Sponsors (3)
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Requires the U.S. State Department to investigate and report on any cooperation between the Polisario Front and Iranian-affiliated terrorist groups, with an initial unclassified report due within 90 days and yearly thereafter. If the report finds that the Polisario Front provided or received specified military support or intelligence from such groups, the President must, within 30 days, designate the Polisario Front as a foreign terrorist organization and apply blocking and transaction sanctions under existing U.S. terrorism authorities.
The bill speeds and standardizes public reporting and mandatory sanctions to improve deterrence and oversight, but does so at the cost of reduced diplomatic flexibility, increased economic and enforcement burdens, and elevated due‑process and reputational risks for designated groups and their associ
All Americans, victims, and law enforcement: mandatory designation and sanctions within 30 days will more quickly cut off terrorist groups' access to funds and networks, aiding prevention, deterrence, and law‑enforcement coordination.
Policymakers, Congress, journalists, researchers, and the public: required unclassified reporting within 90 days and annually on possible Polisario–Iran ties and transfers of arms/intelligence provides standardized, accessible information to inform foreign policy, sanctions decisions, and public oversight.
Businesses, organizations, and the public: clarifying which groups the law targets and aligning new language with existing U.S. terrorism lists (e.g., Hezbollah; naming the Polisario Front) reduces legal uncertainty about enforcement and ensures consistency with established sanctions frameworks.
Congress and the public: specifying which congressional committees will have oversight (once committee names are filled) creates clearer accountability pathways for implementation and reporting.
Organizations, affiliated persons, and foreign nationals: broadening definitions and permitting designations based on executive/statutory lists can impose sanctions and long‑term restrictions without criminal convictions, producing reputational harm and raising due‑process concerns.
U.S. businesses, financial institutions, travelers, and taxpayers: expanded and mandatory designations can block legitimate transactions, disrupt commerce, increase compliance and legal costs, and create downstream taxpayer expenses for enforcement and litigation.
The President, diplomats, and U.S. negotiators: a 30‑day mandatory sanctions deadline reduces diplomatic flexibility and negotiating options, potentially constraining tailored or non‑sanctions responses.
Intelligence community, policymakers, and the public: producing detailed unclassified reports may force redaction or omission of sensitive information, reducing usefulness for specialists and creating the risk of ambiguous findings that fuel misinformation or political disputes.
Designates the Act's official short title as the "Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act of 2026."
Defines "Iranian-affiliated terrorist organization" as an Iranian entity that is either (A) designated a foreign terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. 1189(a) or (B) designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 (authority cited at 50 U.S.C. 1701).
Defines "Iranian entity" to include any entity that is (A) an "Iranian person" as defined in section 6(f) of the Fight CRIME Act (division K of Public Law 118–50) and (B) Hezbollah.
Defines "Polisario Front" as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro, founded May 10, 1973, or any successor organization.
Defines "relevant congressional committees" to mean specified committees (placeholders left in the text for committee names).
Primary direct effect: the Polisario Front would face immediate legal and financial consequences if a required State Department report finds cooperation with Iranian-affiliated terrorist groups. An FTO designation and application of EO 13224 typically lead to frozen assets, bans on most U.S. persons doing business with the designated group, and heightened criminal and immigration consequences for support. Agencies affected: the State Department must prepare and publish reports; the Treasury and Justice Departments would carry out financial blocking, enforcement, and any criminal actions tied to existing law. Broader diplomatic impact: designation could alter U.S. engagement in the Western Sahara dispute and affect relations with regional states (including Morocco and Algeria) and other international partners. Humanitarian and civil-society actors working in affected areas could face obstacles if engagement risks triggering sanction prohibitions. Immigration and asylum processing could be affected in individual cases if the group is placed on the FTO list. Operational and legal costs: agencies will use existing resources for reporting and enforcement; private actors with ties to the group could face asset freezes and transaction bans. Overall, the law creates a clear, time-bound pathway from reporting to mandatory designation, concentrating decision points in the executive branch while increasing congressional visibility through required unclassified reports.
Requires designation as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a) as one of the sanctions to be imposed following a positive determination under section 3.
Requires imposition of sanctions applicable pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (cited with 50 U.S.C. 1701) as one of the sanctions to be imposed following a positive determination under section 3.
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Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Introduced March 11, 2026 by Rafael Edward Cruz · Last progress March 11, 2026
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Introduced in Senate