Sponsors (2)
The bill lets allied foreign shipyards build U.S. hulls when demonstrably cheaper—potentially lowering costs and strengthening allied industrial ties—while raising risks to domestic shipbuilding jobs, supply‑chain security, and oversight costs.
Taxpayers and the Navy could pay less for new hulls when allied shipyards can build them more cheaply, lowering procurement costs for the fleet.
U.S. and allied shipyards (NATO and Indo‑Pacific partners) would deepen industrial cooperation by being eligible to build hulls, strengthening allied production capacity and interoperability.
The Secretary must certify that a foreign shipyard is not owned or operated by Chinese entities, reducing the risk of Chinese control or influence over builds.
Relying on foreign yards could introduce supply‑chain or security vulnerabilities if oversight or certification is incomplete, potentially exposing the military to risk.
Permitting some foreign construction could reduce workload at U.S. shipyards and cost domestic jobs in shipbuilding communities and related small businesses.
Taxpayers could face higher oversight and compliance costs to verify foreign shipyard ownership and to perform cost comparisons.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Introduced February 5, 2025 by Mike Lee · Last progress February 5, 2025
Allows the Navy to build certain naval vessels or major hull/superstructure components in allied foreign shipyards under a limited exception when specific conditions are met. The foreign yard must be in a NATO country or an Indo‑Pacific country that has a mutual defense treaty with the U.S., the foreign option must be cheaper than U.S. construction, and the Secretary of the Navy must certify to Congress that the foreign yard is not owned or operated by a Chinese company or a multinational company domiciled in the People’s Republic of China before construction starts.