The bill keeps U.S. sanctions and export controls on Cuba to maintain pressure on its government, but does so at the cost of continued economic burdens for businesses and families and reduced executive flexibility in foreign policy.
U.S. taxpayers and national security interests: preserves existing sanctions and export controls on Cuba, maintaining economic and diplomatic pressure on the Cuban government until Congress requires a change.
U.S. businesses, Cuban-American families, and immigrants: continues trade and remittance restrictions that can raise costs, limit market opportunities, and reduce financial support to relatives in Cuba.
The President, Secretary of State, and federal diplomatic actors: restricts executive branch flexibility by requiring a statutory finding before sanctions or export-control policy toward Cuba can be changed, potentially constraining diplomatic options.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Bars the President and Secretary of State from removing Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list until the LIBERTAD Act determination is made.
Prohibits the President and the Secretary of State from removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism until the President makes the specific determination required by the LIBERTAD Act of 1996. Defines “state sponsor of terrorism” by cross-reference to existing statutory authorities that trigger export, assistance, and arms-control restrictions. The bill does not create new programs, funding, or deadlines; it only restricts executive branch authority to delist Cuba until the statutory determination is made under existing law.
Official title: To prohibit the removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism until Cuba satisfies certain conditions, and for other purposes.
Introduced January 15, 2025 by Maria Elvira Salazar · Last progress January 15, 2025