Sponsors (2)
The bill strengthens national security and safeguards taxpayer-funded research by restricting specified U.S.–PRC scientific collaborations and publishing a restricted-technology list, but it also narrows international research partnerships and creates uncertainty and compliance risks for universities and companies.
U.S. universities, federal research agencies, and companies: reduce the risk that sensitive dual‑use technologies are transferred to PRC military‑linked entities by prohibiting collaborations identified on a government‑maintained restricted-technology list.
Taxpayers and recipient institutions: protect federal research funds by barring federal financial assistance to institutions that violate the prohibitions or reporting rules, discouraging misuse of taxpayer dollars.
Researchers and research institutions: receive clearer, regularly updated guidance via a twice‑yearly government website that lists specific restricted technologies and fields (e.g., quantum, semiconductors, biotech), reducing ambiguity about prohibited collaborations.
U.S. universities and companies: face broad and vague definitions that may over‑capture institutions with indirect ties to listed entities, creating legal and operational uncertainty that encourages self‑restriction of collaborations beyond what national security strictly requires.
Researchers at U.S. universities and federally funded labs: may lose collaboration opportunities and access to Chinese partners, slowing scientific progress in prioritized fields (quantum, semiconductors, biotechnology, robotics, photonics, big data, advanced materials).
U.S. companies receiving federal assistance: face increased compliance burdens and the risk of losing funding if audited for past or present ties to listed Chinese entities, creating financial exposure and administrative costs especially for smaller firms and research partners.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Defines covered Chinese entities of concern and bars certain U.S. entities from research or technical exchanges with them involving prioritized dual‑use technologies.
Official title: Counter the military-civil fusion strategy of the Chinese Communist Party and prevent United States contributions to the development of dual-use technology in China.
Introduced May 14, 2025 by James E. Banks · Last progress May 14, 2025
Prohibits U.S. colleges, universities, research organizations, and covered U.S. entities from engaging in scientific research or technical exchanges with specified Chinese colleges, universities, or enterprises of concern when the work directly bears on or could be dual‑use for technologies prioritized under China’s military‑civil fusion strategy. Provides detailed definitions of “Chinese entity of concern,” including Chinese institutions tied to the PLA, other security organs, certain government‑controlled enterprises, and criteria for privately owned Chinese companies that make them covered. Sets the definitional framework that would be used to enforce prohibitions and authorities (not included here) aimed at blocking collaboration that could advance Chinese military capabilities; it does not itself create funding, amend 10 U.S.C. §113, or spell out penalties or implementation mechanisms in the text provided.