Official title: To protect the national security of the United States by strengthening review of foreign adversary investments in the general aviation sector, and for other purposes.
Introduced July 15, 2026 by Pat Harrigan · Last progress July 15, 2026
The bill tightens reviews, export controls, and disclosure rules to better protect U.S. aviation technology, infrastructure, and national security, but does so at the expense of higher compliance costs, potential reductions in benign foreign investment and exports, and added uncertainty and disruption for some aviation businesses, training centers, and recipients of federal funds.
Taxpayers, military personnel, and aviation workers: Strengthens national security by expanding and clarifying review and blocking authority to prevent transfer of sensitive general‑aviation technologies, limit risky foreign control of airports and pilot training near bases, and reduce the chance that adversaries gain dual‑use capabilities.
State and federal agencies, recipients, and businesses: Provides clearer statutory definitions, triggers, and firm timelines (e.g., 180‑day rulemaking) for which aviation transactions and assistance are covered, improving interagency coordination and reducing some legal uncertainty going forward.
Local communities, airport operators, and infrastructure stakeholders: Protects critical aviation infrastructure and Part‑139 airports through presumptive review standards and CFIUS screening, lowering the risk of foreign actors gaining persistent access to facilities that support civil and military operations.
Small U.S. aviation businesses, suppliers, and investors: Expanded review standards and evidentiary burdens will raise compliance and legal costs, lengthen transaction timelines, and can deter benign foreign investment—reducing access to capital for manufacturers, repair shops, airports, and training centers.
General aviation manufacturers and maintenance providers: New export controls, ECCNs, and licensing requirements for engines, composites, avionics, and related data/tools could restrict foreign sales, slow innovation (especially software‑defined avionics), and complicate international repair and supply chains.
Pilot schools, students, and local flight training ecosystems near military bases: Increased scrutiny and potential restrictions on training centers within specified distances could disrupt training availability, raise costs for students and instructors, and shrink the local pilot workforce pipeline.
Based on analysis of 11 sections of legislative text.
Imposes mandatory CFIUS review, new export controls, outbound‑investment notifications, supply‑chain audits, and federal‑funding bans for U.S. general aviation entities tied to countries of concern or certain Chinese military‑industrial entities.
Requires mandatory national-security reviews, new export controls, outbound‑investment reporting, supply‑chain audits, and restrictions on federal funds for U.S. general aviation businesses when foreign investors are from a "country of concern" or tied to specified Chinese military‑industrial entities. It directs agencies (Treasury/CFIUS, Commerce, State, Defense, FAA, CISA) to issue rules, complete reviews and audits, and report to Congress within set timeframes. Creates a rebuttable presumption of national‑security risk for many foreign acquisitions of general aviation companies and certain real estate (including certificated general aviation airports), expands CFIUS review factors specific to aviation, empowers prohibition/clawback authority for federal assistance, and mandates changes to export controls and outbound notification for covered aviation technologies and transactions. Effective on enactment with multiple regulatory deadlines (mostly 180–270 days).