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Requires several federal departments and the intelligence community to create interagency task forces and deliver classified intelligence and strategy reports to assess and respond to growing cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Directs U.S. policy to disrupt that adversary alignment using tools such as sanctions, export controls, public exposure, information-sharing with allies, and strengthened deterrence across priority regions. Sets short deadlines (task forces within 60 days; initial reports within 180 days) and mandates detailed, classified assessments and two‑year strategic planning for operations, sanctions/export-control enforcement, allied engagement, munitions and industrial planning, and war‑planning digitization, but does not itself appropriate new funds or change tax law.
The bill strengthens U.S. ability to detect, deter, and disrupt coordinated adversary activity through clearer authorities, joint assessments, and readiness measures—while imposing higher defense/administrative costs, tighter restrictions on international collaboration and trade, and a risk of greater geopolitical friction and reduced public transparency.
Federal national-security planners and military personnel will gain clearer legal authority and mandated, coordinated assessments to treat China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as coordinated adversaries, improving threat assessment and enabling more unified responses.
U.S. and allied defense forces and planners (and state/local partners) will benefit from improved information-sharing, allied deterrence plans, increased munitions stockpiles and co-production, and coordinated readiness measures that strengthen collective deterrence and operational preparedness.
Federal agencies, national laboratories, and defense intelligence programs will be able to restrict high-risk access and procurement and perform resourced reviews of sanctions and export-control enforcement, better protecting sensitive technologies and reducing espionage and illicit technology transfer risks.
Small businesses, universities, researchers, and some financial institutions will face tighter export controls, collaboration restrictions, and compliance costs that could disrupt partnerships, slow research, and raise operating costs.
Taxpayers and federal budgets are likely to face increased costs from expanded defense and intelligence activities, munitions stockpiling, co-production initiatives, and DoD digitization—potentially diverting funds from other domestic priorities.
Ordinary Americans (travelers, exporters, and firms) and state/local interests may face heightened geopolitical tensions and reciprocal measures (trade restrictions, travel limitations, diplomatic pushback) as hostile states react to being labeled and targeted as a coordinated adversary network.
Introduced November 4, 2025 by S. Raja Krishnamoorthi · Last progress November 4, 2025