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Requires the Secretary of Energy to conduct regular assessments of the generation and transmission supply chain for electricity and to report findings and recommendations to the designated congressional committees. The first assessment is due within one year of enactment and subsequent reports must be submitted periodically; reports must cover supply risks, reliance on foreign entities of concern, workforce and manufacturing barriers, national/energy security implications, and recommended actions.
The bill aims to strengthen U.S. electricity generation and transmission supply chains, domestic manufacturing, and grid reliability through focused reporting and stakeholder engagement, but it may raise costs, increase administrative burden, create trade or supply‑disruption risks, and leave vulnerabilities unaddressed if oversight is narrow and recommendations are non‑binding.
Utilities and electricity customers will get regular, evidence-based analysis and recommendations to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, improving grid resilience and reliability.
U.S. domestic generation and transmission supply chains — including manufacturing capacity, critical materials processing, and workforce development — will be explicitly targeted for support and expansion.
Congress, state governments, and regulators will receive clearer, more focused information and oversight tools to inform policymaking and investment decisions for the electricity supply chain.
Utilities, consumers, and taxpayers could face higher costs if policies favoring domestic production or wide authorities to restrict foreign suppliers lead to more expensive inputs or constrained sourcing.
Assessments that identify specific foreign 'entities of concern' or justify restrictions could complicate trade relations and trigger supply disruptions for grid components and materials.
Concentrating oversight in only a couple of congressional committees and issuing non‑binding report recommendations risks limited engagement, weak follow-through, and failure to address identified vulnerabilities.
Introduced December 16, 2025 by Catherine Marie Cortez Masto · Last progress December 16, 2025