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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Select Committee on Intelligence, members such as Charles Ellis Schumer.
Issued
July 20, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6703. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1049A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE WITH RESPECT TO
CYBER AND PHYSICAL THREATS TO THE ELECTRIC
GRID.
(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:
(1) The electric grid of the United States—the commercial
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
system comprising power lines and other infrastructure—
delivers the electricity that is essential for modern life.
As a result, the reliability of the electric grid, ability to
meet the electricity demand of consumers at all times, is not
a luxury. Such reliability is fundamental to the health and
safety of the people of the United States and the continued
strength of the economy of the United States, making the
reliability of the electric grid a paramount issue of
national interest.
(2) The annual report on worldwide threats issued by the
Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 108B of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043b) (commonly
known as the “Annual Threat Assessment”) has consistently
found that state and non-state cyber actors pose the most
significant threats to the critical infrastructure of the
United States.
(3) The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment found that foreign
adversaries are intent on attacking “critical
infrastructure, disrupting utility company business networks
or manipulating poorly secured control systems”.
(4) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment states that “cyber
actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware
groups will continue to pose critical threats to U.S.
networks and critical infrastructure”.
(5) According to the annual report issued by U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, foreign adversaries,
like the Chinese state-backed cyber actor Volt Typhoon, have
infiltrated the power system of the United States to collect
operational insights into the electric grid, identify
chokepoints with outsized control over grid operations, and
pre-position cyber assets for operational disruptions.
(6) Components of the power system produced by the People's
Republic of China, particularly internet-connected devices
and advanced wireless communications equipment, and
commercial satellite communications terminals create
vulnerabilities for the electric grid.
(7) Grid distribution systems increasingly use operational
technology and industrial control systems that allow remote
access via public and private advanced wireless networks for
easier maintenance and more detailed data collection.
(8) The fragmented nature of regulatory authority over the
electric grid of the United States poses challenges to
creating and implementing effective, uniform cybersecurity
regulations.
(9) The Government Accountability Office has warned that
the electric grid of the United States is heavily reliant on
space-based infrastructure, particularly Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS), for the precise timing and synchronization of
power flows. The disruption, degradation, or spoofing of such
signals by foreign adversaries and the compromise of
commercial satellite communications used for remote grid
management, present critical vulnerabilities to the stability
of the electric grid.
(10) A study issued by the Comptroller General of the
United States found that although the Department of Energy
has developed plans and an assessment to implement a Federal
strategy for addressing security risks to the electric grid,
such efforts have fallen short because the Federal Government
has not conducted a complete assessment of all the
cybersecurity risks to the grid.
(b) Requirement.—Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence
Council, shall produce and submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a national intelligence estimate
addressing the risks and national security implications of
foreign adversaries targeting the electric grid of the United
States with cyber and physical attacks.
(c) Elements.—The national intelligence estimate required
by subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1) A comprehensive risk assessment of known cyber and
physical security threats and vulnerabilities to the electric
grid of the United States, including the risk posed by state-
backed actors in the People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, and foreign non-state actors,
such as ransomware groups.
(2) An assessment of how varying lengths of electricity
blackouts caused by cyber and physical attacks would impact—
(A) national security, including with respect to the loss
of access to commercial internet and advanced wireless
telecommunications;
(B) satellite communications infrastructure used in
security operations; and
(C) the total economic activity, health, and other critical
activities of the United States.
(3) An assessment of the efficacy of policies to strengthen
supply chain risk management requirements for the electric
grid, including—
(A) identifying foreign-origin components within high- and
medium-impact bulk electric system and protected cyber
assets, including semiconductors, advanced wireless network
equipment, satellite receiver systems, precision timing
hardware, and other technology components; and
(B) developing requirements to prohibit the installation of
or mitigate the foreign cyber risk posed by such components.
(4) An assessment of the efficacy of policies to support
the adoption of nationwide cyber and physical security
standards and tools to protect the electric grid from foreign
state-backed cyber actors.
(5) An assessment of the efficacy of policies to support
the expansion of the electric grid in a safe and secure
manner.
(d) Submission to Congress.—
(1) Form.—The national intelligence estimate shall be
submitted in classified form
(2) Public availability.—Consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the
Director submits to the appropriate committees of Congress
the national intelligence estimate under subsection (b), the
Director shall make publicly available on an internet website
of the intelligence community an unclassified version of the
key findings of such national intelligence estimate.
(e) Appropriate Committee of Congress Defined.—In this
section, the term “appropriate committee of Congress”
means—
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives.