This bill reduces supply‑chain and human‑rights risks by restricting certain battery sources and increases DHS transparency, but it risks higher costs, reduced competition, and possible short‑term operational disruptions for DHS missions.
DHS components (CBP, ICE, Secret Service, Coast Guard, TSA, CISA, etc.) would avoid using batteries tied to named Chinese or sanctioned entities, reducing supply‑chain links to potential adversary firms and lowering national-security risks.
Taxpayers and the public would see reduced use of batteries potentially linked to forced labor or export‑control violations, supporting human‑rights objectives and trade‑compliance goals.
Taxpayers and federal employees would get increased congressional oversight and transparency because DHS must report within 180 days on mission and cost impacts across nine DHS components.
Taxpayers and federal agencies may face higher procurement costs and reduced supplier competition because restricting suppliers can make compliant batteries more expensive or scarce.
Law‑enforcement personnel and other DHS staff could experience disrupted operational readiness if compliant batteries are unavailable when needed, degrading mission capability for affected components.
Federal employees and operations could face short‑term gaps because the waiver process might be slow or bureaucratic, delaying access to needed batteries despite waiver authority.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Bars DHS from obligating funds after Oct 1, 2027 to buy batteries from specified adversary‑linked companies and their subsidiaries, with narrow waivers and a required impact report.
Introduced February 6, 2025 by Richard Lynn Scott · Last progress February 6, 2025
Prohibits the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from obligating funds to procure batteries produced by certain foreign adversary‑linked companies and their subsidiaries beginning October 1, 2027, while allowing two narrow types of waivers and requiring DHS to report on mission and cost impacts. The prohibition covers named Chinese battery companies, entities on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act lists, entities designated as Chinese military companies, and other Commerce Department export‑control lists, and treats a battery as produced by a covered entity if that entity assembled the final product using the battery or supplied a majority of battery components. The Secretary of Homeland Security may grant waivers for national security or critical system availability (when no viable alternatives exist) and for sole‑use research/testing, with required committee notifications within 15 days; DHS must submit a report within 180 days of enactment assessing mission and cost impacts across nine identified DHS components.