Sponsors (4)
The bill tightens federal supply‑chain security and speeds centralized decisionmaking to remove risky foreign‑tied suppliers, but it centralizes authority and limits transparency while imposing compliance and economic risks—particularly for small contractors.
Federal agencies and government systems gain clearer authority to exclude or remove suppliers tied to foreign adversaries, strengthening protection of federal procurement and national security.
Federal procurement and interagency decisionmakers get a Program Office in the Executive Office of the President that provides expert analysis and administrative support, improving coordination and speeding supply‑chain risk decisions across agencies.
Congress and the public receive annual reports on risks from covered articles, increasing congressional oversight and visibility into supply‑chain threats to government systems.
Small businesses and contractors that rely on foreign inputs or have foreign ownership could be excluded from federal contracts, causing lost revenue and contract‑termination risk.
Contractors with indirect or minor foreign ties may face broad, ambiguous definitions tied to "foreign adversary," increasing compliance burdens, legal uncertainty, and risk of wrongful exclusion.
Federal employees and taxpayers may see reduced interagency independence and increased politicization because the Council and Program Office are concentrated in the Executive Office of the President.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Moves the acquisition security council into the Executive Office of the President, tightens definitions of foreign-adversary supply-chain risks, and expands/seniorizes agency membership.
Introduced January 30, 2026 by William R. Timmons · Last progress January 30, 2026
Amends federal procurement law to relocate the Federal Acquisition Security Council into the Executive Office of the President, tighten and expand definitions around foreign-related supply-chain risks, and revise who sits on the Council and at what seniority. It adds new statutory definitions for types of orders and for what counts as a “source of concern,” and it spells out specific agency representation (including intelligence, defense, cybersecurity, commerce, justice, and acquisition offices) and authority for the Council chair to add officials as needed. The changes are mainly structural and definitional — they do not create new funding or broad new program authorizations in the text provided — but they centralize authority, broaden agency involvement, and make explicit how the Council will identify and act on suppliers and entities tied to foreign adversaries.