Sponsors (4)
The bill strengthens U.S. national security and network resilience by restricting use of high-risk foreign 5G vendors and boosting trusted suppliers, but it risks higher costs, supply-chain disruption, retaliation, and potentially overbroad enforcement that could burden businesses and trade.
Federal, state, and telecom stakeholders gain stronger tools to keep foreign 5G equipment that threatens U.S. security out of American networks, reducing risk of compromised communications and espionage.
U.S. carriers, utilities, and critical infrastructure operators are less likely to rely on potentially untrusted 5G vendors, improving resilience and integrity of national networks.
The bill encourages economic statecraft (e.g., funding or incentives for trusted vendors), which can support domestic telecom suppliers and related jobs.
American consumers, exporters, and businesses face higher costs and greater trade friction if targeted foreign vendors or countries retaliate, driving up equipment and export costs.
Broad standards and liability (e.g., the undefined "significant" transaction test and "knowingly" standard) risk overbroad enforcement that could criminalize or deter routine commercial activity.
Restrictions on certain 5G vendors could disrupt export and supply chains, raising equipment costs and slowing network deployments and upgrades.
Based on analysis of 3 sections of legislative text.
Requires the President to use IEEPA to block significant U.S. transactions tied to foreign producers of 5th+ generation telecom tech that threaten U.S. national security, with limited exceptions and waivers.
Official title: To impose sanctions with respect to foreign telecommunications companies engaged in economic or industrial espionage against United States persons, and for other purposes.
Introduced March 3, 2025 by Christina Houlahan · Last progress March 3, 2025
Requires the President, starting 90 days after enactment, to use authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to block and prohibit "significant" transactions in property or interests in property in the United States tied to foreign persons that produce fifth- or future-generation telecommunications technology and operate in ways contrary to U.S. national security. It declares a non-binding Sense of Congress that untrusted foreign telecom vendors (notably those based in the People’s Republic of China) pose risks and that economic statecraft should be used to promote secure networks. The measure includes reporting, waiver and humanitarian exceptions, civil and criminal penalties for violations, and cross-references existing definitions for covered communications equipment or service.