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Creates a permanent advisory committee within the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to study and report on economic and market risks from Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan. The committee must meet at least twice yearly, produce an annual study and public presentation (with classified material handled in closed session), and submit recommendations that the Council will use in its annual public report on market vulnerabilities and regulatory actions.
Establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council Advisory Committee on Economic Fallout From Chinese Military Aggression Towards Taiwan.
Charge the Advisory Committee to study and report on market implications and vulnerabilities related to Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan.
Charge the Advisory Committee to open lines of communication between policymakers, government agencies, and capital market constituents to prepare for and mitigate economic strain and market volatility related to Chinese aggression in Taiwan.
Set the Committee membership to include: (i) a designee of the Commission; (ii) a designee of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and (iii) 10 members appointed by the Council from among capital markets participants or experts on geopolitical risk related to China.
Require the Chair of the Advisory Committee to be a market maker appointed from among the members appointed under the 10-member category.
Primary effects fall on financial regulators, federal agencies that participate in FSOC, financial firms, investors, and market infrastructure. FSOC and designated agencies will receive regular expert analysis and formal recommendations that can influence regulatory priorities, stress-testing focus, and public risk disclosures. Financial institutions and investors may face updated supervisory attention or guidance as FSOC adapts oversight and communication about vulnerabilities tied to a potential China-Taiwan military conflict. Market participants with concentrated exposure to Taiwan-related supply chains or technology assets could see increased scrutiny or policy responses. Academic and private-sector experts and institutions may be tapped for appointments or to provide analysis. The provision does not itself impose direct regulatory requirements on nonfederal entities, nor does it appropriate funds or mandate state/local obligations, but it can shape federal regulator actions that subsequently affect markets and private-sector behavior.
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Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Introduced May 5, 2025 by Zach Nunn · Last progress May 5, 2025
Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Introduced in House