The resolution encourages NATO allies to increase defense spending to strengthen collective security and reduce U.S. burden, but that shift can raise costs for taxpayers either in the U.S. or in allied countries and force tradeoffs with domestic programs.
U.S. service members and their families will benefit from stronger NATO deterrence and collective security if allied defense spending increases.
U.S. taxpayers could see reduced U.S. defense expenditures abroad if burden‑sharing leads allies to take on more of the cost of collective defense.
U.S. taxpayers may face higher federal spending or tradeoffs with domestic programs if the U.S. responds by increasing its own defense spending.
Citizens in allied countries (and economic ties with the U.S.) could be harmed if pressure to raise defense budgets forces cuts to social services or infrastructure abroad.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Urges NATO members to meet the 2% of GDP defense spending minimum or present a plan before the June 2025 NATO summit.
Official title: Expressing the sense of the Senate that member countries of NATO must commit at least 2 percent of their national gross domestic product to national defense spending to hold leadership or benefit at the expense of those countries who meet their obligations.
Introduced February 12, 2025 by Thomas Roland Tillis · Last progress February 12, 2025
Urges NATO member countries to meet the Alliance’s longstanding guideline of spending at least 2% of national GDP on defense, or to present a credible plan to reach that level before the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025. It highlights NATO findings that 23 of 31 members met the 2% threshold in 2024, notes proposals to raise the target, and states that shortfalls since 2000 have eroded mutual defense capability by an estimated $2 trillion.