Sponsor
Claudia Tenney
Representative · R-NY
Representative · R-NY
The bill increases protection of sensitive DOE lab work from foreign access and strengthens congressional oversight to reduce technology transfer risks, but does so at the cost of restricting collaborations, creating operational and administrative friction, and potentially slowing both civilian research and urgent intelligence activities.
Scientists, federal intelligence programs, and taxpayers face reduced risk that sensitive DOE lab work and advanced energy/defense technologies will be accessed or collected by assignees or visitors from designated 'countries of risk,' lowering chances of foreign technology transfer or exploitation.
Congressional intelligence committees and taxpayers gain stronger oversight because waivers require certification and congressional notification, making risky intelligence-funded lab collaborations harder to approve without justification.
Scientists and DOE research staff could experience curtailed international collaborations and project delays if labs restrict access or lose intelligence funding, slowing scientific progress and training opportunities.
Urgent intelligence research that relies on rapid engagement with DOE labs may be slowed by a narrow waiver process and required certifications, reducing operational agility for federal programs.
DOE National Laboratories may lose intelligence-funded revenue if they cannot accommodate the new access restrictions, potentially increasing costs for taxpayers or forcing program reductions.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Bars intelligence-community-funded work at DOE national labs that allow certain foreign nationals access unless a narrow waiver and certification prove no risk of foreign collection.
Official title: To prohibit the use of funds by the intelligence community for research, development, or technical support performed by any National Laboratory that lacks certain security measures.
Introduced July 13, 2026 by Claudia Tenney · Last progress July 13, 2026
Prohibits intelligence community funding for research, development, or technical support at Department of Energy national laboratories that permit access by certain foreign nationals from identified "countries of risk," unless a narrow waiver is granted with a written certification that the work is not at risk of foreign collection. The ban covers activities funded by intelligence community element heads and requires a specific written justification and certification to waive the prohibition. Defines terms by reference to existing statutes and a prior intelligence authorization provision; no new appropriations, deadlines, or administrative directions are included beyond the funding prohibition and waiver requirement.