Sponsors (9)
Stops nationals of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba from accessing DOE national labs unless the Secretary grants a written waiver following counterintelligence consultation.
The bill strengthens protection of sensitive DOE lab technologies and classified information by restricting access and creating a centralized waiver process, but it does so at the cost of reduced international scientific collaboration, potential disruption to ongoing research and talent shortfalls, and concerns about fairness and oversight balance.
Members of the American public and U.S. national-security programs benefit because the bill reduces the risk that nationals of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba obtain access to sensitive DOE lab facilities and classified or sensitive technologies.
DOE decision-making is more structured because the bill creates a formal waiver process that requires interagency consultation (including DOE counterintelligence and a senior FBI official) before exceptions are granted.
Congress and taxpayers gain greater transparency because the bill requires congressional notification within 30 days whenever a waiver is issued.
Scientists and research teams at DOE labs (and the broader scientific enterprise) will face reduced collaboration opportunities with many foreign researchers and visitors, likely slowing scientific progress and hampering joint projects.
Ongoing experiments, projects, and contracts could be disrupted if currently approved foreign nationals are excluded or removed, causing delays, increased costs, and possible loss of project continuity.
DOE labs may face a smaller talent pool and higher recruitment costs for specialized expertise, slowing programs that depend on scarce skills.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Official title: To prohibit National Laboratories from admitting certain foreign nationals, and for other purposes.
Introduced August 13, 2026 by Pat Harrigan · Last progress August 13, 2026
Bars nationals of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba from accessing Department of Energy national laboratories, whether as short-term visitors (≤30 days) or longer-term assignees (>30 days). The Secretary of Energy may grant a written waiver after consulting DOE counterintelligence and an FBI counterintelligence official if benefits to the United States outweigh national security and economic risks, and must notify specified congressional committees within 30 days of any waiver. Defines covered foreign nationals using existing immigration and DOE National Laboratory statutory definitions and takes effect on enactment.