Sponsors (4)
The bill increases representation, coordination, and predictability for community-bank supervision but trades off increased politicization risk, potential shifts in regulatory parity as the GDP-indexed threshold grows, and modest additional taxpayer costs.
Community banks and small-business owners (including rural communities) gain a dedicated Fed Board member and stronger interagency consultation, increasing representation and coordination in rulemaking and supervision that affects smaller institutions.
Small-business owners and taxpayers benefit from automatic annual adjustments of the $17 billion asset threshold using BEA nominal GDP, making the community-bank cutoff more predictable and aligned with economic growth.
Taxpayers and the public gain more transparency and accountability through semi-annual congressional hearings on supervision of community banks.
Small-business owners and taxpayers could face reduced regulatory parity over time because indexing the threshold to nominal GDP may expand the set of institutions classified as 'community banks', changing which rules apply to mid-sized versus larger banks.
Community banks and the independence of supervision could be politicized if the Chairman selects the community-bank-experienced Governor, allowing political influence over supervision priorities.
State governments, hospitals and health systems (and other supervised entities) risk inconsistent or politicized supervisory actions because semi-annual congressional appearances could pressure examiners and politicize supervisory discussions.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Introduced December 10, 2025 by Monica De La Cruz · Last progress December 10, 2025
Creates a new Federal Reserve Board seat designated for a member with primary experience working in or supervising community banks, charged with developing policy and overseeing supervision of banking organizations with less than $17,000,000,000 in total assets. That asset threshold is indexed annually to nominal GDP, and the community-bank-experienced Governor must testify at semi‑annual House and Senate hearings about supervision and regulation of those banks. Also requires the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Governor to consult with the new community-bank-experienced Governor when carrying out FFIEC duties, removes or alters an existing asset-size phrase in current law, and adds an inflation/nominal‑GDP-based procedure to adjust dollar thresholds in several statutory provisions using BEA nominal GDP data. No new appropriations or penalties are included.