Sponsors (3)
The bill strengthens federal tools to secure the electric grid and limit high‑risk foreign ICTS—improving national and consumer security—while imposing compliance, procurement, and possible product‑availability costs that could raise prices and complicate implementation.
Utilities, grid operators, and state/local governments gain federally coordinated assessments and actionable mitigation recommendations to reduce risk of mass demand‑manipulation and cyber/physical attacks on the electric grid, lowering the chance of large outages.
Households and small businesses using networked high‑wattage (500W+) devices get a clear threshold and focused guidance that enables targeted security measures to reduce blackout risk and protect public safety.
Federal agencies and procurement officials get clearer authority and a codified legal standard to identify, restrict, and manage apps and ICTS tied to foreign adversaries, improving federal network and data security and consistency across agencies.
Manufacturers, importers, and device makers face new certification, labeling, redesign, and procurement restrictions that could raise compliance costs and lead to higher prices for consumers and businesses.
Restrictions, transaction limits under EO 13873, or procurement exclusions could reduce availability of some IoT products and vendor choices, disrupt supply chains, and increase costs for federal agencies and private consumers.
New reporting, compliance, and cross‑statutory requirements — combined with tight deadlines — could create legal uncertainty and administrative burden for companies and agencies, diverting resources and slowing product availability or timely mitigation.
Based on analysis of 5 sections of legislative text.
Directs a Commerce‑led 270‑day report on national‑security risks from foreign‑adversary controlled apps on high‑wattage IoT devices and codifies Executive Order 13873 into law.
Introduced January 22, 2026 by Daniel Crenshaw · Last progress January 22, 2026
Directs the Secretary of Commerce, working with other federal officials, to assess and report within 270 days on national-security risks from foreign-adversary‑controlled applications that can operate or influence high-wattage Internet‑connected home appliances (devices over 500 watts). The report must evaluate risks to the electric grid, consider public input, and recommend mitigation options such as restrictions on transactions, procurement limits, labeling or certification, or other actions to prevent foreign control or manipulation of these devices. Also incorporates an existing executive order on securing the information and communications technology supply chain into federal law as it exists on the day of enactment and requires the Archivist to include that order when publishing the Act.