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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions members such as Michael F. Bennet.
Issued
July 21, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6705. Mr. BENNET (for himself and Mr. Hickenlooper) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4748, to establish the Foreign Investment Review Authority to determine whether foreign countries that have made investment commitments to the United States have complied with those commitments, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle A of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1510A. PROMOTING COMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL BASE
RESILIENCE FOR PROLIFERATED SPACE
ARCHITECTURES.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States requires a resilient, survivable, and
rapidly scalable space architecture to support joint all-
domain operations against peer adversaries.
(2) Competition among multiple qualified domestic providers
is essential to maintaining innovation, reducing costs,
increasing production capacity, and mitigating risks
associated with single-source dependencies.
(3) Excessive reliance on a single contractor or limited
supplier base for proliferated space architectures creates
strategic risks to the defense industrial base, supply chain
resilience, production surge capacity, and operational
continuity.
(4) Congress is concerned that recent acquisition
strategies for certain proliferated space capabilities may
not adequately sustain multiple viable domestic suppliers
capable of supporting future national security requirements.
(5) Maintaining multiple competitive providers for space
vehicles, mission payloads, tactical data transport, and
supporting ground infrastructure is in the national security
interest of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Department of the Air Force and the National
Reconnaissance Office should maintain robust competition
across proliferated national security space acquisition
programs;
(2) acquisition strategies should preserve multiple
domestic sources capable of designing, manufacturing,
integrating, and sustaining proliferated satellite
constellations;
(3) competition should be sustained throughout production
and follow-on capability development whenever practicable;
and
(4) long-term acquisition strategies should strengthen the
United States industrial base rather than create unnecessary
single-source dependencies.
(c) Requirement for Competitive Procurement Strategy.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force,
acting through the Assistant Secretary for Space Acquisition
and Integration, in coordination with the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office, shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a strategy to maintain
competition for the development, procurement, and maintenance
of proliferated national security space architectures,
including—
(A) the proliferated architecture of the National
Reconnaissance Office;
(B) space-based tactical data transport capabilities;
(C) space-based advanced moving-target indication
capabilities;
(D) Space Data Network capabilities; and
(E) any successor proliferated low-Earth orbit operational
architecture that supports a mission of the Department of
Defense.
(2) Elements.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include—
(A) an assessment of the risks associated with single-
source procurement of any such architecture;
(B) an evaluation of industrial base capacity, workforce,
supply chain resilience, and surge production capability with
respect to such architectures;
(C) recommendations to sustain not fewer than two viable
domestic providers for each major capability area relating to
such architectures; and
(D) a plan for preserving meaningful competition in future
production of, and capability upgrades to, such
architectures.
(d) Minimum Competitive Investment.—Beginning in fiscal
year 2028, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office shall, to the maximum
extent practicable and consistent with mission requirements—
(1) maintain not fewer than two qualified domestic
providers for each major proliferated space acquisition
program relating to the architectures described in subsection
(c)(1); and
(2) ensure that not less than 25 percent of annual
production quantities, contract value, or program funding for
each such program is competitively awarded to a qualified
provider other than the incumbent provider, unless the
Secretary of the Air Force submits to the congressional
defense committees—
(A) a certification that—
(i) only one responsible source exists for such program;
(ii) mission assurance requirements cannot reasonably be
met through competitive procurement; or
(iii) such allocation would substantially increase program
risk or cost without corresponding operational benefit; and
(B) a detailed justification and an assessment of the
impact on competition and the defense industrial base of
awarding a greater such percentage to the incumbent provider.
(e) Annual Report.—Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
five years, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director
of the National Reconnaissance Office shall jointly submit to
the congressional defense committees a report describing—
(1) the number of qualified providers supporting each major
proliferated space acquisition program relating to the
architectures described in subsection (c)(1);
(2) annual funding allocated among such providers; and
(3) with respect to such proliferated space architectures—
(A) industrial base health indicators;
(B) supply chain vulnerabilities;
(C) actions taken to promote sustained competition among
providers; and
(D) recommendations for any additional legislative
authorities required to strengthen competition and
resilience.