This is not an official government website.
© 2026 PLEJ LC. All rights reserved.
Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Committee on Foreign Relations, members such as Mike Lee.
Issued
June 24, 2026
senate side of the record
People
1
Linked members mentioned in this section
Legislation
0
No linked legislation in this section
Committees
3
Committees connected to this section
Senate Holds
0
No hold activity linked here
Source Document
Connected Data
Source Control
Reader mode is for comprehension. The linked government PDF is the official published source.
Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6539. Mr. LEE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, add the following:
Subtitle F—Arctic Security and Diplomacy Act
SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the “Arctic Security and
Diplomacy Act”.
SEC. 1282. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States is an Arctic nation by virtue of the
State of Alaska.
(2) The Arctic is a critical domain for the security and
sovereignty of the United States and faces elevated risks
related to the threats of territorial expansion and
violation, influence operations, sabotage of critical
undersea infrastructure, and espionage by foreign
adversaries, particularly the People's Republic of China and
the Russian Federation.
(3) The Russian Federation holds a significant portion of
the Arctic, accounting for approximately 53 percent of the
Arctic Ocean coastline, and has significantly expanded its
military basing infrastructure and capabilities in the
region.
(4) In 2018, the People's Republic of China declared that
it is a “Near-Arctic State” with significant interests in
the Arctic and is attempting to become a “polar great
power” through economic expansion, scientific investments,
and dual-use civilian and military infrastructure.
(5) The Russian Federation is cooperating with the People's
Republic of China to establish a “Polar Silk Road” in the
Arctic, and the two countries are working together to
strengthen cooperation in polar shipbuilding and ship
technology.
(6) The People's Republic of China has made multiple
attempts to gain strategic footholds in the Arctic, has
research stations in Norway's Svalbard archipelago and in
Iceland, and consistently attempts to co-opt and manipulate
civilian science and research activities, university
partnerships, and multilateral science and research
initiatives throughout the Arctic.
(7) The People's Republic of China has observer status on
the Arctic Council, has significantly increased diplomatic
engagement with Nordic countries, and uses investments in
cooperative marine scientific research as a form of soft
power in the Arctic.
(8) The People's Republic of China engages in extensive
marine surveying, much of which has dual-use risk for
military applications, including seabed mapping, NATO asset
monitoring, and other espionage-related activity.
(9) The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of
China have overlapping priority interests in the Arctic,
though each have their own distinct interests with associated
challenges.
(10) In 2022, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service
reported several attempts at espionage by the People's
Republic of China against Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe
Islands.
(11) In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
warned of espionage activity by the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation, and the Canadian military
discovered and removed buoys in the Arctic owned by the
People's Republic of China.
(12) In 2025, the head of the National Police Commission in
Iceland warned that the China-Iceland Arctic Science
Observatory poses dual-use risks and may be used for
espionage.
(13) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the intelligence
community describes the Russian Federation as “our primary
challenge in the Arctic . . . Moscow is seeking to expand and
deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime
trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity,”
while warning that the People's Republic of China “seeks to
expand its Arctic presence using scientific research,
investments, and commercial ventures along the Northern Sea
Route.”
(14) The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy highlighted the
Russian Federation's military build-up in the Arctic and use
of hybrid threats like sabotage against critical undersea
infrastructure, while warning that the People's Republic of
China “is pursuing a military build-up, including rapidly
expanding its naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-
use military-scientific vessels and surging its presence in
the High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque about
its intentions.”
(15) According to the Department of Homeland Security, an
unprecedented number of military and research vessels of the
People's Republic of China are operating in or near United
States Arctic waters.
(16) On May 22, 2026, at the NATO Foreign Ministerial in
Sweden, the Arctic allies, consisting of Canada, the Kingdom
of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, the
Kingdom of Sweden, and the United States, issued a joint
statement which stated that “With Russia's increased
military activity and China's growing strategic interest, we
seek to bolster stability in the Arctic region” and
“recognize the importance of economic and resource
development in the Arctic and have tasked our experts to
coordinate more closely on these issues . . . to achieve our
common goal of a safe, prosperous, and peaceful Arctic”;
(17) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to
cooperatively limit the ability of the Russian Federation and
the People's Republic of China to conduct further espionage
in the Arctic.
(18) It is in the interest of the United States to
encourage marine scientific research, as President Ronald
Reagan noted in his Statement on United States Oceans Policy
on March 10, 1983.
SEC. 1283. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.—The term “agency” has the meaning given the
term “Executive agency” in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.—The term
“appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(3) Arctic.—The term “Arctic” has the meaning given that
term in section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of
1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).
(4) Covered activities.—The term “covered activities”
means marine surveys that may pose dual-use risks for
civilian and military applications, including—
(A) exploration of natural resources;
(B) seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys, and oceanographic
surveys;
(C) data collection related to subsea assets and
infrastructure;
(D) operation of unmanned maritime systems; and
(E) any other activity designated by the Secretary of State
as posing a risk to national security.
(5) Covered vessel.—The term “covered vessel” means a
foreign vessel that—
(A) is a vessel of a foreign adversary; or
(B) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be
associated with a foreign adversary in a manner that
threatens the security of the United States.
(6) Exclusive economic zone.—The term “exclusive economic
zone” means, with respect to the United States, including
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United
States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or possession
over which the United States exercises sovereignty, the zone
seaward of and adjacent to the territorial sea, including the
contiguous zone, and extending 200 nautical miles from the
territorial sea baseline (except where otherwise limited by
treaty or other agreement recognized by the United States) in
which the United States has sovereign rights and
jurisdiction.
(7) Foreign adversary.—The term “foreign adversary”
means any foreign government or foreign nongovernment person
engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of
conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the
United States or the security and safety of United States
persons, including—
(A) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(B) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(C) the People's Republic of China; and
(D) the Russian Federation.
(8) Foreign vessel.—The term “foreign vessel” means any
vessel that is—
(A) owned, operated, or chartered by a foreign government;
(B) owned or controlled by an entity organized under the
laws of, headquartered in, or otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of a foreign country; or
(C) registered under the flag of a foreign country.
(9) Intelligence community.—The term “intelligence
community” has the meaning given that term in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Marine scientific research.—The term “marine
scientific research” means any activity that is—
(A) undertaken in the ocean to expand knowledge of the
marine environment and its processes, including data
collection activities; and
(B) regulated by the United States under the Presidential
Proclamation on Revision to United States Marine Scientific
Research Policy of September 2020.
(11) Territorial sea.—The term “territorial sea” means
the waters extending to 12 nautical miles from the baselines
of the United States.
(12) United states waters.—The term “United States
waters” means—
(A) the territorial sea of the United States;
(B) the exclusive economic zone of the United States; and
(C) the continental shelf of the United States, as it
pertains to marine scientific research and other activities
on the seabed or subsoil.
SEC. 1284. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to limit espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters;
(2) to inform allied countries with a presence in the
Arctic about the espionage and influence operations of
foreign adversaries in the Arctic, including espionage
through covered activities;
(3) to condition support from the Federal Government for
marine surveys on cooperation with counterespionage in the
Arctic and in United States waters, including limitations on
information sharing of data obtained through covered
activities in the Arctic and in United States waters; and
(4) to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means available
to ensure the security of the Arctic and the sovereignty of
United States waters through the enforcement of section 1286,
including through—
(A) demarches;
(B) public condemnations;
(C) diplomatic sanctions;
(D) coordination of multilateral diplomatic pressure;
(E) any other diplomatic means authorized by law; and
(F) maintaining robust participation of the United States
in the Arctic Council to limit Chinese and Russian efforts to
undermine the interests of the United States in the Arctic.
SEC. 1285. STRATEGY.
(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, shall produce a strategy to identify and combat
espionage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in
the Arctic.
(b) Elements.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include—
(1) identifying and countering espionage activities in the
Arctic;
(2) diplomatic methods to enforce section 1286; and
(3) as appropriate, enlistment of and coordination with
allied countries that have a presence in the Arctic to combat
espionage by foreign adversaries.
SEC. 1286. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES
WATERS.
(a) In General.—No foreign scientist may conduct a marine
scientific research project in United States waters without
prior consent from the United States Government provided in
accordance with this section and with appropriate
international customs.
(b) Requirements; Applications.—The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, shall—
(1) require foreign vessels to obtain prior consent to
conduct marine scientific research in United States waters;
and
(2) implement a process for reviewing applications for such
consent.
(c) Information Sharing.—To facilitate the process for
reviewing applications to conduct marine scientific research
under this section, the head of each agency shall share
information related to such marine scientific research with
the Department of State unless otherwise prohibited by law.
(d) Prohibition on Covered Vessels.—Except as provided in
subsection (e) or as necessary to abide by appropriate
international customs, applications submitted under this
section for any covered vessels shall not be approved.
(e) National Interest Waiver.—
(1) In general.—The Secretary of State may waive the
prohibition in subsection (d) on an individual basis if the
Secretary determines that doing so is the national interest
of the United States.
(2) Notice required.—Not later than 5 days after any
issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
written notice describing the waiver.
(f) Congressional Notification.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 15 days after the Secretary
of State determines a violation of subsection (a) has
occurred, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate
committees of Congress of such violation, in classified form.
(2) Elements.—Notice described in paragraph (1) shall
include—
(A) the country affiliation of the foreign scientist;
(B) the nature of the violation; and
(C) subsequent action by the Federal Government to address
the violation.
(g) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report that
details—
(1) how the requirements of this section compare to the
requirements of existing multilateral marine scientific
research consent regimes; and
(2) the staffing and resources necessary for the Department
of State to review applications under such consent regime in
a manner that is timely and continues to encourage marine
scientific research and scientific diplomacy.
SEC. 1287. REPORT.
(a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on espionage and influence operations by
foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United States
waters.
(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of the extent to which covered activities
support espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(2) A description of United States Government support for
covered activities in the Arctic that involve foreign
adversaries, including—
(A) funding;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) maritime security;
(D) technical assistance;
(E) information sharing;
(F) scientific research; and
(G) any other form of material or technical support.
(3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of State to
enlist allied countries with a presence in the Arctic to
combat espionage in the Arctic by foreign adversaries.
(4) Recommendations for combating such espionage.
(5) An assessment of the feasibility and potential utility
of establishing a formal Arctic security information-sharing
framework, under a new or existing framework or mechanism,
among allied Arctic countries, as appropriate, such as
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), the
Kingdom of Norway, Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, and
Iceland, including mechanisms for the exchange of information
and joint identification of dual-use maritime scientific
activity, and the development of shared watchlists of high-
risk vessels, entities, and individuals.
(6) An analysis of how existing multilateral agreements
combat espionage and influence operations in the Arctic.
(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
(d) Availability.—The report required by subsection (a)
shall be made available on request to any Member of Congress.