) to require the disclosure of classified information to

unauthorized persons; or

(3) to establish commercial, competition, or technology

policy outside the purview of the intelligence community.

(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.—Any information

shared by a covered person or other entity or individual with

the United States Government pursuant to this section—

(1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without

discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B)

of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of

United States law or law of any State, political subdivision

or agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of

information or records; and

(2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable

privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.

SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT TARGETING.

(a) Definitions.—In this subsection:

(1) Director.—The term “Director” means the Director of

National Intelligence.

(2) Intelligence.—The term “Intelligence” has the

meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of

Artificial Intelligence to Support Targeting.—

(1) Policy and procedure reviews.—

(A) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and

assess the policies and procedures that govern the use by the

intelligence community of artificial intelligence

technologies in the production, or review, of intelligence

used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with

lethal effects.

(B) Elements.—In carrying out the review and assessment

required by subparagraph (A), the Director shall—

(i) assess whether policies and procedures of the

intelligence community that were in effect on the day before

the date of the enactment of this Act adequately address

risks posed by the use of artificial intelligence

technologies in the targeting analysis and development and

civilian harm mitigation processes; and

(ii) ensure the review covers all policies of the

intelligence community that regard the production or review

of intelligence, regardless of which element first produced

the intelligence.

(2) Workflow reviews.—Not later than 90 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review

and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that

incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States

to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.

In carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the

Director shall direct the National Intelligence Council to

conduct a structured, exploratory analysis that—

(1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence

models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine

intelligence or other information provided by the

intelligence community that informs targeting accuracy;

(2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and

(3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and

correct such mistakes.

(d) Consultation.—In carrying out the review and

assessments required by subsection (b), the Director shall

consult with the heads of the elements of the intelligence

community whose intelligence is commonly consulted to inform

targeting decisions with lethal effects, such as the National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence

Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central

Intelligence Agency, to solicit input on potential negative

consequences resulting from artificial intelligence supported

analysis, and possible ways to mitigate such consequences.

(e) Policies and Directives.—The Director shall issue or

adjust such policies and directives to the intelligence

community as the Director considers appropriate to improve

risk mitigation in light of the review carried out under

subsection (b).

(f) Report.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews

and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a

summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to

subsection (e).

(2) Contents.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall

include the following:

(A) A description of contributions of the intelligence

community to targeting workflows, such as identification of

points of interest, pattern of life analysis, review of

proposed targets, target selection, and civilian impact

reviews, as well as the understanding of the intelligence

community of the delineation of roles and responsibilities

with the Armed Forces where applicable.

(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence tools

utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are used.

whether human review of artificial intelligence system

outputs is required to be conducted prior to dissemination of

materials.

(D) The scope of individuals expected to have access to the

materials described in subparagraph (C).

(E) An explanation of whether and how the capability

limitations of artificial intelligence tools available to

personnel of the intelligence community are communicated to

users, including the cutoff date for the tool's training

data, databases to which it does or does not have access

rights, and the tasks the model has been trained for or

approved for use.

(3) Form.—The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)

shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a

classified annex.

SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES,

STANDARDS, AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.—Section 6702 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is

amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an

artificial intelligence system.—The Chief Artificial

Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer

of each element of the intelligence community, shall examine

whether the intelligence community should identify

intelligence information generated or materially modified by

an artificial intelligence system, including determining what

methods are necessary to preserve such information throughout

the intelligence lifecycle.”;

(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:

“(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing

methodologies and benchmarks.—Consistent with applicable

classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial

Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer

of each element of the intelligence community, shall—

“(A) establish a process to review artificial intelligence

testing methodologies and benchmarks employed within each

element; and

“(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks remain

commensurate with the capabilities and impacts of systems

being evaluated.”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate

Incidents.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the

enactment of this

subsection, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the

Intelligence Community, in coordination with the National

Manager for National Security Systems, shall establish a

process to systematically track and evaluate incidents

associated with compromises to the confidentiality,

integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems

within each element of the intelligence community.

“(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems

and Processes.—

“(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system

or process.—In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial

intelligence system or process'—

“(A) means an artificial intelligence system or process

that, given an objective or instruction—

“(i) determines the action or sequence of actions to be

taken to accomplish that objective; and

“(ii) is capable of executing such actions directly on

information systems, data, or external services; and

“(B) does not include a system or process that solely

generates informational or advisory output for a human

operator to act upon.

“(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity,

credential, and access management systems for information

within the intelligence community.—

“(A) In general.—Consistent with authority under section

102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

3024(g)), the Director of National Intelligence, in

coordination with the National Manager for National Security

Systems, shall—

“(i) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment

of this paragraph, complete a review of the adequacy of

existing identity, credential, and access management systems

for information within the intelligence community used by

agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes; and

“(ii) not permit access to any information within the

intelligence community by an external department or agency

for use in an agentic artificial intelligence system or

process until the review required by clause (i) is completed.

“(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic

artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate

as non-human actors.—The review required by subparagraph

(A)(i) shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of

mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and

processes to authenticate as non-human actors, including the

appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and the

traceability of any action taken by an agentic artificial

intelligence system or process to a cleared individual on

whose behalf the agentic artificial intelligence system or

process is acting.

“(3) Policy guidance.—Upon completion of the review

required by paragraph (2), the Director of National

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the

National Security Agency, the Director of the National

Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate

policy guidance on—

“(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence systems

and processes within the intelligence community; and

“(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence systems

and processes to information within the intelligence

community.

“(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial

intelligence systems and processes.—In carrying out

paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a

minimum and to the extent such requirements are not already

replicated in existing processes or policies, consider—

“(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and security

risks associated with agentic artificial intelligence systems

and processes that operate on, or have the possibility of

accessing, information within the intelligence community; and

“(B) establishing technical controls, processes, and other

mitigation measures to address the risks identified under

subparagraph (A), including, at a minimum—

“(i) requirements that any element of the intelligence

community or external department or agency incorporating

information from an intelligence community element as part of

an agentic artificial intelligence system or process provide

the relevant element of the intelligence community

controlling such information with documentation of—

“(I) the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence

system or process, including the range of additional systems

or data sources it may access (whether as a system or process

input or as an agent action), the permissions and

classification entitlements associated with such access, as

well as any relevant model or system documentation, such as

model and system cards;

“(II) anticipated mission use cases for any access to

information within the intelligence community in the context

of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process,

including whether any use case constitutes a high-impact

artificial intelligence use as those terms are defined under

existing Federal policies;

“(III) procedures to notify relevant intelligence

community elements controlling such information of any

changes to the properties of the agentic artificial

intelligence system or process, to permissions and

classification entitlements, or to anticipated use cases of

such system or process, that might significantly limit the

utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such

information; and

“(IV) procedures for intelligence community elements to

promptly notify external intelligence community elements or

departments or agencies of any material changes to upstream

classified data or systems that might significantly limit or

impair the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or

availability of any downstream agentic artificial

intelligence system or process maintained by that external

intelligence community element or department or agency;

“(ii) policies and procedures to log any actions, as well

as associated inputs, taken by an agentic artificial

intelligence system or process to information within the

intelligence community, including mechanisms to reverse or

negate unauthorized actions or actions that pose a risk to

the user intent or confidentiality, integrity, or

availability of such information;

“(iii) policies and procedures for safeguards, continuous

monitoring, and the detection of security incidents or other

unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial intelligence

system or process, or failures of associated safeguards, that

may pose a threat to the confidentiality, availability, or

integrity of information within the intelligence community;

“(iv) policies and procedures for system-level controls of

agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes,

tailored to address each system or process component; and

“(v) criteria for the selection of interoperability

standards for agentic artificial intelligence systems and

processes, with preference, to the extent practicable, for

standards that are openly specified, governed in a vendor-

neutral manner, supported by multiple model providers,

extensible to future requirements, and subject to ongoing

independent security review.”.

SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.

Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is

amended—

(1) in subsection (c)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new

paragraph (3):

“(3) Making available a research test-bed to private

sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to

engage in artificial intelligence security research,

including through the secure provision of access in a secure

environment for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary

third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the

models.”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) Test-bed Requirements.—

“(1) Access and terms of usage.—

“(A) Researcher access.—The Director shall establish

terms of usage governing researcher access to the test-bed

made available under subsection (c)(3), with limitations on

researcher publication only to the extent necessary to

protect classified information or proprietary information

concerning third-party models provided through the consent of

model vendors.

“(B) Availability to federal agencies.—The Director shall

ensure that the test-bed made available under subsection

(c)(3) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a

cost-recovery basis.

“(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.—

In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall

leverage, to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure

and other resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive

Order 14110 (88 Fed. Reg. 75191; relating to safe, secure,

and trustworthy development and use of artificial

intelligence).

“(3) Voluntary security guidance.—In order to incentivize

participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to

promote the national security of the United States, the

Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre-

deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment

identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor

actions to mitigate against potential security threats to

such models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such

models for computer network exploitation campaigns, the

design or development of weapons systems, or to further

foreign surveillance capabilities.”.

SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

TECHNOLOGY.

(a) Definition.—In this section, the term “novel use of

artificial intelligence technology” means—

(1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of

capabilities combined that has not previously been included

in an intelligence community element's inventory of

artificial intelligence use cases consistent with guidance

issued pursuant to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b));

(2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that

contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial

intelligence contained in such an inventory; or

(3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that

constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that

term is defined under policies of the executive branch.

(b) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the

Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with

the heads of the other elements of the intelligence

community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence

committees a consolidated report detailing any novel use of

artificial intelligence technology that any element of the

intelligence community is considering employing within the

one-year period following submission of such report.

(b) shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial

intelligence technology, including—

(1) hardware and software requirements;

(2) the proposed application of the technology;

(3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the

proposed novel use;

(4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated,

including measures specific to the proposed novel use;

(5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in

conjunction with the proposed novel use;

(6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is

still needed, and whether the intelligence community has

resources to conduct and fund such activity; and

(7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection

with the proposed novel use.

(d) Form.—Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)

shall be submitted in classified form.

(e) Sunset.—This section shall expire on October 1, 2032.

SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS

FOR TARGETING WORKFLOWS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of

this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers

of the elements of the intelligence community, establish a

policy that applies to elements of the intelligence

community, which generate intelligence that could reasonably

be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal

effects, and that requires—

(1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence

system used in the development of such intelligence are

clearly marked to indicate—

(A) that artificial intelligence was used;

(B) the artificial intelligence system or model used;

intelligence was used; and

(D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief

Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address questions

about data inputs, system access, or artificial intelligence

system performance; and

(2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to

paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work

product in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any

person who subsequently interacts with that data on a system

of the intelligence community, regardless of organizational

affiliation of the person or the role of the person in

developing the data.

SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING

TO INADVERTENT ESCALATION.

(a) Requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of

appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced

Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief

Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the

understanding of the intelligence community with respect to

specific ways in which the use of artificial intelligence

systems by the intelligence community could contribute to

inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.

(b) Elements.—The research campaign required by subsection

(a) shall include—

(1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial

intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent

escalation with foreign nations or actors, including—

(A) analytic judgments that fail to properly consider or

weigh alternative explanations;

(B) automation of imagery classification or signals

intelligence;

targets;

(D) operational uses of artificial intelligence, such as

time-constrained uses that do not allow for independent

verification; and

(E) such other scenarios as identified by the Director or

participating subject matter experts;

(2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where

miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood

of occurrence; and

(3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for

vulnerabilities discovered; or

(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification

of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the

intelligence community.

(1) Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of

completion of the research campaign required by subsection

(a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence

Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence

committees on the findings and recommendations of the

research campaign.

(2) Intelligence community.—The Director of the

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer

of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the

intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of

the research campaign required by subsection (a), as

appropriate.

SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.

(a) Requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of

appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced

Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief

Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the

understanding of the intelligence community with respect to

novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may arise when an

adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts directly

with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community

that include artificial intelligence components.

(b) Elements.—The research campaign required by subsection

(a) shall—

(1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial

intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to

uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems,

infrastructure, or personnel that may result from—

(A) the accelerated development of artificial intelligence

capabilities by foreign nations;

(B) the increasing access that non-state and criminal

actors have to commercial artificial intelligence tools that

can identify vulnerabilities and propose or orchestrate

attacks; and

interact directly with each other during an attack; and

(2) pursue findings, including—

(A) an identification of potential mitigations for unique

vulnerabilities discovered; or

(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification

of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the

intelligence community.

(1) Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of

completion of the research campaign required by subsection

(a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence

Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence

Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence

committees on the findings and recommendations of the

research campaign.

(2) Intelligence community.—The Director of the

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in

coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer

of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and

Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the

intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of

the research campaign required by subsection (a), as

appropriate.

SEC. 709. PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENTS REGARDING ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term

“appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of

the Senate.

(2) Controlled artificial intelligence technology.—The

term “controlled artificial intelligence technology”

means—

(A) any United States-origin model weights, semiconductors,

and semiconductor manufacturing equipment as classified under

Export Control Classification Number 3A090, 4A090, 4E091,

3B001, 3B002, or 3B994 of the Commerce Control List or

corresponding entries in the Export Administration

Regulation, as in effect on the day before the date of the

enactment of this Act, or any subsequent revisions to the

Commerce Control List as may be amended by the Bureau of

Industry and Security; or

(B) any other related technology that the Director of

National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of

the National Security Agency and the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, determines could pose a potential risk

to the national security of the United States if proliferated

to adversaries of the United States.

(3) Export control terms.—The terms “export”, “Export

Administration Regulations”, “in-country transfer”,

“reexport”, and “United States person” have the meanings

given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control

Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(b) Statement of Policy.—It shall be the policy of the

intelligence community to prioritize collection and analysis

on the proliferation risks associated with controlled

artificial intelligence technology acquisitions that could be

exploited by adversaries of the United States.

the enactment of this Act, not less frequently than once

every 180 days thereafter, and not later than 30 days after

any supplemental request by the congressional intelligence

committees, the Director

of National Intelligence shall, acting through the National

Intelligence Council and in coordination with the Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of

State for Intelligence and Research, the Director of the

National Security Agency, and the such heads of other

elements of the intelligence community as the Director of

National Intelligence considers appropriate, submit to the

appropriate congressional committees a written assessment

regarding the risks associated with the proliferation of

controlled artificial intelligence technology to countries of

proliferation concern.

(d) Substance.—Each report submitted under subsection (c)

shall include the assessment of the intelligence community of

the proliferation consequences for United States national

security, including an assessment of—

(1) the acquiring country's export control system with

respect to controlled artificial intelligence technology,

including integrated circuits, integrated circuit design

software, tools, and manufacturing equipment;

(2) information on any past, present, or expected

interactions, including commercial ties and cooperation,

between commercial entities or government entities in the

acquiring country and other countries of proliferation

concern, including the People's Republic of China and the

Russian Federation;

(3) actual or suspected transfers of controlled artificial

intelligence technology to such countries, including the

People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

(4) the consequences that onward proliferation of United

States controlled artificial intelligence technology from the

acquiring country would have for United States efforts to

both deny adversaries access to controlled artificial

intelligence technology and maintain a significant

competitive advantage in frontier artificial intelligence

development, integrated design, and integrated manufacturing,

especially relative to the progress of the People's Republic

of China and the Russian Federation;

(5) the capacity of the intelligence community and United

States commercial entities to have near real-time awareness

of the any potential technology leakage or export violations

by the acquiring country;

(6) potential measures that the intelligence community

assesses could reasonably be taken by the acquiring country

to mitigate both the proliferation concerns identified by the

intelligence community and the consequences of any potential

onward proliferation as detailed in paragraph (4);

(7) whether acquisition of controlled artificial

intelligence technology would reinforce United States

artificial intelligence dominance;

(8) the intended and likely end-uses, including military,

intelligence, and domestic surveillance applications, and

whether such uses are consistent with United States national

security interests; and

(9) current and planned agreements and arrangements between

the United States and the government of the acquiring

country.

(e) Form.—Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall

be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a

classified annex.

SEC. 710. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY

VULNERABILITIES UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES

PROCESS.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.—The

term “artificial intelligence security vulnerability” means

a weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be

exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization,

the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial

intelligence system, including through techniques such as—

(A) evasion attacks;

(B) poisoning attacks;

(D) model theft or extraction attacks; and

(E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the safety,

alignment, or access control mechanisms of an artificial

intelligence system.

(2) Artificial intelligence system.—The term “artificial

intelligence system” means a capability or series of

capabilities combined that can, for a given set of

objectives, generate outputs such as predictions,

recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or

input.

(3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.—

The term “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process

document” means the executive branch document entitled

“Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United

States Government” dated November 15, 2017.

(4) Vulnerabilities equities process.—The term

“Vulnerabilities Equities Process” means the interagency

review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the

Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any

successor document.

(b) Evaluation; Report.—Not later than 90 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the

National Security Agency shall—

(1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities

Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review

of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a

report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities

Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether

the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the

Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly

large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so,

an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such

notifications.

Director of the National Security Agency determines that the

existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not

sufficiently accommodate the submission and review of

artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities identified

by elements of the intelligence community, and that such

vulnerabilities present public interest considerations

meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process,

the Director shall establish a process for the submission and

review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities

Equities Process not later than 30 days after the date of

such determination.

(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial

Intelligence Systems.—Not later than 90 days after the date

of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National

Security Agency shall provide the congressional intelligence

committees with a briefing on—

(1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems

identified by artificial intelligence systems;

(2) the impact of any change in such volume on the

functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and

exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors

using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the

equity of disclosure.

(e) Consultation Required.—The Director of the National

Security Agency shall carry out subsections (b), (c), and (d)

in consultation with—

(1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

and

(3) other entities as the Director of the National Security

Agency considers appropriate.

SEC. 711. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

MODELS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Appropriate committees of congress.—The term

“appropriate committees of Congress” means the following:

(A) The congressional intelligence committees.

(B) The Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

Representatives.

(2) Artificial intelligence model.—The term “artificial

intelligence model” means a capability or series of

capabilities combined that can, for a given set of

objectives, generate outputs such as predictions,

recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or

input.

(3) Child pornography.—The term “child pornography” has

the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18,

United States Code.

(4) Covered application.—The term “covered application”

means any specific artificial intelligence model that has

been confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence

community, or their designee, as—

(A) failing to comply with the National Institute of

Standard and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk

Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence

Profile with respect to “obscene, degrading, and/or abusive

content”, or a successor standard or framework, to the

extent the framework applies to synthetic child sexual abuse

material or non-consensual intimate images of adults;

(B) subject to a Federal court determination that such

artificial intelligence model has generated content depicting

child pornography; or

artificial intelligence model has generated non-consensual

intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a

minor.

(5) Intimate visual depiction.—The term “intimate visual

depiction” has the meaning given that term in section 1309

of the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022

(15 U.S.C. 6851).

(b) Prohibition.—

(1) In general.—The acquisition or use of any covered

application on national security systems operated by an

element of the intelligence community or by a contractor of

such element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards

described in subsection (c) can be implemented.

(2) Implementation.—

(A) Initial removal.—Not later than 180 days after the

date of the enactment of this Act, any covered application

shall be required to be removed from national security

systems operated by an element of the intelligence community

or a contractor of such element.

(B) Subsequent removals.—Beginning after the 180-day

period described in subparagraph (A), any artificial

intelligence model that becomes a covered application shall

be required to be removed from national security systems

operated by an element of the intelligence community or a

contractor of such element not later than 180 days after the

date that the model is confirmed by the

head of an element of the intelligence community, or their

designee, to be a covered application.

(1) In general.—The head of an element of the intelligence

community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit

the generation of child pornography or non-consensual

intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a

minor.

(2) Certification required.—The head of an element of the

intelligence community shall certify to the Director of

National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under

paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered

applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual

depictions of a minor.

(3) Congressional notification.—The head of an element of

the intelligence community that issues a certification

pursuant to paragraph (2) shall notify the appropriate

committees of Congress of such certification not later than 7

days after issuing such certification. Such a notification

shall identify the safeguards implemented pursuant to

paragraph (1).

(d) National Security and Research Waiver.—

(1) In general.—The head of an element of the intelligence

community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence

model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition

under subsection (b) if the head identifies a national

security or research justification for such artificial

intelligence model that benefits the intelligence community.

(2) Congressional notification.—Not later than 7 days

after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of

the element of the intelligence community that issues such

waiver shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress

a notification that includes—

(A) an identification of the national security or research

justification for such usage;

(B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such usage; and

allow for continued usage consistent with the general

prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1).

(e) Cure.—If a covered application is identified for

removal or is disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant

to this section, the head of an element of the intelligence

community may offer the provider of the covered application

an opportunity to cure performance to avoid removal pursuant

to subsection (b)(2).

TITLE VIII—OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR

AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURES.

Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C. 4865 note; division E of

Public Law 119-60) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, the Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,”

after “Foreign Affairs”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting “, the Select Committee

on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,” after

“Foreign Relations”.

SEC. 802. IDENTIFICATION OF REALLOCABLE FREQUENCIES.

Section 113 of the National Telecommunications and

Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923)

is amended—

(1) in subsection (h)(7)(A)—

(A) in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I) and (II)

as items (aa) and (bb), respectively, and adjusting the

margins accordingly;

(B) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subclauses (I)

and (II), respectively, and adjusting the margins

accordingly;

the following:

“(i) In general.—If a portion of the information”; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) Full classification.—

“(I) In general.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (5) and (6),

if the classification of information required to be included

in the transition plan of a Federal entity prohibits even the

public release of a redacted transition plan, as determined

by the head of the Federal entity, the Federal entity shall—

“(aa) notify the NTIA that the entire transition plan must

be classified and that even a redacted version cannot be made

public; and

“(bb) classify the transition plan in accordance with the

levels of materials contained in the transition plan.

“(II) Rule of construction.—Nothing in subclause (I) may

be construed as relieving a Federal entity from the

requirement under paragraph (1) to submit to the NTIA and to

the Technical Panel established by paragraph (3) a transition

plan for the implementation by such entity of the applicable

relocation or sharing arrangement.”; and

(2) in subsection (l)—

(A) by striking “For purposes of” and inserting the

following:

“(1) In general.—For purposes of”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) Elements of the intelligence community.—

Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of this

part, each element of the intelligence community (as defined

in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

3003)) shall be considered a Federal entity and shall be

eligible to receive payment from the Spectrum Relocation Fund

for any auction-related relocation or sharing costs incurred

by the element regardless of the existence of a Government

station license.”.

SEC. 803. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with

the heads of the other elements of the intelligence

community, shall provide intelligence and analytic support to

the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to

ensure all projects of the Corporation are appropriately

informed and strategically executed in accordance with the

purpose of the Corporation as described in section 1412(b) of

the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)).

SEC. 804. ESTABLISHING PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR

PROTECTING FEDERAL RESERVE INFORMATION.

(a) In General.—The Director of National Intelligence, in

coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and in consultation with the relevant heads of

the elements of the intelligence community, as determined by

the Directors, shall—

(1) brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System; and

(2) work with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System to create and implement standardized

security and classification measures for protecting

information collected, generated, and stored by the Federal

Reserve System.

(b) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,

the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the

Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional

committees a report detailing the status of implementing the

security measures described in subsection (a).

section, the term “appropriate congressional committees”

means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on

Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 805. OFFENSES INVOLVING ESPIONAGE.

(a) In General.—Chapter 213 of title 18, United States

Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Sec. 3302. Espionage offenses

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment

may be found or an information may be instituted at any time

without limitation for a violation of section 794 or a

conspiracy to violate such section.”.

(b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections for chapter

213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at

the end the following:

“3302. Espionage offenses.”.

(1) subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall

apply to an offense committed before, on, or after the date

of enactment of this Act; and

(2) shall not authorize the prosecution of any offense for

which the applicable statute of limitations expired before

the date of enactment of this Act.

(d) Conforming Amendment.—Section 19 of the Internal

Security Act of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note; 64 Stat. 1005) is

amended by striking “, 793, or 794” and inserting “or

793”.

SEC. 806. PARENTAL BEREAVEMENT LEAVE.

Section 6329d(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is

amended by inserting “, including any instance of the

natural or spontaneous loss of an unborn child (as defined in

section 1841(d) of title 18), such as through miscarriage,

stillbirth, or a loss that occurs due to a medical

intervention for a pregnancy emergency, such as the treatment

of an ectopic pregnancy” after “of the employee”.

SEC. 807. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR PURPOSES

OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PROHIBITION.

Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States Code, is

amended—

(1) by striking “that is substantially owned” and

inserting the following: “that is—

“(A) substantially owned”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following: “or

“(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in section

4872 of title 10;”.

SEC. 808. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS.

(a) Requiring Advantage to Foreign Entity or Injury to

United States Under Economic Espionage Statute.—Section

1831(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended, in the

matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “benefit any

foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign

agent” and inserting “provide any advantage to a foreign

government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, or

injure or disadvantage in any way the United States, an

instrumentality of the United States, or an agent of the

United States”.

(b) Extending Jurisdiction Over Economic Espionage and

Trade Secret Offenses.—Section 1837 of title 18, United

States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and

inserting a semicolon; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) the victim is—

“(A) a natural person who is a citizen or permanent

resident alien of the United States; or

“(B) a person, including an organization, headquartered or

incorporated in the United States; or

“(4) an act committed in furtherance of the offense used

or took place through—

“(A) communications in interstate or foreign commerce; or

“(B) financial infrastructure in the United States.”.

Secrets Outside the United States.—Section 1832 of title 18,

United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“(c) Transmission of Trade Secrets Outside the United

States.—

“(1) Offense.—It shall be unlawful for a person, knowing

that prior authorization is required, without such

authorization to knowingly—

“(A) transmit a trade secret outside the United States;

“(B) attempt to commit an offense described in

subparagraph (A); or

“(C) conspire with one or more other persons to commit an

offense described in subparagraph (A).

“(2) Penalties.—

“(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B),

any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not more

than $5,000,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

“(B) Organizations.—Any organization that commits an

offense described in paragraph (1) shall be fined not less

than 3 times the value of the stolen trade secret to the

victim, including expenses for research and design and other

costs of reproducing the trade secret that the organization

has thus avoided.”.

(d) Criminalizing Inciting Economic Espionage and Theft of

Trade Secrets.—Chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code,

is amended—

(1) in section 1831, by adding at the end the following:

“(c) Incitement or Solicitation of Economic Espionage.—

“(1) In general.—It shall be unlawful for a person to

solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade

another person to engage in an offense described in

subsection (a).

“(2) Penalties.—Any person who violates paragraph (1)

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than

10 years, or both.

“(d) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall

be construed to limit or abridge—

“(1) any right protected under the Constitution of the

United States; or

“(2) any whistleblowing procedure under any Federal

statute.”; and

(2) in section 1832, as amended by subsection (c), by

adding at the end the following:

“(d) Incitement or Solicitation of Theft of Trade

Secrets.—

“(1) In general.—It shall be unlawful for a person to

knowingly solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to

persuade another person to engage in an offense described in

subsection (a) or (c).

“(2) Penalties.—Any person who violates paragraph (1)

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than

10 years, or both.

“(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall

be construed to limit or abridge—

“(1) any right protected under the Constitution of the

United States; or

“(2) any whistleblowing procedure under any Federal

statute.”.

(e) Definition of Foreign Instrumentality for Purposes of

Economic Espionage Prohibition.—Section 1839(1) of title 18,

United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking “that is substantially owned” and

inserting the following: “that is—

“(A) substantially owned”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following: “or

“(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in section

4872 of title 10, provided that, for purposes of this

subparagraph, an organization, corporation, firm, or entity—

“(i) is domiciled in a covered nation only if it is

organized under the laws of that nation or maintains its

principal place of business in that nation; and

“(ii) shall not be considered domiciled in a covered

nation solely because it conducts business operations,

maintains offices or facilities, owns property, or has

employees, subsidiaries, or affiliates in that nation, unless

such subsidiaries or affiliates are substantially owned or

controlled by that nation;”.

SEC. 809. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of

1947.—Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947

(50 U.S.C. 3126(8)) is amended by inserting “Space Force,”

after “Marine Corps,”.

(b) National Intelligence University.—Section 6801(a)(4)

of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

(Public Law 119-60) is amended in the matter preceding

subparagraph (A) by striking “3327” and inserting “3227”.

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