Sponsors
The bill tightens controls on U.S. space collaborations with PRC entities to protect national security and increase oversight, but it does so at the cost of slower science collaborations, added administrative hurdles, potential economic impacts, and a risk of politicized decisionmaking.
Taxpayers and the public: reduces the risk that sensitive space technologies or data are transferred to PRC entities by blocking or conditioning NASA/OSTP/NSpC bilateral collaborations with Chinese entities unless approved or certified.
Congress, agencies, and the public: increases oversight and transparency by requiring FBI review and advance notice for certain interactions with PRC entities, giving more vetting and information about sensitive engagements.
Scientists and researchers: restricts scientific collaboration with PRC partners, potentially slowing research progress and long-term international partnerships in space science.
Federal employees and researchers: creates risk of uneven or politicized application by leaving discretionary national-security judgments to agencies with FBI consultation.
Companies, contractors, and taxpayers: may reduce economic and commercial opportunities by restricting official visits and collaborations that can lead to contracts, partnerships, or business development.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Blocks federal funding for NASA/OSTP/NSpC bilateral space cooperation with China or Chinese-owned companies unless Congress authorizes it; narrow exceptions allowed with FBI-reviewed certifications submitted 30 days prior.
Prohibits federal funds from being used to authorize NASA, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), or the National Space Council to engage in bilateral space activities with the People’s Republic of China or Chinese-owned companies unless Congress later passes a law authorizing the activity. It also bars federal funds from hosting official Chinese visitors at federal facilities used by NASA. Allows narrow exceptions if the agency certifies, after consulting the FBI, that the proposed activity poses no risk of transferring technology or data with national-security or economic-security implications to China or Chinese-owned companies and will not knowingly involve U.S.-designated officials involved in human-rights violations; those certifications and activity details must be sent to relevant congressional committees and the FBI at least 30 days before the activity.
Introduced July 10, 2025 by Daniel A. Webster · Last progress July 10, 2025