Sponsors (2)
The bill advances arms‑control diplomacy, verification, and congressional oversight to reduce nuclear testing and accidental escalation risks, but it risks constraining modernization, lacks binding enforcement, and could produce political, economic, and transparency trade‑offs if not reciprocated or fully funded.
Taxpayers, service members, and the general public: A coordinated push to halt testing, production, and deployment would lower the overall risk of nuclear war and new arms races.
Taxpayers and policymakers: Strengthening treaty-based verification (CTBT/CTBTO) and pursuing Senate/Annex 2 ratification would improve the ability to detect tests and enable onsite inspections, increasing international monitoring and confidence.
Military personnel and taxpayers: Pursuing multilateral ceilings and limits on delivery systems reduces deployed stockpiles and the chance of large-scale nuclear exchanges.
Military personnel and taxpayers: Deep freezes or limits—if not reciprocated—could constrain necessary modernization and be perceived as weakening deterrence, raising security risks.
Taxpayers and policymakers: The policy is largely nonbinding and lacks dedicated funding/enforcement, so desired disarmament may not materialize while expectations and political capital rise.
Federal employees, defense labs, and military units: Requiring Congressional approval for yield-producing tests could delay urgent testing needed for weapon reliability or emergency responses, constraining executive flexibility.
Based on analysis of 4 sections of legislative text.
Introduced December 4, 2025 by Edward John Markey · Last progress December 4, 2025
Prohibits use of federal funds to carry out or prepare for any explosive nuclear weapons test that produces a yield unless the President submits an annual addendum reporting changes to the nuclear stockpile and Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the test. Directs the United States to lead renewed international efforts to halt testing, production, and deployment of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, pursue arms‑control measures (including CTBT ratification and fissile material talks), and refrain from new warhead designs while allowing lawful zero‑yield stockpile stewardship activities to continue.