Sponsors (3)
The bill lowers procedural hurdles for antitrust plaintiffs to strengthen enforcement and preserve remedies for harmed parties, at the cost of higher litigation risk, greater legal expenses, and less predictable outcomes for businesses and potentially taxpayers.
State attorneys general, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and private plaintiffs can more easily survive early dismissal by pleading parallel conduct plus additional factors, making it more likely legitimate antitrust claims reach juries and strengthening enforcement against collusion.
Consumers and harmed businesses retain access to the full range of antitrust remedies (monetary damages and injunctive relief), preserving potential compensation and corrective actions for anticompetitive conduct.
Lowering the summary‑judgment burden increases the chance legitimate antitrust claims proceed past early dismissal, helping enforcement agencies disrupt large‑scale or national security–relevant collusion.
Businesses, including small firms, will face higher litigation risk and legal costs because more antitrust suits can survive early dismissal and proceed to costly discovery and trial.
Consumers and taxpayers may shoulder higher prices or diverted resources if weak or speculative antitrust claims are allowed to advance and force expanded discovery or government litigation.
Businesses and consumers may face less predictable antitrust outcomes because limiting judicial gatekeeping shifts more fact‑finding to juries rather than judges.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Lowers pleading and summary-judgment standards so antitrust plaintiffs can proceed on parallel conduct plus two or more "plus factors" without direct evidence of conspiracy.
Official title: To specify the standards governing claims of consciously parallel pricing coordination in civil actions under the Sherman Act, and to clarify the meaning of contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
Introduced April 30, 2026 by Mary Gay Scanlon · Last progress April 30, 2026
Makes it easier for antitrust plaintiffs (the United States, the FTC, state attorneys general, and private parties) to survive early dismissal and summary-judgment motions by lowering the pleading and evidentiary standards. Plaintiffs can proceed on claims when they allege parallel conduct plus two or more specified “plus factors,” and summary judgment can be denied where direct or circumstantial evidence would allow a reasonable factfinder to infer a conspiracy, without forcing plaintiffs to prove that independent action is impossible or that their explanation is the most plausible.