The bill trades reduced national-security risk from certain foreign research ties and a clearer compliance path for universities against significant risks to academic collaboration, research funding, institutional costs, and potential overbroad restrictions that could harm students and researchers.
Universities that cut ties with listed Chinese entities face reduced potential national-security risks from foreign influence on research.
Universities regain a clear compliance pathway because DHS grant eligibility is restored only after termination of covered ties, giving institutions a defined route to keep federal homeland-security funding.
Scientists, researchers, students, and tech workers could see research collaboration and academic exchanges with some Chinese institutions curtailed, slowing scientific progress and harming careers and training opportunities.
Universities, students, and researchers could lose DHS-funded programs or research support if institutions maintain listed relationships, reducing funding and program availability.
Universities and taxpayers may incur administrative and legal costs to identify, sever, or renegotiate ties to avoid losing DHS grants, increasing institutional overhead and potential public expense.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Conditions DHS grants and contracts on higher-education institutions ending relationships with Confucius Institutes, the Thousand Talents Program, or defined Chinese entities of concern, and requires DHS reporting.
Conditions DHS grant and contract eligibility on institutions of higher education by requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to withhold DHS funding from any college or university that maintains a "relationship" with a Confucius Institute, the Thousand Talents Program, or a defined category of "Chinese entity of concern." The funding restriction begins in the first fiscal year that starts more than 12 months after enactment and continues until the institution ends the relationship. The measure also requires DHS to identify and report to specified congressional committees which institutions both have such relationships and receive DHS funds. Definitions in the text set the covered higher education institutions by reference to federal law and define "Chinese entity of concern" by several criteria (e.g., ties to defense or security bodies, military-civil fusion, forced labor participation, election interference, or affiliation with the Chinese Academy of Sciences).
Introduced January 31, 2025 by August Pfluger · Last progress May 8, 2025