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Creates a special, fast process to temporarily extend or suspend the federal debt limit when the Treasury Department certifies more borrowing is needed. It defines a unique type of “joint resolution,” sets deadlines for Treasury certification and for Congress to act, limits what kinds of new debt Treasury can issue during the extension, and requires a short GDP-related debt disclosure. The bill makes these procedures part of each chamber’s rules so such joint resolutions get expedited handling, with specific timing and transitional rules to apply when the authority is used.
Amend Subchapter I of chapter 31 of subtitle III of title 31, United States Code, by inserting a new section 3101B titled “Suspension of the debt ceiling,” and adjust the table of sections to insert the new item after section 3101A.
Define the term “joint resolution” for this section to mean only a joint resolution that (1) is introduced during the period beginning on the date Congress receives the Treasury certification and ending 45 calendar days after that date; (2) has no preamble; (3) uses a specified short title showing the submission date; and (4) contains specific language in the resolving clause disapproving the Secretary’s exercise of authority to suspend the debt limit.
Require the Secretary of the Treasury, if the Secretary determines further borrowing will be necessary after a suspension ends, to submit to Congress a written certification specifying the end date for the suspension. The certification must be submitted not earlier than 60 days and not later than 46 days before the last day of the current suspension; the end date specified may be no later than 2 years after the otherwise applicable end of the suspension period.
If Congress does not enact a disapproval joint resolution within 45 calendar days after receiving the Treasury certification, section 3101(b) (the debt limit suspension rule) shall not apply for the period beginning 46 calendar days after Congress receives the certification and ending on the date specified by the Secretary in the certification (i.e., the suspension continues for the specified period).
Provide a special rule adjusting the statutory limitation during any extension period: the debt limitation shall be increased to the extent that the face amount of obligations issued (and guaranteed obligations except those held by the Secretary) outstanding on the day after the Secretary’s specified date exceeds the face amount outstanding on the day after the most recent day during which the limit was not suspended.
Adds new section 3101B to chapter 31, subtitle III of title 31, U.S. Code, titled 'Suspension of the debt ceiling', establishing definitions, Secretary of the Treasury certification requirements, expedited procedures for House and Senate consideration of a specified joint resolution, and rules for treatment of outcomes.
Amends section 1105(a)(10) of title 31 to require that information include, as a percentage of U.S. GDP, an estimate of the debt held by the public and the debt held by the public net of financial assets.
Who is affected and how:
Treasury Department: Directly affected because it must prepare and deliver a formal certification when extra borrowing is needed and must follow limits on how it issues obligations during any temporary extension. The Treasury’s operational flexibility for financing may be constrained by the statutorily specified limits.
Members of Congress and congressional staff: Procedural responsibilities shift because the chamber rules are supplemented by statutory deadlines and handling requirements, forcing faster floor action and limiting opportunities for extended debate or amendments on the special joint resolution.
Federal government operations and programs: Indirectly affected because a faster path to suspend the debt limit may reduce short-term risk of default and protect ongoing government payments and programs from interruption.
Financial markets, investors, and credit rating agencies: A clear, expedited statutory process could lower near‑term default risk if used, but markets may react to how often or under what political context the process is used; concerns about bypassing regular oversight could influence confidence.
Taxpayers and the public: The change affects how long the federal government can legally borrow without the usual extended congressional process; it may reduce the chance of shutdowns or payment delays but could also be seen as altering checks and balances over borrowing.
Broader considerations:
Political and negotiating dynamics may shift: Faster statutory deadlines could limit leverage in debt-limit negotiations and change how Congress and the administration bargain over fiscal policy.
Legal and constitutional issues: Making expedited procedures statutory and treating them as part of chamber rules could raise institutional or legal questions about separation of powers and each chamber’s right to set its own rules.
Operational clarity: The transitional rule and the GDP disclosure requirement aim to ensure predictable application and better public understanding of debt relative to economic size.
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.
Introduced July 23, 2025 by Jeff Merkley · Last progress July 23, 2025
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Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.
Introduced in Senate