Sponsors (10)
Urging NATO allies to increase defense spending could strengthen deterrence and ease U.S. military burdens, but risks higher U.S. defense costs or harmful domestic tradeoffs for allied populations.
U.S. service members and their families would likely face improved collective deterrence and security if NATO allies increase defense spending, lowering the risk to forces stationed with allied partners.
U.S. taxpayers could benefit from stronger NATO burden‑sharing if allied members shoulder more defense costs, potentially reducing U.S. defense expenditures abroad or easing pressure on U.S. forces.
U.S. taxpayers could face higher federal defense spending or tradeoffs with domestic programs if the U.S. responds by increasing its own defense investment alongside allies.
Pressure on NATO members to raise defense budgets could force cuts to domestic social services or infrastructure in those countries, indirectly harming their citizens and weakening economic ties with the U.S.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Expresses findings on NATO defense spending and urges members to meet or plan to meet the 2% of GDP defense-spending minimum before the June 2025 NATO Summit.
Urges NATO members to meet the alliance’s longstanding defense spending benchmark of at least 2% of national GDP and to present plans to reach that level before the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025. Notes that 23 of 31 NATO members met the 2% target in 2024, recalls that the 2% figure is treated as a floor, mentions consideration of raising the target, and asserts a roughly $2 trillion loss in mutual defense capability since 2000 tied to shortfalls.
Introduced February 12, 2025 by Thomas Roland Tillis · Last progress February 12, 2025