Sponsors (16)
Official title: To protect U.S. food security, provide the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States greater jurisdiction over land purchases, impose special guards against foreign adversary purchases of land in the United States near sensitive sites, expand the definition of sensitive sites, and for other purposes.
Introduced May 7, 2026 by John Moolenaar · Last progress May 7, 2026
The bill increases national-security protection—expanding CFIUS review power over real estate, critical infrastructure, and agricultural/biotech transactions and adding USDA and state roles—at the cost of higher compliance burdens, longer transaction timelines, potential chilling of lawful foreign investment, and greater regulatory complexity for businesses and property owners.
Homeowners, local governments, government contractors, utilities, and taxpayers: more real-estate transactions near ports, military sites, and telecom/communications facilities will be subject to CFIUS review, reducing the risk of foreign intelligence collection, espionage, and other national-security threats.
Farmers, rural communities, and agribusinesses: CFIUS will explicitly consider impacts on food, water, regional availability, and ag-biotech transfers (with USDA participation), increasing protections for the domestic food supply and agricultural-security concerns.
Owners/operators of critical infrastructure (power plants, cable landings, data centers) and telecom facilities: transactions involving listed foreign adversaries can be screened or blocked, improving protection of key infrastructure assets.
Buyers, sellers, financial institutions, and small businesses across real estate, agriculture, and biotech: expanded CFIUS reviews will increase due-diligence burdens, prolong transaction timelines, and raise compliance costs, affecting many transactions nationwide.
Farmers, rural communities, ag startups, and foreign investors: broader prohibitions and heightened scrutiny may deter lawful foreign investment and reduce capital for farms and ag/biotech startups, potentially harming agricultural markets and innovation.
Homeowners, operators of benign commercial properties (data centers, fiber nodes), and transaction parties: broad or vague definitions of 'sensitive sites' and presumptions of elevated risk could catch routine transactions, leading to over‑classification and chilling of otherwise benign investments.
Based on analysis of 8 sections of legislative text.
Expands CFIUS authority to treat certain foreign‑adversary real estate and agriculture transactions as elevated national‑security risks, adds agriculture/biotech review factors, and creates presumptions against approval unless CFIUS clears them by clear and convincing evidence.
The bill expands CFIUS authority to treat purchases, leases, or concessions of U.S. real estate and agricultural assets by persons tied to listed foreign adversaries as higher‑risk covered transactions. It defines new terms (including "elevated risk real estate transaction," "foreign adversary/person," and "sensitive site"), adds food and agricultural security and biotechnology to the factors CFIUS must consider, gives the Secretary of Agriculture a formal role on CFIUS for agriculture-related cases, preserves generally applicable State laws that restrict foreign acquisitions, creates presumptions that certain elevated‑risk deals are unresolvable national‑security risks unless CFIUS clears them by clear and convincing evidence with congressional committee notice, and requires CFIUS to issue implementing rules within 120 days of enactment. Overall, the measure strengthens national‑security screening of foreign investment in farmland, agri‑biotech, and real estate near military, communications, and other sensitive sites, shifts burdens toward proponents of some transactions, and increases interbranch notification and administrative responsibilities without providing new funding.