SUPPORTING EARLY-CHILDHOOD EDUCATORS' DEDUCTIONS ACT

Quick facts

Record: House Floor
Section type: Floor speeches
Chamber: House
Date: September 16, 2026
Congress: 119th Congress
Why this source matters: This section came from the House floor portion of the record.

Linked context

People mentioned: McCaul, Michael T., Meeks, Gregory W., Turner, Michael R.
Bills and resolutions: H.Res. 1530 (119th Congress), H.R. 5334 (119th Congress)
Committees: Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Committee on Ways and Means, Committee on Foreign Affairs

Readable version of the official text

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution Number 1530, I call up the bill (H.R. 5334) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow early childhood educators to take the educator expense deduction, and for other purposes, with the Senate amendments thereto, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the Senate amendments.

Senate amendments: Strike section 1 and insert the following:

DIVISION A—LINDSEY O. GRAHAM SANCTIONING RUSSIA AND IRAN ACT OF 2026

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the “Lindsey O.

Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026”.

(b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents for this

division is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Sec. 101. Definitions. Sec. 102. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or

supporting the Government of the Russian Federation. Sec. 103. Imposition of sanctions with respect to financial

institutions affiliated with the Government of the

Russian Federation. Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to other entities owned

or controlled by the Government of the Russian

Federation. Sec. 105. Prohibition on transfers of funds involving the Russian

Federation. Sec. 106. Prohibition on listing or trading of Russian entities on

United States securities exchanges. Sec. 107. Prohibition on investment by United States persons in the

Russian Federation. Sec. 108. Prohibition on energy exports to, and investment in energy

sector of, the Russian Federation. Sec. 109. Prohibition on purchase of sovereign debt of the Russian

Federation by United States persons. Sec. 110. Prohibition on provision of services to sanctioned financial

institutions by international financial messaging

systems. Sec. 111. Prohibition on importing, and sanctions with respect to,

uranium from the Russian Federation. Sec. 112. Increase in duties on goods imported from the Russian

Federation. Sec. 113. Duties on countries that purchase Russian-origin crude oil or

natural gas or facilitate sanctions evasion.
Sec. 114. Exceptions.
Sec. 115. Waiver.
Sec. 116. Sanctions implementation and penalties.
Sec. 117. Termination.

TITLE II—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 201. Extension of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
Sec. 202. Severability.
Sec. 203. Sunset.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through

account.—The terms “account”, “correspondent account”,

and “payable-through account” have the meanings given those

terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

(2) Adequate maritime insurance.—The term “adequate

maritime insurance”—

(A) means verified documentation evidencing protection and

indemnity insurance with audited financial statements of the

insurer; and

(B) does not include insurance provided by an insurer

organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or

otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of

the Russian Federation.

(3) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.—The terms

“admission”, “admitted”, “alien”, and “lawfully

admitted for permanent residence” have the meanings given

those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality

Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(4) Armed forces of the russian federation.—The term

“Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” includes—

(A) the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation;

(B) the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation;

(D) the Navy of the Russian Federation;

(E) the Special Operations Command of the Russian

Federation;

(F) the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation;

(G) the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian

Federation;

(H) the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Russian Federation (formerly known as the Main

Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation);

(I) the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation;

(J) the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian

Federation;

(K) cyber actors of the Government of the Russian

Federation; and

(L) any successor entities or proxies of the entities

described in subparagraphs (A) through (K).

(5) Blocked property.—The term “blocked property” means

any property blocked pursuant to the authority of the

President under section 203 of the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702).

(6) Critical infrastructure.—

(A) In general.—The term “critical infrastructure”, with

respect to Ukraine, means systems and assets, whether

physical or virtual, so vital to Ukraine that the incapacity

or destruction of such systems and assets would have

catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or

safety, economic security, or national security.

(B) Included sectors.—The term “critical infrastructure”

includes assets in the following sectors:

(i) Biotechnology.

(ii) Chemical.

(iii) Commercial facilities.

(iv) Communications.

(v) Critical manufacturing.

(vi) Dams.

(vii) Defense industrial base.

(viii) Emergency services.

(ix) Energy.

(x) Financial services.

(xi) Food and agriculture.

(xii) Government facilities.

(xiii) Healthcare and public health.

(xiv) Information technology.

(xv) Materials and waste.

(xvi) Nuclear reactors.

(xvii) Space.

(xviii) Transportation systems.

(xix) Water and wastewater systems.

(7) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means an

individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(8) Knowing; knowingly; knows.—The terms “knowing”,

“knowingly”, and “knows”, with respect to conduct, a

circumstance, or a result, means that a person had actual

knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the

circumstance, or the result.

(9) Military invasion.—The term “military invasion”

includes—

(A) a ground operation or assault;

(B) an amphibious landing or assault;

(D) an aerial bombardment or blockade;

(E) missile attacks, including rockets, ballistic missiles,

cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles;

(F) a naval bombardment or armed blockade;

(G) a destructive or destabilizing cyberattack against

critical infrastructure; and

(H) an attack by a country on any territory controlled or

administered by any other independent, sovereign country,

including offshore islands controlled or administered by that

country.

(10) Russian person.—The term “Russian person” means—

(A) a citizen or national of the Russian Federation; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian

Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the

Government of the Russian Federation.

(11) United states person.—The term “United States

person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted

for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States

or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a

foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 102. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS

AFFILIATED WITH OR SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the

President shall—

(1) review any persons and vessels that may be described in

subsection (b); and

(2) after conducting that review—

(A) impose the sanctions described in subsection (e) with

respect to any persons the President determines are described

in subsection (b); and

(B) identify as blocked property any vessels the President

determines are described in subsection (b).

(b) Persons Described.—The persons and vessels described

in this subsection are the following:

(1) The following officials of the Government of the

Russian Federation:

(A) The President of the Russian Federation.

(B) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

(D) The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of

the Russian Federation.

(E) The Deputy Ministers of Defense of the Russian

Federation.

(F) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the

Russian Federation.

(G) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the

Russian Federation.

(H) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian

Federation.

(I) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian

Federation.

(J) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the

Russian Federation.

(K) The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the

Russian Federation.

(L) The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed Forces

of the Russian Federation.

(M) The commanders of the Russian Federation military

districts.

(N) The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian

Federation.

(O) The Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation.

(P) The Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.

(Q) The Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian

Federation.

(R) The Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation.

(S) The Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation.

(T) The Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the

Russian Federation.

(U) The Director of the Federal Security Service of the

Russian Federation.

(V) The Director of the Main Directorate of the General

Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

(W) The Director of the National Guard of the Russian

Federation.

(X) The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation.

(Y) Any other senior official of the Government of the

Russian Federation, as determined by the President.

(2) Any foreign person that the President determines, on or

after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) knowingly sells, leases, or provides, or facilitates

selling, leasing, or providing, goods or services relating to

the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation,

including—

(i) computer numerical control (CNC) tools and associated

machinery, software, and maintenance or upgrade services;

(ii) lubricant additives;

(iii) nitrocellulose, wood cellulose, and associated

additives and components necessary for the production of

propellant or energetics for munitions;

(iv) chemical coatings;

(v) fiber optic cables with military applications and

associated technologies needed to manufacture such cables;

(vi) advanced sensors;

(vii) items on the Common High Priority Items List

maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the

Department of Commerce; or

(viii) any additional items determined by the Secretary of

State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, to be

critical to the defense industrial base of the Russian

Federation;

(B) knowingly facilitates deceptive or structured

transactions to provide the goods and services described in

subparagraph (A);

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

(D) knowingly engages, directly or indirectly, in

activities that—

(i) materially undermine the military readiness of Ukraine;

(ii) seek to overthrow, dismantle, or subvert the

Government of Ukraine;

(iii) debilitate the critical infrastructure of Ukraine;

(iv) debilitate cybersecurity systems through malicious

electronic attacks or cyberattacks on Ukraine;

(v) undermine the democratic processes of Ukraine;

(vi) undermine the peace, security, political stability, or

territorial integrity of Ukraine; or

(vii) involve committing serious abuses of internationally

recognized human rights against citizens of Ukraine,

including forcible transfers, enforced disappearances, unjust

detainment, forced deportation of children, or torture;

(E) is a leader, official, senior executive officer, or

member of the board of directors of, or principal shareholder

with a controlling or majority interest in, an entity that is

operating in the defense industrial base or energy or

transportation sectors of the economy of the Russian

Federation in support of the Armed Forces of the Russian

Federation;

(F) is an oligarch in the Russian Federation who—

(i) has not demonstrated opposition to the Russian

Federation's war on Ukraine; or

(ii) continues, on or after the date of the enactment of

this Act, to benefit from an association with the Government

of the Russian Federation;

(G) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or

indirectly engaged in, for or on behalf of, or for the

benefit of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the

Russian Federation—

(i) transnational crime, corruption, bribery, extortion, or

money laundering;

(ii) assassination, murder, or other unlawful killing of,

or infliction of other bodily harm or other crimes against

humanity against, a United States person or a citizen or

national of an ally or partner of the United States;

(iii) activities that undermine the peace, security,

political stability, or territorial integrity of the United

States or an ally or partner of the United States; or

(iv) deceptive or structured transactions or dealings that

circumvent the application of any sanctions imposed by the

United States, including through the use of digital

currencies or assets or the use of physical assets; or

(H) is a leader, official, senior executive officer, or

member of the board of directors of, or principal shareholder

with a controlling or majority interest in, any of the

following Russian energy projects:

(i) The Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas Project or a successor

project.

(ii) The Arctic 1, 2, and 3 Liquefied Natural Gas Projects

or a successor project.

(iii) Projects in the Arctic region carried out after the

date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) Any foreign vessel the President determines, based on

credible information, is used by the Government of the

Russian Federation or Russian persons to move crude oil,

uranium, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum,

petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal, coal

products, arms, or other goods for the purpose of

circumventing sanctions imposed by the United States or other

countries, including any vessel the owner, operator, or

manager of which knowingly—

(A) exhibits or engages in unsafe or nonstandard maritime

behavior in furtherance of the transportation of crude oil,

uranium, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum,

petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal, or coal

products that originated in the Russian Federation;

(B) lacks adequate maritime insurance for the transport of

goods described in subparagraph (A); or

petroleum products that originated in the Russian Federation

established by—

(i) the international coalition made up of Australia,

Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States and

known as the “Price Cap Coalition”; or

(ii) the United States.

(4) Any foreign person that the President determines

knowingly—

(A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel described in

paragraph (3);

(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or

reinsurance necessary for such a vessel;

such a vessel; or

(D) transfers to the Russian Federation, or provides for

the use of by a Russian person, any vessel designed for the

transportation of crude oil, uranium, natural gas, liquefied

natural gas, petroleum, petroleum products, petrochemical

products, coal, or coal products.

(5) Any foreign vessel that the President determines

knowingly—

(A) transports crude oil, uranium, natural gas, liquefied

natural gas, petroleum, petroleum products, petrochemical

products, coal, or coal products that originated in the

Russian Federation;

(B) engages in a ship-to-ship transfer involving crude oil,

uranium, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum,

petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal, or coal

products that originated in the Russian Federation with a

vessel that is subject to sanctions imposed by the United

States; or

(A) or (B).

(6) Any foreign person that the President determines is the

owner or operator of a foreign port that allows a vessel

subject to sanctions imposed by the United States for

supporting the Russian Federation to port or otherwise

receive services.

(7) Any foreign person, including a foreign person acting

on behalf of a person described in this subsection (in this

paragraph referred to as the “sanctioned person”), if the

sanctioned person transferred property or an interest in

property to the person—

(A) after the date on which the President imposed sanctions

with respect to the sanctioned person; or

(B) before that date, if the sanctioned person did so in an

attempt to evade the imposition of sanctions.

European Union.—In determining under subsection (b)(3) if a

vessel is a foreign vessel used by the Government of the

Russian Federation or Russian persons to move crude oil,

uranium, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum,

petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal, coal

products, arms, or other goods for the purpose of

circumventing sanctions, the President may use as prima facie

evidence that the vessel is subject to sanctions imposed by

the United Kingdom, the European Union, the Group of 7, or a

member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.

(d) Maintenance of Certain Sanctions Relating to Specified

Harmful Foreign Activities.—Sanctions and other measures

provided for under any Executive Order issued to address the

national emergency that the President continued on March 24,

2026, with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of

the Government of the Russian Federation (91 Fed. Reg.

15515), as in effect on the day before the date of the

enactment of this Act, including with respect to all persons

sanctioned under any such Executive Order, shall remain in

effect.

(e) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this

subsection to be imposed with respect to a person described

in subsection (b) are the following:

(1) Blocking of property.—The President shall exercise all

of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to block any vessel

described in subsection (b), and block and prohibit all

transactions in all property and interests in property of a

person described in subsection (b), if such property and

interests in property are in the United States, come within

the United States, or are or come within the possession or

control of a United States person.

(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.—

(A) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien described in

subsection (b) shall be—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to

enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into

the United States or to receive any other benefit under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) Current visas revoked.—

(i) In general.—The visa or other entry documentation of

an alien described in subsection (b) shall be revoked,

regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is

or was issued.

(ii) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause (i)

shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry

documentation that is in the possession of the alien.

SEC. 103. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Imposition of Sanctions.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(A) impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in

subsection (d) with respect to the Central Bank of the

Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) and any subsidiary of, or

successor entity to, that Bank;

(B) impose all of the sanctions described in subsection (d)

with respect to—

(i) Sberbank;

(ii) VTB Bank;

(iii) Gazprombank;

(iv) any other financial institution organized under the

laws of the Russian Federation and owned in whole or in part

by the Government of the Russian Federation;

(v) any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, any of the

financial institutions described in clauses (i) through (iv);

and

(vi) except as provided by subsection (c), any foreign

financial institution that engages in significant

transactions with any of the financial institutions described

in clauses (i) through (v); and

respect to any leaders, officials, senior executive officers,

or members of the board of directors of, or any principal

shareholders with a controlling or majority interest in, a

financial institution described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

(2) Updates.—Not later than 210 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the

President shall—

(A) review any persons that may be described in paragraph

(1); and

(B) if sanctions have not been imposed under this

subsection with respect to any person the President

determines is described in paragraph (1), impose such

sanctions with respect to that person.

(b) Prohibition on Transactions by United States Persons.—

Effective on the date that is 30 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the President shall prohibit any

United States person from engaging in any transaction with a

financial institution described in subsection (a)(1)(B).

President is not required to impose sanctions under

subsection (a)(1)(B) with respect to a foreign financial

institution described in clause (vi) of that subsection if

the Secretary of the Treasury determines that imposing such

sanctions is not consistent with the economic or foreign

policy interests of the United States.

(d) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this

subsection to be imposed with respect to a financial

institution described in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) Blocking of property.—The President shall exercise all

of the powers granted to the President under the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701

et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all

transactions in property and interests in property of the

financial institution if such property and interests in

property are in the United States, come within the United

States, or are or come within the possession or control of a

United States person.

(2) CAATSA sanctions.—Two or more of the sanctions

described in section 235 of the Countering America's

Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9529) that are

not already imposed.

(3) Restrictions on correspondent and payable-through

accounts.—The President shall prohibit the opening, and

prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in

the United States, of a correspondent account or payable-

through account by the financial institution.

(e) Rule of Construction.—

(1) Treatment of returns on immobilized russian sovereign

assets.—

(A) In general.—A United States or foreign financial

institution holding immobilized Russian sovereign assets

under the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for

Ukrainians Act (division F of Public Law 118-50; 22 U.S.C.

9521 note) or any other provision of law is not required to

return any interest earned on those assets and due to the

Russian Federation.

(B) Exception for interest earned.—Subparagraph (A) shall

not be construed as affecting the treatment of interest

earned on the assets of persons the assets of which have been

blocked under any provision of law.

(2) Loans to ukraine using immobilized russian sovereign

assets.—Sanctions imposed under this section shall not apply

with respect to payments on—

(A) the loans provided by the United States and the Group

of 7 or the European Union to Ukraine that are serviced and

repaid with the proceeds of immobilized Russian sovereign

assets; or

(B) any loans from the United States or countries that are

members of the Group of 7 or the European Union made after

the date of the enactment of this Act using proceeds from

immobilized Russian sovereign assets.

SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER

ENTITIES OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the

President shall—

(1) review any entity—

(A) in which the Government of the Russian Federation may

have a controlling or majority ownership interest; or

(B) that may otherwise be affiliated with the Government of

the Russian Federation; and

(2) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with

respect to an entity if the President determines that—

(A) the Government of the Russian Federation has a

controlling or majority ownership interest in the entity; or

(B) the entity is otherwise affiliated with the Government

of the Russian Federation.

(b) Sanctions Described.—The President shall exercise all

of the powers granted to the President under the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701

et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all

transactions in property and interests in property of an

entity described in subsection (a) if such property and

interests in property are in the United States, come within

the United States, or are or come within the possession or

control of a United States person.

SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFERS OF FUNDS INVOLVING THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.—Except as provided by subsection (b),

effective on the date that is 30 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, a depository institution (as defined

in section 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.

461(b)(1)(A))) or a broker or dealer in securities registered

with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) may

not process transfers of funds—

(1) to or from the Government of the Russian Federation,

including any entity owned by the Government of the Russian

Federation; or

(2) for the direct or indirect benefit of officials of the

Government of the Russian Federation.

(b) Exception.—A depository institution, broker, or dealer

described in subsection (a) may process a transfer described

in that subsection if the transfer arises from, and is

ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to, an

underlying transaction that is authorized by a specific or

general license.

SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON LISTING OR TRADING OF RUSSIAN

ENTITIES ON UNITED STATES SECURITIES EXCHANGES.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange

Commission shall prohibit the securities of an issuer

described in subsection (b) from being traded on a national

securities exchange.

(b) Issuers.—An issuer described in this subsection is an

issuer that is—

(1) an official of or individual affiliated with the

Government of the Russian Federation; or

(2) an entity—

(A) in which the Government of the Russian Federation has a

controlling or majority ownership interest; or

(B) that is otherwise affiliated with the Government of the

Russian Federation.

(1) Issuer; security.—The terms “issuer” and

“security” have the meanings given those terms in section

3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.

78c(a)).

(2) National securities exchange.—The term “national

securities exchange” means an exchange registered as a

national securities exchange in accordance with section 6 of

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78f).

SEC. 107. PROHIBITION ON INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES PERSONS

IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Effective on the date that is 30 days after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the following are prohibited:

(1) New investment in the Russian Federation by a United

States person, wherever located.

(2) The exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply,

directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a

United States person, wherever located, of any category of

services identified by the Secretary of the Treasury, in

consultation with the Secretary of State, to any person

located in the Russian Federation.

(3) Any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by

a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by

a foreign person if the transaction by that foreign person

would be prohibited by this section if performed by a United

States person or within the United States.

SEC. 108. PROHIBITION ON ENERGY EXPORTS TO, AND INVESTMENT IN

ENERGY SECTOR OF, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Prohibitions on Investment and Exports.—

(1) In general.—Effective on the date that is 30 days

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the following

are prohibited:

(A) Any new investment in the energy sector of the Russian

Federation by a United States person.

(B) The export, reexport, or in-country transfer to or in

the Russian Federation of any energy or energy product

produced in the United States.

(2) Definitions.—In this subsection, the terms “export”,

“in-country transfer”, and “reexport” have the meanings

given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control

Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(b) Sanctions.—The President shall impose the sanctions

described in section 102(e) with respect to any foreign

person that the President determines knowingly sells,

supplies, transfers, markets, or otherwise provides goods,

services, technology, or other support that facilitates the

maintenance or expansion of the production of oil, uranium,

natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum, petroleum

products, petrochemical products, coal, or coal products for

use by any person subject to sanctions under section 102 or

SEC. 109. PROHIBITION ON PURCHASE OF SOVEREIGN DEBT OF THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION BY UNITED STATES PERSONS.

Upon the enactment of this Act, the purchase of sovereign

debt of the Government of the Russian Federation by any

United States person (including a United States financial

institution) is prohibited.

SEC. 110. PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF SERVICES TO SANCTIONED

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BY INTERNATIONAL

FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the

President shall—

(1) review any person that may be described in subsection

(b); and

(2) impose sanctions pursuant to the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with

respect to any person the President determines is described

in that subsection.

(b) Persons Described.—A person described in this

subsection is—

(1) any entity that—

(A) operates with the intent to predominantly engage in the

business of providing global financial messaging services;

and

(B) is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in

consultation with the Secretary of State, as knowingly being

used to circumvent any sanctions imposed under section 103 or

any other provision of this title; or

(2) a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member

of the board of directors of, or principal shareholder with a

controlling or majority interest in, any entity described in

paragraph (1).

sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to an entity

predominantly engaged in the business of providing global

financial messaging services for, directly providing such

services to, or enabling or facilitating direct or indirect

access to such services for, any financial institution

subject to sanctions under section 103 or any other provision

of this title if—

(1) the entity—

(A) is subject to a sanctions regime under its governing

foreign law that requires it to eliminate the knowing

provision of such services to, and the knowing enabling and

facilitation of direct or indirect access to such services

for, foreign financial institutions identified under such

governing foreign law for purposes of that sanctions regime

if the President determines that the sanctions regime under

governing foreign law is not inconsistent with the economic

or foreign policy interests of the United States; and

(B) has, pursuant to that sanctions regime, terminated the

knowing provision of such services to, and the knowing

enabling and facilitation of direct or indirect access to

such services for, foreign financial institutions identified

under such governing foreign law for purposes of that

sanctions regime; or

(2) the entity provides significant financial messaging

services to United States financial institutions, as

determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation

with the Secretary of State.

(d) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be

construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.

1701 et seq.).

SEC. 111. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTING, AND SANCTIONS WITH

RESPECT TO, URANIUM FROM THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION.

(a) Implementation of Prohibition on Uranium Imports From

the Russian Federation.—Upon the date of the enactment of

this Act, the President shall take all necessary steps to

implement the requirements of section 3112A(d) of the USEC

Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(d)) regarding the

importation of uranium from the Russian Federation, including

the importation of any uranium from Rosatom State Atomic

Energy Corporation or any subsidiary or successor entity.

(b) Sanctions.—Beginning on the date described in section

3112A(d)(2)(C) of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C.

2297h-10a(d)(2)(C)), and every 180 days thereafter, the

President shall impose sanctions described in section 102(e)

with respect to any leaders, officials, senior executive

officers, or members of the board of directors of, or

principal shareholders with a controlling or majority

interest in, Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation or any

subsidiary or successor entity.

SEC. 112. INCREASE IN DUTIES ON GOODS IMPORTED FROM THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the President shall,

notwithstanding any other provision of law, increase the rate

of duty for all goods, including oil, natural gas, liquefied

natural gas, petroleum, petroleum products, petrochemical

products, coal, and coal products, imported into the United

States from the Russian Federation to a rate of up to 500

percent ad valorem.

(b) Duty Rate in Addition to Other Duties, Fees, Taxes,

Exactions, or Charges.—The rate of duty required under

subsection (a) with respect to a good described in that

subsection shall be in addition to any other duty, fee, tax,

exaction, or charge applicable with respect to the good,

including any duty imposed under title VII of the Tariff Act

of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.), section 122, 201, or 301 of

the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2132, 2251, and 2411), or

section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C.

1862).

SEC. 113. DUTIES ON COUNTRIES THAT PURCHASE RUSSIAN-ORIGIN

CRUDE OIL OR NATURAL GAS OR FACILITATE

SANCTIONS EVASION.

(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the President shall,

notwithstanding any other provision of law, increase the rate

of duty for all goods imported into the United States from a

country described in subsection (c) (and only from a country

described in subsection (c)) to a rate of up to 100 percent

ad valorem.

(b) Modification to Rate of Duty.—At any time after the

initial imposition of duties under subsection (a) or (e), the

United States Trade Representative shall modify or adjust any

rate of duty imposed under subsection (a) or (e) to a rate

greater than zero and up to 100 percent ad valorem upon

submitting a written determination to the appropriate

congressional committees that a country described in

subsection (c) has taken significant steps—

(1) to increase the importation, sale, supply, transfer, or

purchase of crude oil or natural gas that originated in the

Russian Federation; or

(2) to decrease or cease engaging in the importation, sale,

supply, transfer, or purchase of such crude oil or natural

gas.

subsection is a foreign country that—

(1)(A) knowingly made new purchases of crude oil or natural

gas that originated in the Russian Federation on a date that

is on or after 30 days after the date of enactment of this

Act; and

(B) was among the 5 largest importers, by total volume, of

crude oil or natural gas that originated in the Russian

Federation during the most recent 12-month period preceding

the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(2) was among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil

sanctions evasion during the most recent 12-month period

preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) Exception.—A duty shall not be imposed under this

section with respect to goods imported from a country

described in subsection (c)(1) for the importation by that

country of natural gas that originated in the Russian

Federation if—

(1) that country's total imports of natural gas that

originated in the Russian Federation during the 12-month

period described in subsection (c)(1)(B) were less than 15

percent of the total annual exports of natural gas from the

Russian Federation during that period; and

(2) that country has taken significant steps to reduce its

imports of natural gas that originated in the Russian

Federation.

(e) Subsequent Determinations.—Not later than 180 days

after the initial imposition of duties under subsection (a),

and every 180 days thereafter, the United States Trade

Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State

and the Secretary of Energy, shall—

(1) determine, based on the most recent 12-month period

preceding the determination, the countries that are—

(A) the 5 largest importers of crude oil, by total volume,

originating in the Russian Federation; and

(B) the 5 largest importers of natural gas, by total

volume, originating in the Russian Federation; and

(2) impose duties pursuant to subsection (a) with respect

to goods imported from those countries.

(f) Duty Rate in Addition to Other Duties, Fees, Taxes,

Exactions, or Charges.—A rate of duty imposed under this

section with respect to a good imported from a country

described in subsection (c) shall be in addition to any other

duty, fee, tax, exaction, or charge applicable with respect

to the good, including any duty imposed under title VII of

the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.), section 122,

201, or 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2132, 2251,

and 2411), or section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962

(19 U.S.C. 1862).

(g) Methodology, Documentation, and Reports.—

(1) Reports required.—Not later than 10 days before

imposing a duty under subsection (a) or (e), or modifying or

adjusting the rate of such a duty under subsection (b), the

President or the United States Trade Representative shall

submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written

justification for the duty that—

(A) provides a substantive rationale for the determination

of the rate of duty imposed under subsection (a) or (e) or

the modification or adjustment made pursuant to subsection

(b), as the case may be; and

(B) details the methodology used to determine that the

country subject to the duty is a country described in

subsection (c).

(2) Determinations of imports of crude oil and natural

gas.—For the purposes of determining whether a country is an

importer of crude oil or natural gas described in subsection

(c)(1)—

(A) crude oil is the substance described in Harmonized

System code 2709; and

(B) natural gas is the substance described in Harmonized

System code 2711.

(h) Rule of Construction.—Notwithstanding section 115,

nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the

imposition of duties with respect to goods imported from any

country not expressly described in subsection (c) or the

Russian Federation.

(i) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term

“appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign

Relations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban

Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on

Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial Services of

the House of Representatives.

(2) Countries facilitating russian oil sanctions evasion.—

The term “countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions

evasion” means countries in which foreign persons are

located or are operating, or under the laws of which foreign

persons are organized, if such foreign persons are knowingly

engaging in transactions, activities, or services that

circumvent, or assist any third party to circumvent, any

sanction related to oil that originated in the Russian

Federation, including by—

(A) providing significant financial or other support for

the purchase, loading, or shipment of oil that originated in

the Russian Federation and is subject to sanctions; and

(B) engaging in any transaction, activity, or service

related to a shadow fleet vessel that transported, is

transporting, or is attempting to transport oil that

originated in the Russian Federation and is subject to

sanctions.

(3) Natural gas.—Except as provided by subsection (g)(2),

the term “natural gas” means natural gas, whether unmixed

or any mixture of natural and artificial gas, including

liquefied natural gas.

SEC. 114. EXCEPTIONS.

(a) Exception for Humanitarian Assistance.—

(1) In general.—Sanctions and other measures under this

title shall not apply to—

(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the

provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine,

medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian

purposes; or

(B) transactions that are necessary for, or related to, the

activities described in subparagraph (A).

(2) Rule of interpretation.—This subsection should be

interpreted to apply to an entity carrying out any

internationally recognized agreement with the Government of

Ukraine for the sale or provision of agricultural

commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to and from

Ukraine unless the President determines that the agreement is

being used to evade sanctions imposed by the United States,

the United Kingdom, the European Union, or the Group of 7.

(3) Definitions.—In this subsection:

(A) Agricultural commodity.—The term “agricultural

commodity” has the meaning given such term in section 102 of

the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(B) Medical device.—The term “medical device” has the

meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,

and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(b) Exception for Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Activities.—This title shall not apply with respect to

activities subject to the reporting requirements under title

V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et

seq.) or to carry out or assist any authorized intelligence

or law enforcement activities of the United States.

Sanctions under this title shall not apply to the admission

or parole of an alien into the United States if such

admission or parole is necessary to comply with United States

obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations

and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters

of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,

and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the

Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24,

1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other

international obligations.

(d) Exception To Comply With Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

Agreements.—This title shall not apply to activities carried

out under an agreement for cooperation between the United

States and the Russian Federation entered into under section

123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153).

(e) Exception for Certain Imports of Low-enriched Uranium

for Nuclear Reactors.—This title shall not apply with

respect to imports into the United States of low-enriched

uranium described in paragraph (1) of section 3112A(d) of the

USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(d)) or medical

isotopes for which a waiver has been issued under paragraph

(2) of that section.

(f) Exception for Official Government Business.—This title

shall not apply to transactions for the conduct of official

business of the United States Government (including

transactions necessary for the operation of the United States

embassy or United States consulates in the Russian

Federation) or the United Nations (including its specialized

agencies, programs, funds, and related organizations) by

employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.

(g) Exception for Non-Russian Oil That Transits Russian

Territory.—This title shall not apply to oil originating in

a country other than the Russian Federation that transits the

territory of the Russian Federation, or to any entity that

transports such oil, for export to international markets.

(h) General Licenses.—

(1) In general.—This title shall not apply with respect to

a United States person that is operating under the terms of a

general license issued by the Department of the Treasury

before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this title shall be

construed to affect the terms of a general license described

in paragraph (1), the authority of United States persons to

continue to operate under such a license, or the authority of

the Secretary of the Treasury to extend or issue new general

licenses.

(i) Exception for Winddown Operations.—During the 270-day

period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act,

sanctions under this title shall not apply with respect to—

(1) an activity related to the winddown or divestiture of

operations in the Russian Federation by an entity located in

the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled,

directly or indirectly, by a Russian person; or

(2) an entity located in the Russian Federation that is

owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a United

States person if that United States person is engaged in good

faith efforts to winddown or divest operations in the Russian

Federation, including providing ongoing operational support

to wind down or divest operations.

(j) Exception for Safety of Vessels and Crew.—Sanctions

under this title shall not apply with respect to a person

providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to

sanctions under this title if such provisions are intended—

(1) for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel;

(2) for the protection of human life aboard the vessel; or

(3) to avoid any environmental or other significant damage.

(k) Exception Relating to Activities of the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration.—

(1) In general.—This title shall not apply with respect to

activities of the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration.

(2) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this title shall be

construed to authorize the imposition of any sanction or

other condition, limitation, restriction, prohibition, or

other measure, that directly or indirectly impedes the supply

by any entity of the Russian Federation of any product or

service, or the procurement of such product or service by any

contractor or subcontractor of the United States or any other

entity, relating to or in connection with any space launch

conducted for—

(A) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or

(B) any other non-Department of Defense customer.

SEC. 115. WAIVER.

(a) In General.—The President may, subject to subsection

(b), waive the application of any sanctions provision with

respect to a foreign person, any restriction with respect to

a person, or any duty under this title.

(b) Reports Required.—

(1) In general.—Before issuing a waiver under subsection

(a), the President shall submit to Congress—

(A) a certification in writing that the issuance of the

waiver is in the national interests of the United States; and

(B) a report explaining the basis for the certification.

(2) Consolidation of reports.—If the President is issuing

more than one waiver of a section of this title, the

President may include, in one report submitted under

paragraph (1), the certifications and explanations required

by that paragraph with respect to each such waiver, as long

as all of such certifications and explanations relate to a

waiver of the same section of this title.

(3) Form of report.—Each report required by paragraph (1)

shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a

classified annex.

(4) Applicability to modifications of certain duty rates.—

The President is not required to submit a report under

paragraph (1) for a modification or adjustment of a rate of

duty pursuant to section 113(b). This paragraph does not

modify or negate the requirement to submit a written

determination required by section 113(b) or a report required

by section 113(g)(1).

SEC. 116. SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION AND PENALTIES.

(a) Implementation.—The President may exercise all

authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702

and 1704) to carry out sections 102 through 111.

(b) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in subsections

(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to any

person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to

violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition under any

of sections 102 through 111, or an order or regulation

prescribed under any of such sections, to the same extent

that such penalties apply to a person that commits an

unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

SEC. 117. TERMINATION.

(a) In General.—Subject to subsection (b), the President

may terminate the application of any sanction with respect to

a foreign person, any restriction with respect to a person,

or any duty under this title, if the President submits to

Congress a report—

(1) certifying in writing that—

(A) in the case of the termination of the application of a

sanction, restriction, or duty with respect to a Russian

person or the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation

has—

(i) signed a peace agreement that is accepted by the free

and independent Government of Ukraine; and

(ii) ceased all military hostilities against and any

activities to overthrow, dismantle, and subvert the

Government of Ukraine; or

(B) in the case of the termination of the application of a

sanction, restriction, or duty with respect to any foreign

person or foreign country (other than a Russian person or the

Russian Federation)—

(i) the foreign person or the government of the foreign

country, as the case may be, is not engaging in the activity

that was the basis for the sanctions or other measures being

terminated; and

(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that

the foreign person or the government of the foreign country,

as the case may be, will not knowingly engage in activity

subject to sanctions or other measures under this title in

the future; and

(2) that includes, in the case of a report not relating to

the termination of a duty under section 112 or 113, a

determination of whether the termination is intended to

significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard

to the Russian Federation.

(b) Period for Review by Congress.—

(1) In general.—During the period of 30 calendar days

beginning on the date on which the President submits a report

under subsection (a) with respect to the termination of the

application of a sanction, restriction, or duty under this

title, the termination shall not take effect. If, after the

end of that period, a joint resolution of disapproval with

respect to the termination has not been enacted into law

under subsection (c), the termination may take effect.

(2) Consideration by congress.—During the period described

in paragraph (1), the appropriate committee of the Senate and

the appropriate committee of the House of Representatives

should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and

otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the

report.

(3) Exception.—The period for congressional review under

paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under

subsection (a) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is

submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in

any calendar year.

(1) Joint resolution of disapproval defined.—In this

subsection, the term “joint resolution of disapproval”

means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress the

sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as

follows: “That Congress disapproves of the termination of

the application of section __ of the Lindsey O. Graham

Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, with respect to

which the President submitted a report on .”, with the

first blank space being filled with the appropriate section

number and the second blank space being filled with the

appropriate date.

(2) Introduction.—During the period of 30 calendar days

provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any

additional period as applicable under the exception provided

in subsection (b)(3), a joint resolution of disapproval may

be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader

or the minority leader; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or a designee of

the majority leader) or the minority leader (or a designee of

the minority leader).

(3) Consideration in house of representatives.—

(A) Reporting and discharge.—Any committee of the House of

Representatives to which a joint resolution of disapproval is

referred shall report it to the House of Representatives

without amendment not later than 10 calendar days after the

date of referral. If a committee fails to report the joint

resolution within that period, the committee shall be

discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution

and the joint resolution shall be referred to the appropriate

calendar.

(B) Proceeding to consideration.—After each committee

authorized to consider a joint resolution of disapproval

reports it to the House of Representatives or has been

discharged from its consideration, it shall be in order to

move to proceed to consider the joint resolution of

disapproval in the House of Representatives. All points of

order against the motion are waived. The previous question

shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption

without intervening motion. The motion shall not be

debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the

motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

shall be considered as read. All points of order against the

joint resolution of disapproval and against its consideration

are waived. The previous question shall be considered as

ordered on the joint resolution of disapproval to its passage

without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally

divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent. A

motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint

resolution of disapproval shall not be in order.

(4) Consideration in the senate.—

(A) Committee referral.—A joint resolution of disapproval

introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the appropriate

committee of the Senate.

(B) Reporting and discharge.—If the appropriate committee

of the Senate has not reported the joint resolution within 10

calendar days after the date of referral of the joint

resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further

consideration of the joint resolution and the joint

resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any

time after the appropriate committee of the Senate reports a

joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been

discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution to

move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution,

and all points of order against the joint resolution (and

against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived.

The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not

subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the

vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall

not be in order. Approval by the Senate of a motion to

proceed to a joint resolution of disapproval shall require

the affirmative vote of three-fifths of Members of the

Senate, duly chosen and sworn.

(D) Consideration.—Consideration in the Senate of a joint

resolution of disapproval and of all debatable motions and

appeals in connection therewith shall not exceed a total of

10 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority

and minority leaders or their designees. Any debatable motion

or appeal is debatable for not to exceed 1 hour, to be

divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the

motion or appeal.

(E) No amendments or motions.—An amendment to a joint

resolution of disapproval, a motion to postpone, a motion to

proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion

to recommit the joint resolution is not in order.

(F) Vote on joint resolution.—If the Senate has voted to

proceed to a joint resolution of disapproval, the vote on

approval of the joint resolution shall occur immediately

following the conclusion of consideration of the joint

resolution, and a single quorum call if requested. Approval

by the Senate of a joint resolution of disapproval shall

require the affirmative vote of three-fifths of Members of

the Senate, duly chosen and sworn.

(G) Consideration of veto messages.—Consideration in the

Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution

of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals

in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to

10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by,

the majority leader and the minority leader or their

designees.

(5) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.—

(A) If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint

resolution of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical

joint resolution from the House of Representatives, the

following procedures shall apply:

(i) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a

committee.

(ii) With respect to that joint resolution—

(I) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no

joint resolution had been received from the House of

Representatives; but

(II) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution

from the House of Representatives.

(B) If the Senate passes a joint resolution of disapproval

before receiving a joint resolution of disapproval from the

House of Representatives, the joint resolution passed by the

Senate shall be held at the desk pending receipt of the joint

resolution from the House of Representatives. Upon receipt of

a joint resolution from the House of Representatives that is

identical to the joint resolution passed by the Senate, the

Senate shall proceed to its immediate consideration and the

joint resolution shall be considered read a third time and

passed and the motion to reconsider be considered made and

laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate.

the House, and no companion joint resolution has been

introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this

subsection shall apply to the House joint resolution.

(6) Rules of house of representatives and senate.—This

subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate

and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such

is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively,

and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is

inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of

either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the

procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and

to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that

House.

(7) Definitions.—In this subsection:

(A) Appropriate committee of the house of

representatives.—The term “appropriate committee of the

House of Representatives” means—

(i) with respect to the termination of a duty under section

112 or 113, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of

Representatives;

(ii) with respect to the termination of any sanction or

restriction under any of sections 102 through 111 that is

intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy

with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee on

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; or

(iii) with respect to the termination of any sanction or

restriction under any of sections 102 through 111 that is not

intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy

with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee on

Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(B) Appropriate committee of the senate.—The term

“appropriate committee of the Senate” means—

(i) with respect to the termination of a duty under section

112 or 113, the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(ii) with respect to the termination of any sanction or

restriction under any of sections 102 through 111 that is

intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy

with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee on

Foreign Relations of the Senate; or

(iii) with respect to the termination of any sanction or

restriction under any of sections 102 through 111 that is not

intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy

with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

TITLE II—OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 201. EXTENSION OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

Section 13(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law

104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking “2026”

and inserting “2031”.

SEC. 202. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this division, or the application of

any such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to

be unconstitutional, the remainder of the provisions of this

division, and the application of those provisions to any

other person or circumstance, shall not be affected.

SEC. 203. SUNSET.

This division (other than section 201) shall terminate on

the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of

this Act.

DIVISION B—SUPPORTING EARLY-CHILDHOOD EDUCATORS' DEDUCTIONS

Amend the title so as to read: “An Act to impose

sanctions and other measures with respect to the Russian

Federation, as championed by the late Senator Lindsey O.

Graham, and for other purposes.”.

Motion to Concur

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to concur in the Senate amendments to H.R. 5334 at the desk.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the motion.

The text of the motion is as follows:

Mr. McCaul of Texas moves that the House concur in the

Senate amendments.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution Number 1530, the motion shall be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or their respective designees.

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

General Leave

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this is a critical time in history, a time my friend Lindsey Graham described as a magic moment, a moment that we cannot afford to waste.

America's adversaries--Russia, China, and North Korea--are working

together to threaten the free world. Make no mistake, they are watching what we do here today because they know that they will suffer if this bill is passed.

Senator Lindsey Graham understood these global threats well, and that

is why we spent more than a year working together on this bill. He brought Republicans and Democrats together and secured the White House's support.

Today, we have a chance to finish his work, to help end this war in

Europe, and to project peace through strength around the globe.

I am proud to champion the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, and I thank Mr. Hoyer and our colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their strong support.

For me, this is also personal. Lindsey Graham was my friend and my mentor. We shared a fundamental belief: that America is strongest at home when it projects strength abroad.

This legislation does exactly that. It targets the money that fuels Russia's war machine. It sanctions Russian officials and oligarchs, banks, and financial institutions, and the shadow fleet that helps keep Russian energy moving.

Through precisely targeted tariffs, it also punishes countries

providing financial support for the deadliest war in Europe since World War II. Why? Because, as we have heard from President Zelenskyy's team, you can evade sanctions, which the Russians have done for years, but you cannot evade tariffs.

In fact, President Zelenskyy's sanction expert, whom I personally met

with in Kyiv, told me: Tariffs are a powerful way to amplify the impact
of sanctions. That is why they are the teeth of this bill.

Pursuant to the bill's rule of construction, only the top five

importers of Russian oil will be tariffed. If a country falls off of the top-five list, the tariffs are removed. It incentivizes a race to the bottom.

These countries have a choice to make about whether they will

continue to sustain Putin's aggression. Putin believes he can keep financing this war indefinitely. We need to change that calculation and bleed his regime economically dry, because the Kremlin has murdered thousands of civilians in cold blood. They've bombed sacred churches and schools. They have kidnapped countless children, tortured and indoctrinated them, and sent them to fight on the front lines against their own country.

We have a moral responsibility here today, Mr. Speaker, to bring an end to this suffering, but this is also a matter of national security. If Putin is rewarded for invading a sovereign nation, if he succeeds, he has already told us he will go further. His army will move into Moldova, to Georgia, and the Baltic states.

Just like Putin wants to bring back the power of the Soviet Union,

also President Xi of China wants to restore Imperial China. These dictators must be deterred before it is too late.

This legislation also extends sanctions on Iran, which are set to

expire at the end of this year.

Again, this is all tied together, and in 2024, I spoke about the

Iranian drones being used by Russia to kill Ukrainians. In return, Russia is reportedly providing target information to the IRGC.

We cannot look at one part of this threat and ignore the others. This bill leverages our economic strength to make it harder for these regimes to finance aggression.

Lindsey Graham once said that this bill would be his greatest

achievement. I can think of no better way, Mr. Speaker, to honor his life and his legacy than by passing these tough sanctions, which will force Mr. Putin to the negotiating table.

Evil is on the march. History is calling, and now is the time to act.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise regrettably to oppose the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act. Why? It is a magic moment. It is a moment that we need to take right now. It is a moment that we need to move forward with.

Here is why I have to oppose it. Number one, this bill wasn't written by Lindsey Graham. It was written by Donald Trump and Donald Trump's attorneys. We know his attorneys did it because he doesn't know how to write himself, but they wrote this bill.

{time} 0920

I say to my Ukrainian friends and to the Ukrainian people: We need to do more.

Just last night, we saw Russia again attack the electric grid of

Ukraine. These sanctions that are proposed now, the President of the United States, if this were urgent, could do them right now.

When you look at the facts and the evidence, what has the President

done in all of this time to help Ukraine? He has not done one thing from the very beginning, when he told Volodymyr Zelenskyy that he has no cards, to the time that we gave the red carpet to Putin when he came to the United States.

The fact of the matter is, if we just look at recent history, just 2

weeks ago, what did the President do? He took the Finance Minister of Russia to the G20 finance meeting, without any notice to the rest of the Finance Ministers.

He has removed sanctions on Russia. Just last week, he removed some sanctions off of Russia.

I am saying to my Ukrainian friends: I don't want to give you false
hope. I want to give you real hope.

Just yesterday, in the Rules Committee, because I wanted to work

something out so that we can make sure that we get something done, I asked for some simple things that would give relief to Ukrainians right now. Do you know what would help them right now? Having Patriot missiles to defend themselves from these attacks would help. I put an amendment in. Let's give them $15 billion so that they can purchase and get something that would help themselves and protect their grid.

In fact, this House has passed a bill that would have given the

Ukrainians money to fix their grid, money to buy more munitions, and tougher sanctions in this bill. We sent it over to the Senate. Unfortunately, the Senate did nothing but go through Mr. Trump and say: You write the bill, and then we will get it passed in the Senate.

We said let's make sure that our friends in the European Union will

not be subject to tariffs. In this bill, my friends from Europe can be tariffed. Even though we have done nothing, no supplemental to Ukraine, they have stood up and made sure that Ukraine had what it needed to continue this war that has been thrust upon them by the Russians. Let's make sure that our allies and friends cannot be tariffed. I said let's put that in the bill. No, that can't happen. I said, okay, let's have stronger waivers. Let's make sure this President, who has done nothing for Ukraine—there are stronger waivers.

We are supposed to be a separate but equal branch of government, not

just concede to the executive branch, no

matter who is in the White House. Let's make stronger waivers if we really care about the Ukrainian people, so that no President can waive the sanctions that we are putting on Russia. No, can't do that. No secondary tariff.

Now, this is to the American people, because we know what is

happening with this economy. The President has said himself, proudly, that he is the tariff man. That is what he calls himself.

We see what is happening to the economy in the United States of

America. We see what is happening with our friend and ally to the north of us, Canada. This President has always said he loves tariffs, and we know the history of what he has done with reference to tariffs to our European allies and our allies everywhere.

So, no, I have to come in opposition today to this bill. It does not give the Ukrainians what they need at this moment. They need to have the munitions to protect themselves and continue to do what they are doing to preserve their own country and democracy.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, it is no secret the ranking member and I are good friends. We will disagree with civility.

The President did sanction the VTB Bank, one of the largest banks in

Russia, just yesterday.

With respect to broad, sweeping tariff authority, that is absolutely

a false argument. The fact is, the rule construction in the bill says: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the imposition of duties . . . from any country not expressly described.”

Ambassador Greer, the U.S. Trade Representative, sent a letter to Senator Warnock that got his approval in the Senate—an 86-11 vote, by the way. It basically said that, absent legal basis, such duties cannot be maintained. In other words, you cannot go beyond the prescribed language in the statute—the top five importers of Russian energy. This does not provide broad, sweeping tariff authority. That is a fiction.

With respect to support, President Zelenskyy supports this bill. I was at the Ukrainian Embassy last night with the Ukrainian Acting Foreign Minister and the President of the European Commission, so to say that Europe doesn't support this is absolutely false. The EU Ambassador to the United Nations and President Biden's former Ambassador to Ukraine support this, as well as all NATO countries. I would address that, if I could, head-on.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the letter from Ambassador Greer to Senator Warnock.

The Unied States Trade Representative,

Executive Office of the President,

Washington, August 6, 2026.

Hon. Raphael Warnock,

U.S. Senate,

Washington DC.

Dear Senator Warnock: Regarding our conversation on Sec.

113, the legal basis to maintain, modify, or adjust the rate

of duty specified in subsection (a) exists only where a

country meets the description in subsection (c), including

countries identified in subsequent determinations made

pursuant to subsection (e). Absent this legal basis, such

duties cannot be maintained.

Sincerely,

Ambassador Jamieson L. Greer,

United States Trade Representative.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).

Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this critical legislation. I congratulate Representative McCaul for his strong advocacy for Ukraine and for bringing this piece of legislation to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, 9,374, that is the number of Ukrainian civilians killed or wounded in the first 6 months of this year by Russia's relentless barrage of missiles and drones—9,374.

Mr. Speaker, 68,147, that is the number of Ukrainian civilians killed or injured since Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale war of aggression in 2022.

For over 4 years, Russia's war has taken a devastating amount of

human lives, destroyed cities and communities, displaced families, and destabilized economies far from Russia's borders. The consequences have been felt around the world, from disruptions to critical supply chains to Russian sabotage of operations in Europe that have increasingly threatened NATO security and global stability.

Mr. Speaker, after more than 1.4 million Russian casualties, one fact is clear: Putin has chosen to continue this war regardless of the cost in Russian lives. Russia can only continue fighting because of those who choose to fund Putin's war machine by buying cheap Russian energy. The economic lifelines that keep the Kremlin's war machine running must be restricted.

This legislation gives us the opportunity to strike at those networks

and impose real consequences on Russia and those who continue financing Putin's war. Now is the time for action.

As an original cosponsor of this House legislation, I urge my

colleagues to support this bill.

{time} 0930

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I just want to let my good friend, Mr. McCaul, know that, yes, I know that the President did sanction a bank that had already been sanctioned previously, so it was just something for show because this bank had already been sanctioned before yesterday.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), the ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Speaker, there is very little that the chairman said that I disagree with. However, amnesia apparently has overtaken this debate.

Do we remember the humiliation that President Trump and the Vice

President offered to President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office? Is there a moment of clarity here as to whose side we are really on? Every Democrat in this House is supportive of President Zelenskyy and Ukraine.

In memory of Ronald Reagan, can Republicans say today that they are

in support of Ukraine, given the position that President Trump has taken with ambiguity as it relates to Ukraine and their heroism?

Remember 5 years ago, President Trump said: I will end that war on the first day that I am President? Well, he couldn't find it in terms of national purpose to even come to their aid with military equipment.

What happened to a Republican Party that was steadfast about Russian

aggression? What happened to this notion that, since Truman, we were all on the same side in this institution as it related to Russian aggression?

Standing up to Russia united this institution, united both parties

until President Trump said that he could solve the war between Ukraine and Russia and more than once encouraged Vladimir Putin and that aggression that I have just outlined.

We are for Ukraine, and we are for Zelenskyy. What we are not for is giving more tariff authority to this President. There is no guarantee in this legislation that the President could not use these tariffs against Ukraine if he decided to do so. There is no guarantee in this legislation that the President can impose these tariffs on Russia with the enthusiasm that our friends on the other side have offered.

What is stunning about this, this morning, the European Union is

offering admittance to Canada to join the European Union.

We don't like the result of a Presidential election in Brazil? We will impose tariffs. We don't like the way somebody across the globe speaks to us? We will impose tariffs.

When Ronald Reagan left the Presidency, the average tariff was 2.7 percent, and these tariffs are driving costs up for everybody in America today. Just go through a supermarket aisle to see what these tariffs have done.

The use of a tariff here at one time was selective and threatening. You used it to make a point. Now it is embedded in American foreign policy based upon our likes and our dislikes.

We are for Ukraine. We are against giving this President more tariff authority.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I know the gentleman does not like the President of the United States, but this is about Congress exercising its Article I authorities pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent ruling that we have the authority to issue tariffs, which are issued in a very targeted manner against Russian energy being imported by the top five countries.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mast),

the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Emeritus McCaul for yielding. I am proud to see him up here managing this bill, proud to see him back at the podium. I thank him for his work on Russian sanctions not just for now, but for a long time. It has been incredible work.

I did walk in just in time to hear the ranking member talk about that

this bill doesn't give Ukraine what it needs right now, and that is why they can't vote on it. That couldn't be further from the truth. I will just quote President Zelenskyy right here: “Very grateful to the U.S. Senate”—the U.S. House—“and to everyone who supports Ukraine. . . . [It] helps increase pressure on the aggressor to bring this insane Russian war against our independence and our people to an end.” He said he “appreciates all the support the United States is providing to Ukraine.” That is just to quote President Zelenskyy.

Apparently, the ranking member doesn't know any more about what

Ukraine needs than what the United States of America needs in this respect.

However, the late Senator Graham, I want to talk about his bill right

now. He was a stalwart defender of freedom and liberty, and this bill is a very fitting tribute to Senator Graham.

China is very important in this piece of legislation. China is not a bystander in the Russian war against Ukraine. It is helping sustain the machinery that keeps this Russian war of aggression going. China supplies Russia with drone engines, military and commercial drones, missile components, semiconductors, machine tools, ball bearings, explosive precursors, and every other critical industrial good that Russia needs in order to prosecute this war and fight the Ukrainians.

Chinese companies have also provided Russia with satellite imagery,

supporting their military operations. At the same time, China has become a critical customer for Russian energy. Last year alone, China purchased nearly $64 billion in Russian oil and gas. That revenue is the revenue that gives the Kremlin the resources it needs to go out there and fight the war. This matters beyond Ukraine.

China is also Iran's largest customer of oil, providing Tehran with a

major source of revenue despite U.S. sanctions. Reauthorizing Iran sanctions would preserve the ability of the United States to pressure companies and financial networks that are sustaining Iran's oil exports.

The message should be clear: America will not allow our adversaries to build stronger military partnerships by exploiting our markets or exploiting the United States' financial system. If China wants access to the Western economy, it should not simultaneously help finance and equip governments that threaten that international security.

I do urge swift passage of this bill. In that, I would just say one other thing about the previous administration. Zelenskyy was very clear about the previous administration as well when he said to them: Listen, the fight is here. He meant the fight is in Ukraine. The fight is here, it is in Ukraine.

They need ammunition. They don't need a ride. Democrats were trying to get Zelenskyy to run away from the fight, like they are constantly running away from fights that need to be had. Zelenskyy was standing strong, saying the fight is there, he is not going to run away.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I remind the chairman that it was the Republicans that decided that we would not have a supplemental that would keep the Ukrainians armed with what they need.

It was them that decided that we could not put the money in the

budget to continue funding them because they said they would not do it. I was in those meetings at that particular time in the White House arguing to get more money for Ukraine.

Let me just say one other thing. The President will be meeting with Mr. Xi next week. Let's see if he talks about sanctioning China for it buying oil from Russia next week. The President has had the power to put sanctions on China right now. We don't need this bill to do it. The President of the United States could put sanctions on China right now. Let's see what he does next week.

I now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett), a member of the Ukrainian Caucus.

{time} 0940

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, the day after Putin's tanks rolled into Ukraine, I filed the very first sanctions legislation against Russia, some of which became law. Most every day since then, I have proudly worn this pin to symbolize the need for Americans and all people around the world concerned with freedom to stand with Ukrainian patriots and fight Russian war criminals.

As Putin has terrorized Ukrainian civilians from kindergarten to

nursing homes, no American—no American—has done more to help him than Donald J. Trump. At his insistence, American assistance has been reduced by 99 percent. He withheld hundreds of millions of dollars appropriated by this Congress. He has continually humiliated Zelenskyy. Most recently, he has insisted that the price of diesel isn't caused by the Trump reckless war with Iran, but by Zelenskyy.

As Ukrainian families are now preparing for another cold, deadly

winter, what are the Trumps doing?

Donald Trump, Jr., is down on a Bahamian island in a celebration financed by Putin's favorite oligarch whom he has just decorated.

For months this year, Trump suspended any and all sanctions on

Russian oil, and now this bill proposes to give him even more power, though he won't use all the power he already has. In fact, for some reason, only Putin, probably the only person in the world whom Trump has not found some reason to criticize, has escaped sanctions. This bill is not about Ukraine, it is about giving Trump the power that the Supreme Court said he used unlawfully.

This is the same tariff authority which this very month Trump said he

would use against 99 other countries, not because of their conduct, but if his appointee to the Federal Reserve Board did not lower interest rates instead of doing something about Trumpflation that all of us are beginning to feel.

This bill is a tariff notice with Russia written right there on the

memo line, billed to our allies, but it is American families who will be paying for this bill with their groceries, their auto parts, their lumber, and much more.

When it comes to Putin, for some weird reason, Trump's pen always

runs dry, but when it comes to tariffs, his favorite word in the dictionary, it never stops. Republicans blocked every single Democratic amendment to make this a genuine Ukrainian bill instead of a bill that helped Trump. They wouldn't tighten the waiver. They wouldn't protect our allies, and they would not strip out the unrelated tariff provisions.

I understand that many Ukrainians have been intimidated and

threatened to support this bill or lose the little help the United States is currently providing, but Ukraine does not need a symbolic vote. They need the air defense interceptors Trump won't provide. They need the real economic help that he has delayed. They need the respect and earnest support that will allow them to prevail.

Let's stand with Ukraine, stand up to Putin, and don't hand Trump a

trade war weapon.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Goldman of Texas). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 15 seconds to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. DOGGETT. Let's stand with Ukraine. Let's stand up to Putin, and let's not hand Trump another trade war weapon that is dressed up in the beautiful blue and gold Ukrainian colors.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to respond to my friend from Texas.

The economist, Simon Johnson, the 2024 winner of the Nobel Memorial

Prize in Economic Sciences, said: This bill will help reduce global instability, lower energy prices, and make life more affordable. It will end Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It is entirely within the power of the United States Government to make this happen.

With respect to my good friend, Mr. Meeks, China is number one in the

bull's eye targeted in this bill by terrorists which operate as

secondary sanctions.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr.
Hill), who is the chairman of the Financial Services Committee.

Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. McCaul, and I thank Chairman Mast for their work.

Mr. Speaker, for the past decade, and certainly since February 2022, I have consistently advocated for arming the Ukrainians and placing effective sanctions on Russia.

My record of supporting Ukraine is strong.

Unfortunately, today we are, once again, in my view, presented with a

bill that certainly could be better designed, and those points have been made. For example, the sanctions provisions in this bill lack full strategic discipline.

The secondary bank sanctions in this bill only target foreign

national institutions doing business with sanctioned Russian banks, which can be irrelevant when Russia is clearing energy transactions offshore.

Markets have shown little reaction to the bill in terms of the Urals

crude price to the Brent price. I share concerns that the tariffs in the bill could backfire. They could harm our trading partners while sparing the main importers of Russian oil like China.

The risk of the bill is that an important economy like China could be

spared, but tariffs could be used aggressively on smaller U.S. allies.

In my view, on these financial points, Congressman Nunn's PEACE Act,

which the Financial Services Committee passed virtually unanimously on a bipartisan basis, would be a better design.

The bill would cut off Russian energy revenues and channel billions

of Russian money to help Ukrainians.

Despite these design shortcomings I have outlined, I urge a “yes” vote today.

I also urge this House floor to bring the PEACE Act up on suspension,

and let's really stick it to the Russians. We want to deliver today a loud, resounding message to the Kremlin: End this war. Get out of Ukraine. Focus on rebuilding your shattered international reputation and your destroyed economy.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the bill, and I thank Mr. McCaul for his persistent leadership.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Amo), who is the vice ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. AMO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, Russia invaded Ukraine. Vladimir Putin is waging an illegal war against a democratic nation. Russia should be sanctioned, and Ukraine should be supported, but this bill is not the way to do it.

President Trump already can sanction Russia and the companies,

individuals, and vessels funding Putin's war machine. He has chosen not to use that authority, so that means he has had ample opportunity to support Ukraine, but he chooses not to.

In fact, the sanctions in this bill before us can still be waived by

the President whenever he wants.

What this bill does is give Trump sweeping new power to impose

tariffs. That means it is: power to hike prices on Americans with more erratic tariffs; power to hurt economic growth with more erratic tariffs; and power to further destroy our alliances with more erratic tariffs.

Trump already thinks he has power to impose tariffs on anyone and

everything. On so-called liberation day, he hiked illegal tariffs worldwide, including on a remote island of penguins.

Where is the one place he didn't tariff?

It is Russia.

That irony is not lost on me and the Rhode Islanders know who pays

for Trump's tariffs: We do.

The last thing Rhode Islanders need is another Trump tariff driving

up the cost of groceries, energy, and everyday goods. We can stand with Ukraine without giving President Trump another weapon to raise prices on American families. We don't need to cede more power to ruin alliances, raise prices, and make deals that make his family richer and richer.

We already passed the Ukraine Support Act, a thoughtful bill that

both supported Ukraine and sanctioned Russia. That is the kind of legislation we need to punish Putin, stand with Ukraine, and protect families.

Mr. Speaker, I urge a “no” vote.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. Wagner).

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, and I thank our chairman, Michael McCaul, for his tireless efforts on this legislation and his support and friendship over these many years.

The largest land war in Europe since World War II must come to an

end, Mr. Speaker. Vladimir Putin's hopeless plot to rebuild the Soviet Union must come to an end, and the silent support of the murderous Russian and Iranian regimes must come to a definitive end.

This bill will hold nations accountable for facilitating Russian

sanctions evasion and extend crippling sanctions on China and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

There is no better way to honor the late Senator Lindsey Graham, and

I urge all my colleagues to support this bill.

{time} 0950

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), my friend.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my friend, who cosponsored the Ukraine Support Act with me. I am sorry that the Senate won't pass that bill, and I am sorry the President won't sign that bill. The President will sign this bill. This is something we can do. I rise in very strong support of the passage of this legislation.

I am, very frankly, in disagreement with the people who have spoken

about giving Trump this unfettered power. Trump believes he has unfettered power right now without this bill or any action by the House of Representatives. That is an irrelevant argument.

Three-quarters of the Democrats and 87 Members of the Senate--it was

86 votes but McConnell is back—believe that it simply limits to those who are aiding Russia's war effort to additional tariffs under this bill.

I disagree with my dear friend that it opens up any country. France just endorsed this bill within the last 24 hours. They would be one of those countries subject to adverse action.

We must pass this bill because if we do not pass this bill—

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Mr. HOYER. The fact of the matter is that my friend mentioned a Chamberlain moment or a Churchill moment. Let me suggest to you that if we believe the enemy in this case is Trump, it will be a Chamberlain moment. If we vote for this bill, it will be a Churchill moment because we will tell the President he needs to do something that he doesn't want to do. He may not do it, and we can't force him to do it—I would like to force him to do it—but we can say to him to do it because the Congress wants to do it.

We have been unanimous on this side, and the Republicans have had the

majority of votes on your side almost every time we voted to support Ukraine.

If we fail to pass this bill, there will be cheers in the Kremlin and

tears in Kyiv. This is a moment when we stand up and say where we are. We can't control where the President is. I disagree with the President, but I agree strongly that it is time for the Members of this House to stand up and say to Russia: You will not continue with this without our adverse action.

Mr. Speaker, this is an anti-Russia/pro-Ukraine bill. Let us pass it.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Kiggans).

Mrs. KIGGANS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026.

For far too long, Vladimir Putin has waged unprovoked war against the

Ukrainian people, a war that has cost countless lives and threatened our allies across Europe.

This bipartisan legislation ensures the United States has the tools

it needs

to bring Russia to the table and secure a just and lasting peace.

Oil and gas exports are the lifeblood of the Russian war machine. A significant share of the revenue funding Putin's invasion comes directly from the sale of Russian energy on the global market.

This bill cuts off that funding at the source, mandating sanctions on

Russian officials, oligarchs, and the state-owned banks financing the war. It cracks down on Russia's shadow fleet of tankers and shell companies used to evade existing sanctions.

This bill also imposes economic pressure for the largest purchasers

of Russian oil and gas, like China and India, which continue tacitly funding Putin's aggression. It does so while protecting our allies that are already working to reduce that dependence.

Winter is approaching, and Ukraine is bracing for what is expected to

be one of the most severe seasons of Russian missile and drone strikes yet. Every dollar we deny the Kremlin today is a missile or drone Russia cannot resupply this winter.

Mr. Speaker, as a Navy veteran who deployed to the Persian Gulf, I thank Senator Lindsey Graham for his leadership on this issue. I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will just to say to my friend from Maryland, if this is just a message bill to the President, then why don't we send him a message? Why don't we show the Ukrainians that we want to give them $12 billion to $15 billion so they can have what they need? Why don't we say to the President that we want to make sure that he cannot waive China or India? That would be a message from the United States Congress on behalf of the people.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Beyer).

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this well-intentioned but terribly flawed bill.

All of us on our side strongly support Ukraine, but this would do

more harm than good for America and Ukraine.

It has three main points: sanctions, tariffs, and symbolism.

The new sanctions on Russia in this bill would be strong and sweeping

if they were enforced, but the bill gives Trump the power to simply ignore them. That is what he is very likely to do.

His criticism of Ukraine and his friendliness to Russia have both

been rising recently. He is even calling for more Russian energy exports, the very thing this bill is purported to block.

The bill's tariffs are a huge problem. President Trump has abused every Presidential tariff authority—every single one—that Congress has given, often to target our allies.

The bill has a loophole that would allow him to define basically any

country as a facilitator of evading Russian sanctions. He could then hit them with tariffs of up to 100 percent with no guardrails or oversight and no expiration. It is a much stronger tariff power than those he has already abused, and it will be much harder to challenge in court.

Giving him this power, when he has shown us over and over again what

he will do with it, would be an incredible mistake.

Finally, we are told this bill would be a symbolic win for Ukraine

and a show of American support. If this bill passes, I predict Ukraine supporters will regret it. They will be able to say they stood with Ukraine in the immediate aftermath, but when Donald Trump hits our allies with new tariffs and waives sanctions on Russia, the propaganda victory for Putin will be lasting and the damage will be embedded in U.S. law.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian cause will be tied to Trump's widely hated

tariffs, deeply unpopular in America already. Further stressing the American pocketbook is not good for Ukraine's long term.

We can do better. The House has passed a better bill. With negotiation and compromise, we can pass a stronger bill that truly supports Ukraine and tightens the economic screws on Russia without harming Americans.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this misguided bill so we can pass a better one.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bacon), one of the top, if not the top, supporters of Ukraine in the United States House of Representatives and my dear friend.

Mr. BACON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the leadership here from Mr. McCaul, and I appreciate Mr. Hoyer's strong words. I stand 100 percent with him today.

This is a chance for the United States House to stand on the right

side, to support Ukraine in this invasion by Russia, and to make it clear that we oppose the Russian invasion and that we oppose the Russian dictator.

We are going to put tough tariffs, using our Article I authorities,

to say we want tariffs on Russia, the invader. That is our authority.
That is what we are doing.

I have opposed other tariffs. We should be wanting to tariff Russia and those who are buying Russian fuel, propping up their economy.

This is our chance to be on the right side.

President Zelenskyy is asking us to pass this bill. I was there this weekend. They were imploring us to please pass this bill. Our NATO allies are asking us to pass this bill. Our Democratic colleagues in the Senate—at that time, a 3-1 ratio—are asking us to pass this bill.

What the other side is saying is that this bill isn't perfect, so

don't pass it. Do not let perfection be the enemy of good.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would just say to the gentleman that the bill we passed in the House did put sanctions on Russia. We passed a bill that put sanctions on Russia.

What this bill really does--I mean, it puts tariffs on Russia and

sanctions on Russia. What this bill does is put tariffs on our allies and our friends.

Let's make sure in an amendment in the Rules Committee that we

clarify that the EU could not be tariffed. Unfortunately, my Republican colleagues said no to that. Let's just clarify and say who it is. Why leave it open when we know, in fact, what this President has done and said throughout?

Look at the facts. If this is a message bill, then let's send a message to the Ukrainians that we are for them.

What do they need going into this winter? They need resources to fix the electric grid. They need resources for Patriot missiles. They need resources to make sure that they can fight and have what they need coming back.

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Does this tell them that we are ready to stand with them as our

European allies who have put their money where their mouths are? Are we saying, as this Congress, that we are ready to put money up to our Ukrainian friends against the Russians? No, we are not. Do we have the opportunity to do that and make that statement? Yes, we do.

That opportunity was in the Rules Committee, an amendment that we put

in, an opportunity to tell them. What are we saying to our Ukrainian friends and allies who have bravely stood up for their own democracy? What are we telling them? Oh, we will put up something. It will have waivers in it so that anybody the President wants to sanction he can waive it.

What message are we sending? Oh, we are not giving you any resources.

What message are we sending really to our friends in Ukraine?

I know we say we want to make sure Ukraine has what it needs. At least I hope that is what we are saying. This bill does not say that. This bill does not say that.

Yes, I have been talking to my Ukrainian friends, and I will have a

conversation with President Zelenskyy myself next week. We are going to have a meeting at UNGA. I thought that maybe what we should be doing right now, instead of rushing this along, is talking to our friends—we could have waited until after the election—so that we can make sure that we are doing something meaningful.

This is going to be a terrible winter for our friends in Ukraine,

terrible winter. Are we doing anything to make sure that it is not? No, we are not. What they need right now, to get through this winter, is resources.

What have our European allies done in our absence of giving them

resources?

We could have passed a supplemental. I am ready to do that now. If we want

to make sure that our Ukrainian allies, who have fought for 5 years to

protect themselves—what they said to me when I visited Ukraine after I took the last codel to Ukraine before the invasion by Russia, what did they say to me. They didn't say to just give them something that is abstract. They said: If you give us the weapons and the artillery that we need, we will fight.

The one thing that we have stopped doing in the United States of

America is giving them the resources that they need so that they can fight, not just some kind of message.

We, in this Congress, should put a bill on the President's desk, both

the House and the Senate—let the President sign it or reject it—that we want to give the Ukrainians the resources that they need: to help them with humanitarian aid, because humanitarian disasters have taken place in Ukraine; to help them get their children back that were taken by the Russians; to help them fix their grid so that they can have heat during the wintertime; to help them have what they need to defend themselves against this vicious attack from Russia.

Just yesterday, Russia attacked their energy grid. They need help to repair that energy grid, and you can't do that with just words. You have to do it with money.

Put your money where your mouth is. If you are with the Ukrainians and you want to stand up for them, let's put some money in their pockets so they can have what they need, not just talk.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let me just respond. The gentleman says we have time to wait. I was in Ukraine 3 nights. I was on the front lines but also 3 nights in Kyiv getting shelled every night by ballistic missiles. They just bombed the train that goes from Kyiv to Warsaw just recently, killing innocent civilians.

We do not have time to wait. We need to do this now as Ukraine is under fire every day.

These are targeted tariffs pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent

ruling under Article I of Congress' constitutional authority, not the executive. It does not tariff our allies. Let me make that clear. That is why the President of the EU Commission supports this bill. It punishes our adversaries through targeted tariffs on Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Fitzpatrick), my dear friend.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. McCaul for his work.

Mr. Speaker, 86 senators voted for this bill. You cannot get 86 Senators to agree the sky is blue.

Mr. Speaker, 86 senators voted for this bill. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is strongly in support of it, so much so that he flew here to support it.

Vladimir Putin is against it. Should that not tell us all we need to know?

Are we now claiming that we know better than President Zelenskyy

about what is in the best interests of Ukraine? Are we saying we don't care that if this bill were to fail there would be celebrations in the Kremlin and there would be devastation in the morale on the front lines of Ukraine? Are we saying we don't care about that?

I have worked with my colleagues across the aisle, my friends across

the aisle, on every single Ukraine bill. I signed discharge petitions for your bill. I got my friends and my colleagues to sign that discharge, to vote for that discharge, to get that bill to the Senate.

We cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good. Every single bill that hurts Russia and helps Ukraine we have to support. We owe an obligation to them to support it.

I, too, have been on the front lines. These are people who need us.
They need us.

There is not a single pro-Ukraine bill that I will not support on

this floor, not a single one.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will just say to the gentleman that we passed a bipartisan bill out of this House. Are you telling me that President Zelenskyy is not for that bill? He is for that bill. He is for that bill. He is for that bill.

So is that bill better because--does that bill give money--the bill

coming from the Senate, does it give money to the Ukrainians for what they need? No, it doesn't.

Does it give them what they need? No, it doesn't.

Does that bill have sanctions in it stronger than this bill? Yes, it does.

So if you ask Mr. Zelenskyy, and you put those two bills up side by side, which one would he prefer—

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, no, I can't yield. I don't have enough time left.

If you ask which one he prefers, I am sure he will tell you he

prefers the bill that we passed in the House.

Just like we say that we should now do this because the Senate passed

a bill—the Senate should do what we did because we passed a bill, and we passed a bill that really helps the Ukrainian people.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I supported that bill. I voted for it, but that is not the bill before us here today.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr.
Cole), my dear friend and the chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. COLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend and distinguished statesman in his own right for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, Vladimir Putin is a tyrant and a war criminal, and we should be clear about what drives him. He fears freedom, so he attacks it. He obscures the truth, so he can peddle lies. He cannot build his power through accomplishments, so he takes it through bloodshed.

None of this is without purpose. Putin seeks to weaken the United States, fracture the West, and undermine democratic institutions.

This isn't rhetoric. It is reality and one I have seen directly.

I recently traveled to Europe on a bipartisan delegation visiting

Ukraine and Moldova, our new allies; old friends, Sweden and Finland; and also our historic allies like Great Britain and Denmark. What I witnessed only reinforced the truth.

Putin is a despot waging an illegal and ongoing war against a

sovereign nation. Indeed, one of the European leaders I spoke with said Putin's attack on Ukraine is an attack on all of Europe, and that is true. That demands more than just condemnation. It demands consequences.

Today, the House will act to kneecap the Kremlin's war machine and

cripple the cash flow fueling its pursuit of imperial dominance.

This bill will implement an economic onslaught against Putin, his

cronies, and the Iranian regime. It sanctions major buyers of Russian energy, targets Russia's leadership and financial institutions, closes sanctions loopholes, and strengthens President Trump's leverage for peace.

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As Ukraine continues to bravely fight and Russia's economy strains,

this bill will further choke Putin's ability to wage war.

This Congress, alongside the White House and our NATO allies, will

continue to make clear that, with our help, a free people will defeat a despotic tyrant.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support this bipartisan legislation and honor Senator Lindsey Graham's longstanding legacy of steadfastly defending democracy and American values and interests.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Vindman).

Mr. VINDMAN. Mr. Speaker, I will make sure that it is clear that democratic support for Ukraine is ironclad. Freedom for Ukraine is directly linked to America's national security.

Before the upcoming cold and deadly winter, I am proud to vote for

the most serious sanctions package on Russia since this unfair and unprovoked war began. Putin will only back down when there are consequences for his aggression, and when asked what this Congress has done, we can point to this sanctions bill.

We cannot undersell the morale boost that this will provide to

Ukrainians before this dark winter. By targeting the revenue and key industries that help sustain Russia's unjust war, we will increase pressure on the Kremlin while

continuing to stand with our Ukrainian brothers and sisters.

The legislation we will vote on today is not perfect, but is a vital

step in ending the war, supporting Ukraine, and standing up for America's national security.

The President must follow through, and if he doesn't, we will hold

him accountable in the next Congress. I just came back from Ukraine. They were blowing up gas stations. They were blowing up trains. They flew drones over our head. In my previous line of work, “when they hit, we hit back harder.” They need our help, so let's support them.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, my opposition today is rooted in one simple reality. After hearing loud and clear from Americans about the impact of the President's disastrous tariff policies and the affordability crises in this country, we cannot grant the President more tariff power that we know he will abuse.

Conservative estimates put the cost of this bill's tariffs at $3,000 on the average American family. That is assuming Trump limits himself to the top five importers of Russian oil and gas, even though the bill will let him go far beyond that.

At a moment when American families are already facing soaring gas

prices, rising mortgage rates, and high inflation, why would we hand the tariff man, as he calls himself, new authority to impose even more inflationary tariffs without clear guardrails?

What do the Ukrainians get in return? They will receive no security assistance, no air defense, and no reconstruction support for war- ravaged communities. This bill, as drafted, does not require tougher sanctions on Russia. The historically broad waiver language makes imposing sanctions essentially optional.

Do we really believe that President Trump, on his record, is going to

suddenly get serious about punishing Russia?

Let's just look at the facts.

In nearly 2 years, this administration has made just two sanctions

designations on Russian entities compared to nearly 1,500 per year during the Biden administration. The few energy sanctions that Trump did impose, he repeatedly waived.

His Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent lifted other sanctions on Russia

earlier this month and welcomed the Russian Finance Minister back into the G20 finance meetings in North Carolina for the first time since this invasion.

Just last week, the President sent Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to

Moscow to entice the Kremlin into a limited peace deal that reportedly included lifting of major U.S. sanctions.

Do these seem like the actions of a President serious about punishing

Russia?

My colleagues in both parties know, as I do, that Ukraine needs our

help now. The good news is that we do not have to go back to the drawing board. We can make simple, yet critical, changes to this legislation, changes that I, and others, have proposed. Let's send it back to the Senate and then to the President's desk all before the end of this month.

We can support Ukraine. We can hold Russia accountable. We can protect the American people from higher costs at the grocery store and at the pump. We just have to have the courage and the common sense to insist on a better bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Evans of Colorado). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject this legislation in its current form.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I was at the Ukraine Embassy last night, and when I announced to them that the rule had passed to allow this bill to go to the floor for final passage, I got a standing ovation. I got a standing ovation from the ambassador and all supporters of Ukraine.

When I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee, I often said

partisanship stops at the water's edge, and I still believe that. Mr. Meeks and I did pass the emergency wartime supplemental bill that gave Ukraine a lifeline to prevent occupation from Russia so they could advance in their drone technology. I am a bit disheartened by some of my colleagues' remarks here today because they don't reflect that principle.

In fact, it is just all about the President. It is false arguments about an expansion of tariff authority when it is actually limited to our adversaries buying energy from Russia. The premise is that we don't like the President, so let's just do nothing. Let's do nothing as we go into the wintertime when we know the fighting will intensify.

We don't have time to wait. Ukraine doesn't have time to wait. That is precisely why President Zelenskyy told me when I was in Ukraine right after Senator Graham announced this legislation—and I had been working with him for a year on this—that now is the time.

There was excitement in the air. The EU Commissioner supports this bill. Our allies support this bill. We are free to have disagreements. That is democracy. But when we are addressing our adversaries, we need to speak as one, with one voice, as one Nation. They need to know that we are not divided when it comes to our national security.

The Senate, as has been stated, passed this bill 86-11 for God's

sake. That is an overwhelming bipartisan support, and now it is time for the House to unite and do the same.

If this bill fails, the message that that will send to our

adversaries—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, all who want to see this bill go down today—will be celebrating in the streets.

Make no mistake: Putin is watching. President Xi is watching. The Ayatollah is watching. Kim Jong-un is watching. Why? Because they are our adversaries. If the United States can't rally around such broadly supported legislation, what message would that send to them?

This is a critical national security issue, but it also is a moral

issue that requires moral courage. When we look back at this moment in time, I want to be able to say that we used all the tools available to end this war, that we understood the threat, that we had the courage to do what was right to stand up to cripple the Russian war machine and turn the tide toward peace, to be on the right side of history.

In his final press conference, Senator Graham said: “I have never been more optimistic than I am today that we have the formula to end this war.”

This is a formula, this bill, and I couldn't agree more with the late

Lindsey Graham, my friend and mentor.

Let me be clear that a vote for this bill is a vote for Ukraine and

the free world. A vote against this bill is a vote for Putin and his unholy alliance.

Mr. Speaker, we don't have many votes like this in Congress that impact global geopolitical conflicts. This bill will have a direct impact on the conflict threatening Eastern Europe and NATO itself and can bring this to an end and get Putin to the negotiating table. As President Zelenskyy told me, he is ready for a cease-fire. He is ready to negotiate.

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It is Mr. Putin that will not call for a ceasefire. He will not negotiate. This bill will bring him to the table. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it is so important at this time in history.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 1530, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the motion by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
McCaul).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote, or the yeas and nays are ordered, or votes objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

The House will resume proceedings on postponed questions at a later

time.

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