Sponsors (4)
The bill tightens export controls over remote/cloud access to better protect national security and give regulators clearer authority and oversight, but it does so at the cost of higher compliance burdens, regulatory uncertainty, potential limits on legitimate international collaboration, and reduced public transparency.
U.S. taxpayers and national security agencies will face lower risk that high‑risk foreign actors gain access to advanced AI, cyberoffense, or WMD‑enabling capabilities because exports and remote/cloud access to controlled technologies would be restricted.
Regulators and enforcement agencies (e.g., Department of Commerce/BIS) will have clearer authority over cloud services because the bill explicitly brings remote/cloud access under export‑control rules, closing a loophole and improving enforcement against remote transfers of controlled technology.
Small businesses, tech workers, and nonprofits will get clearer guidance, faster and more consistent license review, and privacy‑minimizing recommendations that reduce uncertainty, lower delays and transaction costs, and better protect sensitive data during export‑control reviews.
Small businesses, tech workers, financial institutions, and investors will face increased compliance costs, earlier regulatory scrutiny, and potential licensing delays or new requirements that could raise operating costs and deter investment in cloud and AI services.
Tech workers, students, researchers, and U.S. firms will see limits on legitimate academic and commercial collaboration and reduced market access because broad definitions tied to countries/regions and tightened remote‑access rules could restrict cross‑border cooperation.
Industry, small businesses, and the public could face reduced transparency because classified briefings limit public explanation of the rationale for controls, while public reporting could also reveal sensitive policy positions that might be politically contested or exploitable by foreign actors.
Based on analysis of 4 sections of legislative text.
Adds export-control authority over certain "remote access" via cloud services, defines risky uses (AI, offensive cyber, human-rights-surveillance), expands covered foreign persons, and requires Congressional briefings and a public report.
Creates new export-control authority over "remote access" to U.S.-controlled items delivered via cloud infrastructure when used by certain foreign persons and when the Secretary of Commerce determines such access poses a serious national security or foreign policy risk. It defines risky remote uses (including certain AI model training, offensive cyber capabilities, and surveillance that undermines human rights), references NIST for cloud definitions, and expands the set of covered foreign governments, entities, and persons. Requires the Secretary of Commerce to brief Congress in advance of any rulemaking to control remote access (including classified briefings when needed) and to report publicly within one year with recommendations on licensing, minimizing privacy and compliance costs, licensing speed/consistency, international cooperation, and needed statutory updates; the report must be informed by public input and an industry roundtable.
Introduced December 17, 2025 by David Harold McCormick · Last progress December 17, 2025