Sponsors (4)
The bill aims to expand and accelerate U.S. support for foreign internet connectivity—potentially increasing access and resilience for targeted populations—while creating privacy, operational, and geopolitical risks and adding near‑term resource burdens.
Iranians and other targeted foreign populations would gain more reliable internet access if U.S.-funded direct-to-cell or low-Earth-orbit connectivity solutions are feasible and implemented.
Hospitals, universities, journalists, and other users in affected areas would benefit from improved detection of jamming and drone threats, enabling stronger resilience and fewer communication blackouts.
State and local governments (and implementers) could deploy connectivity tools faster and more cheaply because vetted commercial off-the-shelf technologies would be eligible for grant-supported use.
Iranians and other targeted users could face increased danger if published technical assessments reveal operational details that adversaries or local authorities could exploit.
U.S. taxpayers and policymakers could face higher geopolitical risk and potential retaliation if subsidizing foreign-facing connectivity provokes diplomatic responses or escalatory actions.
Users in target countries (e.g., Iranians) may have increased privacy and surveillance risks if off-the-shelf devices used under grants lack robust data‑protection features.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires State, with FCC and Treasury, to deliver an updated report within 120 days assessing feasibility, risks, and policy implications of direct‑to‑cell, LEO satellites, drones/jamming, and COTS eligibility for internet‑freedom grants.
Introduced December 4, 2025 by Jacklyn Sheryl Rosen · Last progress December 4, 2025
Requires the Secretary of State, working with the FCC and the Treasury Department, to deliver an updated, unclassified report (with an optional classified annex) to the House and Senate foreign affairs committees within 120 days of enactment. The report must analyze the feasibility, risks, and operational details of emerging communications technologies and threats—including direct-to-cell wireless approaches, effects of drones and jamming, and the role of LEO satellite constellations during recent protests—and assess whether common commercial off‑the‑shelf technologies should be eligible for U.S. internet‑freedom grants under existing criteria. The update must also include a survey of terrestrial and non‑terrestrial telecommunications providers operating in Iran (ownership and foreign participation and censorship implications), a classified-plus-unclassified analysis of satellite performance and vulnerabilities observed during January 2026 protests, and recommendations on security, cost, resilience, and grant eligibility criteria.