Sponsors (3)
The bill aims to strengthen national resilience and reduce risky foreign ICT exposure by coordinating federal support for 'trusted' suppliers, at the trade-off of higher public and private costs, potential consumer price increases, and added regulatory/trade complications.
Households and critical service providers (utilities, energy companies, telecom providers) face a lower risk of service disruption because the bill reduces dependence on insecure or adversary-controlled ICT equipment.
Federal, state, and infrastructure operators gain a coordinated, government-wide strategy to strengthen trusted ICT suppliers, improving control over critical communications equipment and national resilience.
U.S. and allied ICT vendors and workers could receive clearer federal support and guidance, boosting competitiveness, domestic investment, and potential job creation.
Taxpayers may face higher costs if the federal government must fund or otherwise support 'trusted' vendors, shifting budget priorities or increasing spending.
Utilities, telecom providers, and consumers could see higher prices as firms replace or avoid 'not trusted' equipment and face restricted market access, raising operating and consumer costs.
Favoring 'trusted' domestic or allied suppliers may disadvantage foreign firms and complicate international trade or procurement relationships, risking trade friction or retaliation.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Introduced March 11, 2025 by John Joyce · Last progress March 11, 2025
Requires the Commerce Department (through the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information) to assess the U.S. information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain and to produce a government-wide strategy to strengthen trusted ICT vendors and reduce dependence on vendors judged "not trusted." The Secretary must deliver a detailed report within one year and then a whole-of-Government strategy within 180 days after that report, after consulting federal agencies and trusted vendors. The report must identify ICT critical to U.S. economic competitiveness, assess industrial capacity and vendor competitiveness, evaluate reliance on not-trusted ICT, and recommend federal actions, resources, and assigned responsibilities. The strategy must translate those findings into recommended changes to federal structure, authorities, programs, and agency responsibilities to support trusted vendors and market-based solutions.