Sponsors (30)
Official title: To provide for export restrictions on certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components therefor, and for other purposes.
Introduced April 2, 2026 by Michael Baumgartner · Last progress April 2, 2026
The bill tightens export controls to better prevent adversaries from obtaining advanced semiconductor tools and preserve U.S. technological leadership, at the cost of higher compliance burdens, potential supply‑chain disruptions, strained trade relations, and limits on some international research and servicing activities.
Government contractors, the U.S. military, and national security agencies will face reduced risk that adversary countries obtain advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools, limiting those countries' ability to produce cutting-edge chips.
U.S. tech workers, domestic manufacturers, and financial stakeholders benefit from strengthened protections for advanced-node integrated circuits and tooling that help preserve U.S. leadership and competitiveness in foundational technologies.
Small-business exporters and technology firms could face lower friction if allied governments coordinate and harmonize controls, reducing circumvention and creating more predictable international rules.
Manufacturers, suppliers, and downstream workers across global supply chains could face higher costs and delays as restrictions on sales to certain foreign firms fragment integrated supplier networks.
Taxpayers, middle-class families, and exporters may suffer if targeted controls or public naming of firms provoke retaliation or sustained trade frictions that raise prices and disrupt commerce.
U.S. manufacturers and equipment exporters could incur new licensing requirements, compliance costs, and lost sales as markets are restricted or licensing regimes tighten.
Based on analysis of 3 sections of legislative text.
Requires agencies to seek allied alignment on countrywide export controls for semiconductor equipment and to impose U.S. countrywide/extraterritorial controls and facility restrictions if diplomacy fails.
Creates a requirement for U.S. agencies to identify U.S.-origin semiconductor fabrication equipment and foreign facilities of concern, push allied countries to adopt matching countrywide export controls and license-deny policies, and—if diplomacy fails—issue U.S. regulations that apply countrywide controls and broad restrictions on covered facilities. Agencies must deliver lists and briefings to Congress within tight deadlines and publish regulations to ensure U.S. origin equipment and defined foreign facilities are subject to comprehensive U.S. export restrictions within about 150 days of enactment, with annual updates thereafter. Aims to align export controls with allies to prevent circumvention, block technology transfer that would aid adversary advanced-node chip production and military-civil fusion, and give the U.S. authority to assert jurisdiction or restrict exports from allied supplier countries that do not adopt the requested controls.