Sponsors (9)
Introduced September 18, 2025 by Angela Deneece Alsobrooks · Last progress September 18, 2025
The bill strengthens federal and local tools to stop deceptive election information, intimidation, and interference—boosting voting access and election security—while creating trade‑offs around free‑speech chill, federal overreach, privacy risks, and additional costs for governments and technology actors.
All voters—particularly racial, ethnic, and language-minority communities—would face fewer materially false messages about when, where, or how to vote in the run‑up to federal elections because the bill strengthens protections and correction mechanisms that reduce confusing or suppressive misinformation.
The Department of Justice, state and local governments, and courts would gain clearer legal tools (updated criminal statutes, clarified offenses, and explicit authorities) to investigate and prosecute organized deceptive voter‑suppression schemes and fake polling-place operations.
State and local election officials, poll workers, and law enforcement would get stronger protections and faster remedies against intimidation or interference at polling places and during ballot processing, making it easier to secure voting operations and post‑voting procedures.
Civic organizations, volunteers, social media users, and ordinary speakers could face chilled political speech because expanded criminal and civil liability for false statements and broader enforcement risk deterring lawful grassroots outreach and debate.
State and local election officials and voters could perceive federal AG communications and rapid federal corrections as federal overreach or partisan interference, heightening federalism tensions and reducing trust in election administration.
Taxpayers, DOJ, and state/local governments could incur meaningful costs because increased enforcement, reporting obligations, legal actions, and authorized but unspecified funding will require additional resources and operational capacity.
Based on analysis of 7 sections of legislative text.
Criminalizes knowingly spreading materially false voting information within 60 days of a federal election (including via AI), expands civil remedies, requires DOJ corrective communications, and broadens intimidation crimes to cover post‑voting processes.
Makes it a federal crime to knowingly communicate or produce materially false information about the time, place, manner of voting or voter eligibility within 60 days before a federal election if done with intent to stop or impede voting, and explicitly covers use of artificial intelligence to produce such false information. It also expands existing prohibitions on intimidation to cover interfering with post‑voting processes (processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, certifying), creates civil remedies, requires the Attorney General to publish procedures and to issue corrective public communications when state or local officials do not, and requires post‑election public reports compiling allegations and responses.