Representative · R-TX
The bill strengthens congressional oversight and requires the U.S. to oppose increases in PRC IMF voting power that fail specified criteria—preserving U.S. influence—but at the cost of potentially slowing urgent multilateral action, straining alliances and diplomacy, and adding recurring administrative burdens.
Financial institutions and U.S. representation at the IMF are protected because the U.S. IMF Governor must oppose any proposal to increase PRC voting power if the PRC fails to meet the bill's transparency/accountability criteria, helping preserve U.S. influence in IMF governance.
Taxpayers and middle-class families (via their representatives) gain greater transparency and Congressional oversight because U.S. policymakers receive advance notice and a formal public determination before any vote to increase PRC IMF voting power.
The President retains needed flexibility for urgent national-interest actions because a presidential waiver allows bypassing procedural requirements in emergencies while still requiring reporting to Congress.
Financial institutions and global crisis-response efforts could be hindered because the bill's requirements may constrain the U.S. from quickly supporting IMF governance decisions during emergencies, slowing multilateral responses.
Allied cooperation and U.S. leverage on IMF issues could be reduced if partners view the U.S. stance as unilateral obstruction, complicating coalition-building on global financial matters.
Taxpayers and U.S.-China diplomatic relations risk negative effects because tying IMF voting changes to contested judgments about China's policies could politicize IMF governance and provoke diplomatic friction with the PRC.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires Treasury to report before U.S. consideration of any IMF voting-power increase for China and directs opposition unless China meets specified transparency and exchange-rate criteria, with a presidential waiver.
Official title: To require the use of the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any quota increase at the International Monetary Fund for member countries that employ certain exchange rate practices, and for other purposes.
Introduced April 15, 2026 by Pete Sessions · Last progress April 15, 2026
Requires the Treasury Secretary to prepare a report at least seven days before any U.S. consideration of a proposal to increase the International Monetary Fund (IMF) voting power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The report must state whether, during the prior 12 months, China met three transparency and exchange-rate-related criteria; if any criterion is not met the U.S. IMF Governor must be instructed to oppose the voting increase, unless the President issues a written national-interest waiver. The rule expires seven years after enactment.